

What do you have to lose? Denial of racism and minority support for Trump

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Abstract

Although Republican candidates for president have recently performed poorly among minority voters, many political observers believed Donald Trump would set a new low given his rhetoric toward minorities on the campaign trail. However, Trump outperformed Romney among Hispanics and Blacks, and only performed slightly worse than Romney among Asian Americans. While one might attribute Trump's success among minorities to party identification, ideology, or anti-immigrant sentiment, using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I show that denial of racism, a novel measure of racism based on the colorblind racism scale, is the strongest predictor of support for Trump among Blacks and Asian Americans. Comparisons to the 2012 presidential election suggest that while 2016 saw an increase in the salience of denial of racism, denial of racism has been a consistent predictor of minority support for Republican candidates. To explain these findings, I offer a theory explaining the role racial threat plays in moderating the relationship between denial of racism and support for Republican candidates among minorities.

INTRODUCTION

Although Republican candidates for president have recently fared poorly among Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans, many political observers forecasted that Donald Trump would set a new low given his rhetoric on the campaign trail (Lopez and Taylor 2012; Tate 1998; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Zeller 2016; Enten 2017). Trump decried immigrants from Mexico as drug traffickers and rapists, questioned where an Asian American college student was *really* from, and appealed to Black voters by comparing inner cities to war zones and bemoaning the living conditions of Blacks (Reilly 2016; Khalid 2015; Johnson 2016): “You’re living in poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58% of your youth is unemployed – what the hell do you have to lose?” (LoBianco and Killough 2016). Despite his rhetoric, Trump outperformed Romney among Hispanics and Blacks, and only performed slightly worse than Romney among Asian Americans (Enten 2016; Sakuma 2016; Ramakrishnan and Ahmad 2014; National Asian American Surgery 2017). While one might attribute Trump’s success among minorities to party identification or ideology, Alamillo (2018) suggests that for Hispanics, vote choice for Trump was motivated by denial of racism.

While it may seem counterintuitive to suggest that denial of racism motivated support for Trump, Alamillo (2018) and Schaffner et al. (2018) use denial of racism as a measure of the new racism, which argues that racism has all but disappeared in our society (Bonilla-Silva 2017). Alamillo (2018) and Rojas-Sosa (2016) argue that Hispanics who deny racism do so for instrumental reasons. By denying racism, Hispanics can reduce the social space that exists between themselves and Whites as a means of climbing the social hierarchy and attaining the social benefits that come with being White. But while a subset of Hispanics will deny racism and support Republican candidates as means of achieving Whiteness (Basler 2008), Alamillo (2018)

demonstrated that in the presence of Trump, who built his campaign on attacking Hispanic Americans and immigrants, Hispanics who hold high levels of denial of racism were much more likely to vote for Trump than Romney four year earlier. Alamillo (2018) suggests that like California's Proposition 187, the 2016 presidential election served as a litmus test for Hispanics, where Hispanics who seek Whiteness and the benefits that come with it could support Trump as a show of allegiance to Whites (Basler 2008).

While Alamillo (2018) and Schaffner et al. (2018) focus their analyses on Hispanics and Whites, respectively, little has been written on why Black and Asian Americans supported Trump. Is it possible that, like for Hispanics, Trump activated the denial of racism present among a subset of Black and Asian American voters like no other Republican could? This paper seeks to remedy this gap in the literature by presenting a unified theory of denial of racism. Using the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections as a test case, I argue that racial threat serves as a moderator for denial of racism's influence on minority vote choice. In the presence of relatively low racial threat, such as Mitt Romney's 2012 presidential campaign, denial of racism should be a salient predictor of minority vote choice; however, in the presence of heightened racial threat, such as Proposition 187 in California or Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, denial of racism should be the strongest predictor of minority vote choice, above even party identification and ideology.

REVIEWING BLACK AND ASIAN AMERICAN VOTE CHOICE

Much of the literature on Black vote choice suggests that Black voters are reliable Democratic supporters dating back to the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Dawson 1994; Tate 1998; Kidd et al. 2007). Party identification remains the dominant predictor of Black vote choice (Kidd

et al. 2007), but for Dawson (1994) and others, the strong loyalty to the Democratic Party observed among Blacks is due to linked fate, or the idea that individual life outcomes for Blacks are inexorably tied to the status of the group (Dawson 1994). Despite social conservatism and a growing middle class, Dawson (1994) argues that because race, and by proxy racism, remains the dominant influence on the lives of Black Americans, Blacks use a black utility heuristic which translates the interests of the group into individual interests. The black utility heuristic is so seemingly widespread that regardless of class, education, ideology, religiosity and gender, linked fate, or at least some sense of racial consciousness rooted in racism, drives Black Democratic identification and support for the Democratic Party (Dawson 1994; Tate 1998; Kidd et al. 1997; Simien 2005; Diamant and Smith 2018).

While party identification is a strong, consistent predictor of Black vote choice, what motivates Asian American vote choice is less clear cut. Among Asian American registered voters, 42% are nonpartisans; however, among partisans, a majority identify as Democrats (Pew Research Center 2018; Fuchs 2018). Hajnal and Lee (2011) attribute the lack of partisanship among Asian Americans to a lack of engagement by the parties, as well as the group's largely immigrant background. Without political socialization from family, first generation immigrants often rely on each other for socialization, and either develop mixed partisan attitudes that result in non-partisanship or opt out of the political process entirely (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Raychaudhuri 2018). While many Asians Americans do not identify with a political party, most Asian Americans hold solidly liberal views on most issues, which could motivate Asian American voters to support Democratic candidates (Edsall 2015). Despite being the most educated and highest earning racial group, research suggests that income and education are not associated with Asian American vote choice (Masuoka et al. 2018).

Although Asian Americans have consistently voted Democratic in recent elections, some generational differences in terms of presidential vote choice have been observed, as foreign-born Asian Americans are slightly more likely to vote Republican than their native-born counterparts (Masuoka et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2011). Regional differences have also been observed, as data suggest Asian Americans in the South are more likely to identify as Republicans, more likely to vote for Trump, and less likely to report discrimination in the form of microaggressions (Wang and Shah 2017). These differences could be due to local context and variation in terms of where Asian American subgroups reside, but these are questions for future research. Regarding the 2016 presidential election specifically, Masuoka et al. (2018) find that being male and frequently attending religious service were positively associated with Asian American support for Trump.

DENIAL OF RACISM AND WHITENING AMONG MINORITIES

A survey of the literature on Black and Asian American vote choice finds little work examining the role racial attitudes play in minority vote choice. In a study investigating why Hispanics voted for Trump, Alamillo (2018) finds a strong association between denial of racism, a novel measure of racial attitudes based on the colorblind racism scale, and Hispanic support for Republican candidates. Alamillo (2018) finds that among the subset of Hispanics holding high levels of denial of racism, denial of racism is the strongest predictor of support for Romney in 2012, and especially Trump in 2016. For Alamillo (2018), denial of racism is a strategy Hispanics use to Whiten themselves. The Whitening literature situates itself in a United States that is moving from a two-level racial hierarchy with Whites at the top and Blacks at the bottom to a tri-racial hierarchy similar to those in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bonilla-Silva 2017). This hierarchy is theorized to see the White category as we know it today expand to include

assimilated, light-skinned Hispanics, and some multiracials, while the Collective Blacks category is theorized to encompass Blacks and darker-skinned, unassimilated Asians and Hispanics (Bonilla-Silva 2017). An intermediary category called Honorary Whites is often hypothesized as including light-skinned Hispanics and Asians, as well as most multiracials (Bonilla-Silva 2017).

Given their phenotypical similarities to Whites and high rates of intermarriage with non-Hispanic Whites, the Whitening literature argues that Hispanics will have the easiest path to Whiteness among America's minority groups (Gans 2012; Warren and Twine 1997; Murguía and Forman 2003). Per the literature, Hispanics who want to undergo the Whitening process will have to modify their beliefs and lifestyles to resemble that of the White majority (Gans 2012). A core tenant of achieving Whiteness will be adopting the colorblind ideology, which argues that "race is no longer a central factor determining the life chances of Americans" (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011, p. 190). According to the literature, Hispanics do not need internalize the colorblind ideology to Whiten, as Whitening among minorities is instrumentally motivated (O'Brien 2008; Basler 2008). To this point, Basler (2008) argues that in the midst of California's Proposition 187, which sought to limit access to public services for undocumented immigrants, some Hispanics voted in favor of the policy as means of demonstrating their loyalty to Whites, even if they didn't entirely agree with the proposal.

While Alamillo (2018) focuses on Hispanics, the literature contends that Whitening is also an option for some Asian Americans, even if they can at best be considered Honorary Whites due to the phenotypical differences that exist between Whites and Asian Americans. To this point, the literature notes that despite having the highest average educational attainment and income of any racial or ethnic group, as well as high intermarriage rates with Whites, Asian Americans have often been othered as model minorities or perpetual foreigners and asked to

prove their Americanness (Zhou 2004; Cheryan and Monin 2005; Kuo 2018). With this in mind, should we expect to see Asian Americans high in denial of racism be more likely to support Republican candidates as Alamillo (2018) found for Hispanics? If so, should denial of racism also be a much stronger predictor of Asian American support for Trump relative to other Republican candidates given the unique threat Trump posed to minorities?

Given that the literature suggests Blacks have no path to Whiteness, as Black is the reference category again Whiteness is judged, should we expect denial of racism to emerge as a predictor of Black support for Republican candidates (Warren and Twine 1997; Gans 2012; Yancey 2003)? With the dearth of reasons for why a Black voter might vote Republican outside of Republican Party identification, it could be the case that Blacks high in denial of racism are much more likely to support Republican candidates than those low denial of racism. If linked fate is based off a sense of racial consciousness rooted in racism, Blacks high in denial of racism may feel little to no sense of commonality with other Blacks, and thus may be less wedded to the Democratic Party.

THEORY

While the literature thus far has only explored the association between denial of racism and vote choice among Hispanics, I argue denial of racism should be a strong predictor of vote choice for minorities who seek to increase their status by aligning themselves with Whites. Building on Basler's (2008) work on the Hispanic response to California's Proposition 187, I argue that salience of denial of racism to a minority voter's vote choice is dependent upon racial threat. Thus, for those minorities who deny racism, we should expect that in situations where racial threat is relatively low, as in the 2012 presidential election with Mitt Romney, denial of

racism will be less salient for minority vote choice. However, in the presence of heightened racial threat, such as the 2016 presidential election with Donald Trump, denial of racism should be more salient for minority vote choice. Moreover, among minorities who hold high levels of denial of racism, denial of racism may become so salient in high threat environments that it even surpasses party identification, ideology, and all other predictors of minority vote choice as Alamillo (2018) found for Hispanics in the 2016 presidential election.

To be clear, I am not arguing that denial of racism is common among any minority group. For many minorities in the United States, their experience as Americans has been shaped or at least impacted in some way by racism, so we should not expect most minorities to deny racism; in addition, we should not expect those who deny racism actually believe the United States is a place that has moved past racism. Rather, as O'Brien (2008), Basler, and Rojas-Sosa (2016) argue, minorities who deny racism do so for instrumental reasons. All minority groups have not had similar racialized experiences though, and because of that, we should not expect similar levels of denial of racism among Hispanics, Blacks, and Asian Americans. As the literature argues that Hispanics have the easiest path to Whiteness, Asian Americans should be less denying of racism than Hispanics (Gans 2012; Warren and Twine 1997; Murguia and Forman 2003); in addition, Blacks should be far less denying of racism than Asian Americans given the legacy of racism Blacks have faced in the United States relative to other minority groups. Based on my theory, I will test the following hypotheses in this paper.

H₁: Denial of racism will be positively associated with support for Romney and Trump among Asian Americans and Blacks.

H₂: Denial of racism will be a stronger predictor of support for Trump than Romney among Asian Americans and Blacks.

H₃: Denial of racism will be a stronger predictor of support for Romney and Trump among Asian Americans than Blacks.

DATA AND METHODS

To examine whether denial of racism is a predictor of Asian American and Black support for Trump, I use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The 2016 CCES includes 2,278 Asian American respondents and 7,926 Black respondents. The primary dependent variable is the two-party vote for president, which only includes respondents who reported voting in the presidential election for the Democratic or Republican candidate. For the sake of comparison on the key independent variable, the 2012 vote models use a measure of presidential vote choice taken during the 2016 CCES as no measure of denial of racism is available on the 2012 CCES. The key independent variable is the denial of racism scale, which is composed of responses to three items:

1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
2. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
3. I am angry racism exists.

These three items were each answered on a five-point scale (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) and responses were scaled and standardized to produce a denial of racism scale with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For more on the denial of racism scale, see Alamillo (2018) and Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta (2018). For a complete list of controls in the models and their coding, see Appendix Table 1.

RESULTS

[Please insert Figure 1 approximately here]

We can begin by looking at Figure 1, the distribution of Whites, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Blacks on the denial of racism scale. Figure 1 suggests that while Whites, Hispanics, and Asian Americans have roughly similar distributions, the distribution of Blacks on the denial of racism skews heavily to the left, with 40% of Blacks residing at the lowest possible level. As a point of comparison, the share of Blacks at the lowest level of denial of racism is more than twice as high for the next highest group, Hispanics. Table 1 shows the mean denial of racism score for each racial and ethnic group and tells us that while Whites are the only group with a positive mean denial of racism score, Blacks have a much lower mean score than Hispanics and Asian Americans.

[Please insert Table 1 approximately here]

As Table 2 shows, Republican Party identification and identifying as a conservative are positively associated with support for the 2012 and 2016 Republican presidential candidates among Asian Americans. Differences in Asian American support for Romney and Trump emerge when we look at income. Relative to Asian Americans with low incomes, only those with high incomes were more likely to support Romney, while Asian Americans with middle, high, and missing incomes were all at least twice as likely to support Trump than those with low incomes. These findings run counter to the literature which suggest there is no relationship between income and vote choice for Asian Americans (Masuoka et al. 2018). Table 2 suggests that while Asian American males were less than half as likely as females to vote for Romney, there was no such difference in the 2016 presidential election. Similarly, while older Asian Americans and those from later immigration generations were more likely to vote for Romney,

there was no relationship between age and support for Trump nor immigration generation and support for Trump. Also contrary to the literature (Wang and Shah 2017), these models suggest that no association between which region of the United States Asian Americans live in and their likelihood of voting for Romney or Trump. As one might expect given his rhetoric, Asian Americans who hold anti-immigrant sentiments were nearly three times as likely to support Trump than those without anti-immigrant sentiments; in contrast, there was no relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and Asian American support for Romney.

[Please insert Table 2 approximately here]

Turning to my key independent variable, Table 2 shows denial of racism is positively associated with support for Mitt Romney and Donald Trump among Asian Americans, but in vastly different way. While moving from the lowest to highest levels of denial of racism nearly doubles the likelihood an Asian American would vote for Romney, moving from the lowest to highest levels of denial of racism increases the likelihood an Asian American would for Trump by more than six times. As my theory predicted, the salience of denial of racism for Asian American vote choice greatly increased in the 2016 presidential election. To better quantify these results, we can transform the odds ratios for the models in Table 2 into average marginal effects. Table 3 presents the results for selected variables with the most predictive power.

[Please insert Table 3 approximately here]

For Asian Americans, Republican Party identification maintained its predictive power from 2012 to 2016. In 2012, identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood an Asian American would vote for Romney by 11.4%, and in 2016, identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood an Asian American would vote for Trump by 10.3%. Turning to denial of racism, moving the lowest to highest levels of denial of racism increases the probability an Asian

American would for Romney from 18.1% to 43.7%, an increase of 25.5%. In 2016, moving from the lowest level of denial of racism to the highest level increases the likelihood an Asian American would vote for Trump from 7.5% to 93.2%, an increase of 85.7%. One might argue that it is a disproportionately small number of Asian Americans with high levels of denial of racism that are driving these results, so Table 3 includes a trimmed measure of denial of racism where the lowest and highest 5% of respondents on the denial of racism scale are removed. We can see that for Asian Americans, while the trimmed denial of racism measures have less predictive power than the full measures, they are still far and away the strongest predictors of support for Romney and Trump, above even party identification. Figure 2 presents these results graphically.

[Please insert Figure 2 approximately here]

As Table 4 shows, Republican party identification and identifying as a conservative are strongly and positively associated with Black support for Romney and Trump, although less so for Trump than Romney. In contrast, anti-immigrant sentiment is more strongly associated with Black support for Trump than Romney. While attaining a higher level of education among Blacks is associated with lower support for Romney, there is no such relationship when predicting support for Trump. There is an interesting reversal in the gender gap, as while Black males were about a third as likely to vote for Romney as Black females, in 2016 Black males were more than twice as likely to vote Trump than Black females. This shift can likely be attributed to Trump's rhetoric and reported past conduct towards women (Valentino, Wayne, and Ocen 2018; Darweesh and Abdullah 2016). Although the relationship is only significant at the 0.10 level, regional differences exist when predicting Black support for Trump, as Blacks in the

South, Midwest, and Northeast were less than half as likely as those in the West to support Trump.

As with Asian Americans, denial of racism is strongly and positively associated with Black support for Romney and Trump. Taking this results into account with those of Table 2, I find support for Hypothesis 1, as denial of racism is positively associated with support for Romney and Trump among Asian Americans and Blacks. Table 4's results also suggest that there is a relationship between denial of racism and partisan identification. Although the relationship is only significant at the 0.10 level, these results suggest that Black Republican and Democratic identifiers who hold high levels of denial of racism are less than half as likely as non-partisan identifiers who hold high levels of denial of racism to vote for Trump. It could be the case that among Blacks, the heightened racial threat of the 2016 presidential election was more strongly felt by non-partisans, who felt the need to Whiten in response to the increased threat. Given the limits of the data though, these results should be further investigated by future research.

[Please insert Table 5 approximately here]

As Table 5 shows, the predictive power of Republican Party identification is weak in both 2012 and 2016. In 2012, identifying as a Republican only increases the likelihood a Black voter supported Romney from 3.7% to 6.3%, an increase of only 2.6%. In 2016, identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood a Black voter supported Trump from 7.9% to 13.2%, an increase of 5.3%. At first glance, denial of racism has much more predictive power than Republican Party identification, as in 2012 moving from the lowest level of denial of racism to the highest level increases the likelihood a Black voter supported Romney from 1.7% to 25.2%, an increase of 23.5%. In 2016, moving from the lowest level of denial of racism to the highest

level increases the likelihood a Black voter supported Trump from 4.7% to 50.6%, an increase of 45.9%. Taking these findings in account with those in Table 3, I find support for Hypothesis 2, as denial of racism is a stronger predictor of support for Trump than Romney among Asian Americans and Blacks.

Unlike Asian Americans, however, removing the outliers on the denial of racism scale drastically reduces the predictive power of denial of racism. Using the trimmed measure of denial of racism, we go from a 23.5% increase in a Black voter's likelihood of supporting Romney to a 4.8% increase. For Trump, we go from a 45.9% increase to only a 10.4% increase when those outliers are removed. Figure 3 presents these results graphically.

[Please insert Figure 3 approximately here]

These results suggest that unlike Asian Americans and Hispanics (see Appendix Tables 2 and 3), the predictive power of denial of racism for Blacks is being largely influenced by outliers. I attribute this to the history of racism Blacks have face in the United States, which likely prevents the higher levels of denial of racism we see among Hispanics and Asian Americans. Likely as a result of this history of racism, and in support of Hypothesis 3, a comparison of Table 3 and Table 5 suggests that whether we look at the trimmed measures of denial of racism or the complete measures, denial of racism is a stronger predictor of support for Romney and Trump among Asian Americans than Blacks.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Using the 2016 CCES, I find that for Asian Americans and Blacks, denial of racism is positively associated with support for Republican presidential candidates; moreover, when compared to traditional predictors of vote choice such as party identification and ideology, denial

of racism is the strongest predictor of support for Republican candidates. Additionally, while denial of racism is a positively associated with Asian American and Black support for Mitt Romney in 2012, denial of racism is a much stronger predictor support for Asian American and Black support for Trump. These findings build on Alamillo's (2018) work, which found similar results for Hispanics (see Appendix Tables 2 and 3. Taken these findings into account with the literature on Whitening (Bonilla-Silva 2017; Gans 2012; Basler 2008), I argue that minorities who deny racism do so instrumentally, as they believe that by emulating racial attitudes commonly held by Whites, they can climb the racial hierarchy and attain the status and security that come with being White. But while the literature treats denial of racism as a constant influence on vote choice (Alamillo 2018; Gans 2012; Basler 2008), I argue that the salience of denial of racism for minority vote choice is dependent on racial threat. Thus, in the presence of a candidate like Trump, who built his campaign on attacking minorities, denial of racism is a much stronger predictor of minority vote choice than it was for Romney four years earlier.

This paper contributes to the literature on racial appeals by presenting evidence that racist rhetoric aimed at Whites can strongly appeal to a subset of minority voters who deny racism (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek 2018; Mendelberg 2001). These results also challenge the literature's dominant narratives on why minorities vote Republican. More than ideology, income, and even party identification, denial of racism is the best predictor of whether a minority voter will support a Republican candidate for president. And while this paper argues that the salience of denial of racism for minority vote choice is dependent upon racial threat, even in the presence of a relatively unthreatening candidate in Mitt Romney, denial of racism still trumps all other predictors of minority vote choice. Like other recent work in race and ethnic politics, this paper challenges the Michigan model and adds to the growing literature that shows the relative decline

of party attachment and ideology as predictors of minority vote choice (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Collingwood, Barreto, and Garcia-Rios 2014; Alamillo and Collingwood 2016; Alamillo 2018).

This paper is not without its limits, however. The data do not contain measures of American identity, racial and ethnic linked fate, and Asian American country of origin, which the literature suggests are strong predictors of political behavior and engagement among Asian Americans and Blacks (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Tate 1998). Future research on denial of racism of and minority vote choice should include these measures when possible. Although the data are limited, we can predict denial of racism among Asian Americans and Blacks using the available measures in the 2016 CCES. These models, available in Appendix Table 4, suggest that for Asian Americans, Republican Party identification, identifying as a conservative, being male, and holding anti-immigrant attitudes are positively associated with higher levels of denial of racism, while Democratic Party identification, identifying as a liberal, higher levels of education, and later immigration generation are negatively associated with denial of racism. For Blacks, Republican Party identification, identifying as a conservative, and being male are associated with higher levels of denial of racism, while being older, Democratic Party identification, identifying as a liberal, having a high income, higher levels of education, and attended religious service more frequently are negatively associated with denial of racism.

Research on denial of racism among minorities should also be cautious to treat non-Whites as a monolithic group when crafting theories. While this paper supports Alamillo's (2018) findings and suggests that denial of racism may motivate Asian American and Hispanic vote choice similarly, it also argues that denial of racism operates differently for Blacks. For Hispanics and Asian Americans, the predictive power of denial of racism remains largely intact

even after removing the most ardent deniers of racism from the data set. Whether the most ardent Hispanics and Asian Americans deniers of racism are included in the data or not, denial of racism remains the strongest predictor of Hispanic and Asian American vote choice for Republican presidential candidates, above even partisan identification and anti-immigrant attitudes. Among Blacks, however, removing the most ardent deniers of racism from the data set largely reduces the predictive power of denial of racism. A trimmed measure of denial of racism remains the strongest predictor of Black support for Republican candidates, but given the lack of reasons why a Black vote might vote Republican, this is not too surprising.

Future research should investigate whether denial of racism also predicts minority support for Republican candidates in congressional and gubernatorial elections. It may be the case that while denial of racism is a consistent predictor of support for Republican candidates down the ballot, the salience of denial of racism for minority vote choice decreases the further away one gets from the presidential elections. As more datasets with measures of denial racism become available, researchers should investigate the degree to which denial of racism remains a salient predictor of minority vote choice after racial threat has passed. For example, after California's Proposition 187 in 1994, how long did it take for the salience of denial of racism to return to its baseline level? To this point, future research on denial of racism should endeavor to include measures of racial threat, or use experimental designs to test the causal mechanism at work in the relationship between denial of racism and minority vote choice.

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Table 1: Average values of denial of racism by race and ethnicity.

Whites	Hispanics	Asian Americans	Blacks
0.114	-0.176	-0.225	-0.701
(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.010)

Values are standardized. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2. The association between Asian American denial of racism and the odds of voting for Republican presidential candidates.

	Vote for Romney	Vote for Trump
Denial of Racism	1.983* (0.704)	6.045*** (2.541)
Age	1.038*** (0.010)	1.008 (0.011)
Republican	3.217*** (1.080)	2.930*** (1.038)
Democrat	0.066*** (0.025)	0.136*** (0.045)
Conservative	1.904** (0.615)	2.257*** (0.715)
Liberal	0.329*** (0.270)	0.728 (0.299)
Missing Income	1.374 (0.751)	3.798*** (1.881)
Middle Income	1.857 (0.807)	3.539*** (1.566)
High Income	2.990** (1.335)	2.186* (0.897)
Education	0.902 (0.110)	0.879 (0.093)
South	0.866 (0.364)	1.614 (0.731)
Midwest	1.195 (0.571)	1.438 (0.716)
Northeast	0.656 (0.286)	1.363 (0.610)
Male	0.452*** (0.134)	0.880 (0.264)
Generation	1.344** (0.195)	1.023 (0.165)
Protestant	1.235 (0.518)	1.534 (0.594)
Born Again	1.505 (0.632)	1.903 (0.815)
Relig. Attendance	1.114 (0.105)	0.949 (0.098)
Pol. Knowledge	1.676*** (0.312)	1.209 (0.186)
Anti-immigrant	1.449 (0.408)	2.783*** (0.835)
% White ZIP	1.001**	0.999

	(0.001)	(0.001)
% Hispanic ZIP	1.000	0.999**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
% His. Change ZIP	1.000	1.0001**
	(0.00004)	(0.0004)
% Black ZIP	1.000	1.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Denial of Racism*	1.270	0.723
Republican	(0.446)	(0.278)
Denial of Racism*	1.931	0.813
Democrat	(0.878)	(0.277)
Denial of Racism*	0.313**	0.707
Protestant	(0.147)	(0.322)
Denial of Racism*	1.020	1.090
Born-Again	(0.459)	(0.556)
Denial of Racism*	1.130	0.946
Relig. Attendance	(0.122)	(0.100)
Denial of Racism*	0.684	0.658
Anti-immigrant	(0.213)	(0.219)
Constant	0.0098***	0.113**
	(0.0095)	(0.120)
Observations	928	1,015
Pseudo R ²	0.531	0.539
Adjusted R ²	0.465	0.487

Entries are odds ratios derived from a logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3. Average marginal effects for selected variables (Asian Americans).

	Vote for Romney				Vote for Trump			
	Change	From	To	p-value	Change	From	To	p-value
Republican	0.114	0.225	0.339	0.002	0.103	0.241	0.343	0.008
Denial of Racism	0.255	0.181	0.437	0.086	0.857	0.075	0.932	0.000
Denial of Racism (trimmed)	0.180	0.181	0.361	0.078	0.587	0.075	0.662	0.000
Anti-immigrant	0.032	0.245	0.276	0.186	0.090	0.225	0.315	0.001

Average marginal effects based on models in Table 2 while holding all other variables at their observed values.

Table 4. The association between Black denial of racism and the odds of voting for Republican presidential candidates.

	Vote for Romney	Vote for Trump
Denial of Racism	4.261*** (0.704)	2.611** (1.016)
Age	1.025* (0.014)	0.988 (0.010)
Republican	3.316*** (1.482)	2.279** (0.937)
Democrat	0.008*** (0.004)	0.114*** (0.041)
Conservative	6.570*** (2.289)	3.247*** (1.081)
Liberal	0.070** (0.086)	1.680 (0.730)
Missing Income	0.985 (0.633)	0.923 (0.427)
Middle Income	1.104 (0.447)	1.801* (0.607)
High Income	1.207 (0.571)	1.726 (0.709)
Education	0.714*** (0.090)	0.920 (0.089)
South	0.972 (0.651)	0.398** (0.151)
Midwest	0.611 (0.453)	0.421* (0.200)
Northeast	0.677 (0.543)	0.436* (0.214)
Male	0.389** (0.149)	2.290*** (0.640)
Protestant	0.845 (0.436)	1.325 (0.447)
Born Again	1.645 (0.864)	1.270 (0.453)
Relig. Attendance	1.111 (0.146)	1.014 (0.098)
Pol. Knowledge	1.155 (0.255)	0.856 (0.145)
Anti-immigrant	2.383** (0.865)	3.416*** (0.979)
% White ZIP	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)
% Hispanic ZIP	0.999	1.0003

	(0.001)	(0.0005)
% His. Change ZIP	0.999996	1.000002
	(0.0001)	(0.00003)
% Black ZIP	0.999	1.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Denial of Racism*	0.281***	0.486*
Republican	(0.125)	(0.196)
Denial of Racism*	0.915	0.544*
Democrat	(0.319)	(0.191)
Denial of Racism*	1.519**	1.716
Protestant	(0.622)	(0.640)
Denial of Racism*	0.595	0.808
Born-Again	(0.280)	(0.268)
Denial of Racism*	0.856	0.906
Relig. Attendance	(0.095)	(0.088)
Denial of Racism*	3.028***	1.528
Anti-immigrant	(0.103)	(0.472)
Constant	0.068**	0.150**
	(0.099)	(0.131)
Observations	3,773	3,798
Pseudo R ²	0.660	0.361
Adjusted R ²	0.662	0.340

Entries are odds ratios derived from a logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Average marginal effects for selected variables (Blacks).

	Vote for Romney				Vote for Trump			
	Change	From	To	p-value	Change	From	To	p-value
Republican	0.026	0.037	0.063	0.028	0.053	0.079	0.132	0.114
Denial of Racism	0.235	0.017	0.252	0.069	0.459	0.047	0.506	0.089
Denial of Racism (trimmed)	0.048	0.017	0.065	0.002	0.104	0.047	0.151	0.039
Anti-immigrant	0.016	0.036	0.053	0.024	0.074	0.063	0.137	0.000

Average marginal effects based on models in Table 4 while holding all other variables at their observed values.




Figure 1. Association between denial of racism and support for Republican primary candidates among Latinos.




Figure 2. Average marginal effects of selected variables on Asian American vote choice in 2012 and 2016.




Figure 3. Average marginal effects of selected variables on Black vote choice in 2012 and 2016.

Table A1. Variable coding.

Variable	Type	Code
Vote for Trump	Dummy	Voted for Trump = 1; Voted for Clinton = 0
Vote for Romney	Dummy	Voted for Romney = 1; Voted for Obama = 0
Hispanic/Latino respondent	Dummy	Based on responses to: (1) “What racial or ethnic group best describes you?”. Hispanic = 1; else = 0. And (2) “Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?”. Yes = 1; No = 0; else = missing. Respondents who were coded as 1 for either measure were coded as Hispanic/Latino.
Non-Hispanic or Latino White respondent	Dummy	Based on responses to: (1) “What racial or ethnic group best describes you?”. White = 1; else = 0. And (2) “Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?”. Yes=1; No = 0; else = missing. Respondents who were coded as 1 for the general race question and 0 for the Hispanic origin question were coded as White.
Age	Continuous	18-98
Republican	Dummy	Republican = 1; Not Republican = 0
Democrat	Dummy	Democrat = 1; Not Democrat = 0
Conservative	Dummy	Conservative = 1; Not Conservative = 0
Liberal	Dummy	Liberal = 1; Not Liberal = 0
Income	Dummy	Missing = No information; Low income = \$0 – \$40k; Middle income = \$40k – \$80k; High income = \$80k +; reference category is Low income
Education	Ordinal	1 = No high school, 2 = High school graduate; 3 = Some

		college; 4 = 2-year degree; 5 = 4-year degree; 6 = Post-graduate study
Region	Dummy	Four regions as designated by Census: West; South; Midwest; Northeast. Reference category is West
Gender	Dummy	Male = 1; Female = 0. Reference category is Female
Generation	Ordinal	Immigrant = 1; First generation = 2; Second Generation = 3; Third Generation = 4
Born Again	Dummy	Born Again = 1; Not Born Again = 0. Reference category is Not Born Again.
Church Attendance	Ordinal	More than once a week = 1; Once a week = 2; Once or twice a month = 3; A few times a year = 4; Seldom = 5; Never = 6; Don't know = 7).
Denial of racism	Continuous (standardized)	Individual scores can vary from -3 to 3
Political Knowledge	Ordinal	Low knowledge = 0; Middle knowledge = 1; High knowledge = 2. Based on responses to (1) Which party has a majority of seats in the House of Representatives? (2) Which party has a majority of seats in the Senate?
Anti-Immigrant	Dummy	Based on responses to "Identify and deport illegal immigrants". No = 0; Yes = 1. Reference category is No.
Protestant	Dummy	Protestant = 1; Not Protestant = 0. Reference category is not Protestant.
% White ZIP	Continuous	0-1.0. Based on 2014 American Community Survey (ACS).
% Latino ZIP	Continuous	0-1.0. Based on 2014 ACS.
% Latino Change ZIP	Continuous	0-1.0. Based on 2014 ACS – 2010 ACS.
% Black ZIP	Continuous	0-1.0. Based on 2014 ACS

Table A2. The association between Hispanic denial of racism and the odds of voting for Republican presidential candidates.

	Vote for Romney	Vote for Trump
Denial of Racism	2.150** (0.666)	4.633*** (1.363)
Age	1.041*** (0.00767)	1.010 (0.00726)
Republican	5.794*** (1.673)	4.890*** (1.431)
Democrat	0.133*** (0.0428)	0.164*** (0.0368)
Conservative	2.041*** (0.539)	1.385 (0.332)
Liberal	0.292*** (0.105)	0.501*** (0.129)
Missing Income	2.073 (1.228)	1.452 (0.850)
Middle Income	1.329 (0.341)	1.420 (0.347)
High Income	1.035 (0.311)	1.459 (0.397)
Education	1.121 (0.101)	1.000 (0.0838)
South	0.892 (0.242)	1.272 (0.329)
Midwest	0.591 (0.204)	1.307 (0.458)
Northeast	0.724 (0.247)	0.820 (0.296)
Male	1.253 (0.295)	1.322 (0.263)
Mexican	1.398 (0.456)	0.969 (0.366)
Puerto Rican	1.492 (0.590)	1.383 (0.610)
Other Hispanic	0.971 (0.331)	1.444 (0.570)
Generation	1.148 (0.128)	1.032 (0.0965)
Protestant	1.703** (0.452)	1.974** (0.562)
Born Again	0.709 (0.172)	1.129 (0.291)
Relig. Attendance	0.980	1.130*

	(0.0712)	(0.0732)
Pol. Knowledge	1.062	1.006
	(0.149)	(0.122)
Anti-immigrant	1.719***	2.864***
	(0.361)	(0.632)
% White ZIP	1.001	1.001**
	(0.000415)	(0.000362)
% Hispanic ZIP	1.000	1.000
	(0.000398)	(0.000371)
% His. Change ZIP	1.000	1.000
	(2.48e-05)	(2.20e-05)
% Black ZIP	1.000	0.999*
	(0.000475)	(0.000407)
Denial of Racism*	0.715	0.770
Republican	(0.160)	(0.224)
Denial of Racism*	1.139	0.962
Democrat	(0.443)	(0.243)
Denial of Racism*	0.834	2.269***
Protestant	(0.210)	(0.688)
Denial of Racism*	0.986	0.515**
Born-Again	(0.267)	(0.138)
Denial of Racism*	1.014	0.956
Relig. Attendance	(0.0819)	(0.0662)
Denial of Racism*	1.083	1.345
Anti-immigrant	(0.252)	(0.335)
Constant	0.0160***	0.0786***
	(0.0136)	(0.0641)
Observations	3320	3512
Pseudo R ²	0.563	0.575
Adjusted R ²	0.543	0.559

Entries are odds ratios derived from a logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Average marginal effects for selected variables (Hispanics).

	Vote for Romney				Vote for Trump			
	Change	From	To	p-value	Change	From	To	p-value
Republican	0.186	0.223	0.409	0.000	0.167	0.280	0.447	0.000
Denial of Racism	0.330	0.185	0.515	0.042	0.757	0.139	0.897	0.000
Denial of Racism (trimmed)	0.203	0.185	0.388	0.029	0.574	0.139	0.713	0.000
Anti-immigrant	0.045	0.263	0.307	0.012	0.094	0.290	0.384	0.000

Average marginal effects based on models in Table A2 while holding all other variables at their observed values.

Table A4. OLS regression models predicting denial of racism among Asian Americans and Blacks.

	Asian Americans	Blacks
Age	0.00300* (0.00182)	-0.00378*** (0.00130)
Republican	0.262*** (0.0961)	0.448*** (0.0974)
Democrat	-0.239*** (0.0549)	-0.246*** (0.0513)
Conservative	0.154** (0.0755)	0.116** (0.0498)
Liberal	-0.315*** (0.0595)	-0.130*** (0.0387)
Missing Income	-0.00314 (0.0920)	-0.0855 (0.0765)
Middle Income	0.0658 (0.0815)	-0.0613 (0.0427)
High Income	-0.0826 (0.0756)	-0.123** (0.0520)
Education	-0.0440** (0.0206)	-0.0651*** (0.0142)
Male	0.104** (0.0497)	0.0810** (0.0400)
Generation	-0.0659** (0.0321)	
Protestant	-0.0248 (0.0850)	-0.0645 (0.0436)
Born Again	0.0425 (0.0893)	0.0175 (0.0440)
Relig. Attendance	-0.00503 (0.0176)	0.0442*** (0.0139)
Anti-immigrant	0.329*** (0.0601)	-0.00897 (0.0400)
% White ZIP	-1.82e-05 (0.000100)	-0.000106 (7.38e-05)
% Hispanic ZIP	-0.000231** (9.45e-05)	-0.000215** (8.68e-05)
% His. ZIP Change	2.54e-05*** (5.85e-06)	8.22e-06* (4.72e-06)
% Black	-9.97e-05 (0.000105)	-6.42e-05 (7.65e-05)
Constant	-0.191	-0.124

	(0.164)	(0.125)
Observations	1,422	4,716
R ²	0.297	0.130
Adjusted R ²	0.287	0.127

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1