“A TYPOLOGY OF SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS”

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Abstract

Violent non-state actors (VNSAs) constitute a formidable threat to national and international security. Although VNSAs consist of a broad range of nefarious actors, they have in common the feature that the longevity and lethality of their violence vary in accordance with the level of support that they can obtain. Support for violence comes from a wide variety of sources, like domestic and diaspora constituencies, foreign and host states, and fellow VNSAs. It also comes in many forms, such as labor, funding, weapons, and sanctuary from counterviolence forces. The conflict literature recognizes the general importance of sponsorship for violent campaigns but does not differentiate support by type. In this article, I argue that support for violence can be classified in terms of behavior (active vs. passive) and attitude (willing vs. unwilling) and that these dichotomies overlap to produce a typology of support for VNSAs. This typology consists of impelled (active and willing), auspicious (passive and willing), compelled (active and unwilling), and deterred (passive and unwilling) support. Each serves as a distinct lens to view VNSA support flows, contributing to knowledge about conflict processes. The typology is applied to the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to illustrate its overall utility.

Introduction

The security threats of most concern today are posed by violent non-state actors (VNSAs) rather than sovereign states.[1] VNSAs include a range of groups, such as insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations, to name a few. In some places around the world, the Westphalian notion of

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[1] For excellent overviews of violent non-state actors, see Kledja Mulaj, *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009); Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer, *Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005); Jason Bartolomei, William Casebeer, and Troy Thomas, “Modeling Violent Non-State Actors: A Summary of Concepts and Methods,” Institute for Information Technology Applications, Research Publication Series 4, Information Series, United States Air Force Academy (2004); Troy S. Thomas and William D. Casebeer, “Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2004); Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, “Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia,” Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 43, United States Air Force (2002); Phil Williams, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security,” International Relations and Security Network, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (2008); Ulrich Schneckener, “Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance,” in *Private Actors and Security Governance*, edited by Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006), pp. 23-40; Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,” Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 57, United States Air Force Academy (2004); Max G. Manwaring, “Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 68-80.

sovereignty is slipping as some states are unable to provide their citizenries with basic security and welfare guarantees. Lapses in sovereignty can be the cause or consequence of the formation of VNSAs, but in either case, they present a security problem for all involved at the local, state, regional, and sometimes global levels. In states where sovereignty remains intact, it is at times challenged directly by violent actors to varying degrees of success. In failed, failing, and even stable regimes, then, these actors attempt to undermine the state's legitimacy as well as monopoly on the use of force in hopes of tipping the balance of power in their favor.

The intensity of violence carried out by VNSAs varies considerably between them and over the duration of their campaigns. Nonetheless, violence is sustained predominately by the support that they are able to acquire. Steady streams of assistance are important contributors to the longevity and lethality of violence.[2] Support comes from a wide variety of sources, such as domestic constituencies, foreign and host states, and fellow VNSAs. It also comes in many forms. For armed groups to achieve their objectives, they require, among other things, labor, funding, weapons, and

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[2] For a review of the ways in which support shapes campaigns of violence, see Paul K. Davis, Eric V. Larson, Zachary Haldeman, Mustafa Oguz, and Yashodhara Rana, "Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012); C. Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, "Who Supports Terrorism?: Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2006), pp. 51-74; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007); Peter Mascini, "Can the Violent *Jihad* Do without Sympathizers?," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2006); 343-357; Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 1 (2004), pp. 61-88; Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger, "Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009); Daniel Byman, "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism," *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2005-2006), pp. 117-144; Bruce Hoffman, "Radicalization, Terrorism, and Diasporas," in "The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich," edited by Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, Andrew J. Curiel, and Doron Zimmermann (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 21 (1998), pp. 149-169; Nils B. Weidmann, "Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 526-543; Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization*, Vol. 63 (2009), pp. 67-106; Paul Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2012), pp. 142-177; Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1994), pp. 96-113; Kimberly Marten, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2006/2007), pp. 41-73; Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland," *Political Studies*, Vol. 49 (2001), pp. 901-922.

sanctuary from what can collectively be termed "counterviolence" forces, such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics. Such supplies of personnel and materiel often remain steady when base populations and states sanction them.

How is support offered to violent non-state actors? Regardless of source or form, support for VNSAs can be classified by the nature of the relationship between sponsor and recipient. On the one hand, support is defined by the sponsor's behavior toward the VNSA, and in particular if it is active or passive. While both active and passive support increase organized violence, active support is demarcated by taking action that directly advances the VNSA campaign, like supplying labor or funding, whereas passive contributions involve constituents remaining inert and silent, thus permitting the continuance of violence by failing to counteract it directly or report it to appropriate counterviolence officials. On the other hand, support can be categorized by the sponsor's attitude towards the VNSA. In this sense, support is given either willingly or unwillingly. Willing support is offered freely (or with little hesitation). Sponsors extend their support willingly when VNSAs provide positive incentives, such as material and symbolic rewards. In contrast, unwilling support is given against the will of the constituent and only in the face of coercive measures, such as intimidation or brute force.

The literature on armed groups recognizes the importance of resources necessary for violence but has not offered a way to categorize support by behavior, attitude, or their overlay. This article's central argument is that the behavioral (active vs. passive) and attitudinal (willing vs. unwilling) dimensions of support for violent non-state actors naturally intersect to produce a typology that can be used to clarify the various types of support extended to campaigns of violence. The typology includes *impelled* support, which is active and willing; *auspicious* support, which is passive and willing; *compelled* support, which is active and unwilling; and *deterred* support, which is passive and unwilling. Each category represents a distinct subset of sponsorship, and collectively

they account for all dimensions of support for violence. Violent groups usually benefit from each of the four types of support at some point in their campaigns. The typology contributes to the stock of knowledge on conflict processes by elucidating incentivization structures connecting violent actors and their sponsors, which should be of use as states design effective counterviolence strategies.

This article proceeds in seven sections. First, it highlights the most common categories of violent non-state actors, identifying the defining characteristics of each. They include insurgents, terrorists, criminals, warlords, militias, and paramilitaries. Second, it reviews the literature linking support with violent non-state actors and pays particular attention to the conditions under which support sustains violence. Third, it explains the two types of behavioral support for violent non-state actors, active and passive. Fourth, it differentiates between the two kinds of attitudinal support for these actors, willing and unwilling. Fifth, it introduces a typology of support for violent non-state actors by showing and explaining the four quadrants that result from the intersection of behavioral and attitudinal support: impelled, auspicious, compelled, and deterred support. Sixth, it shows the utility of this typology by applying it to an important case of protracted non-state violence: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Seventh, it concludes with some implications for counterviolence strategies.

WHAT ARE VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS?

A growing body of literature has begun to identify the characteristics of violent non-state actors. Ulrich Schneckener points out that these actors are defined by their a) willingness and ability to use violence in pursuit of their objectives and b) existence outside of formalized state institutions.[3] Most VNSAs target the state in an attempt to achieve some sort of political or economic gain, while others, in contrast, receive their support from states and act as unconventional

[3] Schneckener, "Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance," p. 25.

vehicles to pursue state objectives. In either case, VNSAs threaten a host of individuals at all levels of society and are a complex challenge to national and international security. As Jason Bartolomei, William Casebeer, and Troy Thomas claim, "With few exceptions, VNSA play a prominent, often destabilizing role in nearly every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international community."[4]

Violent non-state actors include a range of nefarious groups. Insurgents, terrorists, criminal organizations, warlords, militias, and paramilitaries are the most ubiquitous, and although they share the common staples of using violence and operating outside state structures, their goals, targets, and methods differ between them, which necessitates briefly reviewing the defining characteristics of each type of VNSA.

Insurgents are irregular armed forces that carry out protracted military and political campaigns directed at the host state or an occupying power in order to gain control over territory or the entire country.[5] They rely on unconventional tactics to fight their opponents, engaging in guerrilla warfare in particular but also often using terrorist methods to coerce the base population into supporting them. They sometimes resort to smuggling and other crimes to provide a steady source of funding for their activities. Insurgents usually operate under the assumption that after they defeat the state they will become the government (and regular army) of their newly independent homeland. An instance of an insurgent group is the Communist Party of Nepal, consisting of Maoist rebels, which fought the monarchy government in the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006).

Terrorism can be defined as an organization or individual's premeditated use of violence – or threat of violence – to frighten and intimidate an audience and thereby achieve a political

[4] Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas, "Modeling Violent Non-State Actors," p. 1.
[5] See, for example the definition offered by Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007), p. 380.

objective.[6] Terrorists can be organized hierarchically or into cells connected through a network; alternatively, they may be lone wolves. Terrorists will often assail state and military officials but their defining feature is attacking civilians or non-combatants. Terrorism generates fear precisely because civilians are targeted, not conventional military forces. In doing so, they produce long-lasting psychological effects and send the message that anyone, even those unassociated with the conflict, can be targeted. Because their intention is to generate fear and coerce compliance, terrorists carry out their activities and broadcast their ideologies so that media outlets can easily report and continuously recount them, thus prolonging an environment of anxiety. Fundamentally, terrorists have political goals, such as pressuring governmental officials to adopt favorable policies or abandon policies deemed to be discriminatory or invasive vis-à-vis a given ethnic, religious, or social group. Al Qaeda, with its global reach, is a popular example of a terrorist organization. Although insurgent groups often use terrorist tactics during their campaigns, terrorist organizations are not necessarily insurgencies; for instance, they may not control territory or directly target the state.

Unlike insurgents and terrorists, criminal organizations have goals that are primarily economic rather than political.[7] They strive to generate as much profit as possible from activities and enterprises organized in the illicit market. Some actions include stealing, counterfeiting, blackmailing, contract killing, and trafficking of drugs and people. Although piracy is sometimes referred to as "maritime terrorism," it is an activity most belonging to organized crime. To achieve these ends, criminal groups use or threaten violence, bribe or extort public officials, and rely heavily on both subtle and overt intimidation. Criminal groups increasingly take the form of dense and transnational networks enabled by globalization and unrestrained transportation and communication; others are still hierarchical in nature. Ultimately, the only political objective that criminals have is the maintenance of a system that enables them to continue unimpeded in their

[6] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 40.
[7] Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security."

operations. Rather than effecting political change, criminals aim to maintain a beneficial status quo. Colombian drug cartels are a notorious case of criminal organizations.

Warlords are charismatic individuals who maintain private militaries and exercise control over a territory within a state. Their forces function to protect them but are also in place to deter rivals within territories over which they have control. Warlords usually hold a mixed bag of economic and political objectives; however, their goals are self-serving[8] and not intended to advance the wider social, ethnic, or tribal group. Warlords strive to achieve both legitimacy and obsequiousness from their constituents through some combination of carrots and sticks. They exploit natural resources, and they strike deals and apply coercion as needed with relevant stakeholders. Warlords and states may target each other, but they can also coexist under an apprehensive understanding whereby each condones the authority of the other. Charles Taylor, who committed a series of atrocities during the Sierra Leone Civil War and who served as Liberia's president from 1997 to 2003, is a quintessential example of a warlord.

Militias are irregular armed forces operating in failed and failing states.[9] Their objectives are highly malleable and vary according to a set of idiosyncratic and local circumstances. However, many militias operate to garner money and lootable goods to either finance their activities or as an end goal in and of itself. They often provide welfare and security in areas where the state is unwilling or unable to do so. Militias can operate under the direction of warlords; represent the interests of social, ethnic, or tribal groups; or be ad hoc associations formed only to satisfy the greed of their members. Their organizational structure varies considerably between them. In some cases, they are well-coordinated and skilled militarily, although with little formal training. In other cases, they are composed of opportunistic but aimless thugs who prey on civilians. Members can

[8] Marten, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective," p. 48.
[9] Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, "Armed Groups," p. 23.

volunteer or be conscripted against their will. One example is the Kamajor militia, which emerged as the most formidable among the militia forces during the Sierra Leone Civil War.

Paramilitaries are similar to militias, and the difference between the two is somewhat ambiguous.[10] One possible defining feature is that the state controls or tolerates paramilitaries in an effort to achieve a policy objective that it otherwise cannot accomplish through its regular military. The purpose of paramilitaries is similar to formal state militaries, but they are usually organizationally fragmented and carry out practices, such as targeted assassinations and massacres, that the state itself is reluctant to do. In this view, paramilitaries can be considered the state's continuation of politics by other means. However, paramilitaries are difficult to manage, and they usually end up developing agendas separate from the state over the course of the conflict.[11] One example of a paramilitary is the Pancasila Youth in Indonesia, which supported President Suharto and ran death squads for the Indonesian army.

LINKS BETWEEN SUPPORT AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

The conflict literature identifies in several ways the overall importance of support for campaigns of violence. Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas show that support is fundamental to the sustainability of VNSAs.[12] They adopt open systems theory to evaluate VNSAs and identify support as one of four sub-systems vital to the VNSA "system." This subsystem includes stakeholder associations, which involve obtaining social support and legitimacy through societal manipulation and integration, as well as resource acquisition and recruitment.[13] Stakeholders providing support include organization leaders, identity entrepreneurs, religious leaders, vulnerable populations, and

[10] This point is made by Williams, "Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security," p. 11.
[11] At which point, it could be argued that paramilitaries transition into militias.
[12] Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas, "Modeling Violent Non-State Actors."
[13] Thomas and Casebeer, "Violent Non-State Actors," p. 28.

state officials.[14] In addition to stakeholders, armed groups must also acquire resources, such as materiel, to bolster their operations.[15] Accordingly, Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer show that the lethality of terrorist organizations is a function of their "connectedness," defined as the number of ties they have to other terrorist organizations.[16] According to the authors, better networked organizations can retrieve personnel, information, funding, and materiel that might otherwise be unavailable.[17] Thus, terrorism's lethality is determined by level of support. Without stakeholders and resources, organizations break down and either fade away or succumb to law enforcement defeat.

All violent organizations require support, but the type of support most necessary for the sustainability of operations varies by group. For example, insurgent and terrorist movements depend on logistical and ideological backing primarily from their domestic and diaspora constituencies but also from foreign states and non-state actors. Often, insurgents and terrorists resort to crime to help fund their operations, but it is a means to an end, not an end itself. In contrast, criminal networks embedded into society are motivated economically, and they generate funding through robbery, trafficking, smuggling, blackmail, and contract killing; they also rely on political support secured by bribing or extorting public officials to maintain their underground markets. Warlords pull from both political and economic sources of support for personal benefit. Rather than targeting or coercing the state, paramilitaries receive the majority of their funding and training from the state, with the expectation of carrying out state policy, such as kidnappings, assassinations, massacres, or genocide against groups posing a perceived threat to state sovereignty.

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[14] Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas, "Modeling Violent Non-State Actors," p. 10.
[15] Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, "Armed Groups," p. 50.
[16] Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2008), pp. 437-449.
[17] Asal and Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast," p. 440.

Support for VNSAs comes from a variety of sources. Domestic populations, states, and diaspora communities abet violent groups in conducting their operations. Nils Weidmann argues that when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, they can reduce collective action problems and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict (if they so choose).[18] In his view, spatial proximity provides an opportunity for violence. Group concentration creates safe havens, which are essential for the success of many violent groups. Sanctuary protects the group's leaders and members; offers a place for planning future operations; serves as an area from which to carry out attacks; functions as a base for recruitment and training; and shelters insurgents from the target state's forces.[19] For these reasons, many VNSAs require a base population in order to sustain their operations.

In addition to domestic assistance, support also comes from abroad. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson find that external support (defined as foreign economic and military aid as well as sanctuary provided by a neighboring country) for insurgent organizations decreases the likelihood of state counterinsurgency victory.[20] Likewise, Asal and Rethemeyer find that state sponsorship enables killing by terrorist organizations.[21] States support terrorists and increasingly do so by offering passive (rather than active) sponsorship by failing to police borders, disrupt fundraising systems, and prevent recruitment.[22] As one illustration, France passively provided sanctuary for the Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) by refusing to apprehend etarras operating in the French Basque Country, which allowed the organization to escape Francisco Franco's forces. Besides states, diaspora communities provide support for violent groups. Diasporas can offer a range of support for terrorism in particular. Hoffman highlights four categories: fundraising, recruitment, weapons procurement, and lobbying of adopted governments, all of which help to sustain violent

[18] Weidmann, "Geography as Motivation and Opportunity."
[19] Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan, "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements," pp. 84.
[20] Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines."
[21] Asal and Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast," p. 445.
[22] Byman, "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism."

campaigns.[23] In particular, ethnic terrorists often rely more on aid from diaspora populations than foreign governments.[24]

Support contributes to violence in general, but the value of support for violent groups varies by type. Daniel Byman et al. differentiate contributions extended by external actors to insurgent movements by their overall importance for actors' success.[25] They identify three levels: critical, valuable, and minor forms of support from abroad. Critical support consists of safe havens and transit, financial resources, political support and propaganda, and direct military support. Valuable support includes training, weapons, and materiel. Minor support includes fighters, intelligence, organizational aid, and inspiration from abroad (with the caution that these types of external support can inadvertently work against the insurgency). They emphasize that all forms of external support are necessary when insurgents cannot secure support from domestic actors.[26]

Another caveat to the utility of support concerns the way in which it is funneled into organizations. Paul Staniland states that "Insurgent groups are distinctive because they rely heavily on social resources for both their founding and survival: they must be able to draw on support from communities and on trust and communication among group members in the face of risk and repression."[27] He develops a framework, which he calls social-institutional theory, to explain why it is the case that as resources funnel in, some insurgents use them to build controlled and cohesive organizations, while others become fragmented and end up appropriating them for their own selfish aims. He explains, "When resources flow into cohesive organizations that are built around overlapping social bases, they will enhance the groups' fighting power, organizational capacity, and internal discipline. Even large and rapid increases in wealth will not trigger fragmentation and

[23] Hoffman, "Radicalization, Terrorism, and Diasporas," p. 2.
[24] Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," p. 161.
[25] Byman, et al., "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements."
[26] Byman, et al., "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements," p. 83.
[27] Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency," p. 148.

indiscipline but instead contribute to building institutions."[28] Thus, he argues that insurgencies are sustained by large resource endowments when they are built on strong preexisting social networks.[29] In a similar vein, Brian Jackson and David Frelinger argue that terrorist operations succeed only when there is a 1) match between terrorist group capabilities and resources and the requirements of the operation it is planning as well as 2) mismatch between the group's intelligence efforts and security countermeasures.[30] When capabilities and resources are not matched with operational requirements and when the group's intelligence efforts and security countermeasures are matched, the terrorist operation is likely to fail. Thus, resources are most beneficial to the success of organized violence when they are abundant enough to meet operational conditions and when groups are embedded into society.

The final point about the relationship between support and violent non-state actors is that of reverse causality. Support leads to long and brutal campaigns of violence, but the adoption of violence is also a way to secure initial or further support. Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorists may lack general appeal at the outset but that they can acquire the allegiance of the population over the course of the conflict, citing Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN) as an example of a group that used terrorism as a means of mobilizing mass support.[31] Mia Bloom tracks the process by which groups in Palestine used violence to obtain recruits and other forms of support.[32] She argues that multiple organizations in Palestinian territories subscribe to an outbidding logic in which they increasingly rely on suicide bombings to secure support from the Palestinian people. With reference to the period of Yasser Arafat's rule, she writes, "In the absence of monopoly over force, groups competed and outbid each other with more spectacular bombing operations and competition over

[28] Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency," p. 151.
[29] Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency," p. 174.
[30] Jackson and Frelinger, "Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail."
[31] Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1981), p. 388.
[32] Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing."

claiming responsibility. At the same time, the operations whipped up nationalist fervor and swelled the ranks of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who used the bombings, in conjunction with the provision of social services, to win the hearts and minds of Palestinians."[33] Thus, support is required for the continuance of violence, but violence may also be used as a method to garner support.

BEHAVIORAL SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

One way to conceptualize support for violent non-state actors is by the behavior of the sponsor. For armed groups to sustain their activities, they rely on both active and passive forms of assistance provided by constituents. The analytic difference between the two rests on the decision by stakeholders either to take steps to contribute to violence or to do nothing at all, thus indirectly sustaining it. Sponsors of violence actively extend their support when they take some kind of motion that benefits the violent group, like contributing labor, funding, accommodations, weapons, intelligence, and services.[34] Thus, the defining quality of active aid is that it requires the mobilization of the stakeholder. Active support for violence from within the state often takes the form of labor, funding, and logistical assistance, while diaspora communities are active by lobbying their adopted governments to embrace conciliatory policies toward the organization, making financial commitments and undertaking fundraising activities, and organizing sanctuary arrangements for group members. In addition, states offer active forms of support when they provide violent actors with military training, funding, and weapons. Foreign states follow this pattern with insurgents and terrorists in particular, assisting them as they fight their host states, while host states provide this type of assistance to paramilitaries to help them weaken opposition forces operating throughout the country. Violent non-state actors wither without active contributions.

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[33] Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," p. 71.
[34] For a discussion on the interplay between support and terrorism, see Ignacio Sànchez-Cuenca, "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2007), pp. 289-306.

In contrast, passive support involves not taking action vis-à-vis the violent organization. Stakeholders are passive when they turn a blind eye to violent activities. When sponsors are passive, they do not take action to contribute to the campaign but neither do they take action to stop it, opting to remain silent and failing to report violent groups and their operations to law enforcement officials. Not every member of the constituency will be mobilized to fight as an active militant on behalf of the group, but hardly anyone ever fights in opposition to the group[35]; this includes keeping intelligence from counterviolence personnel. Base populations often provide passive support to rebel leaders because they feel sympathy, fear, or indifference. Crenshaw observes, "Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide."[36] Foreign governments and diaspora groups passively support violent actors when they do not prevent them from taking shelter within their borders and communities. Thus, in doing nothing, they provide much-needed sanctuary and protection and allow armed groups to develop logistical networks. Byman argues that states contribute to terrorism primarily by failing to fight it.[37] He argues that states provide passive support to terrorists a) when they do not provide direct assistance but knowingly allow other actors in the country to aid terrorist groups and b) when they have the capacity to stop assistance but choose not to act upon it or have chosen not to develop this capacity altogether.[38] Typically, insurgents and terrorists benefit from passive support from domestic constituencies and neighboring states, while paramilitaries gain passive support from host states. Meanwhile, crime organizations profit immensely from political officials who condone their violence as a result of being bribed or coerced. Passive support is often as valuable as active support.

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[35] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1996), pp. 140-141.
[36] Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 384.
[37] Byman, "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism."
[38] Byman, "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism," p. 118.

Attitudinal Support for Violent Non-State Actors

Another feature of support is the attitude with which constituents give it. Specifically, support can be offered willingly or unwillingly. Constituents willingly contribute their support to campaigns of violence when they feel that armed organizations are providing services or benefits to them. This includes fighting the host state to end discrimination and exclusion; securing an independent homeland or replacing the state system altogether; offering communal and personal protection; providing social service benefits; bestowing gifts and financial rewards; and fighting opposition forces active throughout the region. Besides these material benefits, violent actors can offer symbolic rewards. As coercive movements, armed groups often attain willing support from domestic populations by "engendering a sense of fear that their own values and identity are under threat."[39] In this case, the reward bestowed to constituents is the implication that the armed group is protecting the class or communal character. Sponsors are most likely to offer their support voluntarily when they feel that groups are working on their behalf and not bullying them for the advancement of their own organizational goals and survival. Terrorist organizations, as one class of violent groups, survive when they do not alienate their supporters.[40] Violent actors sustain willing support when they convey (directly or indirectly) to their sponsors that their activities benefit them.

At times, domestic constituencies and other stakeholders would rather not support violent movements but are forced to do so for fear of being punished by them. Extremists are likely to impose sanctions on those who do not willingly contribute to the cause. Unwilling support thus involves coercion, notably compellence and deterrence.[41] Violent actors compel reluctant individuals, communities, and states to extend support while deterring those who would otherwise

[39] United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World" (2004), p. 75.
[40] Sànchez-Cuenca, "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism," p. 300.
[41] For a discussion of compellence and deterrence, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). According to Schelling, compellence is a type of coercion intended to pressure an adversary to stop taking an action that is already underway, while deterrence is coercion aimed at preventing an adversary from taking action that otherwise would be taken.

be tempted to report their activities to counterviolence officials. In both instances, constituents end up offering support, being forced to act in opposition to their initial preferences with expectations of facing considerable punishment if they fail to contribute to the cause. Thus, coercive measures result in fear which enables loyalty to rebels.[42] To the dismay of these supporters, the benefits of abetting violence outweigh the costs associated with defiance and snitching. For example, when voluntary financial contributions are low, armed groups often levy "revolutionary" taxes or extort funds through blackmail in order to fund their operations. Those subject to such tactics will usually pay, against their will, or face repercussions such as death, torture, injury, harm to family members, or relocation. As Byman observes, "Even when a population does not support an insurgent group's cause, fear of terrorist violence can lead individuals to cooperate."[43] Terrorist organizations may also target moderate ethnic group leaders and supporters to deter them from selling them out to others for gains and concessions.[44] Moreover, violent non-state actors of all varieties may forcibly recruit members, like child soldiers, into their ranks if a flow of willing participants is not constant. Unwilling support materializes due to force and threat, while the prospect of gain leads to willing support.

A Typology of Support for Violent Non-State Actors

Figure 1 illustrates the typology of support for violent non-state actors. The behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of support intersect, at which point a four-category typology of support for violent non-state actors naturally materializes. These categories can be described as impelled, auspicious, compelled, and deterred support.

[42] Jannie Lilja, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21 (2009), pp. 309.
[43] Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," p. 160.
[44] Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," p. 160.

Figure 1. Typology of Support for Violent Non-State Actors



Impelled support is characterized by active and willing donations to campaigns of violent non-state actors. Expectations of receiving material or symbolic rewards in return for their efforts impel constituents to contribute to violent campaigns actively and without much, if any, hesitation. Much support can be described as impelled. Individuals emboldened to join organizations offer impelled support to the group, even though they may enlist primarily to satisfy their own economic and political ambitions rather than pursue organizational objectives. Domestic constituencies, states, and diaspora communities offer impelled support when they readily supply funding, weapons, training, and intelligence to armed actors due to genuine endorsement of their cause or the anticipation of political, economic, or personal gain. Diasporas, in particular, extend impelled support to insurgents and terrorists by lobbying their adopted governments for policies favorable towards the group and by making sanctuary arrangements for their ethnic comrades. Impelled support also includes clientelism, which defines many relationships between politicians and members of criminal networks. When regimes fund and train paramilitaries, they are extending their

impelled support. Violent non-state actors secure this type of sponsorship when they convince their patrons of the advantages they will receive if the group is successful. As such, positive incentives, not coercive methods, are instruments used to garner impelled support.

Like impelled support, auspicious assistance is also voluntary, but it is passive rather than active in nature. Auspicious support is extended when stakeholders are, to varying degrees, sympathetic or indifferent toward the goals of armed groups but choose not to contribute actively to achieving them. The passive nature of auspicious support occurs for one of three reasons. First, sponsors may disapprove of the group's reliance on violence even while they agree with its overall objectives. In this scenario, sponsors do not offer labor, funding, or other forms of active support due to the use of violence, but neither do they obstruct violence by countering it directly or by reporting it to appropriate officials. Second, sponsors may be unwilling to contribute actively to campaigns of violence for fear of punishment by counterviolence forces. Potential police or military reprisal dissuades some constituents from making active donations. Finally, in some cases, those who would like to contribute directly to campaigns are unable to do so because of lack of resources, such as funding, useful intelligence, or weapons. Base populations and neighboring states offer auspicious support to violent actors when they fail to report their whereabouts and activities to appropriate counterviolence officials. Sanctuary is a common type of auspicious support offered to insurgents and terrorists by domestic and diaspora communities, as they allow violent actors to roam freely throughout the territory. Auspicious support characterizes relationships between criminal networks and bribed politicians; often, public officials remain inert and silent in exchange for political support and personal rewards, allowing criminals to carry out their activities without fear of apprehension or prosecution. Additionally, at times, states may decide against funding, equipping, or training paramilitaries, thereby denying them impelled support, but they may simultaneously overlook their activities, providing them with auspicious support, when their actions strive to

achieve outcomes in line with state policies. Like impelled support, enticement is the mechanism of auspicious support.

Compelled support is defined by active but unwilling contributions to violent groups. As the name indicates, it results from the application of compellence.[45] "Rather-not" supporters are forced to take action that they otherwise would not but for the explicit or implicit threat of punishment. When constituents do not have the desire to contribute funding and other material resources, perhaps because they do not agree with the use of the violence or endorse the objectives of the campaign, violent groups may force them to comply anyways. Compelled support is in place when violent groups threaten retaliation if the flow of personnel and materiel to them decreases or altogether discontinues. It consists of a range of direct provisions that constituents offer fundamentally against their will. It includes children conscripted away from their families to join insurgencies, terrorist organizations, militias, and paramilitaries. It involves so-called "revolutionary taxes." When violent non-state actors run budgetary deficits, they can reverse them by "taxing" the locals and diaspora members with the logic that they provide services to them. Armed organizations may also torture constituents for vital intelligence about counterviolence officials. Fear of retribution is the fundamental driver of the extension of compelled support.

Finally, deterred support is passive and unwilling. It is a function of dissuasion not to do something rather than persuasion to take action. Deterred, like compelled, support rests on negative inducements, but deterred support takes the form of inertia and silence, not action and communication. When they offer deterred support, constituents are not directly contributing to violent campaigns but neither are they in a position to take action to stop them. This is because

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[45] I make a distinction between impellence and compellence. Impellence is a drive to take action based on an innate desire or in response to a positive stimulus to do so. Compellence, a form of coercion, is a drive to take action against one's will and in response to a negative stimulus. The difference is subtle but important for the construction of the typology. The two terms may also apply to passive contributions but are more applicable to active forms of support given the inherent impulse to act.

violent non-state actors restrain them from disrupting or reporting their activities to law enforcement by threatening retaliatory violence either on them or their loved ones. Deterred support is intelligence withheld from counterviolence officials. When criminals cannot secure auspicious support from public officials through carrots, they often obtain deterred support through sticks. The decision by base populations and states to permit operations of violent groups by refraining from reporting them is often as crucial to the success of their campaigns as the decision by others to provide material means. Deterred support is a product of the violent group's ability to sustain an overall atmosphere of trepidation and anxiety. It rests on the ability of armed groups to use fear tactics to attain compliance and submission from their constituents.

ELUCIDATING SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS: THE TYPOLOGY APPLIED TO THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka serves as a case to show how the typology spotlights various types of support for violent non-state actors. The LTTE campaign, with its fundamental goal of an independent state for the Tamil people, had been particularly long, lasting over thirty years. Throughout its existence, the organization used distinct types of violence, including terrorism, insurgency, warlordism, and organized crime, and at brief points in its campaign, it also functioned as a paramilitary organization backed by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments. Applying the typology to the LTTE case is a useful exercise in demonstrating its overall utility and for revealing the ways in which different types of support fed LTTE violence.

Background to the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Conflict

Velupillai Prabhakaran founded the LTTE in 1976 as the successor to the short-lived Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The organization began to carry out acts of violence in the late 1970s as an

uncompromising faction of the growing Tamil nationalist movement and in response to historic discrimination against the Tamil community. It carried out its first significant attack in 1983 when it killed thirteen members of the Sri Lankan Army. Sinhalese mobs sought revenge for the killings by retaliating against Tamils, primarily in Colombo, killing hundreds, destroying thousands of homes, and displacing tens of thousands of Tamil residents. The government did not actively try to stop Sinhalese violence against the Tamil community, and some evidence even suggests that it in fact incited and supported the violence.[46] Known as Black July, the event is regarded as the beginning of Sri Lanka's civil war, which came to be marked primarily by the enduring conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE.

As violence in the country increased throughout the 1980s, India and Sri Lanka sought a resolution by brokering the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord (ISPA) in 1987, and India introduced the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the agreement. However, many Tamils in Sri Lanka viewed the accord as illegitimate, and the peacekeeping effort ultimately failed when fighting between the IPKF and the LTTE broke out. In 1991, the LTTE assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, effectively ending India's involvement in the conflict, and in 1993, it killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. As such, the LTTE has been the only terrorist organization to assassinate two heads of state.

Although the government and the LTTE attempted a peace initiative in 1994-95, it ultimately failed, and fighting continued. In 2002, the two sides entered the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), managed by Norway and monitored by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). However, the LTTE (and to lesser extent the Sri Lankan government) violated the agreement, prompting the government to abrogate its commitment to a political solution. In 2007, the Sri Lankan government carried out a successful military effort against the LTTE in the Eastern

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[46] See, for example, Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2009), p. 106-107.

Province, and then, in May 2009, it declared victory in the Northern Province where the outfit had been strongest. As part of the northern offensive, the military killed Prabhakaran, effectively bringing an end to the organization and the war.

Throughout its campaign, the LTTE maintained extremely well-developed military, intelligence, and political divisions. Its military wing in particular was one of the most sophisticated for a non-state entity, consisting of a unit that conducted suicide attacks (Black Tigers) and an infantry, navy (Sea Tigers), and air force (Air Tigers). The organization notoriously enlisted women and children to carry out its missions. Leaders also instructed members to wear cyanide capsules around their necks at all times and to consume them if captured, thus killing themselves to avoid revealing information about the organization to government authorities.[47] The organization carried out attacks not only against members of the Sri Lankan and Indian governments and the Sinhalese community, but also ethnic Tamils and Muslims. In total, it killed tens of thousands of people, making it one of the deadliest organizations to have ever existed.

Impelled Support for the LTTE

Like any violent non-state actor, the LTTE's success was a product of the support structure that it was able to manufacture and maintain. Much support for the LTTE, especially in its formative years, was impelled in character. Tamils joined the organization with the conviction that their community must organize to separate from the Sri Lankan polity as a lasting solution to bringing an end to Sinhalese discrimination. Affectionately referred to as "the boys," early Tamil militant youths rebelled against traditional norms of Tamil society.[48] The membership of the LTTE

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[47] Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, "The Tamil Militants – Before the Accord and After," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (1988-1989), p. 612.

[48] Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," in *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity & Identity*, edited by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 170. For information on the role of women in the organization, see Miranda Alison, "Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2003), pp. 37-55; Miranda Alison, "Women as Agents of

quickly swelled after the 1983 riots when Sinhalese mobs killed and displaced Tamils.[49] The cities of Jaffna and Batticaloa supported separatism in particular, since they had the largest concentration of Tamils and received the least amount of government expenditures.[50] In addition to joining the LTTE, Tamils also volunteered to contribute funding and other resources vital to the organization's sustainability.

Besides local Tamils, the diaspora community was a critical source of impelled support. Many diaspora members had been targets of the riots and thus were willing to abet the organization in a number of ways but especially by providing funding. The LTTE raised its funds from a global network of sympathizers, many of whom were members of the Tamil (especially Jaffna Tamil) diaspora.[51] Tamils living in Canada, Europe, and other areas in the developed world financed the organization throughout the duration of its campaign. The LTTE coerced some of this funding, but the diaspora offered most of it voluntarily.[52] The diaspora community also helped with propaganda and publicity efforts.[53] Tamil Nadu, a state in the southern region of India home to over fifty million Tamils, was the LTTE's most important ally in terms of logistical support, as Indian Tamils had hoped to achieve greater justice and autonomy for Sri Lankan Tamils.[54] The state served as a

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Political Violence," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2004), pp. 447-463; Alisa Stack-O'Connor, "Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds: How and Why the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Employs Women," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2007), p. 45; Jessica Davis, "Gendered Terrorism: Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," *Minerva Journal of Women and War*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008), pp. 22-38.

[49] Although enlistments of other Tamil militant groups also increased at this time, the LTTE eventually attracted the most support since it was able to build up a grassroots foundation and loyalty among the local population. See Hellman-Rajanayagam, "The Tamil Militants," p. 612.

[50] Amita Shastri, "The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1990), p. 74.

[51] Manoj Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 19 (1996), p. 22.

[52] Peter Chalk, "The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 9 (2008), p. 101. The LTTE obligated the diaspora community to pay a minimum amount to the war effort. The offering of this funding can be considered impelled support if diaspora members gave it willingly, without fear of punishment. Otherwise, it would be considered compelled support.

[53] Chalk, "The Tigers Abroad," p. 99.

[54] Shastri, "The Material Basis for Separatism," p. 75.

supply area and staging base for armed rebellion against the Sri Lankan government.[55] Ultimately, active and willing support from the diaspora was essential for the continuation of the organization.

The Indian government supported the militants prior to the July 1983 riots but became particularly active in the ensuing conflict, offering a great deal of impelled support. In August 1983, it became increasingly more involved in fueling Tamil violence by providing military support, including training and weapons, through its external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW). RAW-sponsored training camps throughout India, but particularly in Tamil Nadu, provided the support necessary for the LTTE to carry out acts of violence. Between 1983 and 1987, the leading Tamil organizations, including the LTTE, were headquartered in Tamil Nadu and also established outside the region in Andhra Pradesh, New Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh.[56] Without assistance from Tamil Nadu and the central Indian government, it is improbable that the LTTE would have been able to emerge as an overwhelming threat to the Sri Lankan government.[57] India's support lasted until 1991 when the LTTE assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi; the event eliminated the solid base of support that the LTTE had enjoyed in Tamil Nadu.[58] In sum, impelled support came from local Tamils, the diaspora, and the Indian government and sustained the organization particularly in its early years.

Auspicious Support for the LTTE

Some constituents were sympathetic towards the LTTE but did not mobilize to extend their support actively. They instead remained passive while the LTTE developed into a formidable threat

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[55] Sumantra Bose, "Flawed Mediation, Chaotic Implementation: The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 633.
[56] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, p. 114.
[57] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, p. 66.
[58] Neil DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 6 (2009), p. 1041. For more on the fading support from Tamil Nadu after the Gandhi assassination, see also Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge."

to the region, thereby indirectly allowing the advancement of violence. Many Tamils offered auspicious support by failing to develop a movement directed at ending LTTE brutality or by reporting their activities to the Sri Lankan intelligence community. The extension of auspicious support rests largely on the endorsement of the LTTE's quest for independence while simultaneously disapproving of its violence. As Bloom notes, "The rural poor were largely ambivalent and most local Tamils did not [actively] support the LTTE, although they might have been sympathetic to its goals if not its methods."[59] Moreover, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the political party primarily responsible for advocating Tamil separatism at the time, provided some impelled support, but perhaps its greatest contribution was its failure to oppose the organization, thus allowing it to grow in strength from the late 1970s until the early 1980s, at which point the organization became so strong that it eventually turned against TULF leaders. The LTTE achieved a great deal of success in its campaign against the Sri Lankan government in part due to its reliance on auspicious support from local Tamils.

Auspicious support from abroad came notably from India and in particular Tamil Nadu. The Indian government refused to apprehend LTTE militants from Tamil Nadu and other areas, which proved to be the largest source of external support for the organization. While providing impelled support through training and delivery of weapons, India also passively allowed the LTTE to use Tamil Nadu as a safe haven and logistical base to coordinate its operations. LTTE operatives used local contacts to purchase safe houses and communication centers in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka (another state in southern India), while insulating their organization from their control; this network linked the centers with each other and with Jaffna, allowing for control of shipping and smuggling operations.[60] In addition to the central Indian government, Tamil Nadu's political parties

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[59] Mia M. Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2003), p. 64.
[60] Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge," p. 27.

also offered auspicious support. As one example, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progress Federation) was accused of helping the LTTE by not preventing a nexus between the United Liberation Front of Assam and the LTTE.[61] Manoj Joshi summarizes, "It is clear that while the LTTE used Jaffna Tamils for core operations, they had a very important logistical net serviced by Indian sympathizers or dupes."[62] Fundamentally, while impelled support ensured flows of arms and other materiel to the organization, auspicious support guaranteed that the LTTE could develop its capabilities within an environment of favorable inactiveness of the Tamil community.

Compelled Support for the LTTE

Constituents did not always offer their support voluntarily. Many resisted because they disapproved of the general use of violence directed at both the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil community, while others did not support the LTTE because they did not share the same aspirations for an independent Tamil state. For example, the LTTE leadership consistently viewed the Sri Lankan Muslims, who maintain a large concentration in the Eastern Province and view themselves as ethnically distinct from the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, as Tamils, since they speak the Tamil language and live in what the LTTE considers Tamil Eelam. In any event, the LTTE secured some assistance by coercively taxing members of the Tamil community, forcibly recruiting children into its ranks, and altogether strong-arming Tamils into providing any other means necessary for its campaign. Neil DeVotta argues, "The LTTE's access to the population also, at least publicly, implied popular support and gave the group the ability to tax, recruit forced labor, and use civilians as human shields."[63] Thus, in many regards, the Tamil population served as a rich reservoir from which the LTTE would clutch vital resources.

[61] Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge," p. 33.
[62] Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge," p. 31.
[63] DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," p. 1045.

Of notable importance, the organization demanded financial contributions from the Tamil population, both domestic and abroad. A large portion of the LTTE's budget came from internal taxation, levies, tolls, and speeding tickets.[64] It also procured funding by exploiting Tamils wishing to emigrate to the West by trafficking them to places like Canada in exchange for their servitude.[65] In addition to coercing funding, the LTTE filled labor shortages by preying on children in the region. DeVotta points out, "the group's depravity reportedly reached new depths when its cadres forcibly recruited children as young as 12 years old after beating and shooting their parents and guardians."[66] Children served as soldiers, spies, couriers, and suppliers.[67] At the same time, the LTTE required a constant stream of assistance from the diaspora community. Although much of the funding collected from the diaspora community to support an independent Tamil state was given voluntarily, some was also extorted.[68] The organization relied on blackmail and other coercive methods to acquire funding from abroad. Tamil businesses, regardless of location, were forced to pay as well.[69] The LTTE increasingly relied on compelled support as impelled support from India and elsewhere diminished.

Deterred Support for the LTTE

The final category helpful in examining the support structure for the LTTE is deterred support. The LTTE discouraged the Tamil community from challenging its authority through a variety of explicit and implicit threats. Shawn Teresa Flanigan argues, "in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, community support for the LTTE is largely characterized by passive

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[64] Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka," p. 78.
[65] Chalk, "The Tigers Abroad," pp. 101-102.
[66] DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," p. 1046.
[67] Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka," p. 69.
[68] DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," p. 172.
[69] Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2004), p. 422.

acceptance due to silencing and coercion."[70] The LTTE used harsh and brutal punishment,[71] and dissidents were regularly killed. Revenge killings, force, manipulative propaganda, and intimidation were all instruments used against the Tamil community. The LTTE achieved this silence by vowing to take revenge against those who spoke out against its activities.[72] Jannie Lilja identifies a particularly brutal method used by the LTTE: lamp posting executions.[73] Lamp posting involved suspected traitors being tied to a lamp post and killed with a single shot, serving as a warning to the rest of the population not to defect to the state.[74] The diaspora and others also offered their deterred support. As Asoka Bandarage observes, "In the final analysis, the LTTE's image as the Tamil liberator fighting the oppressive Sinhalese was built not only on the powerlessness of ordinary Tamils, but also the silence and complicity of the Tamil diaspora, intelligentsia, churchmen, and external supports of Tamil separatism."[75]

CONCLUSION

This article has intended to provide a new way of thinking about how violent non-state actors receive their support. As these actors have increasingly become a threat to security, it is imperative to better understand how they are able to sustain themselves for protracted periods of time and become so brutal. It has argued that support exists along two dichotomies: behavioral (active vs. passive) and attitudinal (willing vs. unwilling) and also observed that these dichotomies intersect to produce a typology of support for violent non-state actors. These types include impelled (active and willing), auspicious (passive and willing), compelled (active and unwilling), and deterred

[70] Shawn Teresa Flanigan, "Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31 (2008), p. 503.
[71] Hellman-Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," p. 201.
[72] Howard Wriggins, "Sri Lanka: Negotiations in a Secessionist Conflict," in *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, edited by I. William Zartman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 44.
[73] Lilja, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?," p. 313.
[74] Lilja, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?," p. 313.
[75] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, p. 155.

(passive and unwilling) support. Each serves as a distinct lens to view the many aspects of the perplexing structure of sponsorship of violence. The case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam functions to showcase the overall applicability of the typology.

Ending violence is never simple, but the typology should be of use during the construction of counterviolence measures. The acknowledgement of support by type, and of the incentivization structure that animates each, should be of service in ending violence if in no other way than to help identify the promises and pitfalls of various carrots and sticks. It is of course difficult to rank support type by overall importance to the violent group or ease in eradicating it. However, impelled support may be the most challenging to thwart from the counterviolence perspective. VNSAs need both active and passive contributions, but they break down without a constant flow of personnel and materiel, regardless of the benefit of widespread passivity from base populations and neighboring states. When constituents offer their support willingly, the interruption of this flow becomes much more complicated. Counterviolence strategies must either defeat the organization outright, which is altogether problematic and costly on many levels and often occurs without addressing underlying motivations for the violence, or devise a series of methods to persuade supporters to end their remittances, which includes the demanding task of offering incentives that are more enticing than those provided by the armed group. Compelled support is the other type of support that covers active donations, but it is involuntary, and those who extend their contributions against their will should be more receptive to inducements offered by counterviolence forces, primarily if they include guarantees of protection from retaliation by the armed group. Counterviolence strategies must also address auspicious and deterred support, both of which are passive. Like tackling active contributions, impeding passive support requires a strategy centered on careful enticement strategies. However, addressing passivity can be more daunting since constituents tend to extend passive support more than they do active support. The use of military

forces against passive sponsors is also unpalatable precisely because they are regarded as being on the fringes of the conflict and therefore less culpable for the violence.

This framework must contend with multiple factors. First, the response to violence should fundamentally be tailored according to the type of violence in question. Counterterrorism and counternarcotics, for example, differ precisely because terrorist and criminal organizations receive support from different sources and in distinct forms, and the typology does not distinguish between categories of violent non-state actors. Second, the entity or partnership exercising counterviolence is of particular relevance. In many cases, it is the host state, but in others, the state is complicit in violence, such as organized crime or paramilitaries. In such cases, a cohesive counterviolence strategy, at least from the state itself, may not exist at all. Third, the typology primarily focuses on support structures and not on other factors, such as motivational drivers and opportunity structures, leading to violence.

Violent non-state actors consist of a range of disparate groups that have in common the feature that they exist outside the state structure, the belief that the use of violence is advantageous, and the conviction that support is necessary for survival. This article has examined the latter requirement in the hopes of offering a way to simplify the complexity that characterizes the relationship between sponsors and recipients in violent scenarios. Each category of support is theoretically different from another, and this difference should be considered when drafting counterviolence solutions.