

CONFUCIAN - CONFUSION?: HONG KONG BETWEEN VIRTUAL STATE AND TORN
COUNTRY

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Paper Prepared for Delivery at the 74th Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science
Association, Seattle, WA, Apr 1-3, 2021

Abstract

Hong Kong between The Virtual State and Torn-Country conceptualizes constant double-movement historically evident by recent protest that resembles rebellions from the Mid-Nineteenth Century onward in which local residents mobilized against external intrusion. Intrusion—imparting imperialist imperatives—incessantly institutes indoctrination inherent in ideological identity. Identity, objectively subjected to constant change, stages the development of Hong Kong whether Crown Colony or Special Administrative Region amid The Asian Tiger that describes postwar prosperity. Prosperity, though, comes at the ultimate price that goes to mere cost of opportunity through tradeoff transposing more autocratic rule amid less autarkic regulation as the iron-fist from the state dialectically synthesizes the invisible-hand of the market so trapped in some Max Weber Cage that imprisons The Marxist Zeitgeist to haunt hellish History. History, in this way, both begins and ends embedded by liberalism from Keynesian conception to The Reaganomics reaction. Reaction, in turn, radicalizes residential resistance reconciling the constant conflict over economic openness under political oppression that now asks then answers the question of Hong Kong with Confucian-Confusion?

CONFUCIAN-CONFUSION?: HONG KONG BETWEEN THE VIRTUAL STATE AND TORN-COUNTRY

Hong Kong between The Virtual State and Torn-Country incidentally inscribes much recent history of current events replete with mass protests against questionable extraditions to The Mainland among other police powers however abusive or autocratic either way. Either way, Hong Kong embodies the legalistic tradition ever since the Dynastic Days unto Crown Colony that thoroughly modernized The City years ahead of eventual Reversion with communist consolidation incorporating The Special Administrative Region of “Zone.” Zone, while quite descriptive, cannot cover the entire history amid every event responsible for transforming traditional tea gardens around The Pearl Delta into the modern metropolis of Hong Kong however brief or detailed both ways and means. Means thematically suffice to summarize the development of Hong Kong done several times already (Cheng 2020; Lam et al 2012; Lam 2015; Tsang 2003; Vogel 1991) whether past or present.

Past or present, disciplinary discourses amid academic accolades acclimate Hong Kong with the other “Asian Tigers” to showcase successful growth and prosperity in cultures or societies outside The West. The West, with wayward Orients, ostensibly got back on track economically so to speak because of the developmental state (Onis 1991; Thompson 1996). The developmental state—exports, governmental direction, subsidies, low-to-no interest loans, investment in heavy industry, building port facilities—consequently created the financial sector responsible for all the prosperity with very little land. Land—whether geographic or economic endemic to territorial size with almost no natural resources—presented neither the advantage nor disadvantage for Hong Kong amid location. Location—right off The Mainland with immediate access to The Pacific—makes Hong Kong quite lucrative which The Crown and The Communists realized rather well despite different similarities of wealth.

Wealth, from Lease to Reversion, discourses the economic history of Hong Kong through perfectly pristine capitalist terms and conditions almost reminiscent to libertarianism. Libertarianism, indeed ideologically, once called Hong Kong the least restrictive relative to the most regulations of Albania quite curious amid two small economies with the exact opposite results rather extreme for trade. Trade—openness to commodities and investment—created prosperity economically all the while any available opportunity costs concerning sovereignty yields disparity. Disparity, in this way, asks the quintessential question to amorphously answer amid the limited extent of freedom for Hong Kong equalizing the legalistic legacy between Crown Colony and Communist Consolidation somewhat similar while quite different in terms of conditional independence. Independence, something that almost all citizens citywide covet quite quietly (Lo 2016; White 2016; Wong 2015), remains the impossible dream rather than the nightmarish reality so evident even without all the protesting (Broadbent 2011; Cai 2016; Lam and Cooper 2017; Lo et al 2019;) and police crackdowns inherent in wars of position with the reciprocal siege amid the double-movement (Birchfield 1999).

The double-movement, recognized sovereignty abroad with requisite liberty at home, cannot happen for Hong Kong almost Leviathan (Bush 2016) or Orwellian. Orwellian in nature, 1984 introduced Hong Kong to Big Brother over plans for Reversion through the joint-declaration between Britain and China with “two systems” under “one country.” One country (Wong 2008), not so

unified, unilaterally demands submission all the while ceding some liberties by remnants of home-rule set forth from The Basic Law. The Basic Law, for better or worse fundamentally, expires in the next few decades much to the dismay of the protestors and perhaps any other vicarious persons wanting what limited freedoms exist as such. As such, despite what The People's Republic or The CCP prefers, swapping out The Dollar with The Renminbi economically creates crisis for both Hong Kong and the worldwide market of investment irrespective of "The Dollar." The Dollar, in terms of demand and valuation conditioned with supply, potentially causes contagion to the currency market all the while such effects equalize amid eventual stabilization by structural adjustment evident from The EU. The EU, establishing the common market through one-single-currency never panicked financial markets such that potential replacement of The Dollar with The Renminbi actuates acclimation due to presumptuous perceptions over *ReOrient* (Gunder Frank 1998) under which divestment amid any sanctions and embargoes *On China* (Kissinger 2011) otherwise threatens world-systems collapse economically. Economically, China holds the world hostage utmost on stage or at least showcases Hong Kong to force objective subjugation. Subjugation, in this way, propagates protraction unnecessarily all the while demands for justice and reform ensue unabated through the dialectics of Hong Kong.

Dialectics of Hong Kong amid The Double-Movement of Embedded Liberalism


Dialectics of Hong Kong amid The Double-Movement of Embedded Liberalism references The Ballad on East and West by Kipling from poetic parables proclaiming "never the twain shall meet" quite relevant to Hong Kong in which two separate civilizations coterminously conjoin through this parasitic or predatory state (Evans 1995) rather than any symbiotic synthesis impossible throughout *The Great Transformation* (Polanyi 1944). *The Great Transformation* arguably anticipates "The End of History" (Fukuyama 1989) almost fifty-years beforehand by "the double-movement" from "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1982) endemic to capitalist-capitulation rather than materialistic-maturation wherein lies the truth. The truth thus centering around the liberal lie by the one double-movement that yields two opposite reactions from capital and labor, somewhat descriptive of Cobb-Douglas while discoursing Marx-Engels, as fictitious fixtures fixate class-conflict between labor and capital against The Dialectic.


The Dialectic, positing the double-movement of embedded liberalism, thus negates the synthesis and class-consciousness in which immaterial imperatives reality when the philosophical transcends the physical where marketing commodities literally *ReOrient* (Frank 1998) the figurative "traditional society" (Rostow 1960) with exposure to the modern economy through The Great Transformation. *The Great Transformation*, while never considering cultural, maintains materialism that actualizes the double-movement of embedded liberalism idealized through traditional society under the modern economy between East and West reminiscent to Hong Kong. Hong Kong thus takes the given imperialist imperatives inherent in the one double-movement of embedded liberalism since modernity must extract surplus-value abroad on labor-land shortages at home by innovative investment from the traditional society that transposes culture between the perilous East against the prosperous West through truly fictitious fixtures. Fictitious fixtures project the realities of imaginary communities where relative-deprivation sustains absolute-resentment relative to say or surmise that embedded liberalism ascribes the very double-movement of mutual opposite reactions encountered

across the economics between East and West positing negation by any opportune exchange from more openness with less oppression quite disproportionately either way. Either way, perfect competition idealizes reality because the desirable need to correct disequilibrium ensures that the double-movement of embedded liberalism endures quite convenient coincidence. Coincidence controverts convictions over East and West under the double-movement of embedded liberalism that exogenously causes internalized effects relevant to Hong Kong through “the developmental state. The developmental state, advancing Asiatic modes of production, definitively defies Westernization all the while liberalism never abates amid economic openness despite the simultaneous ideologic oppression to institute instigation. Instigation, while never apparent for Hong Kong until recently, actuates potential inherent in identity. Identity—between East and West—embedded liberalism to create crisis quite institutionally.

Institutionally, whether marxist or pluralistic, an overloaded government undermines state capacity (Brittan 1975; Habermas 1975; Huntington 1975; Nordhaus 1975; King 1976; Rose and Peters 1977) since increased prosperity raises expectations of government to maintain current conditions without deviation despite the real possibility of discontent inherent for any ruling regime. For any ruling regime cannot assure economic prosperity let alone mediate the general public welfare while simultaneously sustaining such specified intergroup interests without total or eventual collapse either way (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Collapse of State Capacity between Marxist and Pluralistic Structures





Either way, the overloaded state undermining state capacity plays out in contestation reminiscent of minority (m) and majority (M) positions dependently determined under capacity from gains over losses through the double-movement (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Credibility versus Capacity in a Two-Level Game


				Capacity	
				w	s
	Credibility	m /	execute x	Recant (R)	x $1 - x$
	/ Accept (A)	\		Refute ($\sim R$)	$p_2 - c$ $1 - P_2 - C$
m	\ Abandon ($\sim A$)	\			$p_1 - c$ $1 - P_1 - C$

The double-movement between majority and minority originates outcomes from a single division within the known social surplus multiplied against the uncertain shortages by interaction. Interaction, as such, normalizes the total surplus at 1 such that complex decision-making against all political shortages multiply divisions between majority (M) and minority (m) with valuations x or $1 - x$ respectively either way. Either way, in absolute terms, the bilateral conditions for the double-movement amid any correspondent side supposes that the minority either gains the social surplus relative to the majority from Abandonment ($\sim A$) expressed as p_1 or loses by Acceptance (A) $1 - p_1$ across the double-movement. The double-movement between any two sides costs the minority (c) and the majority (C) such that the total surplus yields 1 from compromise versus $1 - (c + C)$ by contestation because decisions determines the correspondent execute (x) concerning the absolute social surplus ceded without excessive distribution so sequentially. Sequentially then, the double-movement under a two-level game now means that the minority position initiates the majority preponderance over Recant (R) by an execute (x) or Refute ($\sim R$) from $p_2 - c$ expressed as such. As such, and irrespective of what the minority decides, the probability for gains subsequent to the execute (x) offered by the majority supercedes greater losses from the beginning since $p_2 < p_1$ however expressively. Expressively though, when the minority opts to Abandon ($\sim A$) versus Accept (A) with probability p_1 where the majority inverts valuations at $p_1 * 0 + (1 - p_1) * 1 - C = 1 - p_1 -$

C the expected utility yields $p_1 * 1 + (1 - p_1) * 0 - c = p_1 - c$ as the consequence. The consequence also allows alternatives since the minority opts to Accept (A) rather than Abandon ($\sim A$) such that the majority gives an execute (x) which takes Recant or Refute expressing valuations $p_2 * 0 + (1 - p_2) * 1 - C = p_2$ quite presumptuously.

Presumptuously then, the minority position in double-movement now opts for compromise versus contestation when $x \geq p_2 - c$ where the majority preponderance reciprocates through valuations $x = p_2 - C$ either way. Either way, the double-movement assures that the minority loses little or gains great since the majority incurs risk to retain some position amid control without relinquishment through uncertain interaction. Interaction, indeed, asymmetrical at the start arguably equalizes in the end amid a two-level game since the minority gains less when $p_1 > p_2$ where the majority must lose more from an execute (x) as such. As such, to demonstrate that the double-movement always deteriorates across the status-quo $[q]$, the real juxtaposition between majority $[M]$ versus minority $[m]$ thus lies with the contestable space $[x, \bar{x}]$ timed at intervals $[0, 1]$ over originated outcomes under fateful interactions inherently dialectical (See Figure 3).

Figure 3. Minority and Majority: The Double-Movement Across Contestable Space



Dialectical, the double-movement means the initial ends to the status-quo $[q]$ through the contestable space $[x, \bar{x}]$ pursuant by the minority $[m]$ from the majority $[M]$ so positioned. Positioned then, the uncertainties from interaction now assures a future cost paid by the majority $[M]$ to avert serious conflict with the minority $[m]$ through the contestable space $[\bar{x}, x]$ against the status-quo $[q]$ quite irrespectively. Irrespectively then of uncertain perceptions, the minority $[m]$ now either accepts or rejects appeasement from the majority $[M]$ such that x represents any valuations through correspondent intervals at 0 across 1 with the probability for conflict $[p]$ expressing the terms $w(x)$ conditioned. Conditioned, as such, the minimal contestable space $[x, \bar{x}]$ around the status-quo $[q]$ maximizes the correspondent distributions between the majority $[M]$ against the minority $[m]$ such that the probability for conflict yields $w(x) = 1$, where $x \leq \underline{x}$; $w(x) = (\bar{x} - x)/(\bar{x} - \underline{x})$, when $\underline{x} \leq x \leq \bar{x}$; while $w(x) = 0$ for $x \geq \bar{x}$ expressively.

Expressively then, the outcomes originating through interactions between the majority $[M]$ and minority $[m]$ establish the variable constants $\{x, w(x), p\}$ within the status-quo $[q]$ throughout double-movement. The double-movement places the majority $[M]$ apathetically over the contestable space relative to the minority $[m]$ quite concerned under the actual amount available since $\underline{x} = \bar{x}$ amid much uncertainties. Uncertainties assures that any contestable space $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ never suffices for the minority $[m]$ evident by preferences to reject all valuations from the Majority $[M]$ through waging wars of position expressed as valuations $w(x)(1 - p)$. Valuations $w(x)(1 - p)$ denote the real possibility for conflict throughout the double-movement.

The double-movement expressed thus argues that conflict only results through “loss aversion” rather than *expected utility* since risk controverts reward between the majority [M] and minority [m] either way. Either way, interactions originating the double-movement inversely relate to the contestable space since greater valuations (x) lessen the probability for conflict $w(x)$ between the majority [M] and minority [m] when $w(x)(1 - p) < w(y)(1 - p)$ if $x > y$ even though the oddity demonstrates contrary effects that causes both reactions and radicalism since acquiescence through appeasement equalizes instability instinctively. Instinctively, any majority [M] can retain correspondent position with sufficient resources to supply the contestable space $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ which the minority [m] demands all too often.

All too often, though, the majority [M] seldom sustains such favorable positions when or where appeasing the dissatisfied minority [m] with contestable space so suggestive. Suggestive, as such, proven positions of power ironically immobilize the one double-movement after the demand exceeds the capacity to supply with credible commitment. Credible commitment over the best possible terms under the worst realistic conditions always necessitates the disequilibrium of limited resources with infinite desires beyond immediate imperatives to sustain prosperity proportionally.

Proportionally then, with less abstraction amid more actuation, the postwar prosperity of Hong Kong now created the burgeoning bourgeoisie by liberalism apart from democratization despite colonial conditions that predate the terms through communist consolidation all around. All around, whether colonial or communist, Hong Kong definitively defies what *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Moore 1966) since the middle-class never created *The Open Society* (Popper 1945). So rather than Social, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006:226-229) extrapolates inferences inherent in “liberal autocracy” that developmentally describes Hong Kong through three-classes. Three-classes—the wealthy δ^w , the middle-class δ^m , and the poor δ^p —express the total population equalized at 1 such that $\sum_i \delta^i = 1$ since $\delta^p > \delta^m > \delta^w$ with an average income \bar{y} amid $y^w = (\theta^w/\delta^w)\bar{y}$, $y^m = (\theta^m/\delta^m)\bar{y}$, $y^p = (\theta^p/\delta^p)\bar{y}$ respectively. Respectively then, the implication now explicates that the given income group (i) always takes an unbalanced share of the total economic surplus (θ^i) relative to each other, $(\theta^w/\delta^w) > (\theta^m/\delta^m) > (\theta^p/\delta^p)$, showing the clear differences between each social class likewise distorted.

Distorted, though, the political economy of the three-class model dependently determines a nonnegative tax rate (τ) greater or equal to zero ($\tau \geq 0$) with revenues redistributing the total from the aggregate cost (C) multiplied by the average income $C(\tau)\bar{y}$ for any such side. Any such side in the three-class maximizes the tax rate as \hat{y}^i amid the real possibility of a corner solution to this rather straightforward problem expressing either $-y^i + (1 - C'(\tau^i))\bar{y} = 0$ when $\tau^i > 0$ or $-y^i + (1 - C'[\tau^i])\bar{y} \leq 0$ when $\tau^i = 0$ irrespectively. Irrespectively, such expressions in the three-class model now yield the same difference as $([\delta^i - \theta^i]/\delta^i) - C(\tau^i) = 0$ when $\tau^i > 0$ or $([\delta^i - \theta^i]/\delta^i) - C(\tau^i) \leq 0$ where $\tau^i = 0$ since all agents throughout this structure retain correspondent preferences with the ideal tax rate (τ) that propagates descent at real valuations, $(\delta^w - \theta^w)/\delta^w = C'(\tau^w)$, $(\delta^m - \theta^m)/\delta^m = C'(\tau^m)$, $(\delta^p - \theta^p)/\delta^p = C'(\tau^p)$, quite ordinal $\tau^p < \tau^m < \tau^w$. Ordinal then, any political equilibrium must now arrive at the correspondent departure against the economized tax breaks setting majority representation amid minority repression given the ultimate decisional paradox to take as the mere determinist rationality throughout the three-class model.

The three-class model transposes the political majority with the physical minority since realist explications imply otherwise when the masses signify the atypical swing-vote rather than the wealthy and middle-class where any two sides supplant rather than support immobilizing preferences amid the statist position of either expression ($\delta^p < 1/2 = \tau^m$ or $\delta^p \geq \tau^p$) in the end. In the end, what begins with the three-class model must mediate the reverse relationship because income rates vary definitively amid correspondent tax returns when or where some preferences rise just as other positions decline by supply and demand from some arriving at the one centrist equilibria against the politicized economy so irrespective. Irrespective then, mismatch between the physical and political majority versus minority now inversely maximizes the expected utility of the middle-class relative to all other actors or factors quite consistently. Consistently amid any alternative theories on consolidation conditions terms of the three-class model presupposing that outcomes originate through the bourgeoisie rather than the regime replete with vested interest to prevent mass revolution by preemption just as the poor proves unfeasible apart from organization already terse or tangential amid the utmost ultimatums.

Ultimatums aside, the mere supposition of the three-class model supplants the paradoxical logic to the developmental state since economic growth yields the affluent society without the democratic transition that Hong Kong desires rather rhetorically. Rhetorically then, the question to now ask concerns middle-class apathy for complacency amid discontent of the ruling regime such that the answers realize the limitations over the state under utilitarian expectations from society. Society, or rather the middle-class, constitutes the accidental acclamation of the developmental state since the intended prosperity yields affluent lifestyles which the masses expect while the regime tries to sustain some equilibria between private demand and public supply without internal collapse. Collapse, in turn, makes societal demands for utility risk excessiveness beyond what the political economy can realistically supply such that the decision to cede concessions sustains the ruling regime.

The ruling regime relative to the real potential for societal coalition between the middle-class and the masses then consequently confronts the transitional threat without escaping the developmental debacle. The developmental debacle, mathematically modeled, express the variables of revolution (R) and vectors (V) unto utility (μ) between both classes by dividing the same difference from the correspondent sum in which $V^p(R, \mu) = V^m(R, \mu) = [(1 - \mu)\bar{y}]/(\delta^p + \delta^m)$ as such. As such, any coalition against the ruling regime diminishes returns all the while any remainder requires redistribution. Redistribution the revolutionary constraint ($\mu < 1 - [\delta^p/\delta^m + 1]\theta^m$) consolidates when both the middle-class and the masses express dissatisfaction for the current status quo where $V^p(R, \mu) = V^m(R, \mu) = [(1 - \mu)\bar{y}]/(\delta^p + \delta^m) > y^p$ or $V^p(R, \mu) = V^m(R, \mu) = [(1 - \mu)\bar{y}]/(\delta^p + \delta^m) > y^m$ all told.

All told, however, the revolution against the ruling regime may not even happen oddly enough since the state can always prevent this option with concession. So the ultimate tipping-point for the developmental state concerns the decision to offer total or partial reform rather irrespective. Irrespective then, the cost that prevents revolution now expresses new surplus (N) between the middle-class and the masses relative to the ideal tax rate (τ^N) since $V^m(N, \tau^N) \geq V^m(R, \mu)$ as valuation $V^p(N, \tau^N) \geq V^p(R, \mu)$ so simplified. Simplified though, because the middle-class retain income-

brackets higher than the masses as $V^p(R, \mu) = V^m(R, \mu)$, the state need only partially democratize (PD) through the ideal tax rate, where $V^m(N, \tau^N = \tau^m) \geq V^m(R, \mu)$ when $y^m + p(\tau^m(\bar{y} - y^m) - C(\tau^m)\bar{y}) \geq [(1 - \mu)\bar{y}]/(\delta^p + \delta^m)$, such that $\mu^* = 1 - [(\delta^p + \delta^m)/\delta^m][(\theta^m + p(\tau^m(\delta^m - \theta^m) - \delta^m C(\tau^m))]$ rather respectively.

Respectively, however, the regime must also dissuade discontent from any other social class by ideal tax rates such that the bare minimum to maximize expected utility yields the expression through the revolutionary constraint. The revolutionary constraint ($\mu < 1 - [\delta^p/\delta^m + 1]\theta^m$) can therefore abate just as the ruling regime sustains the ideal tax rate equal to the wealthy since $\tau^N = \tau^r$ simultaneously. Simultaneously, though, the revolutionary constraint ($\mu < 1 - [\delta^p/\delta^m + 1]\theta^m$) also risks maintenance cost against middle-class preferences [$1/\delta^m(\theta^m + \tau^m(\delta^m - \theta^m) - \theta^m C(\tau^m)) \geq (1 - \mu)/(\delta^p + \delta^m)$] such that social upheaval changes the ruling regime.

The ruling regime relative to the revolutionary constraint ($\mu < 1 - [\delta^p/\delta^m + 1]\theta^m$) of middle-class preferences [$1/\delta^m(\theta^m + \tau^m(\delta^m - \theta^m) - \theta^m C(\tau^m)) \geq (1 - \mu)/(\delta^p + \delta^m)$] curiously curtails the ideal utility ($\mu < \mu^*$) cannot govern effectively without further reform either way. Either way, middle class income in terms of expected utility dependently determines democracy (d) when $(d\mu^*/d\theta^m) = -[(\delta^p + \delta^m)/\delta^m][1 - p\tau^m + ((\delta^m - \theta^m) - \delta^m C'(\tau^m))(d\tau^m/d\theta^m)] < 0$ where $(\delta^m - \theta^m) - \delta^m C'(\tau^m) = 0$ while $1 - p\tau^m > 0$, since $d\mu^*/d\theta^m < 0$ respectively. Respectively then, while supposing that the actual surplus shares distributed to the middle-class increases as the ideal utility decreases, the state payout yields larger parametric values however unsustainable. Unsustainable though, through diminishing returns amid marginal cost, also prices the ideal tax rate of the middle-class (τ^m) with the correspondent valuation for the status-quo (q) that yields the probability $1 - q$ without alternative where $\tau^N = 0$ when $V^m(PD) + y^m + (1 - q)(\tau^m)(\bar{y} - y^m) - C(\tau^m)\bar{y}$ since any adjustments to initially enrich the masses formulate $V^m(D) + y^m + (\tau^m)(\bar{y} - y^m) - C(\tau^m)\bar{y}$ correspondent expressions in the end.

In the end, without much math to calculate, what now then begins expedites exchange-regimes between the developmental state that presumes prosperity rationalizes conformity because restricted rights necessary for sustainable status-quo becomes the price of widespread wealth as such. As such, “economic origins” produce neither dictatorship nor democracy despite discernible freedom however limited evident by ruling-regimes that control the masses below and the middle between through “revolutions from above” (Trimberger 1978) that lead to liberal autocracy.

Liberal Autocracy and Hong Kong Compared

Liberal autocracy and Hong Kong compared to other hyphenated-hybrids describes less political rights with more personal liberties (Zakaria 1997) that Freedom House calls “partly free societies.” Partly free societies also include electoral democracy that describes more political rights with less personal liberties either way. Either way, partly free societies legitimate authority both similar and different in which illiberal democracy enfranchises everyone eligible while liberal autocracy limits this right despite expanding socioeconomic opportunities ahead of resultant prosperity as the unavoidable buyout or payoff forgone. Forgone, as such, liberal autocracy fares financially better than illiberal democracy across the semi-periphery of the world-system in which correspondent societies now reside or often originate either way. Either way, however, none of this

theorization reveals all that much despite descriptive statistics with other content analysis previously done elsewhere (Honda 2007). Elsewhere, though, correlating liberal autocracy with The Tigers beforehand demonstrates similar strategy with different development in terms of trajectories that conditioned postwar prosperity.

Postwar prosperity, across the periphery, resembled something akin to bureaucratic-authoritarianism (Gold 1986; Minns 2006) though not completely reminiscent of Korea and Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan thus established military governments—before eventual democratization at the end—relative to one-party dominant regimes in Singapore with colonial control for Hong Kong already apparent. Already apparent then, differences now abound despite suggestive similarities necessary for contemplating comparative compartmentalization. Compartmentalization, or pairings, place the two Tigers of Taiwan and Korea together inherent in militarization with US alignment throughout the postwar period quite strategic geographically speaking. Geographically speaking, while political, also involves the physical component that makes Taiwan and Korea rather compatible in terms of size and potential for growth conditioned at almost identical rates throughout the postwar era (Biggart 1991) so presumptuous. Presumptuous, as such, the quintessential question to now ask then answer concerns whether similar pairings exist for Singapore and Hong Kong quite coincidentally.

Coincidentally convenient, *The Four Little Dragons* (Vogel 1991) discuss Singapore and Hong Kong with conterminous conceptions almost unrealized in terms of what the developmental state situates through liberal autocracy. Liberal autocracy, alone however, does begin to the ends of similar strategy with different development between Singapore and Hong Kong. Singapore and Hong Kong, much like the other two Tigers, share similar size territorially since both typify small port-cities located on offshore islands almost barren without any substantial development prior to colonization. Colonization, through The Crown, literally built both port-cities starting with Singapore amidst The Napoleonic Wars followed by Hong Kong almost thirty-years later during The Opium Wars. So two different Wars built two similar port-cities from the one great empire of The United Kingdom as such. As such, Singapore and Hong Kong retain the same colonial traditions responsible for modernization despite different trajectories temporally. Temporally, though, the three-decade developmental difference between the establishment of Singapore versus Hong Kong situates simultaneous similarities that always provided goods and services through trade long before decolonization; producing for the empire did payoff with the incidental externals quit curious.

Quite curious though, because Singapore and Hong Kong served the same single purpose for Britain, the growth rates between each port-city yield undeniable differences unto this day for the cost of living. The cost of living, that includes currency valuations, between Singapore and Hong Kong remain remarkably different despite some similarities whether before or after the fact opined irrespective. Irrespective then, postwar prosperity provides the metaphorical key to literally opening the development state in Singapore and Hong Kong through the same liberal autocracy that begins with different trajectories at the ends of decolonization. Decolonization, much like colonization, began almost thirty-years apart first with Singapore in 1965 then Hong Kong during 1997 that shows similar retort amid different results. Results for Singapore, after much contestation with Malaysia, finally achieved independence relative to Hong Kong. Hong Kong, never part of the negotiations

between The United Kingdom and The People's Republic, underwent Reversion without overcoming the dilemma that now ensues by politics apart from economics hard to simply imagine. Imagine then, the realities of Hong Kong now relay "delayed" independence rather than "industrialization" to *ReOrient* (Gunder Frank 1998) *Pathways from The Periphery* (Haggard 1990) by (b)reaching the core around which the modern-world system traditionally centers as such.

As such, thematic theorization triangulates trade halfway between *The Four Little Dragons* (Vogel 1991) and *The Rise of Virtual-State* (Rosecrance 1999). *The Rise of The Virtual-State* (Rosecrance 1999) arguably expedites extension to *The Four Little Dragons* (Vogel 1991) by reflecting reality apart from the older historicity that now supplement then complement comparison through thematic theorization with newer concepts that differentiate similar trends. Trends—territorial, trading, virtual—trace trajectories of the state (Rosecrance 1999) from mercantilism to neoliberalism by increased openness against diminishing returns. Returns, or rather Reversions, ironically overstates and underestimates what "virtuosity" does to Hong Kong in terms of trade and conditions necessary for prosperity through interdependence.

Interdependence, simply complex, assays asymmetries inherent in "sensitivity" unto "vulnerability" (Keohane and Nye 1977) that *The Rise of The Virtual-State* (Rosecrance 1999) now then resolves by smaller countries trading capital for land and labor available from larger countries quite quintessential while witless with comparative advantage already apparent as the resultant wherewithal or not either way. Either way, what the virtual-state purports purposes preposterousness by generalized specifications from down-and-out "sourcing" development in which upward mobility covets core-correction through peripheral-penetration almost akin to expropriation of The Mainland split between two offshore islands geographically. Geographically, Hong Kong as such more resembles Taiwan while less so Singapore since The People's Republic maintains Mainland maritime claims (Wachman 2007) somewhere between evident Reversion with eventual Reunification rendering both islands detrimental dependencies rather than determinant developers that the virtual-state overlooks with underestimation amid "the conflict-as-usual-thesis." "The conflict-as-usual-thesis" (Rosecrance 1999) covers almost every ism imaginable—national-, radical-, terror-, protection-, revision-, real-—all the while optimistic optimizations at home and abroad differentiate duality by the same pessimist pestilence from *The Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington 1996) to transpose "the virtual-state" with "the torn-country" in which Confucian configurations confine Confusion for Hong Kong. Hong Kong, however classified, truly lies between East and West.

Cartographically, *The Clash of Civilizations* depicts "the cleft-country" across Mainland China with white Buddhist Tibet beside black Western Hong Kong. However, because *The Clash of Civilizations* originally predates Reversion all the while claiming torn-countries can exist without any identity swap, Hong Kong incorporated as The Special Administrative Zone remains Confucian. So without any close comparisons, Hong Kong cannot become Western much to the dismay of some or all citywide residents. For unless unilateral declarations of independence emerge—rather dubious and quite disruptive—Hong Kong belongs to The People's Republic making the wealthiest port-city on The Mainland thoroughly Confucian all around (Goodstadt 2018; Prestong 2016; Summers 2019; White 2016). All around, though, the colonial legacy predating communist legality instituted

Western ways through Commonwealth Civic Culture of language and lifestyle which defines identity for Hong Kong (Edwards 2018).

Hong Kong now then typifies “the torn-country” most evident by bilingual frequency of English and Chinese apart from the least conspicuous control through the literal allowance for The Dollar objectively subject to termination with The Basic Law. The Basic Law thus makes Hong Kong atypically ascribes “the torn-country” most evident by nonexistent sovereignty despite arguable autonomy apart from the least intensive institutional reforms that eliminate everything Western beyond immediate immersion of English simply hard to envision either way. Either way, “the torn-country” cannot connote contradiction coterminously as almost every citywide resident of Hong Kong realizes ever since the police crackdowns against mass demonstrations that protest populist perceptions concerning illegal extraditions as such. As such, whether the intentional instigator or the indifferent incidental, many citywide residents realize rampant instability amid the unavoidable termination of The Basic Law which thus motivates mass expatriate exodus to leave Hong Kong forever before full incorporation within The People’s Republic ultimately transpires hereafter (Goodstadt 2018; Prestong 2016; Summers 2019; White 2016).

Hereafter, though, discretionary departures now ask then answer the quintessential question of arrival since anywhere else looks much better than the dismal realities currently confronting Hong Kong. To this end, what begins abroad for expatriates expunges existence in terms of identity at home. Home, as the basis for any identity, never really existed not unlike “the torn-country.” “The torn-country,” quite curiously, makes the expatriate exodus immigrate *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 1983). Imagined communities—the impossibility of anyone claiming certain heritage to personally know all other ingroup members—both changes and challenges collective-identity at home or abroad either way. Either way, for Hong Kong, residents claiming birthright create “the torn-country” all the while expatriate exodus leads to the loss of collective-identity beyond immediate civilizational classification. Classification—inline with *The Clash of Civilizations* on current events—theoretically transplants “the torn-country” elsewhere since discretionary departures through the expatriate exodus arrive at known destinations that transforms identity into nationality. Nationality, another conceptual confound amid *The Clash of Civilizations*, concerns “kin-country rallying” supposedly.

Supposedly, civilizational affinities affix alignment to suggest which countries “clash” or cooperate (Huntington 1996). Either way, *The Clash of Civilizations* however indeterminate never considers the immigration impact on readily available concepts such as “the torn-country” unto “kin-country rallying” for Hong Kong. For Hong Kong, the expatriate exodus instinctively involves “kin-country rallying” that keeps quite curious “the torn-country” intact while transplanted because discretionary departures ascribe arrivals at destination both Western and Confucian. Confucian, however, creates Confusion for residents intent on relocation between Southeast Asia and The Near Abroad. The Near Abroad, really the euphemism for Taiwan, ostensible looks good due to democracy and stability with a lower cost of living amid higher affordable affluence quite tempting however. However, while not immediately imminent, Taiwan may reunify with The Mainland reversion such that Communist Consolidation remains reality quite comparatively.

Comparatively, much like The Basic Law of Hong Kong, The Four Noes diminishes democracy for Taiwan by presuming eventual incorporation within The People's Republic as such. As such, expatriate exodus to Taiwan just delays the prolonged fate forcing another relocation anywhere else outside The Mainland scape or rather escape. Escape, getting far away as possible dependently determines discretionary departures to arrive at similar while different destinations deemed Confucian. Confucian, outside of China, includes countries such as Singapore. Singapore, already alluded, complicates comparison quite simply for what Confucian means or does to Civilizations through "the cleft-country." "The cleft-country," in which two different civilizations cohabit the same state, does describe Singapore between Confucian and Islam (Honda 2008) which withstands what Western means institutionally despite some remnants of Commonwealth Civic Culture through The English Language. Language alone however, ostensibly obscures "kin-country rallying" by simultaneous English and Chinese frequency in which expatriate exodus from Hong Kong to Singapore introduces "the cleft-country" all the while liberal autocracy already familiar remains through different manifestations of Big Brother quite subtle without the direct confrontational crackdowns as the ominous tradeoff for the better life outside The Mainland malaise.

Malaise, or rather Malays, transposes transplantation in which the expatriate exodus by residents from Hong Kong confute Confucian Confusion since ascribed arrival through discretional departures encounter "the torn-" unto "the cleft-" country concurrently between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur with anywhere else in between under unnecessary clashes over Western and Islam across The Straits. The Straits, as the euphemism for Malacca, also alludes the causeway connecting The Lower Peninsula to The Upward Island on Borneo with which the majority Confucian reside suggestive of another desirable destination for the expatriate exodus despite the minority status politically. However, already sacrificed sovereignty amid acceptance of liberal autocracy in Hong Kong need not make former residents refugees susceptible to "risk" despite the simultaneous "cleft-country" with majority rule against minority rights as Malaysia maintains "the partly free society" all the while affluence affixes anyone Confucian quite suspiciously stereotypical across The Third World.

The Third World, while unfashionably outdated to say these days, both remains and disdains the euphemism of last resort rather than the first response that attenuates the expatriate exodus from Hong Kong by all means necessary for relocation elsewhere through imminent immigration without secondary status or class. Class, indeed, indemnifies entitlement for almost all residents of Hong Kong expecting similar lifestyles at home elsewhere abroad such that "the torn-country" conflates Confucian with Western to render relocation readily realistic through available alternatives. Alternatives, for Hong Kong residents wanting to leave, include Commonwealth Countries deemed Western such as Canada or Britain and perhaps Australia that typify "the free society."

"The Free Society," demonstrating democracy, incurs incurable incidentals in which the tradeoff for prosperity with liberty simultaneously simulates immigrant immersion by expatriate exodus from the cost of lost nationality necessary to find identity across civilizations between "the torn-country" and "the virtual-state." The virtual-state, small countries with large economies, discourses diminishing returns since increased investment yields capital flight just like any other "run-on-the-bank" so hard to imagine amid any such ease realistically. Realistically, though,

expatriate exodus depletes the human capital of skilled labor difficult to replace with any ease such that disequilibrium results and slows the usual expectations for rapid growth inherent in any virtual-state whether Hong Kong or otherwise. Otherwise, however, the alternative to the virtual-state situates dependency which arguably describes Hong Kong all throughout postwar prosperity with nonexistent sovereignty. Nonexistent sovereignty makes Hong Kong the only one little dragon neither East nor West while all alone amid *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Mearsheimer 2001).

Great Power Politics creates and destroys Hong Kong by imperialist imperatives from colonial rule to communist regime in which greater prosperity yields lesser propriety prompting people to leave without any return home. Home, as with the torn-country and virtual-state, never really existed for Hong Kong either way. Either way, economies of scale continue in which highly skilled labor departs while lucrative investment arrives almost macabre or rather Cobb. Cobb with Douglas—measuring the relationship between labor and capital through utility functions—cannot calculate equilibrium for Hong Kong unless The People’s Republic imports skilled labor to correct the expatriate exodus already altering The City. The City, in this way, will look very different despite the familiar financial institutions inherent in remnant widespread wealth as the price paid for the cost of living (Goodstadt 2018; Prestong 2016; Summers 2019; White 2016). The cost of living, usually tied to welfare and wages, economizes conception without sociological implications that exact expectations for happiness or satisfaction. Satisfaction, since the past few years, diminishes with increased extradition and other crackdowns against mass social movements against communist control. Control, ironically, destabilizes The City from start to finish by any and all means as some preliminary conclusions for Hong Kong.

Preliminary Conclusions for Hong Kong

Preliminary conclusions for Hong Kong look rather bleak amid citywide residents wanting to stay or leave somewhere else. Somewhere else—Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, The Commonwealth West—comes at the cost of lost identity only to gain liberty by going abroad from the expatriate exodus. Expatriate exodus, however, forever changes The City now less Cosmopolitan while more Communist and perhaps Confucian. Confucian, in turn, transposes liberty with legality to justify Communist compliance through authoritarian automation almost Orwellian. Orwellian, or rather Machiavelli, metaphorically makes The Little Dragon confront Big Brother always watching to control the forefront while what happens in the background initiates institutional improvements. Improvements—elections, extraditions, executions—impose in ways reminiscent to reverse waves (Huntington 1991) of democratization. Democratization no longer remains reality for Hong Kong nor does The State. The State—territorial, trading, virtual, developmental, Midas—cannot describe Hong Kong politically due to the lack of sovereignty. Sovereignty, the misnomer, makes Hong Kong The Territory rather than any Country. Country—large, small, torn, cleft—cannot describe Hong Kong economically despite known prosperity. Prosperity, however, overstates success in terms of wealth while underestimating the failed conditions for satisfaction through "liberal autocracy" quite curious comparatively. Comparatively, "liberal autocracy" also exists in some destinations that residents covet such as Malaysia or Singapore.

Singapore, perhaps personifying The Orwellian Eastasia of Big Brother, payoffs potential opposition to achieve compliance without regime-change which cannot work for Hong Kong since the communist community wants imposition rather than reform. Reform remains rhetorically redundant rendering repression reality. Reality, in this way, ironically idealizes communist commitment to institute incorporation of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, incorporated, metaphorically machinates monstrosity connecting “the head” to “the body” that *The Rise of The Virtual State* almost disregards despite designs for China since descent describes adaptability at “the semi-periphery.” “The Semi-periphery,” the middle-income economy, highlights Hong Kong by contrasting China which neutralizes equalization from “the virtual-state” without “the torn-country” now impossible twofold since The City lacks sovereignty just as The People's Republic disdains Western and desires Confucian through transposed trajectories. Trajectories, in this way, resolve any dialectic for Hong Kong between “the virtual-state” and “torn-country” all the while China confronts somewhat until The Basic Law expires which also renders “liberal autocracy” automatically authoritarian without much recognizable remnants. Remnants—between Reversion and Consolidation—of Hong Kong most noteworthy include English with the least likelihood for subtle removal due to the colonial legacy despite language laws enacted elsewhere that institute majority rule against minority rights so nonexistent much like autonomy. Autonomy, necessary for freedom, also includes opportune openness expressed economically since China covets continuous prosperity that marxist-markets or communist-commerce produces by capitalist capitulations from Confucian Conformity. Conformity confounding China begins the end for Hong Kong.

Hong Kong, however classified, truly lies between East and West in which *The Clash of Civilizations* outlines by remaking world order almost entirely from China. China, whatever The People's Republic wants in this way, reclaims lost territory toward total consolidation of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, as such, becomes the anomalous Anglophone version of Shanghai showcasing the communist legacy or legality. Legacy or legality, Communism communes Confucian - Confusion.

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