

# **From Wild Horses to Work Horses: Electoral System Reform and Legislative Entrepreneurship in the House of Representatives**

Charles J. Finocchiaro  
Department of Political Science  
University of South Carolina  
finocchi@mailbox.sc.edu

Scott A. MacKenzie  
Department of Political Science  
University of California, Davis  
samackenzie@ucdavis.edu

Prepared for delivery at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hollywood, CA, March 28-30, 2013. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Julianna LaBoy, Sara Price, and Nicholas Wilson.

The portrait of the modern member of Congress as an entrepreneur operating independently of party organizations is well-established in congressional scholarship. Under a candidate-centered system of electoral politics in place since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, congressional candidates are responsible for organizing their campaigns, raising money and crafting a message to appeal to voters (Jacobson 2000). Once in Congress, retaining a strong base of electoral support for future reelection contests becomes the overriding motivation shaping members' behavior. While national issues and presidential performance might enhance or injure the electoral prospects of some (Jacobson and Kernell 1981), candidates believe and scholars agree that their ability to win election to Congress and stay there depends mainly on their own efforts.

As Mayhew (1974) argues, the organization of the modern Congress provides members with ample opportunities to build a base of support that is substantially independent of party. Scholars have documented how members tailor their roll-call voting record to the views of constituents, interest groups and other supporters (Kingdon 1973), and use floor remarks or speeches inserted into the *Congressional Record* to engage in position-taking (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). Until the House curtailed the practice in 1991, unlimited franking privileges enabled members to disseminate advertisements to constituents (Cover and Brumberg 1982; Cover 1985). Modern congressmen also have staff and office resources that enable them to engage in casework, thereby receiving credit for doing favors for constituents that do not require legislative action (Fiorina 1989). These efforts to cultivate personal relationships with constituents based on accessibility and trust rather than partisan attachment or ideological affinity are a key component of contemporary representation (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987).

More recently, congressional scholars have focused on bill introductions or sponsorship as another tool in the arsenal of the modern congressman. Bill sponsorship is an appealing

object of study because unlike roll-call votes, where members make choices among a predetermined set of alternatives they have little influence over, members have complete control over what bills they sponsor (Schiller 1995). Studying bill sponsorship can suggest insights into the demands members face from their constituents. Systematic study can also identify the attributes of members that lead them to introduce different types of legislation and quantify the effects of institutional resources and constraints that affect their proclivity to do so. Finally, bill sponsorship is also integral to the policy-making role of Congress. Without the efforts of individual members to gather information, draft bills and push them through the legislative process, Congress would be unable to perform its core function of responding to the public's preferences with concrete policy actions (Wawro 2000).

Studies that focus on the modern Congress, however, are limited in their ability to address the institutional foundations of bill introduction activity and its interplay with electoral motivations. During the post-World War II era, for example, the House has made few wholesale changes to its system of standing committees. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the House periodically reshuffled its committees and changed the process of assigning members to committees (Canon and Stewart 2001). Similarly, since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, the vast majority of members have been nominated in partisan primaries and elected using official ballots that voters can fill out away from the prying eyes of party workers. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, congressional primaries were private affairs and the ballots voters used on Election Day were printed and distributed by party workers (Rusk 1970; Engstrom and Kernell 2005; Bense 2004; Ware 2002). Finally, in 1911, the House reached its current size of 435 members; following the reapportionment revolution in the 1960s, these members were elected from districts of roughly

equal size. In 1879, the House had 293 members who were elected from districts that varied dramatically in size and composition (Cox and Katz 2002).

How do the bill sponsorship activities of members of the pre-modern House of Representatives compare with those of contemporary congressmen? What impact did institutional changes, such as the onset of the Australian ballot and nominating primary have on members' bill sponsorship activities? We take up these questions by studying bill sponsorship in the House between 1880 and 1930 (the 47<sup>th</sup> through 71<sup>st</sup> Congresses), a period when many features of the modern Congress began to emerge (Polsby 1968; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Specifically, we examined every bill introduced by House members in odd-numbered congresses between 1880 and 1930, coded them by type (private bills, local bills and public bills) and determined their original author. We then compiled a count of each type of bill introduced by each member in these congresses.

We find that the implementation of electoral system reforms was a major factor contributing to the rapid growth in private legislation and, to a lesser extent, bills aimed at local and regional constituencies. Since the growth of private bills was the most important contributor to the House's increasing workload, our results establish an empirical link between these monumental changes in how elections were governed and the House's internal development and policy outputs during this formative period. We also provide evidence for an electoral connection linking members' efforts to cultivate personal votes in the form of private bill introductions and several demand-generating characteristics of their constituencies. Finally, our results indicate that the individual capacities of members along with their institutional position in the chamber best predict their inclination to introduce general policy bills. Taken together, our analyses of bill introductions in the pre-modern House address debates on the causes of

congressional modernization and shed light on the origins of many behavioral hallmarks of the modern member of Congress.

### **Related Literature**

Studies of the modern Congress have identified several factors that contribute to bill introductions. Schiller (1995) finds that bill sponsorship helps members establish credentials on particular issues that are important to their constituents and, as such, contributes to electoral success. She finds that senators' bill introduction activity responds to the size of the state economy and size of senators' personal staffs. The number of introduced bills increases as members acquire seniority, serve on more committees and achieve leadership positions. Studies of bill sponsorship in the House have focused more on cosponsorship than primary sponsorship, with scholars attributing heightened levels of activity to both extra-legislative (position-taking aimed at constituents) and intra-legislative (signaling aimed at party leaders and the chamber median) considerations (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). Specific factors predicting bill cosponsorship include electoral margin, ideology, minority status, expertise and past legislative activism (Campbell 1982; Wilson and Young 1997; Koger 2003; see also Fowler 2006).

Far less attention has been paid to bill introductions in the pre-modern Congress. Cooper and Young (1989) track bill introductions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century U.S. House, documenting the shift in responsibility for introductions from committees to individual members. Cooper and Rybicki (2002) duplicate this analysis for the U.S. Senate. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, members needed to be recognized and given explicit authorization to introduce a bill, a system that limited the use of bill introductions as a tool for serving members' reelection, policy and power goals.

Rules changes in 1880 did away with the last vestiges of this system in the House and allowed individual members to introduce bills with few limitations.

Systematic studies of bill introductions in the pre-modern Congress include Meinke (2008), who collects bill introductions in the Senate for six congresses that straddle the implementation of direct elections for senators in 1913. Meinke finds that directly elected senators tended to introduce more constituency and policy bills, but fewer private bills than their colleagues who were elected by state legislatures. More senior senators, those with majority status and those with better committee assignments also tended to introduce more bills. Combined with similar findings on senators' participation on roll call votes (see also Gailmard and Jenkins 2009; Bernhard and Sala 2006), these results offer empirical support for the link between electoral system reform and legislative entrepreneurship.

Schiller (2006) offers a close examination of senators' bill introduction activities before direct elections. Using bill introduction data from 10 states over the period 1889 to 1913, she finds that the size of a senator's state population and margin of victory were significant predictors of legislative activism. More senior senators did not introduce more bills, though the number of introductions did rise as senators took on additional committee assignments. Schiller concludes that bill introductions were a potent tool for cultivating support with state legislators and the constituents they represented. Senators who did this well were more likely to be returned to office. Thus, she finds evidence linking bill introductions to electoral concerns and career interests well before the onset of direct elections.

To date, there have been no systematic studies of bill introduction in the pre-modern House. However, a few studies suggest a link between electoral system reforms in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and other legislative activities. Katz and Sala (1996) find that the onset of

reforms explains the development of committee property rights, with post-reform members seeking to retain their committee seats for long periods of time. The reason, they argue, is that electoral system reforms created the personal vote-seeking incentives scholars of the modern Congress take for granted. Kernell (2010) finds that reforms contributed to the decisions of members to seek reelection (but see Brady et al. 1999). Wittrock et al. (2008) find that post-reform members were more successful in gaining desired committee assignments, less likely to toe the party line on roll call votes and more adept at securing pork barrel projects.

Though many studies posit an electoral connection motivating bill introduction and sponsorship activities, little evidence exists to support this claim. Wawro's (2000) detailed study of the 94<sup>th</sup> to 103<sup>rd</sup> Congresses finds no relationship between members' proclivity in sponsoring legislation and the amount of campaign contributions they received. Nor did members' sponsorship activities affect voters' evaluations of them or vote choices (see also Johannes and McAdams (1981); Ragsdale and Cook (1987)). Wawro argues instead that members' decisions to sponsor bills reflect other interests, including the desire for good policy and advancement inside the chamber (Fenno 1973). He finds a positive relationship between members' legislative entrepreneurship and their advancement in the committee and party leadership hierarchies.

Taken together, these studies identify several electoral and institutional factors that might have contributed to bill introductions in the pre-modern House. However, as Wawro (2000) suggests, the lack of evidence for a direct link between legislative entrepreneurship and members' reelection prospects should caution scholars against over reliance on electoral considerations in explaining members' bill introduction activities during this period. Similarly, while Katz and Sala (1996) offer a powerful theoretical rationale for expecting changes in the proclivity of House members in introducing different types of bills, Schiller (2006) shows that

senators at least were exploiting their bill introduction privileges long before direct elections. As we demonstrate below, so, too, were House members before ballot and primary reform.

If electoral concerns and the accountability incentives provided by electoral system reforms offer only partial explanations for legislative entrepreneurship in the House, what other factors might account for observed variation in the bills members choose to sponsor? One possibility suggested by previous studies is the institutional advantage created by membership on various committees inside the House. Sitting on a committee might expose members to information about the committee's area of concern and reduce the costs of introducing legislation in that area (Krehbiel 1991; Hall 1996). Members who are well-placed in the committee system might also be more active bill sponsors overall, as they are in the best position to see their bills acted on. Thus, the possibility of advancing in the committee system offers incentives for members to engage in bill sponsorship; as members advance, the system confers additional parliamentary rights and resources, thereby offering further inducements for legislative activism and directing members' bill sponsorship activities toward particular types of bills.

A second possibility raised by cosponsorship studies in the modern Congress is that members differ in their ability and desire to develop policy proposals. Sponsoring a bill is costly, taking resources that could be devoted to alternative activities. Which members are best positioned to absorb these costs? The findings on seniority above offer one answer: learning over the course of a congressional career reduces the costs of bill sponsorship. A recent study by MacKenzie (2011), which shows that members differ substantially in the amount and type of political experience they bring with them to Congress, suggests a second answer: the political experiences of members reveal their inclination to pursue legislative accomplishment and contribute to their ability to do so. Thus, differences in experience can help explain variation in



bill sponsorship within particular congressional cohorts. Similarly, changes in aggregate levels of experience can help explain chamber-level changes in bill sponsorship patterns over time.

This study fills a large gap in the literature on the pre-modern House by providing the first systematic analysis of bill sponsorship during this period. We believe our study can also inform studies of the modern Congress by exploiting variation in electoral system rules that had disappeared by World War II. In addition to examining each piece of legislation introduced in the House in odd-numbered congresses between 1880 and 1930, we utilize newly collected data on the political experiences of incoming members (Kernell and MacKenzie 2011; MacKenzie 2011). In doing so, we are able to compare the contributions of electoral, institutional and individual-level factors to the legislative entrepreneurship of members that was, and is, crucial to Congress fulfilling its institutional role in a separation-of-powers system.

### **Legislating in the Institutionalizing House**

In their review of the evolution of bill introduction practices in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Cooper and Young (1989: 98) observe that by 1890 “members prized the opportunity to introduce their own bills for credit seeking and advertising purposes.” They also argue that the forces that propelled the House from a system of bill introduction privileging committees to one that lifted all restrictions on individual legislators are best understood by accounting for micro-level incentives as well as broader changes within the institution and beyond. In our account of the legislative activities of House members, we focus on two key factors – capacity and incentives – that involve both individual-level and macro-level dynamics. In describing the monumental changes observed in the scope and nature of the House’s legislative workload, we highlight the influence of electoral system reforms that coincided with important changes in institutional rules,

structure, and composition at a time of broad societal change. Disentangling these factors is a primary objective of our analysis.

As scholars have noted, the bulk of the bills introduced in Congress during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries were private in nature, often involving individual citizens' claims against the government for veterans pensions or redress of other personal or property matters. Yet constituency service was nothing new. White (1958: 70-84) comments on the oppressive nature of the Department business that occupied MC's time in the post-Civil War era, and assigns a leading role to pensions and pension claims, estimating that members spent from one-third to two-thirds of their time on such constituent business (see also La Follette 1913: 84).

What is particularly noteworthy about the turn-of-the-century Congress is the degree to which constituent matters spilled onto the legislative agenda. Unlike today, when such matters are referred to the bureaucracy for resolution – a result, according to Hill and Williams (1993), of changing incentives to delegate arising from greater resources to pursue alternative forms of credit claiming – members of the institutionalizing House of Representatives put relatively minor constituency matters directly on the agenda. This often took the form of private bills dealing with topics as seemingly trivial as increasing a veteran's or widow's pension by a few dollars a month or changing a former soldier's discharge status from deserter to honorable in order to qualify him for the pension roll. When taken in isolation, such matters seem to pale in comparison to the major issues of the day – tariff revision, the Spanish-American War, Cuban reciprocity, and a flurry of amendments to the Constitution that fundamentally altered the electoral landscape by extending the franchise to women and instituting the direct election of senators, and set in motion major economic and societal changes as diverse as the income tax and prohibition.

Nonetheless, it was these minor issues that kept members busy and which they viewed as an important component of their reelection portfolio. Conventional forms of “pork,” such as public building projects, river and harbor improvements and the like certainly made up a portion of that portfolio as well, but were less a fixture of day-to-day business, as they were ordinarily folded in omnibus bills passed annually at best (Wilson 1986). Interestingly, these measures were viewed quite similarly to private legislation – both represented electorally-motivated local legislating. Thus, in anticipating that the Reed rules would “repress” the prerogatives of individual members, Rep. Caruth (D-KY) complained that there would be “nothing left for him to do but to tread his weary way from Department to Department, write letters, or scatter ‘seeds’ with a lavish hand over his district in the hope that they will come forth and bear a rich harvest of votes at the fall election” (*Congressional Record*, February 12, 1890: 1248).

The sheer volume of legislative business (mostly private in nature) conducted at a time when most House members had a single staff person at their disposal is staggering. As former Commission of Pensions H. Clay Evans conveyed to a correspondent:

If you do not get the Congressional Record you should at least write to your Member of Congress and have him send you a copy of the “Congressional Record Index Sixty fourth Congress, 1st Session from Dec. 6 to Dec. 17th” – of course it is only an index of 165 pages of bills introduced. (emphasis in original)<sup>1</sup>

Having reviewed this volume of the *Record*, along with many others during this era, we can say that the 64<sup>th</sup> Congress was no exception. In fact, it saw over 12,000 *fewer* bills introduced in the House than the watershed 61<sup>st</sup> Congress in which more than 33,000 bills were dropped in the hopper by ambitious, reelection-minded legislators. The 61<sup>st</sup> is of course the Congress in which

---

<sup>1</sup> H. Clay Evans to William H. Glasson, 15 January 1916, Folder 4, Box 1, William Henry Glasson Papers, 1891-1946 and undated, University Archives, Duke University, Durham, NC.

the speakership was weakened during the last years of Joseph G. Cannon's tenure. Interestingly, such constituency business dominated, at least numerically, the calendars of the House at the same time that party power peaked (Brady 1973; Binder 1997; Schickler 2001).

Figure 1 presents the trends in bill introduction in the House from the 47<sup>th</sup> through the 71<sup>st</sup> Congresses. The period from 1905 to 1913 (the 59<sup>th</sup> through 62<sup>nd</sup> Congresses) represents the high-water mark, with more than 115,000 bills introduced in the House in those four congresses alone. However, the entire time series demonstrates a level of activity that far exceeds that of the modern Congress. While we initially suspected that changes in the size of the House might be one factor leading to higher levels of bill sponsorship (membership increased in stages from 293 in the 47<sup>th</sup> Congress to its present size of 435 in the 63<sup>rd</sup>), it is clear that once we account for changes in membership, the pattern is virtually identical, as evidenced in the average rate of sponsorship reflected in the right axis of the figure.

[Figure 1 about here]

To better understand the nature of the expansive legislative agenda at this time, it helps to disaggregate the series by bill type. Figure 1 also includes the number of bills that were referred to the Committee on Invalid Pensions, which managed between 20 and 50 percent of House bills in most of the congresses spanned by our analysis. This committee's jurisdiction involved pensions for Civil War veterans and their dependents, for which the federal government's expenditures at the turn of the century surpassed that of any other budget category. Interestingly, the increase in private legislation for pensions coincided with expansive *public* legislation that made it quite easy for anyone with a legitimate claim to put their name on the pension roll. The recipients were often those who had been turned down by the Pension Bureau and took their cause to a congressman. Since these cases essentially involved making an exception to public

law (which had grown increasingly liberal over time), private bills were frequently criticized as political favoritism or patronage. In the same letter describing legislation in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Commissioner Evans' remarked that the practice of passing private pension bills:

... is much more corrupt and far reaching in the ramifications than the ordinary "Pork Barrels" – but it is encouraged by the people through their Representatives in Congress irrespective of party politics. After fifty years of liberalizing the pension laws, and fifty years of dolling out big pensions to personal and political friends, by looking over the index suggested you can at once see its abuses. There were something over 121,000 desertions – the general pension laws prohibit pensions to the deserters, but the Congress member wills to see that charge removed or amend his military record, thus giving him a pensionable status and at the same time it nails that deserter to the Congressman. ... Pensions are not to be considered as ending where the pensioner dies if he has left living a M.C. – to perpetuate the memory of the pensioner – he will introduce a bill to pass the pension on to somebody of the same name. ... Our pension system has degenerated – from 1881 beginning under [Commissioner] Dudley – to a system of graft, political graft ... pensions were given by favor and "Wo [sic] be unto the [Commissioner] that gets in the way of the Machine" and attempts to give an honest administration.<sup>2</sup>

Evans was no doubt still smarting over his removal as Commissioner of Pensions by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1902, and others took a more positive view of this realm of legislative business. Former Democratic Speaker Champ Clark's view was that "the beneficiaries of most of the bills were entitled to pensions, but were shut out by some technicality" and by so legislating, he "kept several old soldiers and soldiers' widows out of the almshouse" (Clark 1920: 360-361). Nonetheless, Evans' account is consistent with many others who also note that a convenient amalgamation of pro-tariff and pro-pension interests repeatedly pushed Congress to liberalize pension laws until by 1890 even non-war-related disabilities qualified a veteran for coverage (Glasson 1918; Sanders 1980; Logue 1992; and Skocpol 1992).

---

<sup>2</sup> H. Clay Evans to William H. Glasson, 15 January 1916, Folder 4, Box 1, William Henry Glasson Papers, 1891-1946 and undated, University Archives, Duke University, Durham, NC.

In 1907, Congress formalized administrative practice by making old age alone (defined as 62 years of age) a pensionable disability. Thus, by the 1890s and early 1900s, nearly everyone who was a veteran and wanted a pension should have had one. Nonetheless, Congress ratcheted up its efforts on behalf of pensioners who were dissatisfied with the result of administrative decisions at a time when the pension roll was shrinking due to the death of the “old soldiers”.

While there is no readily-apparent answer in pension politics themselves to explain the rise in private bill activity during this period, neither does House (or Senate) practice seem to provide the answer. The House fully routinized the introduction of private bills in 1887, before moving all bill introductions off the floor by simply allowing members to file bills with the clerk in 1890 (Cooper and Young 1989: 95-96). The Reed Rules of 1890 also enshrined in legislative law a long-standing practice of dedicating Friday nights, and later every other Friday, to pension/private matters, so there was already quite a bit of “room” for these kinds of measures on the calendar (see Hinds 1907 § 3281, pgs. 245-246). While members routinely rushed dozens and sometimes hundreds of bills through the House on “Pension night,” in the 60<sup>th</sup> Congress pension bills began to be passed using omnibus vehicles – a change in practice that was hardly noticed at the time and does not seem to have substantially affected the rate of private enactments vis-à-vis introductions. By the 62<sup>nd</sup> Congress, if not before, pensions were being criticized alongside other types of “pork” that was folded into omnibus measures, for their tendency to increase expenditures (*Congressional Record*, February 26, 1913: 4025).

[Figure 2 about here]

To what degree is the same increase in legislative activity apparent in other areas of Congress’ legislative agenda? Using data on every bill introduced in odd-numbered congresses from the 47<sup>th</sup> to the 71<sup>st</sup> House (a total of nearly 218,000 bills), which we culled from the Index

of House Bills in the *Congressional Record*, we have classified each measure based on its sponsor and committee of referral. Since we can ascertain based on the committee of jurisdiction the private or public nature of the legislation and its substantive focus, we disaggregated bill introductions into four categories:

- *policy* bills – involving issues of a significant public nature
- *local* bills – involving matters of a particularistic or regional nature
- *private* bills – involving claims against the government regarding pensions, military records, property loss in war, Indian depredations, and so forth
- *invalid pension* bills – a specific class of private legislation involving veterans from only the Civil War (claims related to other military service were referred primarily to the Committee on Pensions).

The full coding scheme is described in Appendix A. Based on Figure 2, which presents the first three categories of bills, here plotted as introductions per House member and scaled on the left vertical axis, it appears that both private, non-Civil War pension bills as well as those that were locally-oriented moved in a fashion similar to that of invalid pension bills (note that, unlike the models that we present later, we have excluded invalid pensions from the private bill category in this instance). In contrast, sponsorship of policy bills is relatively flat across the time series. The rise and fall in legislative entrepreneurship in the House that we observe over this fifty-year period, at least on the bills of a predominantly constituency-oriented nature, begs explanation.

## **Theory and Hypotheses**

The era we explore has been the subject of an enormous amount of scholarly attention.

Yet despite this large body of work, we lack a clear linkage between the numerous electoral and societal changes playing out beyond the walls of Congress and the internal dynamics of legislative entrepreneurship in the House. What is not disputed among existing scholarship is that the House of Representatives was transformed from a Reconstruction-era body of non-careerists to a mid-20<sup>th</sup> century chamber characterized by strong committees and seasoned party leaders, and populated with long-serving members (Fiorina, Rohde and Wissel 1975). However, the root causes posited for this transformation are numerous. A number of factors might be linked to changing *incentives* on the part of legislators, who faced both opportunity and constraint as the electoral connection was fundamentally reshuffled by fluctuating electoral coalitions and the introduction of major electoral system reforms involving the Australian ballot and nominating primary. Concurrent with the altered electoral landscape were a series of notable legislative changes which affected the *capacity* of Congress to meet its lawmaking responsibilities. As the nation industrialized and professionalized, so did the House. The role of committees was cemented over time and the prerogatives of committee chairs and property rights over seats on standing committees became a fixture of congressional politics. Increasing tenure in the House, and greater levels of pre-congressional political experience also produced a body of more expert legislators. In what follows we build a theoretical account for how these factors interacted to shape legislators' interest in bill sponsorship.

### *The Electoral Connection: Constituency Constraints*

One of the leading arguments about the roots of careerism is that after the 1896 election northern Republicans and southern Democrats enjoyed considerably greater electoral security



(Price 1971, 1975; Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999).<sup>3</sup> These members from safer seats would potentially be free to invest more effort in policymaking since they needed to worry less about trafficking in constituency service and local legislation prior to the next election. While we are less interested in testing the claim that 1896 was a focal point in the turn to careerism, one implication of the electoral connection is that vulnerable members will be more likely to devote scarce staff resources and personal time to constituency service than their more seasoned and secure colleagues. To what degree was this true? Since pension and private bills, and, to a lesser degree, local bills cater in a tangible way to key electoral constituencies, this is where we would expect to find the most action on the part of vulnerable legislators. In contrast, policy bills probably offer less electoral payoffs and require much more legislative effort.

Other constituency characteristics that may have impacted the legislative initiative of members include the veteran population, the partisan complexion of the electorate, and the degree of industrialization (Bensel 2000). On private and particularly pension matters, legislators with numerous veterans in their districts would likely be attuned to the interests of this segment of the population who often wielded enough votes to turn an election in marginal districts (Sanders 1980; Skocpol 1992). One cannot forget the defeat of President Grover Cleveland in 1888, whose image with veterans and the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) was badly tarnished when he vetoed dozens of private pension bills that he found to be warrantless.<sup>4</sup> In a related fashion, representatives from more heavily industrialized areas and those who represented more Democratic constituencies may well have faced added pressure to provide

---

<sup>3</sup> See Bianco, Spence and Wilkerson (1996) and Carson and Engstrom (2005) for early evidence of the electoral connection in Congress.

<sup>4</sup> On the influence of the GAR in American politics, see Ainsworth (1995).

private and local legislation than their colleagues. Industrialization is said to have spurred demand for action as well as innovation in American government (Skowronek 1982) and has been linked to increasing professionalization and efficiency in Congress (Polsby 1968). Similarly, as the parties began to trade positions on the role of the federal government in economic development, Democrats became the party that demanded more federal action. Thus, we might expect to observe legislators with a larger base of Democratic support and those from more industrialized areas to be leading the charge. The uneven expansion of industrialization during the period covered by our analysis offers a hospitable venue for testing this hypothesis.

### *Institutional Position*

Throughout its history, the House has entrusted a great deal of power to the hands of its committees and their leaders – the chairs and, to a lesser extent, the ranking members. Moreover, party leaders, especially those of the majority party, play a vital role in determining which bills will successfully navigate the legislative process. While the post-Reconstruction era is in many ways uncharacteristic of the modern House, it did give committees, and particularly the most important committees, a great deal of influence over the legislative process. With the rise of party government at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the power of the Speaker and the majority cartel to govern increased dramatically, although committees and their chairs were a major vehicle for the sort of agenda control described by Cox and McCubbins (2005). Increasing levels seniority, with the attendant benefits of relevant legislative experience and growing influence on committees, also became a fixture of the House in the early 1900s although there had always been a small number of long-serving veterans (Polsby 1968). In much the same way that the modern House values legislative expertise (Krehbiel 1991) and more senior members are often

the ones with greater acumen, there is good reason to expect the House's senior legislators to be most proficient at lawmaking. We expect that this will translate into more bill introductions on the part of those with more terms of service. The deference that accrues to senior members also extends to the committees they lead, suggesting that committee leaders and those seated on committees with relevant jurisdiction will likely take an added interest in associated legislation.

Additionally, most scholars agree that majority party status carries with it numerous benefits, not least of which is control of the House agenda and all key positions of influence in the chamber (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Since members of the majority party have a much better chance of seeing their proposals steered successfully through the legislative process, it may well be the case that they also introduce more bills with an eye to taking advantage of this prerogative. As such, we expect members of the majority party, and those who chair a committee, to introduce more bills than those in the minority.

### *Individual Capacity*

Other individual attributes not tied directly to their status in Congress also have the potential to impact members' interest in and capacity for legislative entrepreneurship. While we are agnostic on the effect of age and prior military service as they relate to bill introduction, previous scholarship at least suggests some reasons to consider their potential impact. Younger members may require more time to learn the ropes and gain influence among their more senior colleagues, while older members who are more established both in society and life experience may find it easier to engage in legislative activity (Asher 1973). Additionally, one of the dynamics of life in the post-Civil War era was that many veterans from both sides of the conflict served in the House. The prevalence of the "bloody shirt" as a political issue may well have

meant that these members took a particular interest in legislation that involved matters growing out of the war. For this reason, we might expect veterans with military service to engage in more lawmaking activity on private and pension bills.

Of particular interest for our account of legislative entrepreneurship is the capacity that members bring to the table as a result of prior political experience. Institutionalization of the House may well have been part of a broader trend toward professionalization throughout the political system (Kernell and MacKenzie 2011). If this was so, then the increasing number of House members who had previous legislative experience, as well as those who spent more time in public office prior to their first election to the House, likely translated that professional experience into greater legislative activity. Political professionals had well-established connections to the important constituencies that they would need to serve once elected to Congress; they were more comfortable with the labyrinthine nature of the legislative process; and they likely had some experience with the mechanics of drafting bills. This individual-level capacity of professional legislators should be evident in an increased number of bills introduced. There are, of course, macro-level factors contributing to congressional capacity in this era as well. Staff and legislative branch resources were on the rise, and the House did much to streamline the legislative process and dole out credit-claiming opportunities. Nonetheless, we expect an added level of output for the chamber's most experienced legislators.

### *Electoral System Reforms*

The final, and perhaps most prominent, explanation for the transformation of the House from its 19<sup>th</sup> century form to that of a modern institution focuses on a set of monumental reforms to the way in which elections are conducted in the United States. Ballot and primary reforms

undermined the prerogative of party elites to construct a unified ticket and to choose candidates on the basis of broader party goals, including keeping the peace between competing party factions (Bensel 2000) and the practice of rotation in office (Kernell 1977). In place of the older systems, the secret ballot and the nominating primary drastically altered the nature of elections (Rusk 1970; Engstrom and Kernell 2005) and changed the calculus for incumbents who now had much greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote.

That these incentives might have played a major role in institutional innovation in Congress has been a common theme in the literature (e.g., Katz and Sala 1996), and the reasons for this purported relationship are straightforward. Ballot reform detached, at least to some extent, the electoral fortunes of down-ballot candidates from those of their party. In the previous system, party workers had a large hand in the voting process, distributing partisan ballots to the party faithful who in turn usually submitted the unaltered ballots at polling places under the watchful eye of party workers (Ware 2002; Bensel 2004). The advent of the secret ballot provided not just the privacy that facilitated deviation from the party line but also a ballot that made doing so much easier. For this reason, ambitious candidates, and particularly incumbents who could claim credit for faithful service, were now able to carve out a reputation at least somewhat independent of the issue stances and current favorability of their party and, if need be, encourage voters to cast a split ticket. In a related fashion, the nominating primary put the responsibility for contesting an office more squarely in the hands of the individual politician. No longer did candidates seeking the party's nomination need the good favor of party leaders or find themselves subject to constraints like rotation. Instead, they could determine their own career paths in a much more predictable fashion that would allow them to build longer tenures in office.

Unfortunately, there is little work that directly links electoral system reform to individual-level behavior in Congress. Moreover, disentangling the effect of electoral reform from the impact of the more professionalized candidates it produced and coinciding changes in electoral competition is a vexing task. In our analysis, we are sensitive to the parallel development of these forces and take both a macro-level view of system change over time as well as a more nuanced assessment of the effect of reforms and other individual-level characteristics as we seek to explain legislative entrepreneurship in the pre-modern House. We expect that members of Congress elected under reformed ballot laws that fostered independence from their party will be especially likely to engage in lawmaking of a particularistic nature, introducing more private and perhaps local bills than their colleagues.

### **Research Design and Methods**

To assess the effects of electoral system reforms on bill sponsorship activity, we divide House members into three groups. Group 1 (Control) consists of individuals serving in the House before their state adopted the Australian ballot or nominating primary. Group 2 (Australian ballot) consists of individuals serving in the House after their state adopted the Australian ballot, and before their state adopted the nominating primary. Group 3 (Australian ballot + nominating primary) consists of individuals serving in the House after their state adopted both the Australian ballot and nominating primary. Groups 2 and 3 form the two treatment groups in the analyses below.

Differences in the composition of members' constituencies, previous electoral margin, political experience (in the pre-congressional career as well as inside the chamber) and the timing of electoral system reforms across states offer substantial variation for empirical models

to exploit. Nonetheless, previous work ably demonstrates that reform and non-reform settings differed systematically in ways, apart from reform, that affected the composition of House members in this period and likely impacted their bill introduction activities. Differences in constituents' policy demands, electoral competition, political experience, and regional representation offer competing explanations for how and why members came to serve longer careers inside the House. They also complicate the task of assessing the contribution of reforms and other factors to members' bill sponsorship activities. In this section, we describe problems in estimating the impact of reform and the matching procedures we use to mitigate them.

One of the main problems is illustrated in Figure 3, which compares the distributions of our previous electoral margin variable among reform and non-reform settings. The upper panel is a Q-Q plot that shows the distribution of electoral margin among House members from states implementing the Australian ballot (Treatment) and non-reform (Control) settings. If these distributions were identical, all of the points (quantiles) would lie on the line  $y = x$ . The actual pattern is flatter than the line  $y = x$ . This indicates that the dispersion of electoral margin is greater in non-reform settings.

[Figure 3 about here]

Table 1 indicates that the differences in Figure 3 are significant. The standardized mean difference is substantively large and statistically significant according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which looks for differences across the entire distribution. This problem, however, is not limited to the electoral margin variable. The unmatched populations of members from states with the Australian ballot and from non-reform settings show other troubling differences. There are, for example, more majority party members and fewer members with legislative experience in states with the Australian ballot. Table 1 also indicates that the problems are

equally severe if the analysis is confined to members from states with the Australian ballot and nominating primary (Treatment) and members from non-reform (Control) settings. For all covariates, except age and committee memberships, there are significant differences in the distributions between reform and non-reform settings.

[Table 1 about here]

What problems, if any, do these differences pose for causal inference? The numbers in Table 1 indicate that assignment to a reform setting is nothing like random. The covariate distributions between treated and control populations are very different. Thus, even before the effects of reform take hold, these populations are different in ways that affect the outcome of interest. Including all of these covariates in a model with indicators of reform adoption could, absent proper adjustments, lead to inefficient and biased estimates (most likely attenuation) of the effects of reform institutions. Some adjustment is necessary to separate the causal effects, if any, of electoral system reforms from the effects of these pre-existing differences.

To minimize the impact of differences in reform and non-reform populations, we use matching analysis to estimate the effects of the Australian ballot and nominating primary on bill sponsorship activity. The goal of matching is to reduce bias by simulating the conditions of a randomized experiment using observational data. This is accomplished by selecting subsamples of treatment and control populations that are “balanced” with respect to observed covariates. That is, these subsamples differ only randomly with respect to observed covariates even as they take on different values of the treatment. Thus, any differences in outcomes between these subsamples can be ascribed to the effects of the treatment rather than pre-existing differences between the populations.



Scholars have identified several techniques for selecting subsamples to minimize differences in covariate distributions.<sup>5</sup> Here, we use the genetic matching algorithm developed by Sekhon (2011). Genetic matching chooses matched pairs by minimizing a generalized version of the Mahalanobis distance. In practice, the algorithm (GenMatch) searches over a range of metrics to find the particular measure that minimizes post-matching imbalance of covariates. Genetic matching offers flexibility in determining which covariates to match on, assessing post-matching balance and, incorporating propensity scores. The procedures described here have been used in a number of applied settings (see Diamond and Sekhon 2010).

We applied genetic matching to the 5,196 individuals who served in odd-numbered congresses between 1880 and 1930. We used one-to-one matching with replacement so that each member in our treatment groups, Groups 2 and 3 described above, was paired with a suitable match from our control group, Group 1. Thus, each House member from a state implementing the Australian ballot was paired with a member from a non-reform setting. Similarly, each member from a state implementing the Australian ballot and nominating primary

---

<sup>5</sup> The simplest of these is exact matching, whereby two units are matched only if they take identical values on all covariates, but differ on the indicator of treatment. Exact matching is appealing in that it eliminates all differences between groups beyond the treatment itself. Unfortunately, with finite samples and the inclusion of continuous covariates, exact matching can become infeasible. An alternative is the use of propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Rather than require exact matches on all covariates, matching on a propensity score can yield balanced distributions on the covariates used to define the score. True propensity scores are rarely known, however, and must be estimated. If such models are incorrectly specified, propensity scores can reduce rather than improve balance (Stuart and Rubin 2008).

was paired with a member from a non-reform setting. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows the success of GenMatch in balancing the distributions of electoral margin for House members from reform (Australian ballot) and non-reform settings. In contrast to the pattern in the upper panel, the bulk of the quantiles of these two distributions now lie along the line  $y = x$ .

The right-hand side of Table 1 reports the average values, standardized means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values for twelve covariates. Consistent with Figure 3, differences between the matched subsamples of House members from states implementing the Australian ballot and members from non-reform settings with respect to electoral margin are not statistically significant. GenMatch also succeeded in improving balance for the other covariates. The standardized mean differences are substantively small and only a few reach conventional levels of statistical significance.<sup>6</sup> Matching was less successful in creating similar subsamples of members from states with both the Australian ballot and nominating primary and members from non-reform settings, although improvements in covariate balance are striking. Whereas the unmatched populations showed troubling differences in electoral competition, seniority, previous political experience, industrialism and age, the matched subsamples show fewer statistically significant differences in the distributions of these covariates.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> There is little theoretical reason to suspect that these variables, one indicating previous legislative service and the other a ranking of the member's state in veteran population, are related to our main treatment variable, electoral system reform. The regression models we estimate in the next section control for any remaining differences in these and our other control variables.

<sup>7</sup> Scrutiny of the lower right-hand panel of Table 1 will reveal that, while the mean differences between treatment and control groups has been drastically reduced, there remain significant differences in the distributions for most variables. Thus, the average differences in bill

Two conditions must hold for matching to yield consistent estimates of the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) (Ho et al. 2007) – here, the change in the number of bills introduced by members from states implementing electoral system reforms. One assumption is the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA), which requires that the treatment status of any unit be independent of potential outcomes for all other units, and that treatment is defined identically for all units. In this context, it requires that assignment to a reform setting for any member does not depend on the bill introduction values taken on by other members.<sup>8</sup>

The second assumption is that assignment to the treatment group depends only on the observed covariates and that, given these covariates, assignment is possible but not certain. In this context, it implies that we have not excluded relevant predictors of assignment to a reform setting and that the covariate values in our treatment groups are reflected in the covariate values in our control group. The extent to which this assumption is met is difficult to ascertain. Given the results in Table 1, and lack of evidence to the contrary, we are confident that the data meet the conditions stated above and that the differences between these subsamples can be ascribed to our treatments and not any pre-existing differences between reform and non-reform populations. As such, the average difference between treatment and control groups is an unbiased estimate of

---

introduction between these groups should be examined with care. Our regression models adjust for these remaining differences, which we suspect stem from the fact that members from our Australian ballot + nominating primary group are more separated in time from members of our control group than are members from our Australian ballot treatment group.

<sup>8</sup> The SUTVA assumption could be violated if states adopted reforms in reaction to bill introduction activity among members of its House delegation. I am aware of no research that suggests such a concern was a primary motivation behind ballot and primary reforms.

ATT. In the next section, we report and discuss these average differences, which test our electoral system reform hypotheses stated above.

We also assess the relative effects of electoral system reforms, electoral competition, political experience and other factors by combining matching and regression analysis. Specifically, we present models that predict bill sponsorship in the House using measures of electoral system reform, electoral margin, political experience and other factors. Recent work (Stuart and Rubin 2008) encourages researchers to use matching to reduce differences in covariate distributions and then perform regression-based adjustments on matched samples to increase the efficiency of estimates. Ho et al. (2007) argue that such “preprocessing” makes parametric methods more reliable. If researchers can show that covariate balance has been achieved, there is less reason to fear that their estimates are overly sensitive to arbitrary choices of model specification.

We estimate a series of count models, including separate models for each of the three bill types (private, local and policy) described above, to determine the impact of electoral system reforms and other variables on the number of bills introduced by House members. To illustrate the effects of pre-processing, we first estimate our three models on our unmatched dataset, with and without fixed effects for each congress. We then estimate our three models on a subset of our unmatched dataset that includes members of our Australian ballot treatment group matched with members from non-reform settings (control group). Finally, we estimate our three models on a subset of our unmatched dataset that includes members of our Australian ballot + nominating primary treatment group matched with members from non-reform settings (control group). The dependent variable in each model is the number of bills of that type introduced by each House member. Preliminary analyses of our dependent variables yielded evidence of overdispersion. Thus, we use negative binomial regression (NBR), a Poisson model with additional parameters, to improve our model fit.

We include several variables in our models to test our hypotheses about the effects of constituency characteristics, institutional position and individual capacity and constraint. These include three variables that proxy for constituency characteristics that might influence members' proclivity in sponsoring different bills. The first variable, *Democratic Vote*, indicates the Democratic share of the two-party vote for governor in each state. We used a linear interpolation to fill in values between election years and then smoothed our annual time series by taking a 12-year moving average (Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999). The second variable, *Industrial State*, identifies members whose districts are in states characterized by the highest levels of manufacturing activity according to the U.S. census. If industrialism was generating demand for legislative activism, then one might expect more bill sponsorship activity among members elected from states where industrial activity was most concentrated. The third variable, *Veterans Rank*, ranks districts according to their state's veteran population, with a rank of one indicating districts in the state with the least number of resident veterans in a particular congress.

We define four variables to characterize the institutional position of each member, which we hypothesize contributed to bill introduction activity. The variable *Seniority* counts the number of terms served by each member in the U.S. House. The variable *Majority Party* indicates whether the member's party controlled the chamber in a particular congress. The variable *Pension Committee* indicates whether the member was assigned to the Pensions or Invalid Pensions Committee. *Committee Chair* identifies members who served as chair or ranking member of a committee.

Finally, five additional variables summarize the capacities and constraints of individual members. The first, *Electoral Margin*, is the margin of victory enjoyed by the member in the previous election. In our count models, we interact this variable with *Majority Party* to assess whether margin of victory worked differently for members of the chamber majority. The variable *Age* indicates the age of the member in a particular congress. We square this variable as we suspect

the effects of age on bill introductions diminish at higher levels of this variable. The variable *Military Service* is a dummy variable indicating a member's service in the armed forces. Two other variables capture members' political experience prior to reaching the House. The first, *Years Previous Experience*, counts the number of years spent by each member in public office before first reaching the House. The second, *Previous Legislative Experience*, is a dummy variable that identifies members who served in a legislative office during their pre-congressional career.

## Results

Table 2 reports the estimated effects of reform for each bill type among non-Southern and Southern members of the House. For our first dependent variable – the number of private bills introduced by members – the estimated effect of the Australian ballot for non-Southern members is 15.96 bills. That is, a House member elected from a non-Southern state that adopted ballot reform sponsored, on average, 15 more private bills than a House member from a non-reform setting. Given that the number of private bill introductions was just over 24 bills prior to ballot reform, this constitutes a 65 percent increase in the average member's legislative activity in this area. This result is consistent with our expectations about the effects of electoral system reform in generating incentives for members to engage in service activities, including sponsoring pension and other varieties of private legislation.

[Table 2 about here]

The impact of ballot reform is negligible on our second and third dependent variables – the number of local and policy bills introduced by members. There is virtually no difference in the number of local bills introduced by non-Southern members before and after ballot reform. There is also no difference between members from states implementing the Australian ballot and members from non-reform settings in the number of policy bills introduced. If anything, non-

Southern members after ballot reform introduced fewer policy bills on average than their counterparts in non-reform settings. This result is interesting from the perspective of theories of institutionalization (Polsby 1968), which portray the House as modernizing during this period in response to external demands. While it is true that House members were being asked to do more and many policies considered during this period represented sizable expansions of national authority (Keller 1977; Skowronek 1982; Kernell and McDonald 1999; Johnson 2007), external demands were not translating into increasing legislative activism by individual members on local and policy bills. Moreover, ballot reform appears to have played little role in making members more or less prone to legislative entrepreneurship in these areas.

The right-hand portion of Table 2 reports the estimated effects of the Australian ballot and nominating primary. These results are not much different than those reported for the Australian ballot by itself. The effects of ballot reform do not appear to have been accelerated in states adopting the nominating primary. One exception is the statistically significant difference in local bill introductions between non-Southern members from states implementing the Australian ballot and nominating primary and non-Southern members from non-reform settings. That is, a House member elected from a non-Southern state that implemented both reforms sponsored, on average, an additional .61 local bills than a House member from a non-reform setting. Given that the number of local bill introductions was just over five prior to reform, this constitutes a 13 percent increase in the average member's legislative activity in this area.

It is worth noting that the effects of reform appear to have been mostly confined to non-Southern members. Differences between Southern members from reform and non-reform settings are substantively small and statistically insignificant, with two exceptions. The first is a sizeable uptick in private bill sponsorship among Southerners in states implementing the

Australian ballot. However, given that this effect does not persist when comparing Southerners from states implementing the Australian ballot and nominating primary and Southerners from non-reform settings, we view this result skeptically. The second is the statistically significant decrease in policy bill introductions among Southern members from states implementing both reforms. Past work by historians and political scientists (Kousser 1974; Argersinger 1980) argues that implementation of electoral system reforms in the South was designed to disenfranchise poor, illiterate and minority voters – strengthening rather than destabilizing entrenched party organizations. Thus, reform generated different incentives for non-Southern and Southern members, and it is not surprising that its effects of bill introductions are different.

*Comparing the effects of reform, constituency characteristics, institutional position and individual capacity and constraint*

The size and significance of our treatment effects indicate that electoral system reforms were a major cause of private bill introduction activity between 1880 and 1930, and perhaps a significant contributor to local bill introductions as well. Reform-based theories, however, do not require that other factors be irrelevant. Nor do alternative theories – which argue for the importance of electoral competition, constituency demands, institutional position and individual capacity and constraint – need imply that the effects of reforms were nil. Nonetheless, given that proponents of these and other theories claim primacy in debates over why members came to serve longer careers inside the House and other behaviors associated with the House’s transformation during this period, it is important to assess their relative effects on legislative entrepreneurship. To do this, we rely mostly on the matched subsamples of House members described in Table 1, which are preprocessed to minimize differences in covariate distributions.



Table 3 contains the results of six negative binomial regression models of non-Southern House members' bill sponsorship activity. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show the effects of ballot reform, constituency characteristics, institutional position and individual capacity and constraints on our three dependent variables – the number of private, local and policy bills introduced by members. These models use the Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the effects of ballot and primary reforms as well as our other explanatory variables on private, local and policy bill introductions. To ease our interpretation of these various effects, we have converted the coefficients in our models into more meaningful first differences in Table 5. We also ran similar models using our unmatched dataset of all House members serving in odd-numbered congresses between 1880 and 1930. The results of our models with and without fixed effects for particular congresses are included in the appendix.<sup>9</sup>

[Tables 3 and 5 about here]

The effects of electoral system reform are nearly identical to the differences reported in Table 2. Thus, adjusting for any remaining differences in covariates does not change our treatment effects. The coefficients for other variables in our models that use our Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset indicate that constituency characteristics, institutional

---

<sup>9</sup> The results of the analyses using our unmatched dataset are similar to those we report in this section. Thus, matching is not crucial to reach most of the conclusions we discuss here.

However, as we expected, the size of the effects for several variables are somewhat different. In particular, using unmatched data has the effect of reducing the size of the effect of electoral system reforms. For the reasons we discuss in the previous section, we have greater confidence in our estimates of the effects of reform and our other variables using our matched datasets.

Thus, we focus on these results in the remainder of the paper.

position and individual-level factors also affected House members' bill introduction proclivities. The positive coefficient for *Democratic Vote* in the private bills model, for example, indicates that members from states where Democrats were advantaged in statewide contests tended to introduce a larger number (1.61) of private bills. Interestingly, the coefficient for *Democratic Vote* is negative and significant for local bills (reducing by .37 the number of these bills introduced), suggesting that the partisanship of constituencies influenced the types of bills members chose to sponsor. The coefficient is not significant for policy bills, perhaps a reflection of the gradual realignment of both parties during this period (Brady 1973; Bense 2000).

Our measure of resident veterans is a powerful predictor of members' bill sponsorship activity. The coefficient for *Veterans Rank* is positive and significant in our private bills model, consistent with our expectation that members with large numbers of veterans in their district will respond with more private bills serving this constituency. Moving from the 25<sup>th</sup> to 75<sup>th</sup> percentile in veterans population – for example, from South Dakota with 2,620 veterans per congressional district to Delaware with 3,464 veterans per district in 1896 – increases the number of private bills introduced by 4.11. We did not expect this variable to be strongly associated with local and policy bill introductions. However, *Veterans Rank* has a negative effect on the number of local bill introductions, with a similar change in the veteran population yielding a reduction in the number of these bills introduced by .66.

The coefficients for *Industrial State*, which identifies members from states characterized by the highest levels of industrial activity, are negative and significant in all three models of bill sponsorship activity. Industrialization, historians argue, created the need for a coherent government response, particularly at the national level (Skowronek 1982). Based on these accounts, we would expect that members from industrial states would be more active sponsors of

all types of legislation. Presumably, legislative activism will be most highly valued by constituencies characterized by the industrial economies that required the attention of federal policy-makers. The results in Tables 3 and 5 contradict this hypothesis. Members from industrial states proposed 8.46 fewer private, 2.67 fewer local and .40 fewer policy bills. Overall, there is little evidence to support the claim that industrialization played a major role in spurring legislative entrepreneurship at the individual level.

Our results for *Majority Party*, *Seniority*, *Pension Committee* and *Committee Chair* indicate that the institutional position of members was a powerful catalyst of legislative entrepreneurship and worked to direct members' energies toward particular types of legislation. Not surprisingly, the House's senior members were the most active bill sponsors in every area of legislation. For example, a non-Southern member in his fourth term could be expected to sponsor 3.78 more private bills, .29 more local bills and .70 more policy bills than a freshman legislator. The latter effect is noteworthy; indeed, seniority has larger effects on policy bill introductions than any other variable in our models. These results are consistent with much scholarship that portrays the modernizing House and Senate as increasingly hierarchical places where more senior members take active roles in policy-making while junior members work to secure their districts, serve apprenticeships and bide their time in committee systems dominated by the seniority rule (Matthews 1960; Polsby 1968; and Schiller 1995).

Consistent with our expectations, members of the majority party proposed more of each type of bill, with the effects being most pronounced on local and policy bills. On these bills, which involved the distribution of limited resources and, on occasion, significant changes to status quo policies, the majority can be expected to wield its power to benefit its members and protect its control of the chamber (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Curiously, the

effect of majority status is weak on private bills; nor is there evidence that majority party members were consistently more successful in getting such bills reported and passed (Finocchiaro 2008). Our results suggest that pension and other private legislation may have been a universalistic (Weingast 1979; Wilson 1986) rather than a zero-sum resource distributed in the pursuit of partisan gains (e.g., rural free delivery routes; see Kernell and McDonald 1999).

The coefficients for our *Pension Committee* and *Committee Chair* variables confirm our intuitions about the effects of the committee system in steering the efforts of House members' bill introduction activity. Committee chairs and ranking members appear to be no more likely to introduce private or local bills (although see the results of the models using our Australian ballot + nominating primary matched dataset in Table 5 and our discussion below). These members could be expected to introduce, on average, .43 more policy bills than other members. Given that the average House member introduced 1.77 bills during this period, this constitutes a 24 percent increase in legislative activity in this area. The strong positive effect of membership on the Invalid Pensions and Pension Committees on private bill introductions is consistent with our expectations and testifies to the influence of both members' interests in particular committees and the institutional resources they provide on bill sponsorship activity.

Finally, our discussion would be remiss without highlighting the powerful effects that members' individual capacities and constraints could exert on their bill sponsorship choices. On the constraints side, our models offer powerful evidence that members' bill introduction activity was shaped by electoral competition in their districts. Consistent with our theoretical discussion above, incumbents from marginal districts were among the most active sponsors of private bills. Increasing the average member's previous margin of victory from five to 22 percent reduced the number of private bill introductions by 2.41. Given that the average House member in non-

reform settings introduced 19.01 bills during this period, this translates into a 12 percent reduction in legislative activity in this area. Such a change in House members' electoral circumstances might free up time and energy for pursuing other legislation. The same increase in margin of victory, for example, increases the number of local introduced by .42 and increases the number of policy bills introduced by .30.

Several indicators of capacity suggest that House members were doing more than blindly responding to the push and pull of constituency demands, electoral system incentives and institutional resources. Their interests in particular types of bills were shaped by past experiences. Not surprisingly, for example, members who served in the armed forces tended to be more active sponsors of private legislation. Perhaps more interesting are our results for two measures of members' previous political experiences. The first, *Previous Legislative Service*, is negatively associated with private bill and positively associated with policy bill introductions. Ex-state legislators and those with previous service in local councils exhibited greater interest in general legislation than their colleagues, sponsoring .32 more policy bills on average (an 18 percent increase over our baseline House member). The second, *Years Previous Experience*, has exactly the opposite effects – increasing private and reducing policy bill introductions.

It is tempting to read these results as confirmation that more professionalized members gravitated toward legislative activities likely to yield immediate and tangible payoffs, such as sponsoring pension and other private bills. MacKenzie (2011) demonstrates that professionalization among incoming members increased dramatically during this period. Thus, greater professionalization and legislative activity designed to cultivate personal votes go hand-in-hand. Meanwhile, those with the most inclination and proven ability to perform the hard work of drafting legislation to address the needs of local constituencies or, more importantly, improve

policies of a more general type might shoulder the House's responsibilities in these areas. Our measures of experience, however, are crude even though they improve on those used in previous studies. At the very least, our results confirm that studies of bill sponsorship need to take into account the policy interests of members. We encourage future scholarly efforts to do so.

The coefficients and first differences generated by our models that use our Australian ballot + nominating primary and non-reform matched dataset closely resemble those just described.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the consistency of our results across non-overlapping treatment groups indicates that our conclusions are not artifacts of the particular subsamples selected by the matching algorithm. It is also worth emphasizing that the matching algorithm used to construct our treatment and control subsamples ensures that in evaluating the effects of reform and other factors, we are not simultaneously comparing populations with very different age profiles, partisan compositions, electoral circumstances, regional memberships or previous political experiences. Rather than discuss the results of the three models using our Australian ballot + nominating primary and non-reform matched dataset, we invite the reader to inspect Tables 3 and 5, and move on to discuss our findings for House members from the South.

The negative binomial coefficients in Table 4, converted to more meaningful first differences in Table 6, bear only passing resemblance to those reported for non-Southern House members. Thus, our study joins legions of others in testifying to the exceptional nature of the House's Southern contingent and the system of politics from which they sprang. Some of the

---

<sup>10</sup> Differences include the smaller effects of *Seniority* and larger effects of *Committee Chair* using our Australian ballot + nominating primary and non-reform matched dataset. Our estimates of the effects of *Previous Legislative Experience* and *Years Previous Experience* are similar in magnitude, but are less precise than the first differences discussed in this section.

most important differences between Southern and non-Southern members are revealed in our model of private bill introductions. For the South, the size of the veteran population, majority status and membership on the Invalid Pensions or Pension Committees yielded the largest effects. But few Southerners sat on pension-related committees and their constituents were largely ineligible for benefits programs designed to serve veterans from the winning side. As we suggest above, Southerners were active in submitting private claims for war-related damages. But these bills were mostly rejected by the chamber's non-Southern majority.<sup>11</sup>

[Tables 4 and 6 about here]

Our results for local and policy bill introductions are consistent enough to support a few firm conclusions. First, very little appears to predict legislative activity on local policy bills. Second, on policy bills, electoral system reform and our measures of institutional position have the largest effects. Southern members from states implementing the Australian ballot, either by itself or with the nominating primary, introduced fewer policy bills than Southern members from non-reform settings. The decrease of .43 policy bills among Southerners in reform states represents a change of about 25 percent over the baseline Southerner from a non-reform setting.

Much previous congressional scholarship observes the facility with which the Southern contingent in the House and Senate made use of the committee system. Southerners often reached the House with greater levels of experience than their non-Southern counterparts and the "courthouse gangs" in these states managed to keep their congressmen in place for long enough periods to take advantage of the seniority norm. As our models show, Southern members

---

<sup>11</sup> One odd finding is the strong negative relationship between military service and private bill introductions, which might seem anomalous – except that our military service also identifies those who served in Confederate ranks. Apparently, old rivalries die hard.

introduced more policy bills (.71) when they were in the majority. Senior members of the Southern contingent sponsored more policy bills (.41) as did committee chairs (.50).

These findings are supported by and large by the models using our Australian ballot + nominating primary and non-reform matched dataset and similar analyses we performed on our unmatched dataset (see Table A2 in the appendix). Overall, they suggest that Southern members responded most to the institutional opportunities afforded to them by long service inside the chamber, majority status and the committee system. Their bill introduction proclivities do not reflect differences in individual capacity and constraint in the same way that those of non-Southern House members do. And the relationship between constituency characteristics and legislative entrepreneurship in the South appears to be lacking entirely.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, our results establish a clear link between several of the numerous electoral and societal changes playing out beyond the walls of Congress and the internal dynamics of legislative entrepreneurship in the House. Most impressive is the relationship between changes in electoral system rules, which governed members' pursuit of reelection and structured their relationships with party organizations and voters, and their legislative activities. The relationship is strongest between the implementation of the Australian ballot and members' activities in the area of private legislation. Theory provides ample reason to expect that the onset of these reforms would induce members to seek out new opportunities in Congress to develop personal relationships with voters. In handling constituents' requests for intervention on pension and other private matters (and, in several instances, passing laws to stoke such demands), legislators cultivated constituency relationships based on accessibility and trust rather than partisan and



ideological affinity. Such relationships could help members withstand uncertain national partisan tides and provide a firm foundation for building careers inside the chamber.

Since the growth in private legislation was the most important contributor to the House's increasing workload during this period, our results offer evidence of the crucial role played by electoral system reforms in congressional development during this formative period. The effects of reform on members' proclivities in sponsoring other types of bills are less certain. In particular, ballot and primary reforms do not appear to have increased or decreased House members' interest in or tendency to sponsor general policy proposals. Nor was there substantial growth in either local or policy bill introductions during this period.

Other factors contributed to House members' legislative activism and steered their energies toward particular bill types. Constituency demands, including the partisan composition of districts and the presence of large numbers of veterans inspired members to sponsor more private bills. Industrial activity, a key feature of the economic composition of legislators' districts, worked to depress House members' legislative entrepreneurship. This finding, at odds with theories that tie the modernization of the House to the external demands generated by the rise of industrialism, indicates that the relationship between changes in the economy and changes inside Congress is more complicated than previous studies have led scholars to believe.

Consistent with studies of cosponsorship in the modern Congress, members' individual capacity and constraint play a major role in directing members' legislative activities in the pre-modern House. We demonstrate the existence of a strong electoral connection during the 1880-1930 period, whereby members facing the most uncertain electoral prospects attempted to change their fates by focusing their legislative activity on private bills that would be most likely to yield immediate electoral payoffs. Such particularistic legislating could divert members'

attention from other types of lawmaking, in particular general policy bills. Members with the most political experience, acquired either inside the chamber or prior to entering the House, appeared to distribute their energies most strategically in this regard.

Our results also support accounts that give pride of place to aspects of the House's internal organization during this period. In particular, the ability of the majority party to pursue its legislative agenda unimpeded by the dilatory tactics of pre-Reed Rules congresses appears to have encouraged members to sponsor more bills, including more local and policy bills. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that the adoption of the Reed Rules occurred less than ten years after members secured the "prize" of unfettered opportunity to introduce their own bills for credit seeking and advertising purposes. The stabilizing of the House committee system following the 1910 revolt had the equally salutary effect of distributing the committee assignments that were crucial to members' hopes for legislative accomplishment according to predictable rules rather than the whims of heavy-handed Speakers. As our results verify, a member's institutional position was a major determinant of both the number and type of bills introduced.

In establishing these theoretical and empirical links between electoral system changes, institutional and individual-level attributes, and House members' incentives and capacities for legislative entrepreneurship, our results contribute to answering a question that has long occupied the attention of legislative scholars: how did an institution characterized by rank disorganization and inhabited by amateurs transform itself into a modern legislature, operated by seasoned political professionals under well-developed structures and rules, and capable of exercising independent policy-making? We believe additional progress can be made by examining legislators' activism and effectiveness at other stages of the legislative process, a project we hope to pursue in future studies.

## References

- Ainsworth, Scott. 1995. "Electoral Strength and the Emergence of Group Influence in the Late 1800s: The Grand Army of the Republic." *American Politics Quarterly* 23: 319-338.
- Argersinger, Peter H. 1980. "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws." *American Historical Review* 85(2): 287-306.
- Asher, Herbert B. 1973. "The Learning of Legislative Norms." *American Political Science Review* 67: 499-513.
- Bensel, Richard F. 2000. *The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bensel, Richard F. 2004. *The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bernhard, William and Brian R. Sala. 2006. "The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment and Ideological Responsiveness." *Journal of Politics* 68(2): 345-357.
- Bianco, William T., David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkerson. 1996. "The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 145-171.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brady, David W. 1973. *Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era: A Study of the McKinley Houses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Representatives*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Brady, David, Kara Buckley and Douglas Rivers. 1999. "The Roots of Careerism in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(4): 489-510.
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, James E. 1982. "Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7: 415-422.
- Canon, David T. and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The Evolution of the Committee System in Congress. In *Congress Reconsidered*. 7<sup>th</sup> Edition. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Carson, Jamie L., and Erik J. Engstrom. 2005. "Assessing the Electoral Connection: Evidence from the Early United States." *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 746-757.

- Clark, Champ. 1920. *My Quarter Century of American Politics*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Cooper, Joseph, and Cheryl D. Young. 1989. "Bill Introduction in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of Institutional Change." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14: 67-105.
- Cooper, Joseph, and Elizabeth Rybicki. 2002. Analyzing Institutional Change: Bill Introduction in the Nineteenth-Century Senate. In *U.S. Senate Exceptionalism*. Ed. Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
- Cover, Albert D. 1985. "The Electoral Impact of Franked Congressional Mail." *Polity* 17(4): 649-663.
- Cover, Albert D. and Bruce S. Brumberg. 1982. "Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion." *American Political Science Review* 76(2): 347-359.
- Cox, Gary W. and Jonathan N. Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Diamond, Alexis and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. 2010. "Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects." Unpublished manuscript.
- Engstrom, Erik J. and Samuel Kernell. 2005. "Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840-1940." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 531-549.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Finocchiaro, Charles J. 2008. "Credit Claiming, Party Politics, and the Rise of Legislative Entrepreneurship in the Postbellum Congress." Unpublished manuscript.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris P., David W. Rohde and Peter Wissel. 1975. "Historical Change in House Turnover." In *Congress in Change*. Ed. Norman Ornstein. New York: Praeger.
- Fowler, James. 2006. "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks." *Political Analysis* 14(4): 456-487.
- Gailmard, Sean and Jeffrey A. Jenkins. 2009. "Agency Problems, the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment, and Representation in the Senate." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 324-342.

- Hall, Richard L. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hill, Jeffrey S., and Kenneth C. Williams. 1993. "The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 1008-1031.
- Hinds, Asher C. 1907. *Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States*, Vol. 4. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2000. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell. 1981. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Johannes, John R. and John C. McAdams. 1981. "The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 512-542.
- Johnson, Kimberly S. 2007. *Governing the American State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Katz, Jonathan N. and Brian R. Sala. 1996. "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection." *American Political Science Review* 90(1): 21-33.
- Keller, Morton. 1977. *Affairs of State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1977. "Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers." *American Journal of Political Science* 21(4): 669-693.
- Kernell, Samuel. 2010. "To Stay or Quit? The Growth of Careerism in the House of Representatives from 1876 to 1940." Unpublished manuscript.
- Kernell, Samuel and Scott A. MacKenzie. 2011. "From Political Careers to Career Politicians." Presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2011.
- Kernell, Samuel and Michael P. McDonald. 1999. "Congress and America's Political Development: The Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Service." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 792-811.
- Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. "Dynamics of Cosponsorship." *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 555-566.
- Kingdon, John W. 1973. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Koger, Gregory. 2003. "Position-Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28: 225-246.
- Kousser, J. Morgan. 1974. *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- La Follette, Robert M. 1913. *La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences*. Madison, WI: The Robert M. La Follette Co.
- Maltzman, Forrest and Lee Sigelman. 1996. "The Politics of Talk: Unconstrained Floor Time in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Journal of Politics* 58(3): 819-830.
- MacKenzie, Scott A. 2011. "Life Before Congress: Using Pre-Congressional Experience to Test Competing Explanations for the Modern House Career." Presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, September 2011.
- Matthews, Donald R. 1960. *U.S. Senators and Their World*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Meinke, Scott R. 2008. "Institutional Change and the Electoral Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects of Direct Election." *Political Research Quarterly* 61: 445-457.
- Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62(1): 144-168.
- Price, Douglas. 1971. The Congressional Career: Then and Now. In *Congressional Behavior*. Nelson Polsby, Ed. New York: Random House.
- Price, Douglas. 1975. Congress and the Evolution of Legislative Professionalism. In *Congress in Change*. Norman Ornstein, Ed. New York: Praeger.
- Ragsdale, Lyn and T. E. Cook. 1987. "Representatives' Actions and Challengers' Reactions: Limits to Candidate Connections in the House." *American Journal of Political Science* 31: 45-81.
- Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Rosenbaum, P. R. and Donald B. Rubin. 1973. "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects." *Biometrika* 70(1): 41-55.
- Rusk, Jerrold G. 1970. "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908." *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1220-1238.
- Schickler, Eric. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schiller, Wendy J. 1995. "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 186-203.
- Schiller, Wendy J. 2006. "Building Careers and Courting Constituents: U.S. Senate Representation 1889-1924." *Studies in American Political Development* 20: 185-197.
- Sekhon, Jasjeet S. 2011. "Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance Optimization." *Journal of Statistical Software* 42(7): 1-52.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stuart, Elizabeth A. and Donald B. Rubin. 2008. Best Practices in Quasi-Experimental Designs: Why Matched Subjects Designs are Superior to ANCOVA. In *Best Practices in Quantitative Methods*. Jason W. Osborne, Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Ware, Alan. 2002. *The American Direct Primary*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wawro, Gregory. 2000. *Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1979. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 245-262.
- White, Leonard D. 1958. *The Republican Era*. New York: The Free Press.
- Wilson, Rick K. 1986. "An Empirical Test of Preferences for the Political Pork Barrel: District Level Appropriations for River and Harbor Legislation, 1889-1913." *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 729-754.
- Wilson, Rick K., and Cheryl D. Young. 1997. "Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 25-43.
- Wittrock, Jill N., Stephen C. Nemeth, Howard Sanborn, Brian DiSarro and Peverill Squire. 2008. "The Impact of the Australian Ballot on Member Behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Political Research Quarterly* 61(3): 434-444.

**Table 1.**  
**Comparing Member Characteristics in Reform and Non-Reform Settings**

Treatment = Australian Ballot								
	Before Matching				After Matching			
	Treated	Control	Mean Diff. <sup>a</sup>	KS <sup>b</sup> p-value	Treated	Control	Mean Diff. <sup>a</sup>	KS <sup>b</sup> p-value
Dem. Vote	50.70	57.85	-59.36	0.000	50.70	50.76	-0.49	0.000
Veterans Rank	30.57	24.03	56.71	0.000	30.57	30.07	4.31	0.000
Industrial State	0.42	0.38	9.53	0.011	0.42	0.43	-0.68	0.058
Elect. Margin	20.02	24.25	-21.48	0.000	20.02	18.79	6.23	0.097
Majority Party	0.62	0.54	18.10	0.000	0.62	0.62	0.00	1.000
Seniority	3.04	2.75	12.05	0.027	3.04	2.94	3.94	0.224
Pension Com.	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.975	0.08	0.07	0.49	0.157
Com. Chair	0.32	0.35	-5.91	0.125	0.32	0.32	-0.57	0.345
Age	49.40	48.90	5.30	0.413	49.40	48.84	5.94	0.127
Prev. Legis.	0.45	0.54	-17.72	0.000	0.45	0.47	-2.70	0.049
Yrs. Prev. Exp.	6.66	7.39	-10.60	0.003	6.66	6.47	2.72	0.116
South	0.15	0.36	-55.11	0.000	0.15	0.15	0.00	1.000

Treatment = Australian Ballot + Nominating Primary								
	Before Matching				After Matching			
	Treated	Control	Mean Diff. <sup>a</sup>	KS <sup>b</sup> p-value	Treated	Control	Mean Diff. <sup>a</sup>	KS <sup>b</sup> p-value
Dem. Vote	53.41	57.85	-26.88	0.000	53.41	54.37	-5.83	0.000
Veterans Rank	28.06	24.03	32.67	0.000	28.06	27.69	3.03	0.000
Industrial State	0.37	0.38	-0.41	0.905	0.37	0.38	-1.68	0.000
Elect. Margin	33.23	24.25	30.48	0.000	33.23	29.55	12.48	0.000
Majority Party	0.60	0.54	13.96	0.000	0.60	0.60	0.00	1.000
Seniority	3.89	2.75	40.31	0.000	3.89	3.35	19.26	0.000
Pension Com.	0.07	0.07	-1.33	0.707	0.07	0.05	9.74	0.000
Com. Chair	0.27	0.35	-17.04	0.000	0.27	0.28	-1.41	0.034
Age	51.65	48.90	28.74	0.000	51.65	51.29	3.72	0.025
Prev. Legis.	0.44	0.54	-21.00	0.000	0.44	0.47	-6.21	0.000
Yrs. Prev. Exp.	9.04	7.39	19.71	0.000	9.04	7.76	15.35	0.000
South	0.21	0.36	-34.78	0.000	0.21	0.21	0.00	1.000

<sup>a</sup> Figures in the Mean Diff. columns are standardized differences between treatment and control observations multiplied by 100 – i.e., 100 times the mean difference between treatment and control units divided by the standard deviation of the treatment observations.

<sup>b</sup> Figures in the KS p-value columns are bootstrapped p-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, which test for differences across entire distributions. For categorical variables, this is equivalent to a t-test of difference of means. These results do not change if one instead uses a t-test of differences of means instead of a KS test.



**Table 2.**  
**Average Effects of Electoral System Reform**

	Treatment = Australian Ballot				Treatment = Ballot + Nominating Primary			
	Obs	Mean	Diff. / (S.E.)	Sig.	Obs	Mean	Diff.	Sig.
<i>Private Bills</i>								
Non-Reform Settings (NS)	1249	24.28	15.96 / (1.43)	**	1723	24.72	12.17 / (1.09)	**
Reform Settings (NS)	1249	40.24			1723	36.90		
Non-Reform Settings (S)	237	22.11	26.90 / (5.40)	**	480	19.63	0.21 / (2.16)	
Reform Settings (S)	237	49.01			480	19.84		
<i>Local Bills</i>								
Non-Reform Settings (NS)	1249	4.19	0.24 / (0.22)		1723	4.57	0.61 / (0.22)	**
Reform Settings (NS)	1249	4.21			1723	5.18		
Non-Reform Settings (S)	237	5.60	0.08 / (0.52)		480	6.53	-0.93 / (0.50)	
Reform Settings (S)	237	5.69			480	5.60		
<i>Policy Bills</i>								
Non-Reform Settings (NS)	1249	2.26	0.17 / (0.15)		1723	2.48	-0.17 / (0.15)	
Reform Settings (NS)	1249	2.08			1723	2.31		
Non-Reform Settings (S)	237	2.70	-0.55 / (0.34)		480	2.35	-0.40 / (0.20)	*
Reform Settings (S)	237	2.14			480	1.94		

Note: Numbers in “Diff. / (S.E.)” columns are mean differences with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of bills introduced by House members. Two-group t-tests were conducted for pairs in the left-hand column.

\*\* indicates  $p < .05$ ; \* indicates  $p < .10$ .

**Table 3.**  
**Count Models of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**Non-South (Matched)**

	Treatment = Australian Ballot			Treatment = Ballot + Primary		
	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	<b>0.013</b> (.004)	<b>-0.023</b> (.006)	0.008 (.008)	<b>0.013</b> (.004)	<b>-0.019</b> (.006)	0.000 (.006)
Industrial State	<b>-0.367</b> (.052)	<b>-0.743</b> (.075)	<b>-0.205</b> (.101)	<b>-0.191</b> (.050)	<b>-0.620</b> (.069)	<b>-0.253</b> (0.089)
Veterans Rank	<b>0.018</b> (.003)	<b>-0.022</b> (.004)	-0.007 (.005)	<b>0.021</b> (.003)	<b>-0.024</b> (.004)	<b>-0.017</b> (.005)
Ballot	<b>0.543</b> (.053)	0.084 (.074)	-0.109 (.095)			
Ballot + Primary				<b>0.439</b> (.054)	0.125 (.078)	-0.148 (.095)
Electoral Margin	<b>-0.007</b> (.003)	<b>0.010</b> (.004)	0.009 (.006)	<b>-0.006</b> (.001)	0.003 (.002)	0.004 (.004)
Majority Party	0.032 (.072)	<b>0.322</b> (.088)	0.183 (.123)	0.019 (.067)	<b>0.225</b> (.079)	<b>0.321</b> (.116)
Majority * Margin	0.006 (.003)	-0.006 (.005)	-0.005 (.007)	<u>0.004</u> (.002)	-0.001 (.002)	-0.001 (.004)
Seniority	<b>0.062</b> (.016)	<u>0.039</u> (.021)	<b>0.123</b> (.023)	0.013 (.013)	<u>0.028</u> (.015)	<b>0.080</b> (.020)
Pension Committee	<b>0.397</b> (.102)	<b>-0.447</b> (.109)	<b>-0.489</b> (.164)	<b>0.340</b> (.091)	<b>-0.371</b> (.107)	<b>-0.406</b> (.202)
Committee Chair	-0.018 (.061)	0.001 (.080)	<b>0.214</b> (.108)	<b>0.165</b> (.049)	<b>0.227</b> (.083)	<b>0.406</b> (.106)
Age	<u>0.043</u> (.026)	0.044 (.036)	<b>0.122</b> (.047)	0.026 (.022)	0.015 (.035)	<u>0.065</u> (.035)
Age * Age	<b>-0.005</b> (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	<b>-0.001</b> (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	<b>-0.000</b> (.000)
Military Service	<b>0.175</b> (.057)	0.144 (.092)	0.036 (.112)	<b>0.218</b> (.059)	0.138 (.086)	0.096 (.120)
Previous Legislative Experience	<b>-0.120</b> (.056)	0.072 (.077)	<u>0.171</u> (.097)	-0.073 (.053)	-0.031 (.075)	0.118 (.110)
Years Previous Experience	<b>0.011</b> (.004)	0.004 (.006)	<b>-0.021</b> (.007)	-0.000 (.003)	0.005 (.005)	-0.011 (.007)
Constant	0.983 (.682)	<b>2.171</b> (.881)	<b>-2.656</b> (1.297)	<u>1.345</u> (.698)	<b>2.850</b> (1.062)	-0.515 (.991)
N	2498	2498	2498	3446	3446	3446
Groups	1177	1177	1177	1376	1376	1376
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	273.95	152.30	87.40	208.72	200.28	100.00

Dependent variable is a count of bills introduced (member-congress obs.). Cluster standard errors in parentheses. Boldface p < .05. Underline p < .10.

**Table 4.**  
**Count Models of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**South (Matched)**

	Treatment = Australian Ballot			Treatment = Ballot + Primary		
	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	<b>0.022</b> (.006)	<b>0.011</b> (.005)	-0.012 (.007)	0.010 (.006)	0.003 (.005)	0.000 (.006)
Veterans Rank	<b>0.127</b> (.019)	<b>0.058</b> (.016)	0.036 (.022)	<b>0.076</b> (.017)	<b>0.031</b> (.011)	0.025 (.015)
Ballot	0.150 (.148)	-0.126 (.111)	<b>-0.322</b> (.164)			
Ballot + Primary				<b>-0.342</b> (.153)	-0.241 (.155)	<u>-0.264</u> (.145)
Electoral Margin	0.000 (.002)	0.003 (.002)	0.000 (.002)	0.001 (.002)	<b>0.005</b> (.002)	0.000 (.002)
Majority Party	<u>0.533</u> (.295)	<b>0.382</b> (.186)	<b>0.552</b> (.243)	<b>0.655</b> (.262)	0.172 (.193)	0.355 (.258)
Majority * Margin	-0.002 (.006)	<b>-0.010</b> (.004)	-0.007 (.005)	<b>-0.012</b> (.003)	-0.004 (.003)	-0.001 (.003)
Seniority	0.037 (.046)	<u>0.066</u> (.036)	<u>0.093</u> (.048)	0.017 (.036)	0.022 (.030)	<b>0.080</b> (.034)
Pension Committee	<b>0.601</b> (.270)	0.257 (.207)	0.194 (.287)	0.585 (.468)	0.091 (.290)	0.236 (.245)
Committee Chair	0.149 (.133)	0.049 (.124)	<u>0.297</u> (.164)	<u>0.275</u> (.144)	0.149 (.135)	0.189 (.140)
Age	-0.066 (.062)	0.036 (.061)	-0.009 (.093)	-0.055 (.066)	0.001 (.048)	0.040 (.076)
Age * Age	0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	0.000 (.000)	0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)
Military Service	<b>-0.543</b> (.165)	-0.116 (.140)	0.050 (.207)	-0.036 (.168)	-0.243 (.176)	-0.055 (.152)
Previous Legislative Experience	-0.081 (.165)	0.054 (.132)	-0.255 (.177)	0.076 (.165)	-0.005 (.163)	-0.205 (.137)
Years Previous Experience	0.008 (.012)	<b>-0.026</b> (.010)	-0.013 (.011)	-0.000 (.010)	<b>-0.021</b> (.011)	-0.010 (.009)
Constant	1.293 (1.693)	-0.689 (1.546)	1.572 (2.417)	<u>2.837</u> (1.72)	0.860 (1.296)	-0.330 (2.068)
<i>N</i>	474	474	474	960	960	960
Groups	252	252	252	355	355	355
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	119.40	40.18	54.89	50.17	45.77	33.79

Dependent variable is a count of bills introduced (member-congress obs.). Cluster standard errors in parentheses. Boldface  $p < .05$ . Underline  $p < .10$ .

**Table 5.**  
**First Difference Estimates of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**Non-South (Matched)**

Changing this ...	From	To <sup>a</sup>	Changes the number of this type of bill introductions by ...					
			Treatment = Australian Ballot			Treatment = Ballot + Primary		
			PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	43.69	50.12	<b>1.61</b>	<b>-0.37</b>	0.09	<b>1.94</b>	<b>-0.34</b>	0.00
Industrial State	No	Yes	<b>-8.46</b>	<b>-2.67</b>	<b>-0.40</b>	<b>-4.54</b>	<b>-2.29</b>	<b>-0.51</b>
Veterans Rank	28	40	<b>4.11</b>	<b>-0.66</b>	-0.17	<b>5.61</b>	<b>-0.79</b>	<b>-0.39</b>
Ballot	No	Yes	<b>13.70</b>	0.20	-0.19			
Ballot + Primary	No	Yes				<b>12.15</b>	0.35	-0.24
Electoral Margin	5	22	<b>-2.41</b>	<b>0.42</b>	0.30	<b>-2.23</b>	0.18	0.13
Majority Party <sup>b</sup>	No	Yes	<u>1.80</u>	<b>0.53</b>	0.19	1.54	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.48</b>
Seniority	1	4	<b>3.78</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.70</b>	1.00	<u>0.23</u>	<b>0.46</b>
Pension Comm.	No	Yes	<b>9.47</b>	<b>-0.86</b>	<b>-0.67</b>	<b>9.11</b>	<b>-0.82</b>	<b>-0.69</b>
Committee Chair	No	Yes	-0.37	0.00	<b>0.43</b>	<b>4.02</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.93</b>
Age <sup>b</sup>	43	55	<b>-2.07</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	-0.05	<u>-1.77</u>	<u>-0.22</u>	-0.10
Military Service	No	Yes	<b>3.62</b>	0.38	0.06	<b>5.38</b>	0.39	0.19
Prev. Leg. Exp.	No	Yes	<b>-2.12</b>	0.18	<u>0.32</u>	-1.52	-0.08	0.23
Years Prev. Exp.	1	9	<b>1.72</b>	0.08	<b>-0.30</b>	-0.05	0.11	-0.16
Baseline			19.01	2.42	1.77	22.06	2.67	1.82

Baseline number of introductions generated from the models in Table 3 setting Ballot / Ballot + Primary to “No,” and other variables to their median values in the Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset. Boldface indicates differences are significant at the .05 level. Underline indicates differences are significant at the .10 level. Expected value of bill introduction figures and first differences generated using CLARIFY (King et al. 2000).

<sup>(a)</sup> For continuous variables, values are the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset.

<sup>(b)</sup> First differences reported for majority party also include the effects of changing majority \* margin from 0 to 11. First differences reported for age also include the effects of changing age \* age from 1849 to 3025.

**Table 6.**  
**First Difference Estimates of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**South (Matched)**


Changing this ...	From	To <sup>a</sup>	Changes the number of this type of bill introductions by ...					
			Treatment = Australian Ballot			Treatment = Ballot + Primary		
			PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	46.29	70.29	<b>8.56</b>	<b>0.99</b>	-0.53	2.67	0.37	-0.00
Veterans Rank	8	16	<b>26.00</b>	<b>2.08</b>	0.44	<b>9.17</b>	<b>1.38</b>	0.40
Ballot	No	Yes	3.38	-0.50	<b>-0.40</b>			
Ballot + Primary	No	Yes				<b>-3.97</b>	-1.22	<b>-0.43</b>
Electoral Margin	17	55	0.11	0.56	0.00	0.78	<b>1.10</b>	0.04
Majority Party <sup>b</sup>	No	Yes	<b>13.08</b>	0.20	<b>0.71</b>	5.64	0.05	<u>0.64</u>
Seniority	2	5	2.31	0.86	<u>0.41</u>	0.76	0.38	<b>0.47</b>
Pension Comm.	No	Yes	<b>18.75</b>	1.34	0.33	13.14	0.96	0.56
Committee Chair	No	Yes	3.05	0.19	0.50	<u>4.30</u>	0.77	0.37
Age <sup>b</sup>	42	54	3.88	-0.26	-0.18	-1.80	0.61	-0.33
Military Service	No	Yes	<b>-8.98</b>	-0.44	0.07	-0.47	-1.22	-0.09
Prev. Leg. Exp.	No	Yes	-1.70	0.24	-0.40	0.96	0.05	-0.41
Years Prev. Exp.	1	11	1.75	<b>-1.12</b>	-0.20	-0.15	<b>-1.27</b>	-0.18
Baseline			21.08	4.17	1.43	13.64	5.28	1.81

Baseline number of introductions generated from the models in Table 4 setting Ballot / Ballot + Primary to “No,” and other variables to their median values in the Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset. Boldface indicates differences are significant at the .05 level. Underline indicates differences are significant at the .10 level. Expected value of bill introduction figures and first differences generated using CLARIFY (King et al. 2000).


<sup>(a)</sup> For continuous variables, values are the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the Australian ballot and non-reform matched dataset.

<sup>(b)</sup> First differences reported for majority party also include the effects of changing majority \* margin from 0 to 11. First differences reported for age also include the effects of changing age \* age from 1849 to 3025.



**Figure 1.**  
**Bill Introductions in the U.S. House, 1880-1930**



**Figure 2.**  
**Introductions by Bill Type, 1880-1930**



**Figure 3.**  
**Empirical Q-Q Plots of “Electoral Margin”**



## Appendix: Classification of Bill Types

*Private bills* – include those measures referred to the following committees that predominantly, if not exclusively, handle private claims

- Claims (most private and domestic claims not war-related)
- Invalid Pensions (pensions of Civil War veterans and their dependents)
- Military Affairs (dealing mostly with changes/corrections to individuals' military service records)
- Naval Affairs
- Pensions (pensions of veterans of all other conflicts and their dependents)
- Private Land Claims
- Revolutionary Claims
- Revolutionary Pensions (pensions of Revolutionary War veterans and their dependents)
- War Claims

*Local bills* – include those measures referred to the following committees whose jurisdictions typically or frequently encompass bills with more diffuse benefits than exhibited in private legislation but nonetheless restricted to a narrow geographic area

- Commerce/ Interstate and Foreign Commerce (many bills involving local bridge construction and coastal water safety)
- Indian Affairs
- Irrigation and Reclamation/Irrigation of Arid Lands
- Judiciary (many bills of a local or regional nature dealing with specific district court issues, involving incorporation, etc.)
- Library
- Merchant Marine and Fisheries
- Public Buildings and Grounds
- Public Lands
- Rivers and Harbors
- Territories

*Policy bills* – include measures referred to the following committees that ordinarily deal with national level policymaking and salient political issues

- Agriculture
- Appropriations
- Banking and Currency
- Coinage, Weights, and Measures
- District of Columbia
- Foreign Affairs
- Immigration and Naturalization
- Post Office and Post Roads
- Reform in the Civil Service
- Ways and Means



**Table A1.**  
**Count Models of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**Non-South (Unmatched)**

	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	<b>0.011</b> (.003)	<b>-0.010</b> (.004)	-0.001 (.005)	<b>0.020</b> (.003)	<u>-0.008</u> (.004)	0.001 (.005)
Industrial State	<b>-0.220</b> (.041)	<b>-0.652</b> (.049)	<b>-0.298</b> (.072)	<b>-0.218</b> (.039)	<b>-0.650</b> (.049)	<b>-0.292</b> (.072)
Veterans Rank	<b>0.024</b> (.002)	<b>-0.025</b> (.002)	<b>-0.013</b> (.003)	<b>0.024</b> (.002)	<b>-0.025</b> (.002)	<b>-0.013</b> (.003)
Ballot	<b>0.421</b> (.038)	<b>0.108</b> (.053)	-0.102 (.073)	<b>0.392</b> (.096)	0.061 (.116)	0.067 (.171)
Electoral Margin	<b>-0.006</b> (.001)	<b>0.004</b> (.002)	0.005 (.003)	<b>-0.004</b> (.001)	<b>0.005</b> (.002)	<u>0.006</u> (.003)
Majority Party	<b>0.118</b> (.051)	<b>0.233</b> (.058)	<b>0.352</b> (.087)	<b>0.107</b> (.045)	<b>0.205</b> (.057)	<b>0.333</b> (.087)
Majority * Margin	<b>0.004</b> (.002)	-0.001 (.002)	-0.004 (.003)	<u>0.003</u> (.002)	-0.003 (.002)	-0.005 (.003)
Seniority	<b>0.032</b> (.009)	<b>0.053</b> (.013)	<b>0.119</b> (.015)	<b>0.023</b> (.009)	<b>0.048</b> (.013)	<b>0.116</b> (.015)
Pension Committee	<b>0.497</b> (.079)	<b>-0.233</b> (.072)	<b>-0.382</b> (.157)	<b>0.288</b> (.063)	<b>-0.224</b> (.073)	<b>-0.391</b> (.146)
Committee Chair	0.041 (.038)	<b>0.160</b> (.051)	<b>0.313</b> (.072)	<b>0.074</b> (.035)	<b>0.181</b> (.052)	<b>0.335</b> (.073)
Age	<u>0.030</u> (.016)	0.007 (.029)	<b>0.085</b> (.028)	<b>0.041</b> (.014)	0.009 (.029)	<b>0.087</b> (.028)
Age * Age	<b>-0.000</b> (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	<b>-0.000</b> (.000)	<b>-0.000</b> (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	<b>-0.000</b> (.000)
Military Service	<b>0.094</b> (.047)	0.053 (.060)	0.134 (.082)	<b>0.135</b> (.045)	0.073 (.059)	0.135 (.083)
Previous Legislative Experience	-0.039 (.042)	-0.023 (.053)	<b>0.197</b> (.077)	-0.046 (.041)	-0.031 (.052)	<b>0.193</b> (.077)
Years Previous Experience	-0.000 (.002)	0.003 (.004)	<u>-0.011</u> (.006)	-0.000 (.002)	0.003 (.004)	<u>-0.011</u> (.006)
Constant	<b>1.233</b> (.473)	<b>2.623</b> (.768)	-1.021 (.782)	0.223 (.481)	<b>2.272</b> (0.771)	<b>-1.680</b> (.812)
<i>N</i>	3577	3577	3577	3577	3577	3577
Groups	2027	2027	2027	2027	2027	2027
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	432.81	376.42	170.07	1123.89	549.30	213.70
f.e.s	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Dependent variable is a count of bills introduced (member-congress obs.). Cluster standard errors in parentheses. Boldface  $p < .05$ . Underline  $p < .10$ .

**Table A2.**  
**Count Models of Private, Local and Policy Bills Introduced,**  
**South (Matched)**

	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY	PRIVATE	LOCAL	POLICY
Democratic Vote	<b>0.010</b> (.004)	0.005 (.003)	-0.000 (.004)	.005 (.004)	<u>0.007</u> (.003)	-0.000 (.004)
Veterans Rank	<b>0.085</b> (.014)	<b>0.031</b> (.009)	<b>0.025</b> (.012)	<b>0.088</b> (.011)	<b>0.034</b> (.009)	<b>0.028</b> (.012)
Ballot	-0.079 (.117)	-0.062 (.076)	<b>-0.358</b> (.112)	<b>-0.313</b> (.125)	-0.077 (.105)	<b>-0.413</b> (.147)
Electoral Margin	-0.003 (.002)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.002)	<u>-0.003</u> (.001)	0.000 (.001)	0.002 (.002)
Majority Party	0.063 (.158)	-0.033 (.108)	<b>0.306</b> (.141)	<u>0.275</u> (.142)	0.144 (.122)	<b>0.365</b> (.171)
Majority * Margin	<u>-0.004</u> (.002)	-0.002 (.001)	-0.002 (.002)	0.000 (.002)	-0.001 (.002)	<u>-0.005</u> (.003)
Seniority	0.010 (.027)	0.025 (.020)	<b>0.084</b> (.027)	0.005 (.024)	0.017 (.021)	<b>0.082</b> (.027)
Pension Committee	<u>0.494</u> (.256)	0.144 (.155)	0.058 (.173)	0.270 (.170)	0.085 (.141)	0.061 (.174)
Committee Chair	0.142 (.089)	0.103 (.071)	<b>0.240</b> (.095)	<b>0.192</b> (.078)	<b>0.144</b> (.071)	<b>0.231</b> (.090)
Age	-0.027 (.050)	-0.005 (.029)	-0.001 (.055)	0.035 (.038)	0.013 (.028)	0.008 (.053)
Age * Age	0.000 (.000)	0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)
Military Service	-0.042 (.130)	-0.098 (.097)	-0.057 (.126)	<b>0.228</b> (.116)	-0.015 (.105)	-0.041 (.132)
Previous Legislative Experience	-0.005 (.137)	-0.061 (.093)	-0.181 (.117)	-0.094 (.122)	-0.070 (.090)	<u>-0.203</u> (.115)
Years Previous Experience	-0.012 (.009)	<b>-0.015</b> (.006)	-0.007 (.007)	-0.006 (.007)	<b>-0.014</b> (.006)	-0.005 (.007)
Constant	<u>2.322</u> (1.298)	1.023 (.799)	0.583 (1.474)	0.183 (1.037)	0.112 (.776)	0.046 (1.430)
<i>N</i>	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165
Groups	540	540	540	540	540	540
Wald X <sup>2</sup>	106.69	54.47	55.71	457.91	156.67	93.23
f.e.s	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Dependent variable is a count of bills introduced (member-congress obs.). Cluster standard errors in parentheses. Boldface  $p < .05$ . Underline  $p < .10$ .