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Rousseau's Practical Philosophy: Applying a Standard of Right to Poland and Corsica

“And, therefore, when he was afterwards asked if he had left the Athenians the best laws that could be given, he replied, ‘The best they could receive’”(Plutarch, *Life of Solon*:115)

In this paper, I investigate how Rousseau engages in practical philosophy in *Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation* and his *Constitutional Project for Corsica*. I begin by stating some particular problems for practical philosophy that Rousseau describes in a work concerned with his native home of Geneva:

for the force of the laws has its measure, and the force of the vices that they repress has one too. It is only after one has compared these two quantities and found that the former surpasses the latter that the execution of the laws can be depended upon. The knowledge of these relations constitutes the true legislator’s science. For if it had to do only with publishing edict after edict, regulation after regulation, to remedy abuses as they arise, doubtless many very fine things would be said, but which, for the most part, would remain without effect and would serve as indications of what would need to be done rather than as means toward executing it. On the whole, the institution of laws is not such a marvelous thing that any man of sense and equity could not easily find those which, well observed, would be the most beneficial for society. Where is the least student of the law who cannot erect a moral code as pure as that of Plato’s laws? But this is not the only issue. The problem is to adapt this code to the people for which it is made and to the things about which it decrees to such an extent that its execution follows from the very conjunction of these relations; it is to impose on the people, after the fashion of Solon, less the best laws in themselves than the best of which it admits in the given situation. Otherwise, it is better to let the disorders subsist than to forestall them, or take steps thereto, by laws which will not be observed. For without remedying the evil, this degrades the laws too.

(Rousseau, *Letter to d’Alembert*:66)

While it seems as if Rousseau praises the brilliance of ancient legislators throughout his works, here this praise is qualified. He differentiates the art of practical philosophy from any attempt to instantiate ideal laws. Typically, ancient legislators such as Lycurgus are praised for the unchanging and perfect nature of their laws. Counter to what we might expect, Rousseau argues that this type of legislation is not in itself difficult, “the institution of laws is not such a marvelous thing”

and can be done by “any man of sense and equity.” In fact, there is a problem with creating a perfectly immutable code of laws, as this very rigidity hastens the death of states.

The real art of politics lies in practice, and Rousseau instead points us toward an ancient legislator, Solon, who worked under untenable conditions. His use here is telling, as Solon established laws that Rousseau says were not “the best laws in themselves” but the “best of which it admits in the given situation.” Adaptability of laws is a core concern of palliative measures, not an attempt to bring all relations back in line with the original perfection of the laws. This idea of adaptability, in which the state is not simply trying once again to reach perfection but is instead trying to pursue the best possible practices given the situation, lowers the requirements for practice. Yet, as Rousseau points out, there is a systematic approach, a “science,” to adaptability that is required so that problems are not exacerbated by haphazard legislation. The science is the systematic application of the standard of political right.

Given his attention to the principles of political right and the acknowledgement that every society will necessarily be instituted imperfectly, it is understandable that many interpreters come away from Rousseau’s work with the idea that the state can do nothing but decline and die. However, Rousseau makes clear that if we set our goals correctly, it is possible at the very least to stave off that decline and death. Rousseau claims that “to succeed one must not attempt the impossible, nor flatter oneself that the work of men can be endowed with a solidity human things do not allow for;” however, it is still within men’s “capacity to prolong the State’s life as far as possible by giving it the best constitution it can have. Even the best constituted State will end, but later than another, if no unforeseen accident brings about its doom before its time” (Rousseau, *SC* III.11:109). Durability is an overriding concern in institutional design, but this term might mean something different than we might think. Initial perfection does not constitute durability so much as adaptability does; “if we want to form a lasting establishment, let us therefore not dream of making it eternal” (Rousseau, *SC* III.11:109). As I try to show, a theory of adaptability implies that

Rousseau is not solely concerned with slowing down decline, but that there is a glimmer of hope besides. Progress, to some extent, is possible.

Mere maintenance of the state does not constitute the limit of the possible for Rousseau: there is a practical theory embedded in the *Social Contract* for which progressive institutional change is possible, and we see some of these ideas come to fruition in his tracts on *Poland* and *Corsica*. Recall that in the *Social Contract*, his treatise on political right, Rousseau claims that the examples from history that we have of the best constituted states, which are undoubtedly still imperfectly constituted in his estimation, can give us purchase on what is possible. Rousseau asks us to “let us consider what can be done in light of what has been done” and posits that “the inference from what is to what is possible seems...sound” (Rousseau, *Social Contract* III.12:110). We can start with something that exists or has existed, and despite its imperfections, build something out of it if we have the proper attention to right when we are making changes in laws.

This methodological assumption about the possibilities of politics connects what Rousseau is doing in the constitutional projects for Poland and Corsica more clearly to his theoretical work in the *Social Contract*. There is a theoretical basis for Rousseau’s practical prescriptions that exists beyond a specific reckoning of each nation’s time and conditions. Instead, it relies on the conscious combination of principles of political right with maxims of politics. Understanding this commitment to melding two seemingly irreconcilable things, something universal with something utterly changeable, constitutes a practical philosophy. Thus, Rousseau’s practical philosophy is not solely seen in his practical political tracts¹ like *Poland* and *Corsica* but also has a solid basis in his theoretical works like the *Social Contract*.

¹ These works were comprised as a response to Rousseau’s political theory itself: “in each case, Rousseau’s work was written in response to a request from the people in question, though with respect to Corsica that request was prompted by Rousseau’s reference in the *Social Contract* to this island as the one country in Europe fit to receive legislation” (Plattner 1997:191). This may make one ask the extent to which Rousseau saw these works as part of a practical philosophy if they were not initiated by him, but keep in mind that there were other works concerned with changing real

In the work that follows, I show the extent to which a practical theory that is rooted in his abstract political theory is systematically applied to these nations. I explore how the changes that Rousseau advises for Poland and Corsica fall in line with Rousseau's desire both to use right as a normative standard, which at times requires a lowering or tempering of institutions, and a raising of the citizenry up to the baseline needed for self-legislation. This education is oriented toward magnifying and making politically salutary the motivational principles of human behavior (e.g. channeling *amour-propre*) rather than facilitating mass enlightenment. Further, I argue that any changes that deviate from his preferred prescriptive measures tend to do so in the sense of a permissive law, that is, a temporary concession that allows for a dilution of right. Rousseau does not advise measures contrary to right that are meant to be permanent. Contradictory laws are allowances necessitated by the inability to make changes all at once given the current state of positive law and international relations with respect to each country.

The work that I am doing here draws two main conclusions: first, Rousseau's practical prescriptions in the *Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation* and his *Constitutional Project for Corsica* are not merely undesirable concessions to historical contingencies but are in fact applications of a more capacious view of the practical philosophy that can be reconstructed from Rousseau's abstract political theory; and second, that this practical philosophy, even when applied to Poland and Corsica, relies far more heavily upon changing institutions, as opposed to making perfect citizens, than is typically thought.

General Aspects of Practical Philosophy

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy has been characterized variously as idealistic, critical, ahistorical, historically reflective, romantic, revolutionary, conservative, and reactionary.

states that were not solicited, specifically, the works on Geneva: the *Letters Written from the Mountain* and the *Letter to d'Alembert*. At the very least, his attempts in these writings constitute at minimum a concern with real polities.

Yet, there are very few scholars who would categorize his thought as programmatic. Given that Rousseau claims there is room for improvement in the human species (Rousseau, *SC* III.12.2), what explains the fact that most work on Rousseau largely denies his belief in the possibility for such improvement? The failure of scholars to reconcile the theoretical and the practical in Rousseau has led to the contradictory nature of the scholarship on Rousseau in the secondary literature.

I categorize the scholarship on Rousseau into three main approaches. A first school of thought tends to treat Rousseau as an idealist or even a proto-Kantian (Cassirer 1954, Starobinski 1971, de Lue 1994, Neuhouser 2008). On this view, Rousseau provides a theory of political right that serves as an unyielding plan for a state with a remarkably high standard but one that has little possibility for coming into being. A second category of thought, by far the largest, contains scholars who argue that Rousseau presents a critique to modern society but ultimately espouses no real solutions. Many scholars have noted the pervasive cynicism, and ultimate despair, of Rousseau's political works (Strauss 1950, Shklar 1969, Gildin 1983, Horowitz 1990, Bloom 1997). For these scholars, the primary question of importance is how Rousseau conceived of insoluble conflicts between man and society, but not his solutions to them (Strauss 1950). This pessimistic view ignores the work Rousseau himself claims he doing. His very attention to practical concerns and historical contingency displays a sophisticated understanding of tensions of which others deny he takes note (for instance, Trachtenberg 1997). A third school of thought is much more in line with my own. These scholars acknowledge that Rousseau believes some political change is possible. While there is some work in Rousseau scholarship on this intersection of theory and practice, this is by far the smallest group. Many of the scholars who do investigate his practical theory argue for a measured, and ultimately still largely skeptical, view where Rousseau is concerned with merely conserving remaining republics (Melzer 1983) or halting decline (Green 1950, Conroy 1979). However, there are those for whom Rousseau's practical theory is a bit more confident. Marks argues that "not all that Rousseau has to say is discouraging" as, even though man is divided,

Rousseau “seeks to arrange for human flourishing in spite of it” which undoubtedly “requires a difficult and delicate arrangement of conflicting goods” (Marks 2005:7). On this view, Rousseau shows both the problems and the solutions: “while he makes us aware of the world’s injustice and oppression, its domination and slavery, he is also keen to emphasize that these are the products of *contingent* features of our human nature...we have the possibility of creating and sustaining institutions of co-operation and social justice and of behaving decently and morally in our dealings with our fellow humans” (Bertram 2004:31). My work can be said to fall into this third approach to Rousseau’s practical thought, the category where Rousseau believes there is some applicability to his work and some practical progress to be achieved.

The core difference in my approach is this: I attempt to present an even more expansive view of his practical philosophy, grounded primarily in his abstract notion of institutional theory, where Rousseau does not dismiss progress out of hand and is not solely concerned with slowing down the degeneration and decay of the state. As I hope to show, Rousseau leaves open the possibility for making improvements in society. My main goal is to make the case that the attempt to reconstruct a practical theory in Rousseau is a fruitful endeavor, as it allows us to see the full spectrum of what he thinks is possible in politics.

Prescriptions in Rousseau’s Practical Theory

There are two main categories in Rousseau’s practical prescriptions, both in the *Social Contract* and in *Poland* and *Corsica*. The first group of remedies attempts to *bring the state more in accordance with political right*. Since “every legitimate Government is republican,” by which Rousseau means “not only an Aristocracy or a Democracy, but in general any government guided by the general will, which is the law,” (Rousseau, *SC* II.6:67), legitimate legislative power should be in the hands of the people regardless of who holds executive power. This commitment requires institutions that safeguard the preservation of right, as seen in legitimacy-oriented measures such as oversight, reapportionment, and electoral reform.

The second category contains attempts *to create greater concord between nature and law*, and for Rousseau, “what makes the constitution of a State genuinely solid and lasting is when what is appropriate is so well attended to that natural relations and the laws always agree on the same points, and the latter as it were only secure, accompany and rectify the former” (Rousseau, *SC* II.11:79-80). This commitment necessitates a change in citizens themselves, as many of Rousseau’s practical recommendations involve civic education.

Rousseau’s normative standard of political right provides us with guidance about what kinds of changes are undesirable, as well. Laws should be few and evident and directed toward instantiating political right in a society’s institutions while at the same time attempting to raise the quality of citizens themselves so that they are capable of self-legislation and the further realization of political right. Changes made without these goals are counterproductive, since

if the Lawgiver mistakes his object, if he adopts a principle different from that which arises from the nature of things, if one principle tends toward servitude while the other tends toward freedom, one toward wealth, the other toward population, one toward peace, the other toward conquests, then the laws will be found imperceptibly to weaken, the constitution to deteriorate, and the State will not be free of turmoil until it is either destroyed or altered, and invincible nature has resumed its empire

(Rousseau, *SC* II.11:80).

Consistency in legislation is key, and political right provides a standard to direct and ensure such consistency. One should not make changes without attention to such a standard. In this regard, he admonishes Poland for remedial lawmaking, and states that in this nation, “as abuses were seen, a law was made to remedy it. From that law were born other abuses that had to be corrected again. This manner of operating has no end at all, and leads to the most terrible of all abuses, which is to enervate all the laws by virtue of multiplying them” (Rousseau, *Poland*:186). To make incremental changes without attention to right is counterproductive, like cutting off the heads of the Hydra.

Realizing Right

While some have noted the generalizations that Rousseau makes in these practical works as indicative of some sort of tenuous combination of his theory and particular circumstances, I argue that these works contain a systematic application of his abstract thought. Political right is not often emphasized in scholarly analyses of these works. However, scholars do note the generality of many of his claims here, for undoubtedly, “as a political theorist, even Rousseau’s *practical* works contain a hypothetical dimension. That is to say, that he is able to anticipate political developments or at least hypothesize about them in a theoretical way” (Simon 1995:45). Yet, there is often a focus primarily on his claims about civic education (Engel 2005, Maloy 2005) at the expense of an extended account of Rousseau’s application of political right on political institutions. While it may be the case that “the science of government is nothing but a science of combinations, applications and exceptions, according to times, places, circumstances” (Rousseau, *Letter to Mirabeau*:269), Rousseau makes the case both here and in the *Social Contract* that the application of particular laws should be guided by a standard of right.

In terms of realizing political right, the first category of changes deals with redistributing the classes and extending suffrage in such a way that popular sovereignty is more closely approximated, or in other words, laying the institutional foundations that acknowledge the germ of legitimacy present in all political associations and allowing sovereignty to be more in line with political right.

First, Rousseau extends suffrage to those who are currently either *de jure* or *de facto* disenfranchised. With Poland, Rousseau acknowledges that “to enfranchise the peoples of Poland is a great and fine operation, but bold, perilous, and not to be attempted inconsiderately” (Rousseau, *Poland*:186). Even though he says “it would be reckless of me to guarantee its success,” still, he does “not doubt it” and “set[s] out one of the means that can be employed for that” (Rousseau, *Poland*:186). Enfranchisement is required by right, although it may be delayed, and Rousseau tells them: “consider that your serfs are men like you, that they have in them the stuff to become everything that you are” (Rousseau, *Poland*:186). The goal is “to make all the members of the State

collaborate in the supreme authority” even as you “confer the administration only upon a small number” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:128). By adequately including all in the role of Sovereign and by properly limiting the scope of Government, both integral concerns in the *Social Contract*, political right is kept as a foremost consideration.

Second, Rousseau recommends class redistribution in order to change the bases of political power away from instituted inequality based upon wealth and hereditary entitlements and toward reshaping political power into something reflective of administrative expertise and wisdom. To do this, he advises changing the nobility from hereditary titles into distinctions based upon long-term, observable merit. This solution is necessary due to an already established system of partial societies, that is, he is working with a preexisting society and all of its instituted inequalities. His recommendation for class redistribution is based upon a practical prescription given in the *Social Contract*, that “if there are partial societies, their number must be multiplied, and inequality among them prevented, as was done by Solon, Numa, and Servius” (Rousseau, *SC* II.3:60). When one looks at the specific instance in which Rousseau mentions Servius’ redistribution of the classes of Rome, “which by its effect became the most important [change] of all” (Rousseau, *SC* IV.4:130), one sees that Servius changes a hereditary class system into one based on other attachments and thereby mitigates the effects of partial societies by transferring pre-existing attachments into artificial ones. In this vein, Rousseau wants to change a feudal nobility, whose rights, “although hereditary, are so to speak individual, private, attached to each family and so independent of each other that they are even independent of the constitution of the state and of sovereignty,” into a political nobility, whose “rights are in the body and not in its members” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130). This solution is completely artificial, but at the same time so practicable, that Rousseau brags that he shows “how one can calibrate different orders in a people without birth and nobility entering into it for anything” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130). The state should establish a “levelness” amongst individuals, and distinctions should only be granted according “to merit, to virtues, to services

rendered to the fatherland and these distinctions ought not to be any more hereditary than are the qualities based on which they are founded” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130). This change attempts to rectify the self-perpetuating damages done by the “faux” social contract, where instituted inequalities are not reflective of natural ones, which are in truth negligible².

In a similar fashion to his recommendations for Corsica, Rousseau’s advice to Poland about instituting a three-stage graduated progression for members of the government’s administration, that is, Servants of the State, Citizens Elect, and Guardians of the Laws (Rousseau, *Poland*:223-225), is largely an attempt to shift the current nobility into a true aristocracy. Political virtue, even if it is only a mask for ambition, is filtered upward through conspicuous merit, as the requirements necessary to move from one grade to the next are publicly transparent and predicated on accountability of the magistrates to the Sovereign. The public “subjects the representatives to following their instructions exactly and to giving a strict account to their constituents of their conduct at the Diet” (Rousseau, *Poland*:190). In his plan, there is no outlet for ambition outside of conspicuous public service, a service completely in thrall to the Sovereign. By opening up the political nobility to the bourgeois (Rousseau, *Poland*:226), he filters ambition for gain, the traditional outlet for the bourgeois, into ambition for political power, which I will turn to momentarily. Note, though, that what this change amounts to is a formal equality of opportunity when one sees it as based upon his prior extension of suffrage, as any citizen is open to political office and the power attached to it.

The refashioning of old attachments into a new competition of individual ambition allows for, surprisingly, greater political consensus. It is nonsensical to attempt to fabricate complete homogeneity in the state since “if there were no different interests, the common interest would

² Recall the conclusion of the *Second Discourse*: “inequality, being almost null in the state of nature...finally becomes stable and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws. It follows, further, that *moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to natural right whenever it is not combined in the same proportion with physical inequality*” (Rousseau, *SD*:180, my emphasis).

scarcely be sensible since it would never encounter obstacles: everything would run by itself, and politics would cease to be an art” (Rousseau, *SC* II.3:fn.60). Rousseau does not think it is possible or necessary to make all citizens the same.

Needless to say, this view of Rousseau is atypical. Scholars like Bloom argue that Rousseau categorically dismisses any type of competing interests, evidence of his opposition to liberal constitutionalism, since “crafting government to be compliant with particular interests” tends to “exacerbate the tension between individual and society” (Bloom 1997:160). However, Bloom and others (Bertram 2004, McCormick 2007) seem to ignore the pluralistic maxims that Rousseau advises for societies that already contain heterogeneity. While homogeneity may be desirable in theory, or if you are as lucky as Lycurgus, who was able to create institutions where “every Citizen state[s] only his own opinion” (Rousseau, *SC* II.3:60), it is not true in practice, that is, if one must be a Solon, Numa, or Servius. Since we must work within the context of preexisting groups of people who have partial societies that must be “multiplied” “in order to have the general will expressed well” (Rousseau, *SC* II.3:60), it is possible to benefit from competing interests. Further, Rousseau argues that this remedy ensures that the general will is expressed well: greater consensus is the result.

We can see with this category of prescriptions that Rousseau is concerned with refashioning the classes into true aristocracy in order to ensure that government itself responds to its sovereign. In both the *Social Contract* and these works, Rousseau notes that hereditary aristocracy “is the worst of all Governments,” but that “the best and most natural order is to have the wisest govern the multitude, so long as it is certain that they will govern it for its advantage and not for their own” (Rousseau, *SC* III.5:93). The problem is that a true aristocracy is difficult to secure if it must depend on the virtue of its members since men are notoriously faulty in their pursuit of the public good over their own interests. It is therefore desirable to create an aristocracy by convention only if one can make sure that its members truly belong in such a class, for this class “forms so essential a part of

the body politic that the former cannot continue to exist without the latter nor the latter without the former” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130).

Rousseau repairs this problem by allowing the free reign of *amour-propre*; he encourages its pursuit while redirecting its focus. The ambitious man, who seeks the regard of others, must secure that regard legally in order to advance. It does not matter what the internal motivations of political officers are in Rousseau’s scenario since their promotion is dependent upon outward actions of public spiritedness, or conspicuous citizenship. Internal virtue is no longer required of the good statesman. What Rousseau does, by making political office the only outlet for ambition, is to ensure by institutional design some sort of public good. Rousseau thus changes harmful factions, ones without basis in nature, into beneficial classes that must secure public good in order for an individual’s own particular interests to be realized. These institutional changes, ones that allow the entire state to profit off of the pride of individual men, are steps toward the realization of right.

Changing Men

The second category of changes that Rousseau recommends can, at least in a preliminary reading, be described as those measures that change men themselves. Rousseau attempts to decrease the citizenry’s dependence on outside forces (other States) while at the same time increasing their dependence on one another, thereby creating a chain of mutual obligation between the citizens. We see that his prescriptions do just these things: they attach the citizens to each other and the land itself through the cultivation of agrarian arts, through the avoidance of trade and finance, and through a focus on repopulation.

The prescriptions that he gives the two countries for creating good citizens vary due to their different circumstances. Whereas Corsica is an island nation that after years of warfare and blockade has already learned to depend upon itself out of necessity, Poland is “always divided inside, always menaced from outside, it has no stability of its own, and depends on its neighbors’ caprice” (Rousseau, *Poland*:174). Despite their apparent differences, their general aim is the same,

which is creating a State that can thrive on its own by the way its citizens thrive through one another. Both countries should attempt to “to make use of their people and of their country as much as possible; to cultivate and gather together their own forces, to depend upon them alone, and to think about foreign powers no more than one would if none of them existed” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:125). Their complete dependence on one another echoes the language of the logic of the political association in the *Social Contract*.

Rousseau advises these nations to orient the citizenry toward the cultivation of agricultural virtues. These virtues allow each country to mitigate or avoid some of the problems that are agitated by the interdependent economics of commercial republics, where a state must turn outside itself for trade. Further, commercial republics exacerbate income inequality as some individuals become vastly wealthy in such economies. As Rousseau notes in the *Social Contract*, not only formal equality, but also decreased disparity in wealth is an important component of stability: “Do you, then, want to give the State stability? bring the extremes as close together as possible; tolerate neither very rich people nor beggars...it is always between these two that there is trafficking in public freedom; one buys it, the other sells it” (Rousseau, *SC* II.11:78).

Formal equality is often *de facto* diminished or destroyed by extreme income inequality. The Corsicans must understand that “the fundamental law of [their] foundation ought to be equality” since “all ought to be equal by right of birth” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130), and Rousseau finds it necessary for them to know that in order to ensure this right, they must “diminish the extreme inequality” that is felt between individuals. This type of inequality does more than effectively disenfranchise those who should participate in sovereignty; it also weakens the bond between citizens. Extreme income inequality exacerbates the problems motivated by vanity amongst citizens, as the relative comparison humiliates citizens and destroys friendship. Rousseau’s admonition against trade is an attempt to mitigate this problem, which he sees as critical to overcome in order to bind citizens together.

Focusing on agriculture allows a country to be more self-sufficient, free from dependence on foreign powers for trade, and capable of dispersing citizens throughout the state. Trade is a dependence on others due to scarcity, and straying from the agricultural path to allow for artisans, bourgeois exploits, and rampant innovation increases the need for trade, makes foreign policy an issue, necessitates offensive wars, and speeds the decline of the state. This idea has been borne out by their own histories: external attention to Poland and Corsica has led each nation to a “state of depopulation and devastation” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:124). An agricultural economy is a remedy to such accelerators of decline; “the only means for maintaining a State in independence of others is agriculture” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:127). Rousseau is seen as a staunch advocate of autarky, yet, pragmatically, he acknowledges that some trade is going to occur. He states that “one must not exaggerate my maxims beyond my intentions and beyond reason; that my design is not to suppress the circulation of specie, but only to slow it down, and above all to prove how much it matters that a good economic system not be a system of finance and money” (Rousseau, *Poland*:213). Even though there will be some system of finance, agriculture should not be pursued in order to create surpluses, since a sub-optimal use of resources does not bother Rousseau: “it would be better to use fields badly than men” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:143). Inculcating virtues of the agricultural citizen helps avoid the ills of commercialism, income inequality, and foreign wars.

Rousseau connects agricultural values to indicators of progress and social growth, as agriculture is conducive to population increases and independent labor. When speaking of “signs of a good government,” Rousseau inquires, “What is the aim of the political association? It is the preservation and prosperity of its members. And what is the surest sign that they are preserving themselves and prospering? It is their number and their population” (Rousseau, *SC* III.9:105). Agricultural life is one way to facilitate population growth, as farmers need families to work their land. Yet, what makes this type of population increase something that does not drain the state is

both the self-sufficiency of the agricultural arts and also the requirement of dispersion, for farming is a turning away from cities and a turning toward the full extent of a nation's land.

Rousseau advises creating a populace equally dispersed throughout the country, and as in the *Second Discourse's* assumptions of plenty and dispersion, such dispersion of peoples reduces their chance for conflict and dependence at the most basic, theoretical level. The importance he places on population dispersion is also seen in his discussion of the Roman Comitia in the *Social Contract*. The uneven population growth of the tribes of the foreigners in comparison to the Alban and Sabine tribes presented a problem of administration in the popular assemblies themselves that was alleviated by Servius' reclassification from tribes into districts, aided by a later distinction between urban and rural districts. This reclassification resulted in an equal dispersion of people bolstered by the mandate against intermingling. Rousseau praises this action by claiming that "as [Servius] remedied the existing inequality he forestalled its future recurrence" by forbidding "the inhabitants of one quarter to move to another, which prevented the races from merging" (Rousseau, *SC* IV.4:128), a measure that tried to maintain balance in the future. It is to this institutional change that "Rome owed...both the preservation of its morals, and the growth of its empire" (Rousseau, *SC* IV:4:128). One can tease out the further importance Rousseau places on population dispersion by analyzing the action he claims led to a decline in the Roman Republic: the Censors allowed new enrollees to enroll in any tribe they chose, "a permission which was certainly not good for anything" (Rousseau, *SC* IV.4:129) and which led to intermingling, dispersion of values, and unequal dispersion of peoples. Rousseau advises: "Let us make it so that it keeps its population in equilibrium everywhere and by that alone we will have made it as perfect as it could be" (Rousseau, *Corsica*:128-129). Dense population centers lead to scarcity, trade, and finally, pernicious cosmopolitanism as people reach outside of their nation. The citizen is disconnected from what is his own by focusing on what is outside.

While Rousseau seems to be supporting agricultural virtues for the independence and civic virtue that it instills, or good, self-reliant hard work, this recommendation bolsters his primary goal, which is to make changes more in accord with popular sovereignty. In fact, Rousseau continually notes the mutually reinforcing nature of agriculture and republicanism. He veils a theoretical concern for popular sovereignty by giving pragmatic reasons to his audience for supporting institutions that are legitimate. He claims that “the form of Government we have to choose is, on the one hand, the least costly because Corsica is poor, and on the other the most favorable to agriculture,” and “the least costly administration is the one that passes through the fewest ranks and requires the fewest different orders; such is in general the republican and in particular the democratic state” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:127). He claims that democracy is *not a choice* since “the rustic system entails” such a state (Rousseau, *Corsica*:128). Yet, given the problems with assembling a large state, it should create a “Mixed Government” where “the depositaries of its power are often changed” between a “small number” of administrators while the entire citizenry “collaborate[s] in the supreme authority” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:128). The resulting recommendation combines popular sovereignty with small administration. Thus, the Sovereign power is properly separated from the Government (administration), something the *Social Contract* notes as necessary for legitimacy. He makes these issues sound as if they are concessions required of necessity when truly they are requirements of legitimacy. Even Rousseau’s “pragmatism” promotes republicanism.

Pride, not Patriots: the Modern Legislator

To what extent, then, is Rousseau attempting to change human nature rather than channel it into institutions? Do the requirements for citizenship in Rousseau’s practical philosophy necessitate a change in the internal motivations of men? Must they act out of duty? Must their civic virtue fit their particular nation-state?

Human nature, a thorny subject in Rousseau generally, presents equally thorny problems for lawmaking. Rousseau points out the variability of convention and the problems with legislation that

can result: “Man is one; I admit it! But man modified by religions, governments, laws, customs, prejudices, and climates becomes so different from himself that one ought not to seek among us for what is good for men in general, but only what is good for them in this time or that country” (Rousseau, *Letter to d’Alembert*:17). However, many of the recommendations he makes are general guidelines to channeling passions that all men have, an endeavor guided by the principles of political right, which are unvarying and unchanging.

Rousseau explores the amount of particular information of each nation that is necessary to be a good Legislator. He notes, “unless one has a thorough knowledge of the Nation for which one is laboring, the work one does for it, however excellent it might be in itself, will always err in application” and he, as an outsider, claims “a foreigner can hardly give anything but general views, can enlighten the institutor, not guide him” (Rousseau, *Poland*:169). Rousseau ascribes a certain amount of self-determination as necessary in making a people, an idea that is explored in the *Social Contract*. A nation must become its own Legislator figure as there are no more Numas, Solons, or Lycurguses. Rousseau looks “out at modern nations” and sees “there many makers of laws and not one legislator” (Rousseau, *Poland*:171). Still, Rousseau attempts to give some guidance despite his “foreignness” and becomes a type of Legislator himself, indicating that particular national knowledge might not be the overriding factor in practical philosophy.

The role of the Legislator becomes less focused on a crafting of particular peoples, with their own prejudices, etc., into a perfect model of public virtue. Even the best examples of Legislators do not change men in the manner described in the *Social Contract* II.7 and II.10. The people “fit for legislation” (Rousseau, *SC* II.10:77) do not and could not exist, since the effect of legislation would have to be the cause, and further, these men would not even need the laws that they would form³. Yet, it is in a discussion of people “fit for legislation” that Rousseau notes, “there

³ Recall that Rousseau describes this type of people as “one which, while finding itself already bound together by some union of origin, interest, or convention, has not yet borne the true yoke of laws; one with neither deep-rooted customs

is one country left in Europe capable of receiving legislation; it is the island of Corsica” (Rousseau, *SC II.10:78*). This passage would suggest that, in calling them fit for legislation, they meet these prerequisites of civic virtue. Some scholars interpret this passage to mean that civic education, in the sense of turning men into ancient Spartans, is potentially possible, since in Corsica, “their nascent virtues already give promise of one day equaling those of Sparta and Rome. Does this not suggest that there is not so great a gulf with regard to virtue between the republics Rousseau seeks to found and those of ancient times, in spite of what he affirms...?” (Gildin 1983:148). Corsica “is still ‘capable’ in that regard because its mores have again become tractable, owing to the restorative effects of its recent struggle for liberation from Genoese tyranny” (Smith 2006:23). The conditions are ripe and the people are brave and virtuous under this understanding.

Yet, is Rousseau’s confidence in Corsica due to the virtues that the Corsicans currently possess? Do their mores make them any more civic-minded than other states? Rousseau gives us a description of their current moral state: the Corsicans, threatened from the outside, “preferred to do nothing rather than to fatigue themselves at a pure loss. The laborious and simple life gave way to laziness, to inaction, to all sorts of vices, theft procured them the money they needed to pay their tax, and which they did not find at all with their produce; they left their fields in order to labor as highwaymen” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:137). In Rousseau’s time, they are a nation full of pirates, prone to thievery and brigandage, forms of conflict that the social compact is necessarily instituted to prevent. Rousseau says they need to “lose the habit of wandering around the Island like bandits”

nor deep-rooted superstitions; one which is not in fear of being overrun by a sudden invasion; which without taking part in its neighbors’ quarrels can resist each one of them by itself, or enlist the help of one to repulse the other; one whose every member can be known to all, and where one is not forced to charge a man with a greater burden than a man can bear; one which can do without all other peoples and without which every other people can do; One which is neither rich nor poor, and can be self-sufficient; finally, one which combines the stability of an ancient people with the docility of a new people” (Rousseau, *SC II.10:77-78*).

(Rousseau, *Corsica*:138). The Corsicans are certainly not requisite citizens. Nascent virtues, it seems, are not what make a people capable of legislation.

Rousseau's civic education does not depend on perfect citizens, nor does it attempt to successfully change men into something that is against their nature. While it is possible to "make better laws," "it is impossible to make any that men's passions do not abuse," so it is necessary to know "how to reach hearts" (Rousseau, *Poland*:170-171). It is easy to interpret this attempt to reach hearts as an attempt to instill a public spiritedness based on duty and *eros* for the city, for "if you would have the laws obeyed, see to it that they are loved, and that in order to do what one ought, it suffices to think that one ought to do it" (Rousseau, *Political Economy*:13). Yet, the way in which Rousseau tries to effect this is not by forcing citizens into an annihilation of individualism through a complete identity of self with the state, as in the manner of the ancients. Undoubtedly, Rousseau is acting under "the same spirit [which] guided all the ancient Legislators in their institutions," who "all looked for bonds which attached the citizens to the fatherland and each to each other" (Rousseau, *Poland*:173). While this spirit, too, guides Rousseau, what he realizes is that the bonds that attach citizens are tenuous. Attachment is achieved by keeping citizens "ceaselessly occupied" with the fatherland (Rousseau, *Poland*:173), meaning that duty or obligation be in the forefront of their minds, but also *solely* on their minds. Although this is true of, say, the Spartans, what differentiates Rousseau's citizen is that he becomes a good citizen through a channeling of his individual desire for distinction. The way to reach hearts is by harnessing the passions that motivate them in a completely self-interested manner, not through a genuine *amour de la patrie*. His citizenship does not depend upon the *amour de la patrie* actually taking root and motivating his behavior. Internal motivations are not the most important components of good citizenry; rather, apparent virtue will do.

One complicated aspect of the ancient citizen is that they rush headlong into a wartime death in order to acquire political glory, an act inspired by their fierce and bloodthirsty civic education.

Rousseau's changing conception of the citizen channels this desire for glory into one that makes more sense in light of the logic of the political association, that is, one that tries to recapture the natural goodness of man (one who seeks his preservation without the destructive influence of *amour-propre*) by changing the objects of the citizen's *amour-propre*. Rather than a hastily acquired immortality toward which the citizen rushes headlong, Rousseau would have him focus his actions on a more localized pride, one internal to the city itself. Honors and merit would form the bases of these new objects of man's affection instead of victory on the battlefield. Rousseau exploits the *amour-propre* of men by giving them no other manner in which to pursue their vanity outside of the state. Social bonds are strengthened by exacerbating the very device that endangers them. Rousseau does not try to change *men as they are*. Rather, he amplifies their existing passions through institutions and laws that incentivize the beneficial use of pride-oriented *amour-propre*.

Rousseau does not speak of ancient citizens in order to have men simply emulate them. "When one reads ancient history, one believes one has been transported into another universe among other beings," Rousseau says, "nevertheless, they did exist, and they were humans as we are" (Rousseau, *Poland*:171). The gulf between the ancients and moderns is not as great as we think, not because we have the possibility to become Spartans, but because of the *human flaws* that we have in common; we are all motivated by self-interest, even the ancients. Rousseau uses this fact to recast citizenship. Instead of a faceless Spartan, the modern citizen is a distinguished public servant motivated by glory, by hunger to be esteemed in the eyes of others, not by duty. While both the Spartan and the Rousseauan citizen are motivated by a desire for distinction, Rousseau channels the citizen's *amour-propre* into a more reliable outlet, individual distinction that does not require the self-sacrifice of wartime courage.

The need for patriotism is predicated on the need to have the general will expressed well, which cannot be done by means of mass enlightenment. Reason is fallible, and patriotism is an instrumental virtue that helps achieve the public good. However, his account of partial societies and

their role in realizing the common good presents problems for any view of Rousseau's civic education that thinks he attempts simple homogeneity in the populace. His view of partial societies complicates his view of the citizen. Rousseau is attempting to have the general will realized neither through mass enlightenment, nor homogeneity, nor patriotism traditionally understood, but through laying the institutional foundations for popular happiness via freedom and equality. Mass enlightenment thus should not be a practical goal for legislators, as we should not attempt the impossible, and Rousseau, in making this connection between freedom and happiness apparent, compares Socrates to Cato: "we would be taught by the one and led by the other, and this alone would determine the preference between them: for no one has ever made a people of wise men, but it is not impossible to make a people happy" (Rousseau, *PE*:16). The role of institutions in civic education thus becomes much more important than his discussion of patriotism taken by itself.

Political right, as it serves as a guiding standard, is not only an ideal but also a functional tool for developing institutions that guide the citizenry in salutary ways. While it may be desirable for its capacity to bind citizens together with affection, patriotism is not an end in itself, nor even one upon which the success of institutions ultimately depends. Since there are external indicators of civic virtue, it does not matter what the internal motivations of the citizen are. This idea is counter to those who think that the principles of political right can only be realized with good mores (O'Hagan 1999, Engel 2005, Maloy 2005), those who think that political decline is the decay of virtue (Melzer 1990), or those that argue that "virtue, the psychological product [of legitimacy], is more important than its structural support" (Mara 1980:541). Rather than viewing mores as a pinnacle from which everything descends after the institution of society, institutions form and shape mores, starting from very little, ascending to its apogee, then finally descending. The relationship between institutions and mores is a reciprocal one, yet not necessarily an endogenous one. Institutions form mores, then mores and laws feed off of one another. By changing the incentives for human action through institutions, one can change the objects of their affections.

Rousseau thinks such a refashioning is possible: he is not looking “for a perfection beyond their nature of which they are not capable,” nor is he “destroy[ing] their passions,” “a project...no more desirable than it would be possible” (Rousseau, *PE*:20). Attempts at political asceticism are harmful, for “a man devoid of all passions would certainly be a very bad citizen: but it must also be granted that while men cannot be taught not to love anything, it is not impossible to teach them to love one object rather than another” (Rousseau, *PE*:20). He fixes their gaze on acquiring powerful distinction, a power connected with actions that promote the public good; thus, by amplifying *amour-propre*, Rousseau truly activates their love. Rousseau wants them to love the powers that encourage legitimacy.

To protect right, it is necessary to provide a single avenue for satisfaction of political ambition. Violations of right are exacerbated by a disparity between who has the mandate to govern and who *de facto* governs: “civil power is exercised in two manners: the one legitimate from authority, the other abusive from wealth” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:155). In commercial states, “the object of longing is divided” since “power and authority are separated” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:155). Damage to the state occurs due to the plurality of paths to power, as “the means of acquiring wealth and the means of attaining authority, not being the same, are rarely employed by the same people” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:155). Rousseau wants to unify power into its legitimate form, and “thus the great art of government consists in the economy of civil power well understood, not only in order to maintain it, but in order to diffuse activity and life into the whole state; in order to make the people active and laborious” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:154-155). For Rousseau, unity and consistency in institutions leads to vigor, and vigor leads not only to preservation, but also to growth.

So, in the end, what type of Legislator figure is Rousseau? Rousseau takes the ancient legislator *par excellence*, Lycurgus, as his model for his practical suggestions but changes the recommendations, guided by his own practical philosophy. Even Lycurgus had to work with an imperfect people and had his eye poked out for his troubles. His people were not new, they had

established inequalities, and they suffered from preexisting prejudices. Lycurgus found that with the Spartans, “there was an extreme inequality amongst them, and their state was overloaded with a multitude of indigent and necessitous persons while its whole wealth had centred upon a very few” (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*:59). His solution was threefold: establishing popular institutions, facilitating wealth redistribution, and creating a sense of community. The people consented to a restructuring of political institutions into a new merit-based system. The senate he established provided, to use Rousseau’s language from the *Social Contract*, an intermediate term that prevented fluctuation between the monarchical and democratic elements of society. Wealth redistribution was aimed at leveling, as Lycurgus had the citizens renounce both their landed and portable property, which was then redistributed by the state. He changed their specie (making it less portable), outlawed superfluous arts, and implicitly eliminated foreign trade. In order to increase community, he instituted common mess and made the rearing of children a public concern. While most of these aspects are familiar, as Rousseau incorporates almost all of them in some manner into his advice for Poland and Corsica, what is telling is what he leaves out from the story of Lycurgus.

Lycurgus, who wanted to make his work “immortal” and “as far as human forecast could reach” (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*:78), is not emulated simply. Instead, Rousseau warns us “if we want to form a lasting establishment, let us therefore not dream of making it eternal” (Rousseau, *SC* III.11:109). Whereas Lycurgus desired to secure the maintenance of his perfect system of legislation by duping the Spartans into not changing any of his institutions, Rousseau instills in his “peoples” the idea that stasis is not conducive to the stability of a state. Perfection in institutions is impossible, and it is imperative to include the ability to correct problematic institutions and laws in any political administration. Rousseau’s contrast with Lycurgus shows observers further that he is constructing a practical philosophy.

Rousseau uses Lycurgus’ institutions to inspire his graduated system of political office. *Amour-propre* is flattered by such a system, “for what more glorious competition could there be

amongst men, than one in which it was not contested who was swiftest among the swift or strongest of the strong, but who of many wise and good was wisest and best, and fittest to be intrusted for ever after, as the reward of his merits, with the supreme authority of the commonwealth, and with power over the lives, franchises, and highest interests of all his countrymen?" (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*:75). The Legislator ensures this, and "so it is the science of government, to inspire men with a willingness to obey. The Lacedaemonians inspired men not with a mere willingness, but with an absolute desire to be their subjects" (Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*:79). Rousseau transforms the Legislator into a modern one: Rousseau inspires this desire to be a subject not by playing up men's willingness to obey as good patriots but by increasing their ambition for gain and tying that gain with the good of the state. Rousseau's citizens want to be subjects in a state where being outwardly politically virtuous is rewarded with the gifts that humans desperately desire: distinction, power, and acclaim.

While he allows for inequality in status when correctly channeled, Rousseau understands the importance of political equality as a baseline for stability in the state. Even if Rousseau cannot make every person equal in property or goods, he can make them equal in terms of political legitimacy by including all in the role of Sovereign, which is required by right.

Although not required by right, he commits much attention to economic equality, too, as any inequality is a threat to right. While many are shocked by the autarkic and totalitarian nature of his economic policy, it is important to note what he does not do in order to see Rousseau's particular modern reincarnation of the Legislator. He does not confiscate all lands *and personal goods* from the state, as does Lycurgus. This would be an illegitimate violation of property rights of those who currently possess such goods, as "one cannot confiscate any land acquired legitimately however large it might be in virtue of a posterior law that forbids having that much" (Rousseau, *Corsica*:153). "It is, therefore, one of the most important tasks of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes, not by taking their treasures away from those who possess them, but by

depriving everyone of the means to accumulate treasures” (Rousseau, *PE*:19), and this is the choice that Rousseau makes in his advice to institute an agricultural economy and limit the use (not eliminate the use) of specie. Lycurgus was correct in taking away the means to income inequality, but he was mistaken in uprooting the current bases of wealth. Still, steps should be taken in the direction of income and wealth redistribution: “all fiefs, homages, rents, and feudal rights hitherto abolished will therefore be so forever, and the state will buy back those that still continue to exist so that all seigniorial rights will remain extinct and suppressed on the whole Island” (Rousseau, *Corsica*:130). This immediate permission with an eye toward change in the direction of political equality brings us to the next category of changes that Rousseau allows, those that fall under the category of concessions or the dilution of right.

Making Concessions/Diluting Right

One final discussion deals with Rousseau’s recommendations that attenuate the democratic nature of his institutions. Some of Rousseau’s advice to Poland and Corsica might be seen as nondemocratic or contrary to an attention to political right. However, historical contingencies, current bases of power, and accidents necessitate a tempering of democracy in order to preserve the state, and Rousseau advises stipulations that allow a state to become more durable by lowering the standards of political institutions.

Rousseau acknowledges the problems that historical contingencies can impose, “and it is a very necessary foresight to sense that one cannot foresee everything” (Rousseau, *SC* IV.6:138). In the *Social Contract*, he recommends the Dictator’s power as a stipulation to allow prerogative or emergency powers in times where expediency is required. It is a necessary magistracy “when the salvation of the fatherland is at stake” (Rousseau, *SC* IV.6:138). Such a power is necessary in times that call for swift action because “the inflexibility of the laws, which keeps them from bending to events, can in some cases render them pernicious, and through them cause the ruin of a State in crisis” (Rousseau, *SC* IV.6:138). Through the example of the Dictatorship, one may see the extent

to which faith in institutional design without corrective measures is inadequate: “one should therefore not try to consolidate political institutions to the point of depriving oneself of the power to suspend their effect” (Rousseau, *SC IV.6:138*). Rousseau explicitly compares the Confederations in Poland to the office of Dictator, as “both silence the laws in a pressing danger (Rousseau, *Poland:205*), and he states, “the Confederations are the shield, the refuge, the sanctuary of this constitution. As long as they continue to exist it appears impossible to me that [Poland] will be destroyed” (Rousseau, *Poland:206*). Rousseau hopes that over time, as the state advances and “abuses...removed, the confederations would become almost useless. The reform of your Government ought to bring about this effect” (Rousseau, *Poland:206*). Rousseau finds this office necessary to a state like Poland, where foreign powers are continuously menacing from all sides. While despotic, as it suspends the laws, it preserves the ultimate ends of the political association and thus serves political right, for “it is obvious that the people’s foremost intention is that the State not perish” (Rousseau, *SC IV.6:138*). Rather than simply exemplifying inconsistencies or incomprehensible paradoxes, non-democratic measures in Rousseau’s practical measures can be taken as things necessary to lay the groundwork for a political association that moves in the direction of right, but that first and foremost, continues to exist.

Although Rousseau uses a normative standard of right to know in what direction changes should be made, he does not think that these changes can be made all at once since one should “never shake the machine too abruptly” (Rousseau, *Poland:239*). Although changes should be made in the direction of right, Rousseau allows for permissive laws. Concessions can be made until necessary political changes can be implemented. Class redistribution “ought not at all to be done by a census or enumeration at the moment of foundation, but it ought to be established gradually by itself by the simple progression of time” (Rousseau, *Corsica:138*), as it is “neither prudent nor possible to change it at one stroke; but it might be both to bring about this change by degrees, to make it so that the most numerous part of the nation be attached by affection to the Fatherland and

even to the Government without any tangible revolution” (Rousseau, *Poland*:226). Since the adequate conditions have not yet been met in making the Polish serfs capable of self-legislation, the groundwork must be laid gradually. “Among the precautions to take, there is one indispensable one that requires time,” Rousseau notes, “it is, before everything else, to make the serfs one wants to enfranchise worthy of freedom and capable of bearing it” (Rousseau, *Poland*:186). Perhaps time is required because “for Nations as for men there is a time of maturity for which one has to wait before subjecting them to laws” (Rousseau, *SC* II.8:73), yet the obstacle that Rousseau points out in enfranchising serfs lies less in *their* capabilities than in the reluctance of the nobles. The solution he advises is twofold: “first, a precise observation of justice, so that the serf and the commoner, never having to fear being unjustly bothered by the noble, will be cured of the aversion that they must naturally have for him. This requires a great reform in the law courts and a particular care for the formation of the corps of lawyers...The second means, without which the first is nothing, is to open a door to the serfs to acquire freedom” (Rousseau, *Poland*:226). Changes cannot be made at once, but there is a necessity in making changes in the direction of political right as soon as they can be done without endangering the state itself. “If the thing is not practicable in fact,” Rousseau says, “it must at least be seen to be so as a possibility; but one can do more, it seems to me, and do so without running any risk” (Rousseau, *Poland*:226). Concessions can be made, but expediency does not require as much of a dilution of right as political conservatives would like to claim.

The Practical Possibility of Progress

If steps in the direction of right should be made over time, then what are the possibilities for progress? By progress, to be clear, I mean not merely slowing decline but positive improvement toward the realization of political right.

Rousseau states simply that progress is possible: “one must not wish that Corsica be right away what it can be (for it would not maintain itself at all in such a condition); it is better that it arrive there and *that it ascend* rather than to be there right away and do nothing but decline”

(Rousseau, *Corsica*:136, my emphasis). Rousseau believes that improvement can occur despite the degenerative nature of political associations, as political progress is an arc rather than a simple negative linear relationship between time and goodness of constitution. By applying a combination of a standard of right and political maxims in order to effect good institutional changes for a state, Rousseau fashions the country's energies into *productive* rather than *destructive* forces, that is, "by disposing it to reach" "its condition of vigor" (Rousseau, *Corsica*:136).

Advancement is not an option for Corsica alone. As I noted earlier, the people of Corsica were not above average in virtue nor as isolated as Rousseau sometimes states with his rhetoric. Corsica is not altogether different from states in bad situations, such as the constantly threatened Poland, and, as it turns out, there is a similarity in remedies for both. Looking beyond, in other works Rousseau claims that a nation, "without ceasing to exist, ...can find itself at a point of vigor or of withering away, from which— either weak, healthy, or sick, and tending to destroy itself or to strengthen itself—its well-being can increase or deteriorate in an infinite number of ways, which almost always depend on it" (Rousseau, *State of War*:69). Movement forward is a prospect that is rarely considered by interpreters of Rousseau, and future researchers should explore the possibilities for progress in his works.

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