

An Empirical Assessment of Patterns of Support for Political Violence among Muslim and non-Muslim Americans

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Abstract

Which individuals in a society are most likely to view political violence as legitimate? Radicalism theories have proliferated since 9/11; however, minimal empirical evidence is available to substantiate such theories due to the difficulty of data collection on violent individuals and their relevant comparison groups. The present study provides an empirical analysis of the most common theories by assessing patterns of support for political violence among a nationally-representative set of American Muslims and non-Muslims. This original study demonstrates that patterns of sympathy towards political violence are identical for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The findings provide more nuance to existing theories by demonstrating that sympathy towards violent political action is strongly associated with individuals who identify closely with an aggrieved group in society *and* do not believe they have a voice in politics. Neither grievance nor cynicism about government responsiveness alone can account for support for violence. Finally, individuals who maintain segregated social networks hold the highest levels of support for political violence. This study puts Muslims' attitudes in context with the broader American population and provides a systematic assessment of common, yet untested theories of radicalization.

1 Introduction

Homegrown radicalization is not a new phenomenon in the United States, but the subject has remained at the forefront of policy concerns since 2001, and most recently in light of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Social science theories assessing the characteristics of those who support political violence have burgeoned in the last decade. Experts in the field however suggest that continued theoretical modeling without empirical evidence means that the conclusions of the literature remain speculative, and basing counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategies on models that have not been empirically validated can be misleading and risky (King and Taylor 2011). The critical lack of empirical analyses on radical individuals is in part due to the difficulty of collecting systematic data on those who support or have chosen to carry out violent acts (Crenshaw 1981; Wiktorowicz 2005; Sageman 2008).

This study begins to address the gaps in the literature by empirically examining the validity of some of the most prominent theories on homegrown radicalism by utilizing expressed sympathy for group-based political violence in an original 2013 nationally-representative sample Americans. While public opinion data is unable to predict who will engage in high-risk, violent political behavior, it sheds light on the broader group of individuals who might abet, support, or sympathize with such behavior.

This study is also able to compare patterns of support for political violence among American Muslims and non-Muslims. Radicalization is not, by definition, specific to any particular national, political, religious, or ideological group; however, the Muslim-American community has been the target of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization policies in the US largely due to jihadists¹ accounting for over half of the terrorism-related arrests on US soil since 2001 (Gilsinan et al 2012). The scrutiny and attention paid to the Muslim-American community suggests that US law enforcement and the media may view Muslims

as more supportive of radical acts of violence; however, no systematic evidence is available to examine this assertion.

The findings of this study demonstrate that religion can serve as a meaningful identity group around which individuals are willing to mobilize due to discrimination; however, Islam is not exceptional compared to other religions in making adherents in the US more supportive of political violence. In fact, patterns of support for political violence are identical among Muslims and non-Muslims.

For Muslims and non-Muslims living in the US, perceived group discrimination is strongly related to sympathy for violent political action on behalf of one's group, but only if individuals also believe American political system is unresponsive to their needs. Experiences of discrimination create a cycle of intense group attachment by strengthening identification with the group while also heightening sensitivity to further mistreatment. If an individual believes the American political system is responsive however, they will reject violent political action, even if they have expressed grievances.

Finally, social networks are analyzed among Muslim respondents. The data reveal that those who maintain segregated social networks are significantly more likely to support violent political activity. Individuals confined to small social circles reflect a lack of exposure to, or more likely, a gradual rejection of broader American society and societal norms and ideas. Such isolation may represent a greater willingness to engage in conflict with the government and the institutions that represent it.

2 Political Mobilization and Theoretical Linkages to Political Violence

Survey research has produced a wealth of findings concerning the amount, types and variations of conventional forms of public participation in political life, greatly enhancing the ability of political scientists to forecast who will act in what ways for a political cause (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972). Less well-developed however is the understanding of unconventional political behaviors that can escalate to violence. Here the term radicalism refers to violent political action on behalf of a group, real or imagined. This is distinguishable from legal, non-violent political action on behalf of a group, referred to as conventional political activity.

2.1 Theories of Homegrown Jihadi Radicalization

Interest in the mechanisms behind radical political behavior in western democracies resurged after the events of September 11th, with much of the focus being on the behavior and beliefs of Muslims worldwide. In a review of the findings on violent radicalization among militant Islamists in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) identifies three bodies of academic scholarship that have contributed to our understanding of the causes of radicalization. The first is those that point to sociological background factors such as globalization and dissolution of traditional communities and identities; the second includes social movement and network theories that emphasize the role of group-level dynamics and interactions; and finally, case-studies that point to individual psychological factors.

King and Taylor (2011) also present a review of the major models of homegrown jihadi radicalization that were developed post-2001, including those advanced in law enforcement circles. The models converge on the assumption that radicalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes. All five models describe emotions, cognitions, and social

influences that, when operating in the right order and in combination, can lead someone to endorse or engage in terrorism (Borum 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004; Moghaddam 2006; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Sageman 2008). The psychological factors that recur most often are relative deprivation and identity crisis; however, both Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) and King and Taylor (2011) find these theories to be severely lacking empirical evidence.

For the purposes of this study, I focus on three central themes that are recurring in the literature: strong group identity and group-based grievances; beliefs of government responsiveness; and self-segregated social networks. I choose to focus on individual and group-level dynamics instead of broader globalization factors due to my inability to test the effect of globalization given the nature of my data. I will empirically assess the relationship between these three themes and support for political violence to discern whether current theories reflect real-world attitudes in the West

2.2 Identity and Group-based Grievances

Several models of racialization highlight one's social identification as being linked to radicalization. Stroink (2007) suggests that radicalization may stem from the burden of managing a dual identity, an experience shared by many children of immigrants. These individuals face discrimination based on both an ethnic and Western identity and must find balance between the two. Such theories have been used to explain the fact that most terrorism plots since 2002 have involved mostly second and third generation immigrants and converts to Islam (Silber and Bhatt 2007).

Perceived group discrimination or deprivation is often used as a proxy measure of social identity, and is extensively discussed and debated in the terrorism literature (Gurr 1976; Crenshaw 1981; Davis and Cragin 2009). The idea is that people experience feelings of relative deprivation by comparing their material conditions to that of other groups, and viewing their group's disadvantage as injustice. A key to understanding feelings of deprivation is

not focusing on the objective quality of a group's circumstances, but rather the circumstances relative to their chosen target group of social comparison (Jost and Kay 2010). It is the *perception* of deprivation, and not actual deprivation, which will motivate a person to action.

Group-based, rather than individually-based grievances have been found to be a stronger predictor of collective action and prejudice towards other groups (Smith and Ortiz 2002). Experiences of discrimination can also be interpreted as group deprivation when focusing on other group members' similar mistreatment (King and Taylor 2011). Social psychological studies present robust findings that reliably predict collective action as a result of perceived mistreatment (van Zomeren et al 2008).

In sum, sympathy towards political violence is argued to stem, in part, from individuals wanting to see a change in society or politics to improve the conditions faced by their group. Motivation is greatest among those who identify strongly with a group they perceive to be systematically mistreated by society or the government. Such mistreatment by the mainstream represents a threat to one's group identity because it implies that the culture as a whole devalues that group. Social identity theory suggests that discrimination serves as a uniting force, enhancing the salience of one's ethnic identity and developing an oppositional identity from the host society (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

2.3 Government Legitimacy & Political Efficacy

It's unlikely that grievance alone, however, can explain sympathies towards radical political behavior. For decades, aggrieved American communities have engaged in the political system to demand conditions be changed on behalf of their group. However, engaging in the political system first assumes that participants believe the system is legitimate, fair, and responsive to their demands. If not, engaging in such activities would be irrational and an ineffective means to a group's ends. America has a long history of some aggrieved groups adopting

violent strategies in the face of what they saw as the inability to make progress through conventional political activity.

An individual's perceived ability to wield political influence is often referred to as political efficacy (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954). Political efficacy has been conceptualized as two separate, but related components. External political efficacy is the perceived responsiveness of the government (Abramson and Aldrich 1982), which is intimately related to legitimacy, trust, and an individual's level of acquiescence and loyalty towards the political system (Balch 1974; Wright 1976; Craig 1979; Iyengar 1980). Internal efficacy refers to beliefs about one's own competence to understand and participate effectively in politics (Craig and Maggiotto 1982).

Political efficacy is thought to impact individuals' political activity in a variety of ways. People who feel efficacious believe their political engagement is productive and influences government procedures. Efficacious people similarly hold a general trust in the system functioning through fair and just processes (Sigelman and Feldman 1983). People become disgruntled if they feel like their voice is unfairly barred from governmental procedures or issues they care about (Farnsworth 2003). Without a general belief in the government's responsiveness, we would expect individuals to either withdraw from the political process altogether, or instead pursue other avenues to meet their needs and demands.

In proposing the "mistrust-efficacious" hypothesis, Gamson (1968) proposed that radical political mobilization could be explained by low levels of trust and high levels of cynicism in the political system, coupled with high motivation to influence the government. Similarly, other studies suggest that the experience of procedural injustice (or unfairness in dealings with authorities) associated with repressive governments is a major motive of political violence, as these individuals find conventional means of participation blocked. Violence may then appear as a logical strategy for a group when the power asymmetry vis-a-vis the government is large (Crenshaw 1981).

Taken together, those who support violent political activity on behalf of a group are distinguished from those who reject violence by their perception political disenfranchisement in terms of what they believe they can achieve through constitutional political activity within the American system. Those who believe the government is not responsive as a result believe conventional political activity is futile. Under such conditions, perceptions of broad mistreatment of one's group by American society have increasingly powerful effects on developing support for political violence.

2.4 Social Networks

Another commonly cited factor in radicalization models is personal connections. An individual's networks are considered central to individual beliefs and behaviors, and lack of integration into mainstream society is often used to explain radicalization (Jenkins 2007; Silber and Bhatt 2007). Both anecdotal and empirical evidence on this topic is mixed (Kirby 2007; Sagar 2009; Sageman 2008; Brewer 1991). Studies have shown that social bonding within small peer groups can facilitate the adaption of more extreme worldviews (Neuman and Rodgers 2007; Wiktorowicz 2004; Sageman 2004). Small, isolated communities can create shared frameworks of meaning that shape identity, perceptions, preferences. Problems of group members may not be "framed" just as misfortunes, but as injustices that are attributed to a particular target and can therefore can justify extreme positions such as violence.

Moreover, radical views that conflict with the norms of society, even if not deeply held, tend to lead to progressive isolation. Individuals with radical views typically have progressively less contact with people of different opinions than themselves due to rejection of their views by outsiders, but also because they increasingly regard the broader society as corrupt and hostile. Social movement theory points out that such isolation is likely to reinforce extremist views and underpin the construction of oppositional identities that are key in explaining violent radicalization (Slootman and Tillie 2006).

2.5 Understanding Support for Political Violence with Survey Research

The present study provides an empirical analysis of central themes in the radicalization literature. To be clear, this study does not attempt to predict who is likely to engage in high-risk, violent political behavior, but seeks to identify patterns among the broader group of individuals who might turn a blind eye to, sympathize with, support combatants, or themselves be open to extreme ideological influences (McCauley 1991). Social movements heavily depend on public support behind their causes, whether for funds, volunteers, or in the condition of rebel and terrorist organizations, operational safe houses or avoidance of infiltration and detection by a militarily stronger government.

Recent studies on radicalization have intensely focused on Muslims in the West despite the fact that we know that a number of different ideologies have served as inspiration and legitimization of violent terrorist acts in different parts of the world at different points in history. This is likely— and arguably understandable — due to the fact that the number of attempted terrorist attacks perpetrated by radical Islamists in the US is significantly higher than those of other groups since 2001 (Gilsinan et al 2012). Moreover, radical Islamism is newer to the United States and Europe than other ideologies and thus less well researched and understood. Nevertheless, studying Muslims in isolation from other groups in the United States prevents scholars from putting the experiences of this group in the context of many others. The present study expands our understanding of support for political violence by assessing patterns among an ethnically diverse, nationally representative sample of Muslims alongside a nationally-representative sample of non-Muslims, allowing for greater generalizability.

3 Data

This study uses data from the Muslim-American National Opinion Survey (MANOS), an original survey administered to an online panel of 500 self-identified Muslims living across the United States. The survey was fielded from February 2, 2013 through March 19, 2013 and was conducted by the international polling firm, YouGov.² The data set captures respondents living in 45 US states plus the District of Columbia, as well as foreign-born respondents from 46 different nations. After filling out the online questionnaire, YouGov weighted the set of survey respondents to characteristics of US Muslims from the 2007 Pew Religious Landscape survey using propensity score weights based on gender, age, education, and voter registration status. This survey was only available in English, and as a result, the sample's proportion of US-born Muslims is about 20 percent higher than that of Pew's. Even so, the respondents look remarkably similar to Pew's across other major demographic factors including the proportion of Shias to Sunnis and match on attitudinal variables such as religiosity.

For the general American population, this study uses an identical survey administered via YouGov to 1000 American respondents in February 2013. YouGov then weighted respondents to known characteristics of the general population of the United States from the 2007 American Community Survey.

3.1 Measuring Attitudes toward Political Violence

The main variable of interest in this study is attitudes towards violent political actions. In an attempt to create a standard to measure individuals' readiness to participate in political and social action, Corning and Myers (2002) develop what they call the Activism Orientation Scale. Based on Corning and Myer's study, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) develop a new scale, the Activism and Radicalization Intention Scale (ARIS), that is designed to examine

the readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action (activism) as well as readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action (radicalism) among a sample of undergraduate students in the US and Ukraine.

The present study builds on the existing body of empirical research by administering a modified version of Moskaleiko and McCauley’s ARIS scale, but focusing only on radical (violent) political activity. Moreover, in an effort to attenuate the effect of social desirability bias, this study asks respondents about *attitudes towards* a variety of violent political activities, rather than personal intentions to engage in violence. This avoids having respondents admit to illegal behavior. For example, an item used to assess openness to political violence is, “I can understand someone who would continue to support an organization that fights for his/her group’s political and legal rights, even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.”

For the index measuring support for violent political behavior in this study (hereafter referred to as *Political Violence*), respondents indicate sympathy for three different violent political actions on behalf of their group— supporting groups that resort to violence, supporting groups that are willing to attack law enforcement, and supporting groups that are willing to attack members of other adversarial groups.³ Respondents rate items on a scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). Items are recoded to equal “1” if the respondent agreed that supporting such a group is understandable, and equal to “0” if the respondent was neutral or disagreed that supporting such a group was understandable. The three items together achieve an alpha score of 0.84.

3.2 Support for Political Violence: A Comparison across Groups

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 displays the percentage of Muslim respondents who agree with each item of the political violence scale, separated by sub-groups. The data show great heterogeneity within the American Muslim community in viewing various types of violent political behavior as legitimate.

3.2.1 Muslim Ideological Divides

Islam is an incredibly diverse belief system with varying ideological standpoints. In understanding support for violence, scholars and policy makers have focused on various divisions as they may pertain to the justification of violence against the government or towards other groups. While the focus of this study is not to flesh out the details of each sub-group within Islam, the data do allow for a closer look at some prominent ideological divisions where we observe interesting variation.

As self-identifying Muslims, respondents were asked a series of questions about their faith and to which variant of Islam they adhere. Within Islam, the mostly widely recognized sectarian division is that between Sunnis and Shia, a historic divide that remains a source of tension and conflict in many parts of the Muslim world. Depending on the source, about 10-20 percent of the world's Muslims are Shia. In this sample, 17 percent of respondents self-identify as Shia. Sunni and Shia respondents here look similar on all three items in the support for political violence scale.

To roughly place respondents on a conservative-moderate continuum, the survey asks which Islamic approach best describes how respondents make an Islamic decision. Indicating that one “follows a particular *madhhab*” (a traditional school of thought) is analogous to following “the traditional way of doing things like it was done back in the old country” (Bagby 2011). A *madhhab* refers to a legal school of thought in Islamic law which developed and solidified in the classical period of Islamic Civilization.⁴ About eight percent of the respondents indicate that they follow a particular *madhhab*.⁵ Most individuals who opt for

this approach tend to be traditionalists and therefore fairly conservative in their practice of Islam. The data show that about 40 percent of these individuals are sympathetic towards some form of violent political activity, compared to those who adopt a more flexible, less literal interpretation of Islam who are half as likely to condone violence.

Those who do not believe it is required to follow a particular school of thought or don't use an Islamic approach in making decisions make up a plurality of the Muslim-American community- about 46 percent of the sample. These individuals follow a more flexible approach to Islam and appear to have the lowest levels of sympathy towards violent behavior- fewer than 20 percent support any kind of political violence.⁶

About 9 percent of respondents indicated that they "follow the *Salafi minhaj*" (way of thought). The Salafi approach is akin to Wahhabi thought, and is associated with a more literal understanding of Islam, in an effort to follow strictly the ways of the first three generations (the *salaf*) of Islam. Individuals in this category express some of the highest levels of sympathy for the use of political violence- averaging around 40 percent approval.

Most Salafi mosques in the United States are African-American (Bagby 2011). In this sample, 46 percent of Salafis are African-American, accounting for 17 percent of the overall black Muslim population. Thirty-one percent of African-American reported being associated with the Nation of Islam (NOI). Among African-Americans in the Nation of Islam, 24 percent are also Salafi.⁷ Individuals associating with NOI report the highest levels of radicalism- upwards of 60 percent approving the use of retaliatory violence against law enforcement. The Nation of Islam is largely known as a black separatist group (officially listed as a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center) noted for its hostile language and its advocacy of self-defense in place of non-violence.⁸

3.2.2 Muslim Demographic Divides

We see that, on average, support for political violence does not vary significantly across racial groups. Muslims who identify as white however appear more sympathetic towards groups who are willing to retaliate against other groups who attack in-group members. Finally, converts also do not stand out in their average levels of sympathy for the use of political violence. Eighty-three percent of converts report being born in the United States. Forty-six identify as white and 39 percent as black.

Looking next at the generational divide, US-born Muslims (59 percent of sample) do not differ significantly from foreign-born Muslims (42 percent of sample) in their level of sympathy for groups who sometimes resort to the use of violence. About 27 percent of US-born and foreign-born Muslims say they could understand someone who would support such a group. This differs from theories that suggest native-born Muslims in the West are more prone to engage in terrorist activities (Silber and Bhatt 2007). However, US-born Muslims score substantially higher when asked whether they would support a group who is willing to attack law enforcement, as well as groups who would retaliate against other groups.

Finally, women are significantly less supportive of all forms of political violence compared to men. This is consistent with political science literature that finds that women are significantly less supportive of violence and are less likely to commit violent crimes compared to men (Eichenburg 2003; Nincic and Nincic 2002).

3.2.3 Non-Muslim Support for Political Violence

[Figure 2 about here]

Understanding the levels and determinants of support for political violence among Muslim-Americans is not informative without an understanding of where Muslims stand in context to other groups living in the United States. Figure 2 displays the average levels of

support for political violence across several sub-groups of the broader American population. Atheists and Agnostics achieve some of the highest average levels of support for political violence— 34 percent and 26 percent approving, respectively. These averages, however, are not statistically distinct from the scores of racial minority groups (25 percent) and Muslims (27 percent). Twenty-two percent of born-again Christians support the use of violence, compared to 14 percent of Jews, 17 percent of Protestants, and 17 percent of Catholics. Finally, women are significantly less supportive of violent groups than men on all measures of the index.

3.3 Correlates of Support for Political Violence

Based on the extant radicalism literature, this study focuses on three conditions that may contribute to individuals' support for violent political action on behalf of a group— group-based grievances, political inefficacy, and segregated social networks.⁹ Here I describe how each concept is measured and present the average response to each variable.

3.3.1 Grievance

The literature suggests that experiences of discrimination create a cycle of intense group-attachment by strengthening identification with the group while also heightening sensitivity to further mistreatment. To measure perceived discrimination, respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that they are treated with less respect because of their religion, and whether they believe Americans are hostile towards their religious group. I use these two items to create an index of perceived discrimination.¹⁰

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 presents mean levels of perceived religious discrimination for Muslims and non-Muslims. On average, Muslims report feeling significantly more discriminated against

because of their religious identities compared to non-Muslim Americans. Among Muslims, blacks are significantly more likely to report religious discrimination compared to all other racial groups. Third-generation Muslims (whose parents are both US-born) are also significantly more likely to report discrimination. While this this distinction is largely driven by black Muslims, third-generation respondents are still significantly more likely to perceive discrimination compared to foreign-born Muslims even after accounting for blacks. There is no difference in perceived discrimination by whether the respondent follows a particular Madhhab or not. Among non-Muslims, Asians and Hispanics report higher levels of religious discrimination than white and black respondents. Looking to religious divisions, we see that Jews and Atheists are significantly more likely to perceive discrimination.

3.3.2 Political Efficacy

Perceptions of political inefficacy are measured using a single item, *People like me don't have any say about what the US government does*. Respondents who agreed with the statement were coded as 1, and the rest as 0.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 presents the mean levels of perceived inefficacy across various Muslim subgroups as well as non-Muslims. On average, non-Muslims express higher levels of inefficacy (50 percent) than Muslims (43 percent).¹¹ However, by looking by generation, foreign-born and second-generation Muslims have higher levels of efficacy (41 percent), but third-generation Muslims have comparable levels of cynicism towards the government as do non-Muslim Americans (46 percent).¹² Among Muslims, we see that blacks and Asians are significantly more likely to feel that they have no say in what the government does than other groups. However, among non-Muslims, blacks and Hispanics are significantly more optimistic about their ability to influence the government compared to other groups.

3.3.3 Segregated Social Networks

The literature suggests that isolation from broader society can reinforce extreme views and generate an oppositional identity. Social movement theory in particular stresses the importance of networks and personal contacts in developing radical attitudes. To assess the level of social isolation of respondents, individuals are asked to indicate how many of their friends, colleagues and acquaintances are of their same ethnicity. They are separately asked this about those who share their religion. Respondents indicate whether all (5), most (4), some (3), not too many (2), or none (1) share their ethnicity or religion. Each item is then rescaled between 0 and 1. These two items are used to create an index of social segregation.¹³ This item was only available for Muslim respondents, and therefore, only an assessment of the effect of social networks among Muslim-Americans is provided.

Who are these individuals who do not associate with Americans of different ethnicities or religions? Looking at the most extreme group, those who say *all* of their friends are of the same religion *and* ethnicity (N=49; 9.8 percent of the sample), we see that 90 percent of these are US-born, and 85 percent are third-generation or beyond. This is striking because it suggests that the isolation is not necessarily due to practical barriers to integration such as language or familiarity with society. Moreover, 88 percent of these individuals also say they have contact with individuals in other countries daily.

Seventy one percent of this group identifies as White and none claim to be converts. This group is significantly younger and wealthier than the average Muslim-American community. As for religious activities, 78 percent say they go to the mosque daily. This group is significantly more likely to have had religious schooling and 91 percent of these individuals say they wear religiously-sanctioned clothing, compared to 46 percent of the broader Muslim-American community.

Fifty-five percent of these individuals are female. It could also be the case that some of these individuals, particularly women, are encouraged by their families or communities

to maintain friendships within narrow groups of people. Some segments within the Muslim-American community emphasize gender segregation and tend to be more protective over whom women interact with (Cesari 2007, 570). Sixty-one percent of the women in this socially-segregated group are married with a mean age of 30. Socially segregated individuals appear to have significantly less egalitarian views towards women compared to the broader Muslim-American community. Specifically, 75 percent of socially segregated Muslims agree that, “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family;” compared with 38 percent of all other Muslims¹⁴, and 74 percent of socially segregated Muslims agree that “Young women in America have too many freedoms” compared to 50 percent of all other Muslims.¹⁵ The data here however are correlational in nature and do not allow for us to know for sure the reason behind these individual’s decision to maintain homogenous networks.

4 Findings

To assess the factors associated with support for political violence, separate multivariate analyses of both Muslims and non-Muslims are conducted. The literature suggests that perceptions of group-based grievance will be associated with higher levels of support for political violence. Moreover the effect of grievance to be greatest among those who believe the government is unresponsive to their needs and interests (inefficacy).

To assess the relationship between support for political violence and perceptions of group-based grievance and political inefficacy, an ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate analysis is ran.

The dependent variable, *Support for Political Violence*, is an index of three items¹⁶ that indicate support for violent political action on behalf of a group. The results are displayed in Table 2.¹⁷

[Table 2 about here]

Looking to Model 1, we see that those who perceive higher levels of discrimination towards their religious group in the United States are significantly more likely to support political violence. This relationship holds for non-Muslims as well, seen in Model 6. In Models 2 and 5, we see that those who believe the government is unresponsive to their needs also hold higher levels of support for radical activism compared to those who feel the government is legitimate and effective.

To assess whether support for political violence is greatest among aggrieved groups who feel the government is unresponsive, Models 3 and 7 interact inefficacy with discrimination. The data show that the effect of discrimination on support for political violence is increasing with greater feelings of inefficacy. The strength of the effect is striking. Among those who feel efficacious— or those who feel they have a say in government and can impact its processes— discrimination has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on increasing attitudes toward political violence. Among Muslims who believe they have say in what the government does, moving from perceiving no discrimination to perceiving the highest levels of discrimination only increases predicted levels of support for political violence from 0.10 up by 11 percentage points to 0.21 ($p < 0.21$).

Alternatively, among Muslims who believe they cannot influence the government, increasing levels of discrimination amplify sympathetic views towards political violence at a dramatic rate. Moving from perceiving no discrimination to perceiving the highest levels of discrimination boosts predicted levels of support for political violence from 0.04 up by 56 percentage points to 0.60 ($p < 0.00$). These findings are consistent for both Muslims and non-Muslims. These identical patterns of support for political violence suggest that Muslims are not unique in terms of the conditions that shape attitudes towards extreme political activities.

This pattern closely reflects findings from a study by Buijs et al. (2006) of young Moroccan activists in the Netherlands. The authors find in their interviews that while conventional and radical activists similarly perceive mistreatment of Muslims in their country, when discussing these grievances, the youth active in conventional political protest focused on the possibility to effect improvements through their own efforts, whereas the more radical focused on structural exclusion.

In Models 4 and 8 in Table 2, controls for religious service attendance, personal piety, and a variety of demographic variables are included. Looking to Model 4, we see that personal religiosity is not associated with support for political violence among Muslims.¹⁸ This insignificant relationship between personal religiosity and support for political violence holds among non-Muslims as well, in Model 8.

For both Muslims and non-Muslims however, those who attend religious services at the highest rates are significantly more likely to sympathize with violent political behavior.¹⁹ In other words, support for violent political action does not vary by individuals' personal religious practice, which can be very individualistic and private; however, there appears to be something different about those who are heavily immersed in their religious communities as far as attending services and events. This relationship between religious service attendance and support for political violence, however, appears to be slightly stronger among Muslims.

Because of the diversity of various religious gatherings and communities, I re-run Model 4 and Model 8 by different sub-groups (not shown) to assess for whom service attendance increases support for political violence. For Muslims, I find that mosque attendance is not associated with increased support for radicalism among foreign-born or second-generation Muslims; however, mosque attendance is significantly related to support for political violence among third-generation Muslims. Among non-Muslims, the relationship between church attendance and radicalism is strongest for born-again Christians.

The political science literature largely suggests that women are significantly less likely to commit violent crimes compared to men and are less likely to support violence (Eichenburg 2003; Nincic and Nincic 2002). Among non-Muslim respondents this pattern holds— women are significantly less likely to support radical activism compared to men. However among Muslims, women are just as likely as men to support radical activism on behalf of a group.

The data indicate that younger individuals are more sympathetic towards political violence among Muslims and non-Muslims alike, consistent with the expectations of several studies on radicalization. Education significantly reduces support for radical ideas among Muslims and non-Muslims alike as well.

4.1 Are Muslims Systematically Distinct from Non-Muslims?

The findings thus far have established that the patterns of support for violent political activity are nearly identical for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. To assess whether being Muslim is related to an increased support for political violence, even after accounting for the other important variables identified in the literature, the samples are combined.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses of the determinants of support for political violence using a combined dataset of Muslims and non-Muslims. Beginning with Model 1, the effect of belonging to a particular religious community is assessed by including a series of dichotomous variables, with Protestants as the reference group. After controlling for basic demographics, the data show that individuals who identify as Agnostic, Atheist, and Muslim are significantly more likely to sympathize with violent political activities. The effect of being Atheist however is more than twice the size of the effect of being Muslim.

Once perceptions of religious discrimination are accounted for in Model 2, the effect of being Muslim goes away. Controlling for inefficacy alone however does not account for the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims (Model 3). This suggests that the observed differences in levels of support for violent political activity seen between Muslims and other groups can be largely attributed to differences in perceived group-based discrimination. For all respondents, perceiving grievance or mistreatment towards one’s group increases sympathy for political violence, particularly under conditions where cynicism towards the government is high and efficacy is low.

As a robustness check, I rerun all models in Table 2 and Table 3 using a measure of perceived ethnic discrimination, instead of religious discrimination.²⁰ The findings in all models are identical, indicating that the findings are not unique to religious-based discrimination, but can also be applied to ethnic-based grievances as well.

4.2 Segregated Social Networks among Muslims

[Figure 5 about here]

Next I narrow in on Muslims specifically to assess the relationship between segregated social networks and support for violent political activity.²¹ Figure 5 displays mean levels of support for political violence among Muslims, by friend networks. We see that respondents who indicate that “none”, “not too many”, “some”, or “most” of their friends are of the same ethnicity or religion do not differ significantly in levels of support for political violence. A large uptick in support appears among those who say that all of their friends are of the same ethnicity or religion. Moving from having “most” to “all” friends in the same ethnic group moves the average level of support for political violence from 27 percent to 71 percent.

[Figure 6 about here]

As a second step, an OLS regression predicting support for political violence is conducted, controlling for discrimination, political efficacy, personal piety, mosque attendance, and the basic demographic controls. Figure 6 presents the predicted values of support for political violence across values of the social networks variable. We see that even after controlling for discrimination and efficacy, individuals who only affiliate with others in their same ethnic and religious group are significantly more likely to sympathize with violent activities. In fact, moving from those with well-integrated social networks to those whose contacts are only within the same ethnic and religious group, we see an increase in support for political violence by 45 percentage points. This suggests those who are cut off from the larger American society, either due to circumstances because they have intentionally chosen to affiliate with in-group ethnic members, are significantly more open to radical activism than those who have regular contact with diverse sets of individuals and ideas.

5 Discussion

This study set out to assess who in society is most likely to view violent political action as legitimate. This topic has become increasingly important as scholars, law enforcement officers, and policy-makers attempt to understand the motivations and patterns behind homegrown radicalization. Considering the focus on Muslims in studies of counter-radicalization emerging from the United States and Europe, this paper analyzes whether Muslims systematically differ from other groups in how their attitudes towards radical political activity are formed.

This study empirically analyzes whether three concepts identified in theoretical studies of homegrown radicalization—grievance, political inefficacy, and segregated social networks—are indeed related to support for radical political activity. The data demonstrate that for both Muslims and non-Muslims, having an attachment to a group that one perceives as mistreated is significantly related to support for political violence when one believes that

conventional political activity is futile or ineffective. However, when people feel that they have a say in what government does, feelings of discrimination do not lead to support for political violence.

The findings also demonstrate that Muslims who maintain isolated social networks have higher levels of support for political violence compared to those who have more interactions with individuals from other religious or ethnic groups. The data show that the most isolated individuals are primarily third-generation, white Muslims who maintain extensive contacts overseas. This is striking because it suggests that the isolation is not necessarily due to practical barriers to integration such as language or familiarity with society, but rather an active choice to disengage from society.

The findings of this study are an important contribution to the literature on homegrown radicalization and political mobilization. Previous studies have largely been unable to assess the accuracy of recently-developed theories due to the difficulty of collecting data on radicalized individuals. The original data used in this study allows for the systematic assessment of how theoretical factors contribute to attitudes towards political extremism. Furthermore, by including non-radical individuals in the assessment, this study is able to identify the key features that distinguish individuals who accept radicalism and those who reject it.

The findings of this study have several important policy implications. While the large majority of the Muslim-American community rejects any use of violence to achieve political goals, the observation that Muslims are on average more sympathetic to radical political action may reflect the fact that the majority of attempted homegrown terrorism plots since 9/11 have been conducted by jihadists (Gilsinan et al. 2012). Throughout its history, America has witnessed terrorist activity from a variety of other groups including, leftist, right-wing, anti-government terrorist groups, as well as ethnic and religious-based groups. The data show that patterns of support for radicalism are identical for Muslims and non-Muslims

alike, suggesting that Muslims are not fundamentally different in when they are likely to support radical activity. In fact, once accounting for the levels of perceived discrimination, Muslims are no more likely than other religious groups to sympathize with political violence.

Contrary to theories which suggest conflict between Muslims and Western society is inevitable, this study provides some initial evidence that as circumstances for Muslims in the United States change, we should also expect attitudes towards violent political action among Muslim-Americans to change as well. Previous studies show that perceptions of ethnic and religious discrimination and negative perceptions of US military involvement in the Muslim world are associated with low levels of trust in the US government (Gillum 2011). As the US withdraws from Afghanistan and reduces its presence in the surrounding region, perceptions of Muslim grievance are likely to decline.

Although the study finds that determinants of support for political violence are identical for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the data show interesting variation across religious subgroups. Individual religiosity is unrelated to support for radical activity across all groups; however, those who attend and participate in religious services are more likely to sympathize with extreme political actions. It could be that those who have personal contact with members of their community are more likely to be aware of broader grievances against the group. Among Muslims, the effect of mosque attendance is greatest among third-generation Muslims. Among Christians, we see this pattern strongest among born-again Christians.

This study does have limitations. Due to the question at hand and the nature of the data, making causal inference is extremely difficult to establish. Random assignment of certain conditions would help us identify what is *causing* some to adopt radical attitudes, but unfortunately we cannot randomly assign individuals to be discriminated against or to live in isolated social networks. As a result, this study cannot claim that discrimination or isolated social networks cause radical views, but simply that the concepts are significantly related. It could be instead that individuals who have radical views that conflict with the norms of

society become progressively isolated due to rejection of their views by outsiders, and also because they increasingly regard the broader society as corrupt and hostile. However, several scholars point to the centrality of personal connections in explaining radicalization, showing that social bonding within small peer groups can facilitate the adaptation of more extreme worldviews (Neuman and Rodgers 2007; Wiktorowicz 2004; Sageman 2004).

Moreover, this study does not attempt to predict who is most likely to actually participate in radical activities or commit acts of political violence. The data here provide a snapshot of *attitudes* and sympathies towards radical activity at one point in time, and is therefore unable to speak to the process of radicalization that individuals go through in its entirety. Understanding attitudes however is extremely valuable as it is likely to reveal the much larger group of individuals who might turn a blind eye to, sympathize with, support combatants, or themselves be open to extreme ideological influences (McCauley 1991). Smaller case-studies thus still play a critical role in understanding the micro-processes of radical political mobilization. Nevertheless, being able to empirically identify the most significant common contributors to radical attitudes across the American populace allows for generalizability and prevents scholars and policy-makers from mislabeling certain groups as inherently violent.

Notes

¹ The term “jihadist” is used to distinguish the subset of homegrown violent extremist plots motivated by radical Islam, as opposed to, for example, those plots motivated by opposition to abortion, environmental policy, or other political grievances. While jihadists have accounted for the most *attempted* attacks, they do not account for the most terror-related deaths. Since 9/11, Muslim-American terrorism has claimed 33 lives in the United States. Over the same period, more than 200 Americans have been killed in political violence by white supremacists and other groups on the far right, according to a recent study published by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy (Perliger 2013).

²A full discussion of YouGov’s sampling methods can be found in the appendix.

³See the appendix for a full description of the scale items.

⁴The four major schools of thought that are most prevalent among Sunnis include Shafi, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki. The most prevalent among Shias is the Jafari *madhhab*.

⁵About 16 percent indicated that they look to all the *madhhabs* instead of just one, a slightly more flexible, but still conservative interpretation. These individuals expressed similar levels of sympathy towards political violence as those who follow just one *madhhab*. Those who refer to the Quran and Sunnah (the normative practice of the Prophet Muhammad) as their authority as opposed to following a traditional *madhhab*, generally believe the Quran and Sunnah are open to interpretations that consider the underlying purposes of the texts and modern circumstances, as opposed to the literal meaning. This is typically a more flexible approach. Individuals who selected this category had a mean score of .29 (.04) and compose about 39 percent of the sample.

⁶The figures here on the distribution of interpretations of Islam differ slightly from a 2011 US Mosque Study reported that reported 11 percent of mosque leaders prefer the more traditional approach of the classical legal schools of thought and a little over 1 percent of mosque leaders indicated they follow the Salafi way (Bagby 2011). The 2011 US Mosque Study however only interviewed mosque leaders and does not reflect the view of those who do not attend a mosque regularly (or not at all). Similar to this sample however, the majority of mosque leaders (56 percent) adopted a more flexible approach of looking to interpretations of Quran and Sunnah that take into account the overall purposes of Islamic Law and modern circumstances.

⁷Among African-Americans not associated with NOI, 15 percent are Salafi. Forty eight percent of African-American respondents are neither Salafi nor NOI. African-Americans make up 23 percent of the Muslim-American population according to this sample.

⁸The Nation of Islam was founded in Detroit in 1930 by Wallace Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad, and become well-known beginning in the 1950s in the advent of the civil rights movement. Members including Malcom X and Muhammad Ali (Cassius Clay before joining NOI), added visibility and popularity to the group. The group created a paramilitary wing designed to defend NOI against police attacks. While alienating many, NOI’s message that black elevation could only come through a radical separation from the structures of white oppression continued to resonate for many. In 1976, Warith Deen Mohammed, handed leadership of NOI by his late father, Elijah Muhammad, disbanded the NOI and brought what is believed to be the majority of NOI followers into mainstream Sunni Islam, abandoning his father’s theology and

black pride views. W.D. Mohammed worked to build closer ties with mainstream Muslim communities in the United States, who largely reject the theology of NOI. In 1977, Louis Farrakhan resigned from W.D. Muhammed's reformed organization. He worked to rebuild the original Nation of Islam upon the foundation established, continuing it as one of the wealthiest and best-known organizations in black America, offering numerous programs and events designed to uplift African-Americans.

⁹In order to partially rule out problems of multicollinearity, I assess how highly correlated each of these independent variables are to one another. I find that none of these three items are highly correlated—discrimination is correlated with political inefficacy at .23, and segregated social networks at .07. Efficacy is correlated with segregated social networks at .01.

¹⁰ Together these items achieve an alpha of .77 among Muslims and .93 for non-Muslims.

¹¹ Muslims mean inefficacy score= .43 (.03); Non-Muslims mean inefficacy=.50 (.01); $t=5.21$ $p < 0.00$

¹² Third-generation inefficacy= .46 (.05)

¹³ Together these items achieve a Cronbach's alpha score of .71.

¹⁴ On a scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely), respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family." Items are recoded to equal "1" if the respondent agreed with the statement, and equal to "0" if the respondent was neutral or disagreed with the statement.

¹⁵ On a scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely), respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Young women in America have too many freedoms." Items are recoded to equal "1" if the respondent agreed with the statement, and equal to "0" if the respondent was neutral or disagreed with the statement.

¹⁶ Each individual item that makes up the *Support for Political Violence* index is rescaled to range from 0 to 1. As a robustness check I re-run the analysis using an item that only assesses support for group based violence against the government. I use a logistic model with the dichotomous outcome variable, "I can understand someone who would continue to support an organization...even if the organization sometimes resort to violence." The item is set equal one if the respondent indicates any level of support for those involved with violent organizations, and zero if they were unsure or showed no support. The results are identical to the models using the full scale.

¹⁷In Models 1-8, I also control for being black or Hispanic using dichotomous variables. Being black or Hispanic is unrelated to sympathy towards radicalism in all models. For Models 5-8, I also control for being Atheist or Agnostic using dichotomous variables. Being Atheist or Agnostic is significantly and positively related to sympathizing with radicalism across all four models. Excluding these variables does not change the main results.

¹⁸Personal piety is measured using the single measure “How often do you pray.” The finding holds when using other measures of personal religiosity such as “How important is religion to your life” whether one wears religious clothing or garb, whether they claim to interpret the Quran literally.


¹⁹The personal religiosity and mosque/church attendance findings hold when included in the models separately from one another for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

²⁰The measurement used for ethnic discrimination is identical to the measurement for religious discrimination. Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that they are treated with less respect because of their ethnicity, and whether they believe Americans are hostile towards their ethnic group.

²¹A measure of social segregation was not available for the non-Muslim respondents, so I was unable to run an analogous assessment.

6 Tables and Figures


Figure 1: Mean Levels of Support for Political Violence among Muslim sub-groups



Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013

Table reports mean levels of agreement to the three items comprising the Political Violence index. Standard errors shown.

Figure 2: Mean Levels of Support for Political Violence among non-Muslim sub-groups



Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013

Table reports mean levels of agreement to the four items comprising the Political Violence index. Standard errors shown.

Table 1: Mean Levels of Perceived Religious Discrimination

	Religious Disc. M (SE)	Obs.		Religious Disc. M (SE)	Obs.
Muslims			Non-Muslims		
White	.59 (.03)	199	White	.31 (.01)	775
Black	.65 (.04)	106	Black	.30 (.03)	76
Asian	.53 (.06)	66	Asian	.41 (.07)	26
Arab	.58 (.06)	70	Hispanic	.41 (.05)	64
Third-generation	.63 (.03)	217	Protestant	.29 (.02)	371
Second-generation	.58 (.05)	109	Catholic	.29 (.03)	178
Foreign Born	.53 (.03)	165	Jewish	.42 (.06)	31
Follows Madhhab	.56 (.03)	174	Atheist	.53 (.06)	59
No Madhhab	.57 (.03)	229	Agnostic	.30 (.04)	49
Total Muslim	.58 (.02)	492	Total Non-Muslims	.32 (.01)	988

Table reports mean levels of perceived discrimination based on religion. Religious discrimination is measured by a two-item index, rescaled to range from 0-1. Respondents are asked: *I am treated with less respect than other people because of my religion; Americans are hostile towards my religious group.* Together these items achieve an alpha score of .77 for Muslims and .93 for non-Muslims. Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013.

Figure 3: *Mean Levels of Political Inefficacy among Muslims*




Figure displays mean levels of agreement towards the item used to measure a lack of political efficacy: *People like me don't have any say about what the US government does*. The item has a value of 1 if the respondent says they agree with the statement somewhat or strongly, and zero otherwise. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013.

Table 2: Determinants of Support for Political Violence among Muslims and Non-Muslims

	Muslims				Non-Muslims			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Discrimination	0.39*** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
Inefficacy		0.22*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)		0.05* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Inefficacy*Discrimination			0.44*** (0.16)	0.34** (0.15)			0.29*** (0.10)	0.26*** (0.09)
Mosque/Church Attendance				0.20*** (0.06)				0.08* (0.05)
Personal Piety				-0.02 (0.07)				-0.02 (0.04)
Female				-0.04 (0.04)				-0.07** (0.03)
Age				-0.00** (0.00)				-0.00*** (0.00)
Income				0.01 (0.01)				-0.00 (0.00)
Education				-0.03* (0.01)				-0.03*** (0.01)
R-squared	0.10	0.17	0.19	0.32	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.12
N. of cases	488	481	481	480	977	977	977	975

* P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01 Table reports the unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.

The dependent variable in each model is support for Political Violence, a continuous variable ranging from 0-1.

^a In Model 4, I also control for being U.S.-born, following a Madhab, identifying as Salafi, and identifying as a member of the Nation of Islam. Being a member of NOI is significantly and positively related to sympathizing with Political Violence. In Model 8, I control for being Atheist, Agnostic, Catholic, Jewish, or "Other religion" using dichotomous variables. Protestants serve as the baseline. Being Atheist or Agnostic is significantly and positively related to sympathizing with Political Violence.


Table 3: Determinants of Support for Political Violence, combined sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Discrimination		0.21*** (0.04)		0.18*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
Inefficacy			0.12*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Inefficacy*Discrimination					0.32*** (0.07)
Muslim	0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.027 (0.03)
Jewish	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)
Catholic	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Atheist	0.17* (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)
Agnostic	0.10* (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)
Mosque/church attendance	0.21*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Personal Piety	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
R^2	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.13
N	1402	1395	1396	1390	1390

* P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01


Table reports the unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression. The dependent variable in each model is support for Political Violence, a continuous variable ranging from 0-1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model controls for age, income, education, and gender. Sample is unweighted and includes Muslims and non-Muslims combined.

Figure 4: Mean Levels of Support for Political Violence by Social Segregation



Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013.
95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure 5: *Predicted Levels of Support for Political Violence by Social Segregation*



Source: Muslim-American National Opinion Survey 2013.

Figure presents the results from an OLS regression controlling for social segregation, discrimination, inefficacy, piety, mosque attendance, age, income, education, gender, and whether or not one was born in the United States. 95-percent confidence intervals are shown.

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8 Appendix

8.1 YouGov Sampling Methods

Muslim-American National Opinion Survey (MANOS) is an original survey administered to an online panel of 501 self-identified Muslims living across the United States. The survey was fielded from February 2, 2013 through March 19, 2013 and was conducted by the international polling firm, YouGov.

All data were collected via the Internet. YouGov recruited respondents who self-identified as Muslims using two methods. First, YouGov contacted previous participants in their American polls via e-mail and solicited their participation. Second, people who were on electronic mailing lists purchased from Internet marketing firms were contacted and invited to join the panel.

YouGov interviewed 557 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 500 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. YouGov then weighted the set of survey respondents to characteristics of the US Muslim population using data from the 2007 Pew Religious Landscape survey using propensity score weights based on gender, age, education, and voter registration status. The maximum weight for this dataset was 7.11, and the minimum weight was .15.

More information about MANOS can be found at [excluded]. For access to the original data, please contact the author at [excluded].

Modified Political Violence Scale:

The United States has a long history of individuals pushing for group rights when they feel they are being mistreated. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about political actions someone might take on behalf of a group that is important to them. (Strongly Agree (7)-Strongly Disagree (1))

I can understand someone who would:

- *Continue to support an organization that fights for his/her group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.*
- *Attack police or security forces if he/she saw them beating members of his/her group.*
- *Retaliate against members of a group that had attacked his/her group.*

Each item is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. To create the Political Violence index, the items are added together and divided by 3. Together the items achieve a Cronbach's alpha of .92 for Muslims and .86 for non-Muslims.




Figure 6: Distribution of Activism and Radicalism Scales

Perceived Discrimination

Please tell us the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: (Strongly Agree (7)-Strongly Disagree (1))

- *I am treated with less respect than other people because of my ethnicity*
- *Americans are hostile towards my ethnic group*

Each item is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. To create the discrimination index, items are added together and divided by 2. Together the items achieve a Cronbach's alpha of .85 for Muslims and .87 for non-Muslims.

Inefficacy

Please tell us how much you agree with the following statement: *People like me don't have any say about what the US government does.* (Strongly Agree (7)-Strongly Disagree (1))


The item is rescaled into a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the respondent indicated that they Somewhat agree (5), Agree (6), or Strongly Agree (7), and 0 otherwise.

Segregated Social Networks


How many of your friends or people in the social, school, work groups you belong to are also the same ethnicity as you? (All(5); Most (4); Some (3); Not too many (2); None(1))

How many of your friends or people in the social, school, work groups you belong to are also the same religion as you? (All(5); Most (4); Some (3); Not too many (2); None(1))

Each item is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. To create the social segregation index, items are added together and divided by 2. Together the items achieve a Cronbach's alpha of .71.



(a) Religious Group



(b) Ethnic Group

Figure 7: Distribution of Social Segregation Index

Religiosity

Personal Piety

How often do you pray?

Several times a day (7), Once a day (6), A few times a week (5), Once a week (4), A few times a month (3), Seldom (2), Never (1)

Mosque or church attendance

How often do you attend religious services?

Every week (5), Almost every week (4), Once or twice a month(3), A few times a year (2), Never (1)