

Original Title: Isomorphism and Local Elections

Working Title: Local Elections: Insights from Urban Theory versus Isomorphism

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Note:

This paper starts with an overview of urban politics theory as it pertains to local elections. It followed by a brief introduction to ways in which local elections may be similar to other types of elections (isomorphism). Additional analysis comparing campaign spending in large American cities versus gubernatorial, U.S. Senate, and Congressional races will be added to the final paper.

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There is an ongoing tension in the study of urban politics about the importance of contextual factors as opposed to patterns that cut across American cities. Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson struggled with this issue in their 1963 text, *City Politics*:

[T]here are enough important underlying similarities to make discussion of a typical situation and a typical set of problems worthwhile. It must be kept in mind, however, that what is true of the “typical” city may not be true of a particular one and certainly will not be the *whole* truth about any city.¹

Clarence Stone, in developing regime theory through a study of Atlanta politics added his own disclaimer:

The Atlanta story is, of course, not the story of every city. Yet, although Atlanta is not a typical city, its experience can tell us a great deal that has general relevance. Atlanta in the postwar period offers a case of the formation and maintenance of a governing coalition capable of promoting far-reaching change, even in the face of substantial resistance. Atlanta’s regime has been extraordinarily effective. How and with what consequences are the relevant questions. They lend significance to the Atlanta narrative.²

Perhaps because of this concern, there has been a lack of research regarding the extent to which local elections may also parallel other types of elections. Urban politics scholars have mainly focused on seeking out patterns particular to urban environments. However, emerging scholarship provides support for the argument, that at least when it comes to campaign finance, that mayoral elections in large cities resemble other types of elections in the American political

system.³ This paper provides an overview of leading urban theories that may provide insights about elections in large cities, to set the stage for a comparison in the final section about whether existing research studies have found that urban elections have unique characteristics.

Urban Politics Theories

Urban Political Machines: Historical Artifact or Still Relevant?

It continues to be difficult to separate myth from reality when it comes to the prevalence and characteristics of political machines. However, it is generally assumed that political machines were most developed within cities rather than in other levels of government. What is known is that political operations in a number of major cities became organized enough in the nineteenth century that the term political machine entered the common lexicon. Banfield and Wilson claimed that “every big city had a machine at one time or another” whose purpose was to benefit its organizers. Machines stayed in power through “petty favors” and cultivation of a sense of friendship between precinct captains and voters.⁴ Their conclusions that political machines were largely a product of “working-class people, especially immigrants unfamiliar with American ways and institutions” and declined by the middle of the twentieth century due to “assimilation to the political ethos of the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant” elite and middle class values seem off the mark, even offensive, to readers today.⁵

Other commentaries portray political machines as rife with corruption, but oddly benevolent in watching out for the needs of their constituents. For example, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* by William Riordon, first published in 1905 and still in print, is a folksy collection of speeches and interviews from a popular New York City politician. It popularized such quotes as “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em” and “honest graft.”⁶

The political machine has received both negative and positive treatments in popular movies. Preston Sturges' 1940 comedic classic, *The Great McGinty*, is the story of a homeless man who rises to the top of a political machine only to lose everything when he turns honest. Frank Capra's *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939) and *Meet John Doe* (1941) portray machines as much more sinister; the latter film features an evil newspaper publisher trying to bring a fascist political machine to power. *The Last Hurrah*, a bestselling novel and popular movie from the 1950s starring Spencer Tracy, is an often wistful portrayal of the end of Irish machine politics. The 1992 movie *Far and Away* showed the lead characters, played by Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman, being befriended by a machine boss in Boston after escaping from Ireland.

Steven Erie examined political machines in eight cities with large Irish populations. Some, but not all, had entrenched political machines. He also found that part of the ambivalence towards machines stems from the fact that they carried out different strategies over time. Emerging machines were more likely to mobilize voters while mature machines tried to restrict participation in order to hold onto power. Corruption and the distribution of benefits to voters were more limited than perceived since machine politicians did not have unlimited public coffers. As a result, established political machines actually welcomed the rise of government social programs that allowed machines to take credit for providing diffuse benefits. The movement of wealth to suburbs, demographic change, and fiscal stresses reducing city employment all contributed to machine decline.⁷

Amy Bridges followed a similar approach to Erie in analyzing reform-oriented cities in the American Southwest, finding that reform cities were as politically entrenched as those run by political machines.⁸ Jessica Trounstein further developed support for the argument that both

political machines and reform coalitions sought to gain and solidify political power. Troustine compared machine and reform cities through dataset analyses and in-depth case studies of machine-run Chicago and reform-oriented San Jose, California.⁹

Both Bridges and Troustine find evidence that reform cities narrowed the scope of city services and voter participation; they established home rule charters that made it easier to enact non-partisan, at-large elections and adopt voter registration requirements. According to Troustine's empirical analysis, reform cities had lower immigrant populations and higher income levels than their machine-run counterparts, resulting in policies that were more blatantly pro-development. Accountability for policy decisions was difficult to trace due to the use of non-partisan slates of candidates for city council seats and the shifting of responsibilities to city managers such as San Jose's long-serving Dutch Hamann; the mayoral position and mayoral elections appeared to have had a less prominent role in reform monopolies than in machine cities.¹⁰

Both types of political monopolies cooperated with business elites. Both mature machines and reform cities attempted to limit political participation and both eventually lost favor when they faced fiscal stresses and failed to diversify their coalitions. A favorite reform strategy, at-large elections, continues to be the dominant electoral structure in mid-sized and smaller cities. However, the civil rights movement and subsequent litigation related to representation under the 1965 Voting Rights Act mean that the largest American cities now have district or ward elections.¹¹

Legacies remain from both types of systems that do shape city elections. The coalition-building strategies of early political machines also have been adopted by candidates from under-represented racial and ethnic groups, with mixed success. As discussed later, political

monopolies may have evolved into pro-development regimes rather than completely fading away. Most large American cities continue to schedule elections on off-years from congressional and presidential campaigns, which dampens voter turnout. Nonpartisan elections are still popular in many cities, whether once machine-run or having a history as a reform city. Yet, top-two primary systems have spread from city hall to state governments, blurring the distinction between local and state electoral arrangements. Once considered a novelty in Louisiana, the top-two primary has been adopted in states such as Washington and California after courts rejected earlier open primary systems.

Race and Representation in Mayoral Elections

The breakdown of political monopolies and the passage of civil rights legislation finally provided opportunities for underrepresented races and ethnicities to gain political office in the later part of the twentieth century. African Americans continued to move to urban areas, with a 58% increase just in the 1960s, as large numbers of white residents moved out of central cities into suburbs.¹² By the mid-1970s, there were over one hundred black mayors in the United States.¹³ The Southern Conference of Black Mayors was founded in 1974 and reorganized into the National Conference of Black Mayors just two years later, with an Atlanta headquarters and executive director.¹⁴

Peter Eisenger, who conducted analyses in the 1970s of racial attitudes in Milwaukee and leadership transition issues in Detroit and Atlanta, found that black urban residents were an “increasingly significant, often autonomous, and cohesive political force” that voted overwhelmingly for black mayoral candidates.¹⁵ At the same time, Eisinger identified that emerging leaders would have difficulty creating and maintaining “community cohesion,” which

can be interpreted as an early indication that political machines would not be reestablished to the same degree as in the past.¹⁶ Eisinger foresaw that winning mayoral candidates would have to bring together coalitions of business and lower income residents and would face daunting challenges in declining cities like Detroit. Those coalitions would be sustainable only through enactment of more incremental improvements such as more inclusive and professionalized law enforcement along with neighborhood and job development programs.¹⁷

Scholars have generally identified three “waves” of black mayors, although there is some overlap in terms of era.¹⁸ The first wave consisted of strong supporters of the civil right movement who were elected in cities with large black populations (minority-majority cities). Mayors such as Coleman Young in Detroit (1974-1993) and Marion Berry in Washington, DC (1979-1994, 1995-1999) were reelected numerous times, but both had scandals towards the end of their tenures. Many first-wave mayors experienced what has long been identified as a hollow-prize problem: increased poverty, falling income levels, and declining populations.¹⁹ Some scholars have found a modest increase in minority police hiring with the election of black mayors, but little policy differences compared to other cities.²⁰ Other recent studies have suggested that black representation has increased political efficacy, satisfaction, and political participation. However, local participation generally declines over time with long-serving black mayors, a finding consistent with studies of other political monopolies.²¹

The second wave of black mayors was categorized and often criticized for adopting more deracialized styles. Maynard Jackson (1974-1982, 1990-1994) and Andrew Young (1982-1990) in Atlanta are sometimes placed in this category because of their cooperation with business elites in a city that had a majority African American population; Coca Cola has its headquarters in Atlanta and Ted Turner established his media empire there.

Other mayors in this category were elected in cities that had more heterogeneous populations and had to rely on the support of business leaders. For example, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley (1973-1993) had extensive political networks that allowed him to create a stable electoral and governing coalition. Bradley's tenure in Los Angeles, which included hosting the 1984 Olympics, is ranked relatively high among historians, but it also had machine-like characteristics. Bradley transitioned from more populist campaigns in 1969 and 1973 to well-funded, reelection campaigns that relied upon a multi-racial coalition of community leaders, business interests, and city employees. It can be argued that Bradley's coalition has been emulated by mayoral candidates in Los Angeles through the 2013 election, although with variation in the support provided by city employee unions.²²

The third wave of mayors that entered office in the early twenty-first century has been described as post-racial or transcending race. Newark's Cory Booker (elected to the U.S. Senate in 2013) and Sacramento's Kevin Johnson (a former NBA star) are part of a group of mayors that were elected at relatively young ages, extremely media savvy, and often identified as rising political stars.²³ This early optimism may be warranted in some cases, but not in others. Most notably, Kwame Kilpatrick's (2003-2008) tenure as mayor of Detroit ended with his resignation and corruption charges, but also has been described as an unsustainable leadership style that mixed pro-business policies with the creation of an unaccountable hip-hop persona.²⁴

As with the previous waves, some of these mayors have been criticized for not adequately addressing continued concerns about racism and inequality. Others have credited these mayors with progress made in revitalizing downtowns and reducing crime in a challenging environment with federal social service cutbacks, the emergence of terrorist threats, immigration controversies, and a vulnerable, changing economy.²⁵

Regime Theory

Certainly, the idea of a political regime is not new. Regime theory as applied to urban politics, though, was largely developed in the 1980s as several scholars began to reexamine local politics in light of economic development concerns. For example, Stephen Elkin argued that urban regimes were inherently biased towards business interests and should be reformed to reflect the values of a commercial republic.²⁶ Norman and Susan Fainstein defined urban regimes as the combination of elected leaders and government and argued that most cities fit a single regime type in a particular era.²⁷

Clarence Stone's version of regime theory, outlined in *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1948-1988*, has become a dominant theoretical framework in urban politics scholarship. Stone refines an urban regime as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to able to make and carry out governing decisions."²⁸ Regime theory, therefore, offers an explanation for why politics in Atlanta and other minority-majority cities remained relatively pro-development. As Stone puts, it "the economic role of businesses and the resources they control are too important for these enterprises to be left out" of coalitions.²⁹

Regime theory is also appealing to both elite theory and pluralist scholars.³⁰ There is enough recognition of corporate interests and full democratic participation being thwarted that regime theory can be appealing to critics of neo-liberalism. Proponents of pluralism can see that there is a role for multiple interests and coalition building. Regime theory is also very

compatible with the growing body of scholarship around collaborative networks in urban environments.

When regime theory is examined in some detail, it actually looks more like an updated adaptation of the political machine/reform city classifications than a new framework. Stone's standard regime typology recognizes four types of coalitions, three of which bear more than a passing resemblance to types of political machines: lower-class opportunity regimes requiring mobilization (emerging machines), pro-development regimes (mature machines and reform cities), and maintenance regimes (mature machines and reform cities trying to maintain the status quo; this type includes both stable and declining cities). Even the fourth type, middle-class progressive, could be associated with a mature reform city that is shifting from pro-development to quality of life concerns although it may first appear to apply more to suburban communities than large cities.³¹

As with any typology, it is relatively easy to criticize regime theory for being more descriptive than explanatory, missing important characteristics, and missing common regime types. Critical theorist David Imbroscio offers up a plethora of flaws and loopholes from so-called "sympathetic critics": focusing too much on development issues at the expense of other issues, neglecting to address external influences on cities, misinterpreting the connections between local governments and markets, and failing to fully examine how race impacts urban politics and programs.³²

Imbroscio argues for including three additional regime types into regime theory that do seem to capture different elements of current political dynamics and twenty-first century economies. One type, petty-bourgeois, may be mislabeled as it sounds like the idealized community of small businesses when it actually refers to a progressive city with a politically

active creative class and a large number of interconnected businesses such as those in technology, finance, and entertainment. His other two regime types, community-based and local-statist, assume a strong role for government itself in local politics, but he doesn't directly describe government workers and contractors as voting blocks or campaign contributors.

These criticisms of regime theory seem rather harsh when Stone has expressed his own disapproval of interpreting his version of regime theory as a paradigm. He states quite emphatically that he was more concerned with a useful tool for considering urban problems than creating what can be labeled a "grand theory."³³ As British scholar Keith Dowding has done, it may be better to identify common characteristics of regimes and place them into a framework for further testing and elaboration.³⁴ Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker have also called for better articulation and testing of core properties related to coalition dynamics.³⁵

By using a framework approach, it is possible to identify embedded a few assumptions about mayoral elections. First, substantial overlap between electoral and governing coalitions is assumed; regime theory speaks more to the later, but there is an assumption that coalition members, especially business interests, will donate to mayoral elections. One of the few studies on this topic found a more mild bias in favor of business interests; there were relatively few individual donors outside the city limits of New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco and those individuals donated only if they lived in close proximity; presumably a large number of business elites in more distant suburbs were not engaged in electoral processes.³⁶

Second, it is assumed that the coalition is stable and on the winning side of elections. There appears to be room for a candidate to first be elected by other constituencies, but then that candidate must cooperate with a coalition to maintain power. Alternatively, there may be a bandwagon effect, with a coalition seeking to curry favor and co-opt a winning candidate; the

parallel would be interest groups that decide to donate all congressional incumbents. In Atlanta, Stone found that white voters and business leaders came to the conclusion that black candidates would continue to be elected and then shifted their voting behavior and support.

Mostly, though, regime theory is largely silent on campaign politics. It doesn't really provide explanations about candidate emergence, campaign platforms, or how candidates may play off of competing interests. It also doesn't directly deal with issues of scale and change. How does electoral coalition building differ in a city of at least a million residents versus one of a half a million? What if the coalition members and their resources are shifting?

Beyond Regime Theory: Vision and Purpose

It may be useful to start an examination of mayoral elections by considering whether city electorates may have shared community visions and whether those visions go beyond economic development goals. Stone himself has commented that he did not adequately address community "purpose" in Atlanta. In a 2005 retrospective, he rather tellingly included an impassioned plea to consider other community interests:

Thus, urban regime analysis is about more than why economic development so often occupies a priority position in agenda setting; it is also about what it would take to build and maintain a different priority agenda, one that is aimed at ameliorating social problems.³⁷

Michael Pagano and Ann Bowman focused on community vision in 1995's *Cityscapes and Capital*.³⁸ They did so through the lens of development projects, but directly went to city leaders to find out their visions and efforts to mobilize political and financial capital. They did not specifically look at the goals of mayoral candidates, but they imply that electing mayors with a sense of vision and purpose is the key to the vitality of cities. In addition, they acknowledge

there can be changes in leadership and vision. “The envisioned city of tomorrow is not static; it evolves in response to shifting economies and political coalitions.”³⁹ Two of the ten cities studied in detail significantly changed their vision for the future between the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Their work suggests that, at least for some cities, elections lead to changes in governing coalitions, rather than the other way around. The quality of leadership mattered for all of the studied cities; elected officials have more of an impact and lead progress more than is posited in regime theory.

Paul Lewis and Max Neiman extend Pagano and Bowman’s perspective further by developing the concept of contingent trusteeship to explain local governance. Although they surveyed appointed economic development staff, not elected officials, it is notable that they found evidence for a variety of community visions. Some visions deal more with quality of life issues (place to raise families, diverse community, having a variety of services, helping the poor) and others are focused on economic development (proving jobs, business-friendly, tourist destination). They also developed a series of testable propositions about trusteeship or the role of leaders as custodians of place:

- Governments are informed by mission and vision
- Policy is shaped by community conditions and history
- Governments have survival instincts
- Policy is steered by leaders
- There is variation in policies across jurisdictions
- Cities have a sense of competition
- Governments have some political insulation or room to make hard decisions to stay on course with vision⁴⁰

The implications of Lewis and Neiman's 2009 work differ in subtle ways from Pagano and Bowman's earlier study. Lewis and Neiman suggest that officials have more constrained parameters for developing a community vision, but also that leaders have more discretion to act as entrepreneurs and for electoral coalitions to differ from governing ones.

Beyond Regime Theory Continued: Size, Scope and Bias

The study of local politics has been plagued by a lack of data on elections, since data on election results is usually maintained at the city government level and not centrally archived.⁴¹ Exit polls that would reveal more complete results have not been consistently conducted as well. There is a rich archive of survey results available from surveys sponsored by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), but the questions asked obviously are more from a management than political science perspective.

Therefore, there is a gap in matching theoretical frameworks with empirical findings. A rare exception is J. Eric Oliver's book on small and mid-sized city elections.⁴² While this work is not targeted towards larger cities, it is well worth considering whether his framework may be more broadly applicable. Oliver identifies three major characteristics that impact city elections. Size refers simply to city size; more candidates are likely to emerge because of the larger pool, but then additional resources are required to run. Scope is similar to power, but also has to do with responsibilities provided to a mayor and other officials.

Oliver comes closest to overlapping with regime theory with his discussion of bias, or how the electorate and policy outcomes may favor some interests over others. He departs from regime theory, though, in characterizing electoral majorities more as "propertied masses" or homeowners rather than business elites.⁴³ He also posits that most smaller and mid-sized city

elections revolve around “managerial democracy,” or the competency of managers and incumbents rather than ideological issues.⁴⁴ Most of the time, elections are relatively dull, but a crisis or major controversy can quickly shift elections in favor of challengers. Oliver actually makes a strong argument that local voters are more well-informed and engaged than the electorate participating in national elections. This is certainly a more populist and optimist view of local elections compared to regime theory.

Oliver argues that large city campaigns resemble those at other levels of governments. Large cities are more likely to offer a fuller range of services, have more heterogeneous populations, and more controversies leading to ideology-driven campaigns. However, Oliver largely tests his framework through analysis of a dataset of voters in thirty suburban cities in five states rather than examining large city elections.

Mayoral Elections in the American Political System: Isomorphism?

According to Jessica Trounstein, “Fundamentally, local politics is similar to and different from politics at other levels of American government.”⁴⁵ Basic campaign strategies such as having a web site and social media accounts, advertising, sending out mailers, seeking endorsements, participating in debates, and get-out-the vote efforts are used in elections at all levels of government. As Oliver indicates, use of the more expensive strategies can be a function of the size of a local government and electorate, but there appear to be similarities in that most candidates now set up web sites, on-line fundraising, and have the ability to post short video clips at little cost. Having a solid web presence is considered the bare minimum for candidates in larger cities. However, a web presence must be supplemented with expensive advertising in order for a candidate to be competitive.

Some other aspects of local elections appear to be quite different, but may be more similar to campaigns for state legislatures, congressional seats, and statewide elections than may first appear. Commonly cited topics include partisanship, campaign finance, and turnout. These are briefly discussed here as a preview to discussion in the following chapters and conclusion.

Partisanship

As a legacy of reform cities and the Progressive era, many cities have nonpartisan elections. However, this evaluation is overly simplistic. Trounstine points out that about a fourth of cities still hold partisan elections and many so-called nonpartisan elections may still have party activity and endorsements; media coverage invariably mentions the party identification of candidates as well.⁴⁶ What we do know is that most urban cities are strongly Democratic and that most mayors in those cities are Democrats. The election of Republican Kevin Faulconer as mayor of San Diego in 2014 is a rare exception to the trend.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Republicans have no influence in mayoral elections. If there is a field of Democratic candidates, Republican voters are likely to vote for the more centrist candidate. This dynamic seems to have partially influenced the outcome of the 2013 mayoral race in Los Angeles and possibly in Detroit as well, as discussed in the chapters on those two races. At least two research studies has shown relative few partisan impacts on policy outcomes at the local level; one set of authors points to competition among cities as the overriding constraint on partisanship, but it seems that the continued presence of opposite-party voters is another plausible explanation.⁴⁷

As the number of independent voters rises and states continue to modify electoral systems, the long history of nonpartisan elections and variations in local government primaries

can offer insights to state governments. A 2007 study found that the challenging party received increased support when party labels were removed from ballots, for both city and statewide elections.⁴⁸ The one-party dominance in many U.S. cities may also provide additional information about campaign dynamics and effective campaign strategies related to single-party dominated legislative districts and even state-level positions in states where one party has a clear majority.

Campaign Finance

Campaign finance is another area where, at first blush, the differences across cities seem too wide to be applicable to other types of governments. Larger cities tend to self-administer elections and campaign finance reporting. There are also variations in contribution limits, types of contributors, filing periods, and reporting periods. While cities have not been immune from *Citizens United* and other rulings, there are enough variations still in place that city elections can be considered fertile ground for finding examples of natural experiments on campaign finance reform that may eventually diffuse to state houses and the U.S. Congress.

While smaller and mid-size cities may be perceived to have less expensive campaigns than campaigns for higher office, this is certainly not the case for larger American cities. As far back as 1989, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley spent almost \$3 million on his successful reelection campaign.⁴⁹ As a point of comparison, the average U.S. House winner in 2012 spent almost \$1.6 million and the average losing challenger close to a half million dollars.⁵⁰ The races covered in this book were big budget affairs; these cities are all located in television media markets. Cleveland, the smallest city profiled in this book, still has a population of almost four hundred thousand persons as the 43rd largest city in the United States. The ten most American

populated cities outrank six states in terms of population. New York City, if it was a state, would rank 13th.

Voter Turnout

It is one of the great ironies of American politics that the level of government where voters are most likely to make a difference on results is also the level that has the lowest turnout rates. This topic has one of most robust bodies of empirical scholarship in the field of urban politics. It is well documented that low voter turnout is associated with higher incumbent reelection rates and a reduced likelihood of underrepresented groups being elected. Voters skew towards wealthy homeowners and the restrictions against non-citizens voting have more of an impact in urban areas with high immigrant populations. Voter turnout is also lower in cities with the council-manager form of government, but that impact may be increasingly difficult to isolate as more large cities move to strong-mayor systems.⁵¹

Even in this area, the differences between local and other elections may be less than first appears. Many mayor and council elections are held off-cycle as stand-alone elections. There may also be confusion about primary elections and whether there will be a run-off. When there is a run-off with a clear front-runner there may be little incentive to go to the polls. In St. Louis, for example, the Democratic primary is the key election and the run-off a formality. A natural experiment in California, where many cities shifted their elections to save costs, led to huge increases in voter turnout. Consolidation with a presidential general election resulted in 36% higher turnout, even when controlling for other variables. Consolidation with other elections led to about 25% higher turnout.⁵² These results may seem obvious, but suggest that there may be simple reforms available to improve electoral processes and participation.

Conclusion and Future Research

This paper is a short introduction to urban theory and ideas about isomorphism. The theme of isomorphism and empirical analysis of campaign finance data will be developed further in forthcoming research.

¹ Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press, 1963), 7.

² Clarence N. Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989), ix-x.

³ Thomas M. Holbrook and Aaron C. Weinschenk, "Money, Candidates, and Mayoral Elections," *Electoral Studies*, forthcoming.

⁴ Banfield and Wilson, 116 and 121.

⁵ Banfield and Wilson, 118 and 123.

⁶ William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1963).

⁷ Steven P. Erie, *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

⁸ Amy Bridges, *Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

⁹ Jessica Trounstein, *Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Peter K. Eisinger, *Patterns of Interracial Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the City* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 1.

¹³ Ibid., 2. This chapter uses the term black mayors has most often used in research studies and professional associations.

¹⁴ "Founders," National Conference of Black Mayors, last modified 2013, accessed March 17, 2014, <http://www.ncbm.org/founders.php>. The NCBM experienced a corruption problem with a former president in ... and fired its long-time executive director in 2013.

¹⁵ Eisinger, 1976, 2.

¹⁶ Ibid, 165.

¹⁷ Peter K. Eisinger, *The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic Transition in Three American Cities* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 194 and 198.

¹⁸ Bernard H. Ross and Myron A. Levine, *Urban Politics: Cities and Suburbs in a Global Age*, 8th ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2012), 115-117; Dennis S. Nordin, *From Edward Brooke to Barack Obama: African American Political Success 1966-2008* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2012), 43-108.

¹⁹ Neil Kraus and Todd Swanstrom, "Minority Mayors and the Hollow-Prize Problem," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31, no. 1 (March 2011): 99-105.

²⁰ John P. Pelissero, David B. Holian and Laura A. Tomaka, "Does Political Incorporation Matter? The Impact of Minority Mayors Over Time," *Urban Affairs Review* 36, no. 1 (September 2000): 84-92. Daniel J. Hopkins and Katherine T. McCabe, "After It's Too Late: Estimating the Policy Impacts of Black Mayoralties in U.S. Cities," *American Politics Research* 40, no. 4 (July 2012): 665-700.

²¹ Melissa J. Marschall and Anirudh V.S. Ruhil, "Substantive Symbols: The Attitudinal Dimension of Black Political Incorporation in Local Government," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (January 2007): 17-

- 33; Lester K. Spence, Harwood K. McClerking and Robert Brown, "Revisiting Black Incorporation and Local Political Participation," *Urban Affairs Review* 45, no. 2 (November 2009): 274-285.
- ²² Richard M. Flanagan, *Mayors and the Challenge of Urban Leadership* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004), 87-104; Nordin, 58-69.
- ²³ Andra Gillespie, "Losing and Winning: Cory Booker's Ascent to Newark's Mayoralty," in *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Black Leadership*, ed. Andra Gillespie (New York: Routledge, 2010), 67-84.
- ²⁴ Athena King, Todd Shaw, and Lester Spence, "Hype, Hip-Hop, and Heartbreak: The Rise and Fall of Kwame Kilpatrick," in *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Black Leadership*, ed. Andra Gillespie (New York: Routledge, 2010), 105-129.
- ²⁵ Dianne Pinderhughes, "Urban Racial and Ethnic Politics," in *Cities, Politics, and Policy: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. John P. Pelissero (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 97-125.
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- ²⁷ Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, "Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces," in *Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Development*, ed. Susan S. Fainstein, Norman I. Fainstein, Richard Child Hill, Dennis R. Judd, and Michael Peter Smith (New York: Longman, 1983), 245-282.
- ²⁸ Stone, 1989, 6.
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