

THE REBIRTH OF THE STATE

Reunification Campaigns in Sixteenth Century Japan and Twentieth Century China

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Abstract: This paper develops a new theory of internally-driven state reconstitution (i.e., the formation of a new state following state collapse) by examining the reunification campaign of Toyotomi Hideyoshi at the end of the Sengoku era (1477-1603) in Japan. Hendrik Spruyt's (1996) theory of state formation, when incorporated into the existing political crisis and critical junctures literature, and coupled with the new theoretical concepts of the logic of reunification and regional elites, can explain why state reconstitution was successful in Japan. In brief, at the beginning of the Sengoku era the regional elite group that had held power under the previous state collapsed along with most of the old institutions. This political space permitted the innovation of new institutions and policies, which were then ultimately used by Hideyoshi to enhance his extractive capacity and thus his military capabilities. The presence of a logic of reunification (a shared understanding among elites that a reconstituted state is expected, and desired, to emerge) inspired the reunification campaign itself and encouraged the new regional elites to bandwagon with rather than balance against Hideyoshi. Consequently, through a combination of success on the battlefield and coalition formation, Hideyoshi's reunification campaign culminated in a reconstituted state. Chiang Kai-shek's failed reunification campaign during the Republican era (1912-1949) in China is used as a contrast to highlight key theoretical points.

Note: Appendices are available upon request.

State collapse and state formation are subjects that have received a considerable amount of attention by scholars. State formation, especially of the European variety, has been a central concern of scholars for decades. The study of state collapse has also seen sustained attention over the past twenty years or so. Comparatively little work, however, has been done on state reconstitution, defined as the formation of a new state following state collapse. Many states collapse, but comparatively few are able to be reconstructed. Why, then, do some states remain collapsed whereas others are reborn? A number of scholars have already addressed this question (e.g., Rotberg 2003; Kieh 2007; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004). These works, when considering theoretical reasons for why states are reconstituted, have in common a general focus on the role of the international community in assisting state reconstruction. Aside from Jeremy M. Weinstein's work (2005), however, it appears that no attempt has been made to develop a systematic theory of how states are reconstituted through internal, primarily indigenous means. The purpose of this paper, then, is to propose a new theory of the factors and processes that are crucial for successful internally-driven state reconstitution. Put simply, this paper asks why certain attempts at internally-driven state reconstitution succeed and others fail. A theory is developed with a specific focus on cases involving reunification campaigns, a subtype of state reconstitution,¹ and then applied to the case of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's successful reunification campaign in sixteenth century Japan. Since the Japanese state was rebuilt without virtually any interaction with the outside world (and is thus a kind of 'quasi-historical laboratory'²), this is an ideal case to test a theory of internally-driven state reconstitution. Chiang Kai-shek's failed reunification campaign during the years 1926 to 1937 in China is used as a contrast to highlight key theoretical points.

Although Chiang Kai-shek's campaign is not incorporated into a proper paired-comparison research design here, there are enough similarities between the two cases to warrant at least a preliminary juxtaposition that can allow us to uncover key structures and dynamics that comprise state reconstitution.

¹ Other types include: national reconciliation, internationally-brokered ceasefires or buffer zones, disarmament, international conservatorships, neo-trusteeships, and shared sovereignty contracts (Zartman 1995, 272-273; Rotberg 2003, 31-32; Fearon and Laitin 2004, 7; Krasner 2004, 89).

² My thanks to Burak Kadercan for this turn of phrase.

First, both cases experienced state collapse, following which both societies came to be dominated by significant military power. Second, state collapse in both societies was precipitated by civil war. Third, both Hideyoshi and Chiang Kai-shek had to contend with strong challengers when conducting their respective reunification campaigns. Fourth, both societies exhibited a two-level elite structure: a regional level and a local one. Finally, state-builders in both eras had a difficult time controlling local elites. Despite these similarities, however, the outcomes were different. The differences between the cases permit us to look at the phenomenon of interest from different angles and potentially discover new theoretical insights that may not be apparent from a more conventional most-similar-systems design where the cases are selected more or less synchronically.

This paper's analysis has a number of scope conditions (or limits on the theory's applicability) and assumptions. First, it only examines a particular subtype of state reconstitution: the reunification campaign, which is a sustained military, political, and administrative process led by a unifier to reconstitute a state after collapse (a fuller conceptualization of this phenomenon is given in the next section). Second, in both cases, the reunification campaign was led by a militarily-capable, charismatic leader. Thus, this theory assumes the presence of strong, effective leadership. Third, by definition, state collapse requires the prior existence of a stable state to have failed. Accordingly, pristine conditions³ of state formation do not exist and so the institutional legacy of the previous state must be taken into consideration. Fourth, in both cases, state collapse precipitated pervasive internal warfare. Consequently, this paper's theory assumes powerholders and unifiers will put a great emphasis on developing and using military forms of power. Moreover, threats to survival will spur these powerholders to act in a self-interested way. Finally, it is assumed that actors in society, when faced with a sudden evaporation of central authority, will seek to fill that vacuum with new institutional arrangements so as to reestablish order and security. The following theory places greater emphasis on macro-level variables than individual or group ones (such as individual agency and factional dynamics), though a more

³ "Pristine state formation" refers to conditions where a society never experienced, nor had knowledge of, a state form of political organization.

comprehensive theory would require systematically examining such micro-level factors as well. Future work will address this shortcoming.

Both sixteenth century Japan and early twentieth century China (from here on referred to as Sengoku Japan (1477-1603) and Republican China (1912-1949), respectively)⁴ experienced state collapse. In Japan, the previous state was the Ashikaga Shogunate, which, following the deadly internal conflict known as the Onin War (1467-1477), quickly lost nearly all control over the country and its political elites. The former central government came to control only the capital city of Kyoto and its environs. Because of their weak regional support bases and close ties to the Shogunate, the regional elite group⁵ of Japan at this time, the *shugo*, collapsed (i.e., ceased to exist as a coherent, corporate group) shortly after the state itself fell apart. What followed was a period of over one hundred years wracked by internal disunity and increasingly intense and frequent warfare between newly-emergent regional elites known as the *daimyo*, who were mostly distinct from the old shugo families. Following a nadir of political decentralization in the early 1550s, a number of increasingly powerful daimyo came to emerge as regional hegemon each leading a coalition of his followers, who were samurai warlords. One such hegemon, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, launched a reunification campaign in 1582 and succeeded in reconstituting the Japanese state eight years later.

In the case of China, the previous state had been ruled by the Qing imperial dynasty. Following the 1911 Revolution, the Qing state was overthrown. By the late 1910s, however, the central regime ceased to control the great majority of the country and was successively captured by warlords, the majority of whom had been generals or other prominent military men under the Qing and now ruled over autonomous regional power bases. Chiang Kai-shek, a regional military leader himself, launched a reunification campaign, the Northern Expedition, in 1926 in collaboration with the Communists. He was partially successful, managing to establish firm control over much of eastern China. However, he was never able to construct a reconstituted state. Although the Japanese invasion in 1937 effectively dashed

⁴ *Sengoku* means “the country at war” in Japanese. The moniker “Republican” is used because the Republic of China, established in 1911 upon the fall of the Qing dynasty, was the mainland government during this period.

⁵ Defined as incumbents who wielded authority under the previous state over a relatively broad geographical area.

any chances he had of success, the question remains as to why, despite having had three more years to reunify his country than Hideyoshi, Chiang failed in his attempt at successful state reconstitution.

I argue that the collapse of the old regional elite group with origins under the previous state was crucial for later successful state reconstitution in the case of Sengoku Japan. This elite collapse entailed the breakdown of the old state institutions that had undergirded the authority of the previous state. As a consequence, political space opened up, within which newly-emergent independent powerholders innovated new administrative, political, and coercive technologies and new institutional arrangements necessary for successful state reconstitution.⁶ In addition, the presence of a logic of reunification motivated the reunification campaigns that were launched in the latter part of the Sengoku Era and encouraged the new regional elites to bandwagon with Hideyoshi as he strove to reunify the country. A causal mechanism involving institutional variation and selection, warfare, and political consolidation links this necessary condition with the success of Hideyoshi's reunification campaign. In Republican China, however, it appears that the continued presence of the old state (i.e., Qing dynasty) institutions and policies in the governments of the regional warlords, including Chiang Kai-shek's, inhibited the innovation of new technologies necessary for a unified state to reemerge, though a systematic comparative-historical analysis will be needed to confirm this conclusion.

Process tracing is the method principally utilized for analysis. James Mahoney argues that analysts employing process tracing should use knowledge of existing generalizations from the relevant literature. These generalizations can be gleaned from analyses of other cases, so long as they fall under the scope conditions for the case under investigation. Moreover, process tracing can be used to check that the outcome explained actually occurred and the hypothesized causal factors were truly present, and that the hypothesized cause was what in fact affected the outcome (Mahoney 2012, 19). Beach and Pedersen establish theory-building as one of three possible variants of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2012,

⁶ A technology is defined here as a portable institution or policy that can be utilized by actors distinct from the original innovator.

60).⁷ In this variant, the analyst uses inductive analysis to build a new theory, though while using existing theories to structure and guide the investigation. My use of process tracing is informed by the work of all of these authors: existing conceptual and theoretical insights will be drawn on to formulate a new theory of state reconstitution that seeks to both adequately explain the success of Hideyoshi's reunification campaign, and to build a parsimonious, abstract theory that can be tested across diverse cases, given those scope conditions detailed above.

The first section of the paper situates my key concepts of *state collapse*, the *reconstituted state*, and the *reunification campaign* in the crises and political development and critical junctures literature. Appendix A tests whether or not instances of these concepts were, in fact, manifest in this paper's principal case of Sengoku Japan.⁸ The second section begins with a brief review of the state formation literature, followed by a detailed account of Hendrik Spruyt's variation-selection theory of European state formation. This section concludes with the presentation of a new theory of internally-driven state reconstitution, accomplished by adapting Spruyt's theory to the crisis/critical junctures conceptual framework developed in section one, and by formulating the new theoretical concepts of regional elites and logics of reunification. Jointly sufficient causal factors and a causal mechanism linking those factors to the outcome of interest are presented. In the third section, I test the theory by applying it to the case of Sengoku Japan (including systematically tracing the causal mechanism) and address alternative explanations as to why state reconstitution was successful in this case. I also highlight key theoretical points by contrasting this case with certain features present in the case of Chiang Kai-shek's failed reunification campaign. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the paper's findings and suggesting directions for future research.

⁷ The other two are theory-testing and explaining-outcome.

⁸ The very short answer is: "they are."

I. Crises and Critical Junctures

In the 1970s, a number of studies were written emphasizing the role that crises play in political development. Binder et al. (1971) and Almond et al. (1973) are two exemplars of this particular research program. A crisis is variously defined as a system-altering episode of political change that challenges the fundamental order of a given political system (Binder et al. 1971, 64), and “a challenge to the authority of the constituted decision makers expressed through extralegal means of protest on a scale sufficient to threaten the incumbents’ ability to maintain order and continued occupancy of authority roles” (Flanagan 1973, 48). In essence, a crisis effects, or threatens to effect, fundamental change in a society’s political structure. Moreover, a sequence of crisis-afflicted political development can be characterized as having four stages: synchronization (the antecedent political system), dissynchronization (radical system-wide fluctuations precipitated by a crisis), breakthrough (formation of a new winning coalition and crisis resolution), and resynchronization (the resultant political system) (Flanagan 1973, 49). A political system undergoing a crisis sequence, in effect, is characterized first by a swift and significant decline in its stability and then, ultimately, by restabilization of its constitutive elements (e.g, coalitions, structures).

In the early 1990s, this broad conceptualization was revived under the name of critical junctures, albeit in a significantly altered form. Crises and/or cleavages are the causal factors that initiate a critical juncture. David and Ruth Berins Collier define a critical juncture as “(1) a period of significant change, which typically (2) occurs in distinct ways in different countries...and which is hypothesized to (3) produce distinct legacies.” (Collier and Collier 1991, 29). James Mahoney specifies a critical juncture somewhat differently: “a key choice point wherein a particular option is selected from two or more alternatives” (Mahoney 2001, 6). Nevertheless, all three scholars agree that critical junctures are crucial historical episodes that explain subsequent divergence across multiple cases. Antecedant conditions set the stage for the cleavage and/or crisis to emerge, thus initiating the critical juncture. Within the critical juncture, different countries take or choose different paths (or legacies), which are then shaped by a series of causally-linked steps (mechanisms of production), and finally perpetuated through continuing political

and institutional processes (mechanisms of *reproduction*) (Collier and Collier 1991, 30-33). This causal argument is said to be path dependent because the path (or stable institutional and political legacy) that a country takes is dependent on the critical choices, or divergences, that were made, or initiated, during the critical juncture period.

Hillel Soifer (2012) expands on this framework. He argues that a critical juncture is a combination of two types of conditions: permissive and productive (Soifer 2012, 1573). Permissive conditions ease the structural constraints on actors such that the causal power of agency and contingency can be increased. In other words, permissive conditions *permit* significant, contingent change to occur. Productive conditions, on the other hand, generate the divergent initial outcomes that are subsequently perpetuated after the critical juncture closes (i.e., when these conditions no longer operate) (Soifer 2012, 1573-1575). When both of these types of conditions are present, a critical juncture occurs. These two conditions can be seen as (I)nsufficient but (N)ecessary components of a causal combination that is (U)nnecessary but (S)ufficient, or INUS conditions (see Mahoney et al. 2009, 125). In other words, although *individually* they are insufficient for a critical juncture to be present, when both are present they are *jointly* sufficient for this phenomenon to occur.

State collapse can be incorporated into the crisis framework outlined above. A collapsed state is a condition of society where there had once been a state, but now that form of political organization no longer exists. State collapse is the *process* through which this condition is brought about. I. William Zartman (1995, 1) defines a collapsed state as a "...situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form old or new." Robert I. Rotberg (2004) concurs, characterizing the situation as one where political goods are obtained privately, a vacuum of authority exists, warlords take over regions of the former state, and widespread disorder, anarchy, and destabilizing networks (e.g., drugs, terror) persist (Rotberg 2004, 9-10).⁹ When a

⁹ It is important to distinguish a collapsed state from a failed one. According to Rotberg (2004, 5-9), state failure is characterized by enduring violence (e.g., armed revolts and insurgencies, civil or communal unrest, criminality), disharmony between communities, deteriorating infrastructure, autonomy movements by internal groups, reduction

state has collapsed, a form of dissynchronization has occurred. One possible resynchronization outcome is a reconstituted state. An enduringly fragmented state (e.g., a collection of stable successor states replaces the original state) is another plausible manifestation of resynchronization. Both outcomes, though, emerge following the dyssynchronized condition of a collapsed state. Although in Flanagan's original framework resynchronization always follows a breakthrough stage, in the case of state collapse an enduringly fragmented state does *not* involve the formation of a new winning coalition and the resolution of the crisis (i.e., state collapse). Rather, a unified coalition fails to materialize, or does materialize but fails to successfully reconstitute the state, and a collection of disparate coalitions emerge, each constructing their own separate successor state (or other institutional arrangement). Thus, I have modified Flanagan's framework to allow for the possibility of resynchronization without breakthrough.

State collapse can be classified as a critical juncture when the crisis precipitates the conditions necessary for a reconstituted state to emerge. These conditions will be explained in the next section. For now, it is sufficient to emphasize that state collapse need not result in a critical juncture. If the necessary permissive and productive conditions are not jointly present, then a critical juncture will not arise and thus a reconstituted state will not be able to emerge. In other words, the *choice* of constructing a reconstituted state is not available to actors in society. Instead, three other outcomes are possible, per Soifer's typology (Soifer 2012, 1580). If the permissive condition(s) is present, but the productive one(s) is not, a missed opportunity occurs. An enduringly fragmented state is an example of such a missed opportunity. If the permissive condition(s) is absent, but the productive one(s) is present, then we should expect a period of incremental change, as actors in society want to fundamentally change the institutional and political situation, but are unable to substantially do so. When neither condition is present, the immediate post-crisis status quo persists, also likely in the form of an enduringly fragmented state.

A reunification campaign is a subtype of state reconstitution. The explicit goal of those who undertake it is the formation of a reconstituted state. If such a campaign is successful, we can say that

and atrophy of government functions, and the inability of the state to control all the regions within its nominal borders. A collapsed state is, in effect, a more extreme version of a failed state (Rotberg 2004, 9).

breakthrough has occurred and the crisis of state collapse has been resolved. What distinguishes a reunification campaign from a more conventional campaign of conquest – and is a direct corollary of the logic of reunification (explained in the next section) – is that such a campaign must be explicitly political in nature; that is, the unifier makes appeals to national-level symbols and strives to associate his governing apparatus with national society¹⁰.

II. State Formation and State Reconstitution

For decades, state formation has been a chief area of research for the scholarly community, especially with regard to the European context. A number of arguments as to why state formation occurs have been made. Joseph R. Strayer argues that the need for enforcement of justice was behind the birth of the modern state in Western Europe (1970, 23). Perry Anderson takes a Marxist approach and asserts that the absolutist state in Europe was a reformulated tool of the dominant aristocratic classes, though he also recognizes the role of war in European political development (1975, 18-20 and 197). Both Charles Tilly and Bruce D. Porter emphasize the role of warfare in the rise of the state (Tilly 1992; Porter 1994, 1). Thomas Ertman, argues that, in early modern Europe, the timing of the onset of external geopolitical competition for a state determined the type of state infrastructure that rulers pursued while the legacy of local governance structured a state's political regime (1995, 28-30). Outside Europe, R. Bin Wong (1997) and Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2005) have examined China from a comparative perspective, and Jeffrey Herbst (2000) and Miguel Centeno (2003) address state formation in Africa and Latin America, respectively. Wong advocates a perspective on state making that recognizes important similarities between European and Chinese processes, but also emphasizes how these cases' different, yet equally significant historical trajectories must be examined without treating one as more "normal" than the other

¹⁰ I use 'national' here in a similar way to how Tilly uses it. For him, a *national* state is one "governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures" (Tilly 1992, 2). For the purposes of this paper, 'national' means encompassing, or associated with, multiple contiguous regions. Thus, when used to characterize a society or society-level variable, the word 'national' does not necessarily imply the presence of modern nationalism.

(1997, 294). Hui asserts that the success of the ancient Chinese state of Qin in establishing a hegemonic empire, unlike what happened in the multi-state system of early modern Europe, was primarily due to the uncompromising self-strengthening strategies chosen by its rulers to buttress their control (2005, 226-228). Herbst argues that the unique geography and demographics of Africa inhibited the expansion of state infrastructure from one area into its peripheries (2000, 11-13). Centeno claims that the paucity of interstate warfare in Latin America led to the widespread phenomenon of weak state strength (2003, 11). In sum, the state formation literature provides a rich theoretical background from which to draw analytic inspiration.¹¹

A number of these scholars have provided theoretical inspiration for my analysis. Wong's (1997) call for not treating any particular region's or country's state making experience as paradigmatic informed my decision to choose a case that was outside of the West. Ertman's (1995) inclusion of antecedent institutional legacies in his theoretical framework has influenced my search for plausible explanatory variables, specifically those that represent the inheritance of inefficient institutional arrangements (e.g., the persistence of elements of the old state apparatus). Adopting Hui's (2005) focus on the strategies of state makers is crucial for understanding the actual historical instances of my proposed causal mechanism. Lastly, Tilly's (1975, 1985, 1992) focus on the close association between war making and state making significantly informs a crucial part of the presented theory's causal mechanism. To varying degrees, then, this paper's theory of state reconstitution draws from a number of different scholarly sources.

My theoretical framework is informed the most, however, by Spruyt's variation-selection theory¹² (Spruyt 1996). Spruyt argues that state formation in Europe can be explained by a broad two-step process. First, widespread external change causes shifts in the relative power of social and political actors. These

¹¹ In essence, state reconstitution is one subtype of state formation. The key distinction is that state reconstitution can never be pristine, in that institutional legacies remain from the previous state that can either help or hinder future state formation. Moreover, the trauma of state collapse can pose special challenges for aspiring state builders, for example by initiating a long period of internal chaos and exposing the country to external interference, who often must begin their effort without having an organized means of resistance. In addition, the time frame of state reconstitution, relative to the centuries-long processes that many state formation scholars examine, is considerably narrower. Thus, their theories are not ideal for my purposes. Nevertheless, the basic phenomenon to be explained – creating a state – is for the most part the same, and so their theories remain highly valuable.

¹² Although Spruyt does not refer to his theory in this way, I believe it properly conveys the crux of his argument.

actors will form new political coalitions, founded on material interests and shared conceptual frameworks, in order to create new institutional arrangements. Second, systemic pressure and choices made by societal actors leads one institutional arrangement to be chosen over others. In the case of Europe, the expansion of trade led the newly-invigorated towns to seek coalitions with other political actors to enhance and safeguard their recent gains. The state won out over city-leagues and city-states because it was more efficient both at fostering and mobilizing resources and organizing external, interunit behavior (e.g., enforcing treaties). Moreover, the state was mutually incompatible with nonhierarchical, nonterritorial organizations. In other words, the state's (and its supporter's) conceptual framework could not accept institutional arrangements that were not hierarchically and territorially sovereign. Once the benefits of the state were made clear, other actors adopted the institutions that were associated with the states' relative success (Spruyt 1996, 26-29). Consequently, the sovereign state came to be the institutional arrangement that dominated the European landscape.

I adapt Spruyt's variation-selection theory to the crisis/critical-juncture framework laid out in the previous section. I first detail the hypothesized set of causal factors that lead to my outcome of interest, successful state reconstitution (i.e., the formation of a reconstituted state) by way of a reunification campaign. I then present a causal mechanism by laying out a series of hoop tests connecting the set of causal factors to the outcome, with each hoop test corresponding to a necessary condition in the causal chain.¹³

Variation-selection theory can be viewed as a special kind of critical-juncture analysis. Whereas typical critical-juncture analyses explore why cases diverge following a common point of significant change, variation-selection theory seeks to explain initial divergence and subsequent *convergence* within a single system. In other words, the modes of reproduction that typically follow a critical juncture are delayed until after a process of selection. Despite this key difference, however, the fundamental nature of a critical juncture (i.e., a point at which institutional constraints on actors are loosened) is left unchanged.

¹³ A hypothesis must pass a hoop test to not be disconfirmed. Passing one, however, does not confirm the hypothesis (Van Evera 1997, 31). In the context of a chain of linked necessary conditions, though, passing all of them *is* sufficient to confirm the hypothesis ((see Mahoney 2012, 11-12).

The lone scholar I have found who has done theoretical work on internally-driven state reconstitution is Jeremy M. Weinstein who argues that the presence of three conditions – a significant threat to the group’s survival, a strong need for internally-derived revenue, and a lack of externally-driven reduction in the cost of conflict – will likely lead to successful state reconstitution (Weinstein 2005, 14). Tilly’s (1992) emphasis on the necessity of warfare for state-building forms the basis of Weinstein’s analysis. This paper, by contrast, seeks to more fully incorporate state reconstitution theory into the broader literature on state formation, especially Spruyt’s contributions on institutional development.

A New Theory of State Reconstitution

In the context of state collapse and internally-driven reconstitution, a crisis (i.e., the collapse of a state) rather than a long-term cleavage (e.g., economic change as in Spruyt’s original analysis) initiates a critical juncture within which we would expect a successful reunification campaign to occur, so long as the following two jointly sufficient conditions are met. First, the permissive condition of the collapse of the old regional elites must be present. In other words, the collapse of the state is accompanied by the collapse of the old regional elites. This elite collapse may come about, for instance, by an especially severe civil war that crippled the regional elites’ power. Alternatively, the authority of the regional elites could be so dependent on the existence of the state (e.g., the elite’s sole source of legitimacy is their position in the state structure), that when the state collapses the regional elites simply cannot maintain their power. A third possibility is that the regional elites are massacred in a foreign war, the loss of which also brings about the collapse of the state, thus leaving a power vacuum back home at the regional level. Whatever the cause may be, so long as the regional elite group collapses this permissive condition is met.

The old regional elites are incumbents who wielded authority under the previous state over a relatively broad geographical area. It is important to distinguish regional elites from generic incumbents (any actor that enjoyed power or privilege under the antecedent political system) because the territoriality of the former’s power can serve as a direct obstacle to the construction of a state, itself by definition a territorial entity. As Flanagan points out, incumbents frequently resist implementing changes that threaten their own resource base and preferences, even if those changes are necessary to adapt to the

political system's changing environment (Flanagan 1973, 54). Should these old regional elites survive the collapse of the state upon which they were previously dependent, they are expected to resist innovation that may destabilize their governing apparatus. Moreover, if the old regional elite group survives, so do the institutions that had supported their power under the previous state.¹⁴ The modes of reproduction that sustain these institutions also inhibit innovation of new technologies. Additionally, to the extent that the governing apparatuses that the old regional elites base their power on are inherited from the old, clearly ineffective state, these elites are expected to be unable to successfully complete a reunification campaign, should one or more of them choose to launch one.¹⁵ Should the group of old regional elites collapse along with the state, however, innovation of new administrative, political, and military technologies occurs, as there are no incumbents or pre-existing institutions to obstruct this process. These new technologies are then used by elites to construct new, more effective governing apparatuses upon which a successful reunification campaign can depend.

Second, the productive condition of a logic of reunification must also be present. The logic of reunification refers to a shared understanding among elites that a reconstituted state is expected, and desired, to emerge. This logic can be fostered by nationalism, a shared national-level symbol of unity, or a common historical legacy. The particular source of the logic of reunification is unimportant for our present purposes. Should this condition be present, the emergence of a reunification campaign is expected to occur sometime following the completed collapse of the state. In addition, regional elites are expected to be more willing to bandwagon with rather than balance against a rising unifier because that unifier, to the extent that he appeals to national or shared cultural notions of authority and political order, will be seen as holding legitimate aims.

¹⁴ A state can collapse and the institutions and policies it had used still can be perpetuated and utilized by formerly incorporated elites. So long as there is no territorial centrality or functional monopoly held by a socio-spatial organization, there is no state.


¹⁵ This idea of inefficient institutional legacies from earlier historical periods is also used by Ertman (1995, 23-24) to explain variation in political regimes in early modern Europe. Similar to my argument regarding the collapse of the old regional elite group, Kiser and Cai argue (2003, 516) that the weakening of aristocratic power is necessary for bureaucratization to occur, which, like state reconstitution, is a form of centralization of political power.

Before turning to the causal mechanism, it is important to distinguish between old and new regional elites. Old regional elites exercised authority under the previous state, as already stated. New regional elites, however, emerge *after* the collapse of the state. Like all incumbents, these elites are also expected to resist innovation of new technologies. As long as the emergence of this new regional elite group does not occur before or in parallel with the crucial period of institutional innovation, though, they are not expected to undermine the overall process of state reconstitution. As a strong new regional elite group emerges, the critical juncture begins to close off. Once new modes of reproduction have been established (either by the stabilization of this regional elite group or the foundation of a new state), the critical juncture has ended completely, as the permissive condition is no longer present.

When the permissive and productive conditions proposed above are both present, I hypothesize that the following causal mechanism will operate and bring about successful internally-driven state reconstitution through a reunification campaign, given that the leader of the campaign selects the state-building strategies that these two structural conditions provide.¹⁶ This causal mechanism proceeds in three broad phases, as summarized in Table 1 (more detailed operationalizations as well as potential disconfirmatory evidence are provided in Appendix B). This phase progression is distinct from the crisis phase progression (i.e., synchronization-dissynchronization-breakthrough-resynchronization) in that the former is causal (i.e., forms a causal mechanism) whereas the latter is conceptual (i.e., describes a trajectory). The first two phases – variation and selection – draw directly from Spruyt’s (1996) framework. The third and final phase is a new theoretical contribution, conceived deductively from the assumptions that a) a society undergoing state collapse will see an increase in conflict, thus initiating the empirically well-established cycle of war making and state making (see Tilly 1992), and b) the presence of a logic of reunification will push this overall cycle towards political consolidation and, ultimately, to the outcome of successful state reconstitution. The overall causal framework is presented in Figure 1.

¹⁶ Mahoney argues that a causal mechanism can be viewed as a chain of linked necessary conditions; that is, a combination of individually necessary conditions that when met in sequence are sufficient for an outcome to occur. If it can be shown that a causal factor is necessary for a causal mechanism that is necessary for the outcome, then this is sufficient evidence to claim that the causal factor is necessary for the outcome (Mahoney 2012, 12-13). This is the strategy for finding the causal mechanism that I will use.

Figure 1: A Causal Framework for State Reconstitution



Phase	Step in Causal Mechanism
1. Variation	(1) Opening of political space
	(2) Development of new technologies/arrangements
	(3) Enhanced extractive and war making potential
2. Selection	(1) Expansion of territory
	(2) Technological diffusion
	(3) Institutional Displacement
3. Reconstitution	(1) Rival elimination
	(2) Bargaining and bandwagoning
	(3) Stronger and more effective unifier coalition

The first phase involves new variations in institutional forms. First, the collapse of the old regional elites entails the opening of political space within which new organizational types and new powerholders can emerge. Second, these new powerholders and organizations develop new administrative, political, and coercive technologies, including (but not limited to) new forms of fiscal administration, new coalitional structures, and the confirmation of property rights for select groups. Third, these new technologies are used to enhance the extractive capabilities and war making potential of these new powerholders.

The second phase entails a single institutional form attaining predominance. First, the new extractive and war making capabilities lead to greater success by these new powerholders in expanding

their territory. Second, akin to Spruyt's institutional mimicry, success by these new powerholders leads to the diffusion of these proven technologies into the repertoires of other powerholders. Third, institutional arrangements that are not comprised of, or do not utilize, these proven technologies, or are otherwise inefficient, are displaced by the more successful ones.

The final phase comprises increasing political consolidation, the emergence of one or more reunification campaigns, and, ultimately, the culmination of the process in a successfully reconstituted state. First, powerholders engage in a Tillian process by generally increasing the use of these new, proven technologies to eliminate or neutralize internal rivals and make war on external ones, thus increasing the overall level of violence and warfare. Second, the success of stronger regional elites (and their coalitions) causes weaker powerholders to bargain and/or bandwagon with them. One of these stronger regional elites emerges as a unifier, that is, the leader of a reunification campaign. This emergence is expected in either the first or second step of the final phase. A reunification campaign is unlikely to occur earlier than this because a potential unifier should want to wait to attempt a national-scale military effort until he has sufficient resources (i.e., a solid support base) for such an endeavor. Third, the success of the unifier leads to him enjoying an increasingly stronger and more effective coalition. Once the strength and effectiveness of this coalition results in a successful reunification campaign, a reconstituted state has been achieved.

As stated above, each step is associated with a hoop test. In order for the theory to hold, the case of Sengoku Japan must pass each hoop test in sequence. If the case passes each of the hoop tests, and the final step results in a reconstituted state, then we can confidently claim that the permissive and productive conditions of the collapse of the old regional elites and the presence of a logic of reunification, respectively, did in fact cause successful state reconstitution in the case under examination. Appendix B describes the hoop tests in detail. What follows in the next section is a more condensed narrative of the causal mechanism.

III. Successful State Reconstitution in Sengoku Japan

In this section, I first assess the validity of existing rival hypotheses that purport to explain why a state reemerged in Sengoku Japan. I follow with an application of my own explanation; specifically, I first apply the two jointly sufficient causal conditions to the case of Sengoku Japan, and I then test my causal argument by tracing the process of successful state reconstitution through the causal mechanism proposed in the previous section. At three points, I briefly discuss key differences in how the process played out in the case of Chiang Kai-shek's 1926-1937 reunification campaign. These key differences are: the persistence of the old Qing Era regional elite and their institutions into the Republican Era, the relative lack of institutional innovation by both them and Chiang Kai-shek, and the failure of Chiang to fully reunify the country.

Alternative Explanations

In addition to the explanation I put forth, four other possible explanations for why state reconstitution was successful in Sengoku Japan can be made. Collier and Collier caution that for any critical juncture argument, both constant causes (i.e., unchanging structural ones) and antecedent causes (i.e., occurring prior to the critical juncture) must be acknowledged as rival hypotheses and assessed accordingly. The first such cause for Sengoku Japan is that economic change, specifically the increasing self-sufficiency of Japanese farmers, unsettled the prevailing political arrangement. This in turn led to insecurity and political instability, necessitating the reestablishment of political order (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010). Although on the face of it this appears to be an antecedent cause, the human desire for security is arguably a universal one. As such, this argument is more appropriately labeled a constant cause. Yet not all societies enjoy such security. Moreover, a state is not the only institutional arrangement that can provide order and security for a society. Thus, although economic change may have contributed to the collapse of the Ashikaga Shogunate, this factor cannot, by itself, explain why a state was reconstituted in Japan at the end of the sixteenth century.

The second Japan-specific alternative explanation is that “organizational changes in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Japan provided the impetus for the consolidation of regional political and military power” (Conlan 2010, 125). In other words, institutional and organizational innovation began in the 1300s and proceeded to develop throughout the next two centuries, culminating in the daimyo domains (discussed below) that formed the foundation for Hideyoshi’s and Tokugawa’s¹⁷ respective states. This process began with the development of the *hanzei* taxation system of the shugo, or old regional elites, under the Ashikaga Shogunate (Conlan 2010, 137). The increasingly sophisticated methods of resource extraction in turn led to new, more manpower-intensive military organizations such as pike formation. This explanation, however, does not account for the institutional break that occurred following the Onin War. As Thomas Conlan himself recognizes, the hanzei system and the new pike formations did not prevent the shugo from collapsing (Conlan 2010, 149). The institutions that the daimyo, or new regional elites, used to build up their power were for the most part innovated *after* the Onin War. Thus, the key institutional developments that led to the successful reconstitution of the Japanese state occurred not during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but rather in the sixteenth.

Charles Tilly and Joseph Strayer present their own arguments as to why states emerged. Although they were looking exclusively at Europe, we can assess the scope of their explanations by comparing their assessments of European state formation to a similar process in Sengoku Japan. Although Sengoku Japan was a single society (unlike Europe), by the 1550s the daimyo domains essentially functioned as independent states, so in this regard the case is not outside the scope of Tilly’s argument. Tilly argues that war, and preparation for war, drives state formation (Tilly 1985, 1992). My theory does take into account the selective pressure that war making has on competing institutional arrangements. However, Tilly’s argument does not explain why the bulk of institutional innovation occurred in the early to mid- 1500s, prior to the period with the highest degree of warfare, the *late* 1500s. If war making had such an impact on the development of new technologies, then we should expect most

¹⁷ Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu were, respectively, the 2nd and 3rd “great unifiers” of Sengoku Japan (Oda Nobunaga was the first). Tokugawa Ieyasu established his regime in 1603, a few years after Hideyoshi’s death.

of the significant institutional innovation to occur during this later period, not the earlier one. Strayer argues that elites desire a third party arbiter and enforcer to dispense impartial justice, especially regarding land disputes (1970, 23). While Sengoku-era daimyo certainly filled this role, judicial institutions were not the only innovations to be developed. Thus, while Strayer's argument, when applied to Sengoku Japan, is not false, it is incomplete.

Causes of Successful State Reconstitution in Sengoku Japan

I argue that the collapse of the old regional elite group, the *shugo*, functioned as the permissive condition for successful state reconstitution in the case of Sengoku Japan by allowing innovation of new administrative, political, and military technologies. These technologies were then used effectively by powerholders and, ultimately, Hideyoshi himself, granting him the required capabilities to reunify the country and reconstitute the Japanese state. Additionally, the continued existence of the emperor served as a unifying national symbol – the productive condition. Each daimyo, or new regional elite, strove to be the one who would reunify Japan, at least by the 1560s/1570s (see Berry 1982, 22-23 and Hall 1991, 9). Powerful daimyo would send tribute missions to Kyoto to pay obeisance to the emperor and court nobility (Asao 1981, 248-249). Hideyoshi acquired court titles for him and his vassals (despite the emperor having no *de facto* political power), and used these titles in all his correspondence, especially when communicating with other daimyo (Berry 1982, 180). Oda Nobunaga, Hideyoshi's predecessor and the first unifier of Sengoku Japan, while at first accepting such titles, quickly abandoned them and likely sought to subordinate the emperor to his will (Berry 1982, 58-59). As a consequence, he was balanced against by other major daimyo (Berry 1982, 49), whereas Hideyoshi was able to successfully encourage rivals to bandwagon with him. In 1590, Hideyoshi successfully reunified the country under a single state centered on his castle in Kyoto.

Tracing the Process of State Reconstitution

In this subsection, I conduct a series of process tracing tests (see table 1) to confirm that my hypothesized causal factors (collapse of regional elites and presence of a logic of reunification) are in fact linked with

the outcome of interest – successful state reconstitution – in the case of Sengoku Japan. The utilization of hoop tests means that each step must be *confirmed* for the causal mechanism to move forward.

Variation Phase

Following the conclusion of the Onin War in 1477, a large amount of political space opened up throughout Japan as the old regional elite group, the shugo, collapsed. Prior to the Onin War, there were about 25 to 30 shugo families in Japan. A generous estimate would be that only fourteen survived the immediate aftermath of that civil war. Of those fourteen, only one, the Ouchi, ruled in central Japan, the locus of political and cultural life in the country (Kawai 1977, 83). Only eight maintained their rule past the 1550s (Berry 1982, 246, fn. 13; see also Hall 1961, 321). The shugo that did survive were the exceptions that proved the rule, having successfully resisted becoming dependent on the Shogunate for legitimacy and developing their own independent support bases. Moreover, by the time Hideyoshi initiated his reunification campaign in 1582, only two former shugo were still around, the Shimazu and the Otomo of Kyushu. In sum, the shugo, *as a group*, ceased to exist following the collapse of the state.

As a result, new powerholders emerged and original organizational types were innovated. The most significant new types of organization were the domain, or hierarchical coalition-based vassalage structure headed by a daimyo lord, the village federation, and the temple association. By the mid-16th century, around 120 daimyo ruled independent domains. Of these, only a dozen had been members of the old shugo regional elite group (Berry 1982, 26). By the late 16th century, several of the major regional daimyo families – including the Hojo, Oda, Chosokabe, and Date – had either been vassals of the old regional elites or had been local powerholders (Souyri 2003, 203-208). As the Ashikaga Shogunate and the socioeconomic order upon which it was based decayed over the course of the 1400s, village communities responded by asserting autonomy over a number of functional areas (Nagahara 1977, 112-117). Some village communities managed to form federations for collective defense. It is likely that these federations emerged in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Matsuoka 1981, 73-75; Tsang 2010, 95). Several independent temple associations also emerged following the Onin War. The Honganji sect established autonomous rule in Kaga province in 1488, while the broader Jodo Shinshu religious

movement was dominant throughout much of Japan, though centered most strongly on the city of Osaka (Tsang 2010, 92). The Honganji temple in Kaga had its rule circumscribed to that province; however, the Jodo Shinshu (of which Honganji was a part of ideologically) enjoyed support throughout Japan (Berry 1982, 63). In other words, the latter Buddhist movement's institutional arrangement was non-territorial. Both associations were relatively horizontal in their authority structure (Tsang 2010, 97; Berry 1982, 63). Thus, both village federations (which were also non-hierarchical) and temple associations were distinctly different institutionally from the hierarchical, territorial daimyo domain.

These new institutional arrangements were built on the development of a plethora of new technologies. The most important – in that they came to be adopted by other, non-innovating actors – were confirmation of property rights, uniform taxation systems, cadastral land surveys, and domainal legal codes. Daimyo early on sought to establish monopolistic authority over the confirmation of property rights. This allowed daimyo to incorporate other powerholders into their vassalage structures as subordinates; local proprietors gained land security while the daimyo enhanced his coalition (Berry 1982, 28; Hall 1991, 15; Souyri 2003, 210-211). The Imagawa, a regional elite family, pioneered the construction of uniform taxation systems within their domain.¹⁸ Under the Ashikaga Shogunate, proprietors could owe taxes to a multitude of higher levels of authority. The Imagawa daimyo unified this patchwork of tax relationships by requiring their vassals to give up their tax rights to their land. The daimyo would then tax directly the villages within the vassal's fief. The vassal's income was given directly to him by the daimyo, thus solidifying the subordinate's dependent relationship with his superior (Berry 1982, 31). The Hojo, meanwhile, pioneered the use of cadastres, systematic, comprehensive surveys of all the daimyo's land. These surveys were necessary for the effective establishment of uniform taxation systems within the daimyo's domain (Nagahara 1981, 52; Souyri 2003, 204). Domainal legal codes, like the uniform taxation systems, were also innovated by the Imagawa. These legal codes

¹⁸ Although the Imagawa had been shugo under the previous state, and thus were considered part of the old regional elite class, they were exceptional. They were not dependent on central state institutions, and thus approximated the later daimyo in autonomy (Berry 1982, 27-28; Kawai 1977, 83). In other words, the old state apparatus had already "collapsed" for them, in a manner of speaking.

asserted daimyo sovereign authority and legitimacy and systematized a wide range of economic, social, and legal regulations (Hall 1978, 131-132; Souyri 2003, 207). These four principal technologies, innovated in the late 15th or early 16th centuries, would form the basis of daimyo rule. Quasi-state apparatuses had emerged in many domains by the 1530s.

With new technologies came greater extractive capacity. The strongest evidence for this link pertains to the cadastral land surveys and uniform taxation systems. Cadastres were necessary for uniform taxation systems to be effective. Without knowing how much land could be taxed, a daimyo lord could not maximize his revenue. Because of the systematic and comprehensive nature of these surveys as well as the uniform character of the taxation system, extraction was much higher under the new system. The Imagawa, Takeda, and Tokugawa families were notable examples of daimyo utilizing these new technologies to enhance their extractive capacity (Nagahara 1981, 43). Importantly, cadastral surveys also formed the basis for determining how many military resources a vassal owed his lord (Souyri 2003, 211). Thus, new technologies were used to successfully extract both fiscal and coercive resources from society by innovators.

Republican China: Persistence of the Old Regional Elite

In early Republican China, the innovation of new technologies was substantially limited. Following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, a new government, known as the Republic of China, was set up with the general Yuan Shikai as president. Under the Qing, Yuan had been leader of the Beiyang Army, a highly centralized, highly autonomous organization that was modeled after earlier regional armies, themselves outgrowths of the great mid-19th century civil war known as the Taiping Rebellion (Pye 1971, 14; Wakeman 1977, 194-195 and 229-231; Kuhn 1980, 206-214). Importantly, all but one of the provincial secessionist movements that made up the 1911 Revolution were led by military officers or gentry leaders of the new provincial assemblies, *not* actual revolutionaries (Wakeman 1977, 228). Under the new Republic, a system of military governors, ultimately known as *dujun*, was set up. Many of these *dujun* had been subordinates of Yuan in the Beiyang Army (Wakeman 1977, 251). Moreover, the later warlords, dominant from 1917 onwards following the collapse of the central government, were almost

entirely from this dujun class; in other words, they constituted an old regional elite group (Pye 1971, 12). Two of the most powerful warlords, Feng Guozhang and Duan Qirui, had enjoyed autonomous power bases within the Beiyang Army prior to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. These two warlords were the founders of two of the most powerful warlord factions in the late 1910s and 1920s (Sheridan 1975, 59-61). In addition, of the ten most powerful warlords, according to James E. Sheridan, five served directly under Yuan Shikai in the Beiyang Army (Sheridan 1975, 59-75). Thus, we can see a clear linkage between one of the most powerful coercive institutions of the late Qing Era and the dominant regional elite group of the Republican Era.

These warlords were, as a group, not inclined towards institutional innovation. Aside from two or three, the ten most powerful warlords, according to Sheridan, were very conservative in their mindset and were poor administrators of the provinces they controlled. They held strongly Confucianist political beliefs that emphasized if not dictatorship, at least benevolent authoritarianism (Sheridan 1975, 59-75; Strauss 1998, 22). Their organizations were, in general, based on highly personalistic ties, ranging from Confucian-style teacher-student relationships to loyalty based on expected rewards (Pye 1971, 52). These personalistic practices were holdovers from the previous political era (Strauss 1998, 18). Furthermore, the warlords, with a few exceptions, had great difficulty gaining the support of the masses in the countryside, primarily thanks to excessive taxation, pressed labor, and widespread pillaging and looting (Sheridan 1975, 90-91). The warlords tended to not support progressive social reforms. For instance, in 1927 Hunan leftists and Communists sought to, among other things, implement widespread land reform and make the peasantry the basis of the political system (McDonald 1978, 291-301). This movement soon ended in failure, ultimately because the provincial warlords crushed the movement violently (McDonald 1978, 315). As Angus W. McDonald states, “[the] logic of warlordism was that army (and people) should be wielded from the top rather than welded together into a new polity from the bottom” (McDonald 1978, 59). In sum, the institutional arrangements of the warlords had significant linkages with the previous political era. Moreover, this warlord group was inherently conservative. As a consequence, institutional innovation was inhibited.

Selection Phase

Returning to Japan, we see institutional innovation leading to institutional selection. The Hojo and the Mori daimyo families were the best examples of powerholders utilizing technologies they innovated to expand their territory. Originally minor vassals of the Imagawa, the Hojo came to dominate eastern Japan by 1541, almost twenty years before Oda Nobunaga, the first unifier of Sengoku Japan, started his reunification campaign. Importantly, the Hojo had been the first to conduct cadastral surveys across their domains (Souyri 2003, 204-205). The Mori innovated politically by first maneuvering themselves to the center of their local military proprietor coalition and then, by 1550, converting a first-among-equals relationship into a proper domain (Kawai 1977, 82-86). Initially controlling no provinces at all, between 1540 and 1568 the Mori took over ten provinces in western Japan (Souyri 2003, 208). Though other early innovators also enjoyed success (such as the Imagawa), these two daimyo families best exemplified the link between institutional and policy innovation and territorial expansion.

By the 1550s, domainal law codes, surveys, and monopolistic confirmation of property rights were being utilized by a number of powerholder families, including the Takeda, Matsudaira (precursors to the Tokugawa), Oda, and Uesugi (Berry 1982, 33-34; Souyri 2003, 211). None of these daimyo were original innovators of these technologies. Importantly, Hideyoshi began using cadastral surveys and confirmation of property rights in his domain prior to the initiation of his reunification campaign in 1582 (Berry 1982, 53). These daimyo lords must have seen the value in adopting these technologies, most likely because of the success the Hojo, Mori, and Imagawa had been enjoying.

The daimyo domain displaced the village federation and temple association. From the mid-1550s on, the daimyo began to consolidate their domains, eliminating rivals through war (which was becoming increasingly widespread by this point) and expanding their ruling coalitions. Technologies innovated by village federations and temple associations have not been presented because they were not widely adopted by other actors. Moreover, these two institutional arrangements themselves did not survive the expansion of daimyo power. Outside the Kyoto region, there were very few village federations (Nagahara 1977, 118-119). The strong sense of internal unity within villages inhibited them from establishing long-term

cross-village cooperation (Nagahara 1977, 121). Instead, the autonomous villages that began to emerge in the fifteenth century came to be incorporated into the daimyo domain (Nagahara 1977, 122). The temple associations were similarly unsuccessful. The Honganji was defeated in 1582 by Oda Nobunaga, and the Jodo Shinshu was eliminated as an independent political force in 1585 by Hideyoshi. Temples, in general, were made dependent on the unifiers. The reason for the failure of temple associations is that they did not have a hierarchical structure. This feature made this institutional arrangement inefficient in warfare, which favored a unified leadership to prevent freeriding and enhance coordination (Tsang 2010, 98 and 104). In addition, the autonomy of both village federations and temple associations did not fit in with the daimyos' conceptual framework which mandated internal sovereignty (Tsang 2010, 97). As a consequence, the domain displaced other rival institutional arrangements in Sengoku Japan. That said, these domains were still essentially independent, and virtually no sense of central political authority was to be found. Only the continued existence of the emperor (a purportedly semi-divine being that had only cultural authority) provided a symbol of unity that could be used to reestablish a state.

Republican China: Use of Old Institutional Arrangements in the Chiang Kai-shek Regime

Chiang Kai-shek's government had two chief similarities with warlord organizations: the use of personalistic ties in administration and the intent to preserve the rural social structure dominated by the local gentry. Personalistic ties, like in the warlord organizations, dominated administration in both the government and the military (Sheridan 1975, 186). Nationalist government was heavily factionalized, contributing to a lack of institutionalization (Strauss 1998, 25-26; McDonald 1978, 238). Personal power networks were most important for advancement, as co-opted groups were granted portions of the bureaucracy for their own aggrandizement (Strauss 1998, 35). Additionally, for Chiang Kai-shek social stability, not change, was the goal of his government, and the local gentry were considered the key to maintaining this stability (Sheridan 1975, 217 and 230). During his rise to power in 1925-26, he conceived of a reduced role for mass movements, and sought to strengthen the military (McDonald 1978, 239). As a consequence, social modernization and central government access to the local level were inhibited (Sheridan 1975, 209 and 237-38). The central government struggled to acquire revenue from

the provinces and only 18% of counties nominally under Nationalist control had party branches, most of which were in the lower Yangzi River valley, the only region directly administered by Nanjing (Sheridan 1975, 204 and 214). These two facts indicate the limited penetration that the Nanjing government managed to achieve following the Northern Expedition.

Reconstitution Phase

Oda Nobunaga was the first unifier of Japan. During his reunification campaign, several rivals were eliminated and the incidence and severity of war increased measurably. Between 1558 and 1577 he soundly defeated the Imagawa and Saito, two of the most powerful lords in east-central Japan. He also forced a peace with the Jodo Shinshu movement, the formidable and highly popular temple association (Berry 1982, 38, 44, and 61-63). Between 1580 and 1582 Oda went on to defeat the daimyo Asai, Asakura, and Takeda, the last of whom was one of the most powerful regional elites in the Sengoku Era (Berry 1982, 257 fn. 30). By the time of Hideyoshi's reunification campaign in 1582, only nine major daimyo remained, as opposed to fifteen in the 1550s. As mentioned above, with the exception of two families in far southwestern Japan¹⁹, none of the original old regional elites, the shugo, still existed and thus posed no threat to Hideyoshi and his campaign.

The emergence of two reunification campaigns following the diffusion of technologies to non-innovating powerholders is consistent with the prediction made in the previous section; that is, we should expect to see such a campaign arise once new, proven technologies are incorporated into the repertoires of powerholders and used to build substantial coalitions. Oda and Hideyoshi used these technologies to establish their support bases, a prerequisite for them to launch national-scale campaigns. The fact that Oda first solidified control over his own domain before moving to attack other regional rivals is further evidence of this claim (Berry 1982, 37). These reunification campaigns, and the unifiers behind them, provided the crucial impetus for state reconstitution. Without them, Sengoku Japan may very well have settled into a permanent state of division.

¹⁹ Only the Shimazu and the Otomo had survived and they were Kyushu shugo families, and so had been far from the institutions and politics of the Ashikaga shogunate under the old state (Berry 1982, 257 fn. 30, 246 fn. 13, and 87). Thus, they were exceptions that proved the rule.

Hideyoshi launched his reunification campaign in 1582, after Oda Nobunaga, his liege lord, was assassinated. He began by eliminating the two men who challenged his preeminence in leading the former Oda coalition, Akechi Mitsuhide and Shibata Katsuie (Berry 1982, 71-72 and 77). Hideyoshi's coalition underwent three major expansions. Following the defeat of the Chosokabe, the majority of land on the island of Shikoku went to supporters who had joined up with Hideyoshi *after* the start of his campaign (Berry 1982, 83-84). Hideyoshi's purpose here was to reward former rivals who had hitched their wagon to him and, at the same time, incentivize future defeated rivals to bandwagon instead of fight to the death. Although the terms of surrender were formally decided solely by Hideyoshi, he implicitly bargained with other regional elites to enhance his coalition. The next two major expansions occurred following the subjugation of the island of Kyushu and the conquest of eastern Japan, respectively. With each expansion, Hideyoshi followed the same strategy: remove former rivals from their base of support, but then richly reward them with new lands taken from the most recently defeated foe and rely on them for local administration (Berry 1982, 90 and 93-96). Moreover, unlike Oda Nobunaga, Hideyoshi actively cultivated symbolic ties to the emperor (Berry 1982, 179-180). This respect for a unifying national symbol tapped into the logic of reunification shared by elite society. The consequences of this strategy were twofold. First, the size of Hideyoshi's army grew with each new expansion in his coalition, thus allowing him to defeat successively stronger foes. Second, his coalition remained cohesive, with himself always as its paramount leader. In brief, Hideyoshi used warfare and bargaining to encourage bandwagoning, thus enlarging and strengthening his coalition.

Hideyoshi's reunification campaign was successful. He defeated a series of formidable foes and formed a powerful, cohesive coalition with himself at the head. Hideyoshi chose very wise strategies, but these strategies were made available by structural conditions. The high intensity of warfare brought on by Oda's reunification campaign, Hideyoshi's willingness to implicitly bargain, and his usage of the symbol of the emperor served as incentives for Hideyoshi's rivals to bandwagon. More fundamentally, the collapse of the old regional elite group, the shugo, following the collapse of the Ashikaga Shogunate permitted the necessary space within which new institutional arrangements were conceived and new

technologies were developed, technologies that, several decades later, Hideyoshi used himself to reunify the country. The logic of reunification, in turn, produced the grand goal that Oda and Hideyoshi pursued and, in part, the willingness on behalf of the daimyo (the *new* regional elite group) to accept Hideyoshi's claims to hegemony. This is not to diminish the vital role Hideyoshi played, though. A less capable leader may not have perceived the strategies available to him or may not have chosen them even if he was aware of their availability. Still, the favorable structural environment cannot be overemphasized.

Following unification in 1590, Hideyoshi founded the first state since the effective collapse of the Ashikaga shogunate in 1477. Although it was a minimal state and relied extensively on the daimyo and their own political apparatuses to govern the country, Hideyoshi did manage to reestablish the center in a country that had been riven by internal violence and disunity for over a hundred years. Importantly, the policies of the subsequent Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) followed very closely the principles that Hideyoshi had put forth.²⁰ Thus, the foundations for Japan's institutional arrangement that would last for the next two and a half centuries can be found in Hideyoshi's accomplishments.

Republican China: Chiang Kai-shek's failure to Reunify the Country

By the early 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek's regime had control over three provinces – Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui – in Eastern China (Strauss 1998, 25-26). By 1937, he had brought another five provinces – Henan, Fujian, Guizhou, Guangdong, and Hunan – under his control. In 1936, he managed to attain limited incorporation of the province of Guangxi (Sheridan 1975, 197). If we include the three provinces of Shanxi, Shandong, and Xinjiang that were ruled by his allies, in addition to the nine already mentioned, Chiang Kai-shek controlled twelve out of a total twenty-three provinces, or just over half, by 1937. Even if we exclude the two provinces of Jahar and Hebei that were at the time coming under Japanese control, Chiang Kai-shek's task of reunification was still far from complete. Of course, the full-scale invasion by Japan in 1937 ruled out any possibility of Chiang succeeding. But it is plausible that the institutions and policies that Chiang, and the other warlords, perpetuated explain why he had not reunified the country

²⁰ See, for example, Berry's discussion of the destruction of castles/fortifications so as to enforce the policy that samurai must live in the daimyo's castle town (Berry 1982, 133). Also, see much of Brown's (1993) discussion of the enforcement of central policies.

earlier. According to Sheridan, the “ultimate explanation of warlordism during the Nanking decade” was that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to preserve the rural social structure; mass mobilization (necessary for defeating the warlords) required *overturning* that structure (Sheridan 1975, 206). In other words, the conservatism – the reluctance to experiment and develop new institutional arrangements – of Chiang’s, which he shared with the old regional elites, precluded the emergence of sufficient political space within which these structures could be replaced.

IV. Conclusion

This paper has presented a theory of internally-driven state reconstitution and has shown that the case of Sengoku Japan adequately supports this theory’s predictions. The evidence compiled in the previous section for each hoop test gives us a high degree of confidence that for the case of Sengoku Japan: a) the collapse of the old regional elite class with origins under the previous regime and the presence of a logic of reunification led to the success of Hideyoshi’s reunification campaign, and b) the proposed mechanism of variation, selection, and reconstitution linking these causal factors and the outcome is a plausible account of *how* these two conditions cause successful internally-driven state reconstitution. Although in general the causal momentum moves unidirectionally, feedback loops between steps in the mechanism can definitely occur, for example, between enhancement of extractive institutions and waging of war, and coalition building and greater coalitional effectiveness. Moreover, two of the assumptions of this causal framework are 1) powerholders operate in an environment of pervasive warfare, and 2) at least one reunification campaign is led by a capable leader who selects effective state-building strategies made available by the two structural conditions upon which this framework is predicated. If state collapse does not lead to widespread internal conflict, an effective unifier does not emerge, or the unifier chooses not to select available effective state-building strategies then the theory’s causal mechanism may not fully operate. In other words, the two structural conditions constitute a critical juncture that *makes available* the political and policy choices that can lead to successful state reconstitution.

The development of new technologies was crucial for the ultimate success of Hideyoshi's reunification campaign. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the elite group with whom he was associated, however, appears to have followed an equally significant trajectory of new technological development. Although there are important differences between the two cases – such as historical era, degree of integration into the world economy, and level of foreign interference – there are enough interesting parallels to elucidate core theoretical insights. Most importantly, like Spruyt's medieval actors in Europe, aspiring unifiers (and ambitious powerseekers, more generally) must be willing and able to innovate new political, administrative, and military technologies. When the old state institutions and elites, which had formed the bedrock of an ineffective political arrangement, persist and thus inhibit this innovation, the level of infrastructural power necessary for the rebirth of the state is unlikely to develop. Moreover, as Spruyt (1996) points out, warfare is not sufficient for states to emerge. Like in his analysis of European state formation, we cannot assume that the territorial, sovereign state will reemerge following state collapse, so long as war is there to drive the process. New institutional arrangements must first be innovated before they can be put into use and, perhaps, ultimately monopolize a society's institutional space.

Future research should test the wider applicability of these findings, especially in more contemporary settings such as the post-Cold War Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Explicit comparisons between *all* the unifiers of Sengoku Japan and Republican China (Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong) should also be pursued. Some scholars (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2004, Krasner 2004) have dealt with international responses to state collapse. Jeremy M. Weinstein, however, suggests that at least in some societies war leads to peace by fostering the emergence of a leader or bloc that is capable of stabilizing political conflict (Weinstein 2005). Autonomous recovery, as Weinstein puts it, may be more durable than international intervention. This paper has suggested that internal processes of state reconstitution may in fact be sufficient for order and stability to be restored, under conditions different, or at least complementary, to those proposed by Weinstein. That said, scholars can explore whether successful, internally-driven state reconstitution can

occur in the *absence* of endemic internal warfare, and whether institutional legacies from the old (collapsed) state can serve a *productive* function. Must societies build a brand-new governing apparatus, or can less ambitious, but equally stable, arrangements be made? State collapse consumes many countries today, and so a deeper understanding of its causes and potential remedies is critical for the future well-being of these societies.

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