

**Rival Military Intervention:  
Prospects for Regime Change and Democracy in Target States**

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## **Introduction**

Foreign imposed regime change (FIRC) is used by states as a way to spread their ideology, or to eliminate barriers to a state's interests in the international system. For example, in the post-9/11 era FIRC has been employed as a counterterrorism policy in areas like the Middle Eastern and South Asia, and to topple regimes long defined as pariahs (Williams & Masters, 2011). Yet the value of military intervention for regime change is not completely understood. We lack clarity in the outcomes of the intervention. Intervening states use military force to install a replacement regime. The replacement regime will, ideally, be more ideologically consistent with the interests of intervening state (Lo, Hashimoto & Reiter 2008; Owen, 2002). This belief, in part, guided US actions in Iraq, and was present in the discussions surrounding NATO intervention in Libya (2011). Regime change and democratization goals shaped part of the public discourse around proposed US-UK military strikes in Syria (2013). Are these perceptions warranted? Does military intervention yield meaningful democratization for the target state? Finally, under what conditions will military intervention result in democratic transition in target states?

The current state of research into foreign imposed regime change is ambiguous. We observe limited liberalizing shifts in a target state's polity, but democratic outcomes are inconsistent (Walker & Pearson, 2007; Enterline & Greig, 2008). Past research on military intervention, though, is limited by a number of factors. One limitation is the tendency to treat military intervention as a monotype event correlated to regime change outcomes. Yet, two separate studies provide evidence to suggest that different types of military intervention may hold brighter prospects for a democratic outcome (Williams & Masters, 2011; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). More precisely, hostile interventions seem to offer better prospects for democratization in a target states. A hostile intervention is when the outside state intervenes against the existing government. These studies suggest that hostile intervention clears existing barriers to democratic transformation, thereby allowing for alternative groups to assume power and put in place more liberal, even democratic, forms of government (Masters, 2012).

However, the findings in the previous studies are suggestive and require additional investigation. This study adds to the broader discussion on military intervention and democratization by critically

evaluating hostile interventions. According to the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset (Kisangani & Pickering, 2008) hostile interventions may (a) oppose the target government, or (b) support rebel or opposition groups. In this study the former intervention is referred to as “oppositional” and the latter is referred to as “rival.” Given that hostile interventions take on different forms, it is logical to ask if differences in the direction of the intervention result in different regime change outcomes for the target states.

This study proceeds in three parts. The first part lays out the general logic on foreign imposed regime change and democratization, and explores the difference between oppositional versus supportive interventions, and hostile versus rival interventions. The outcome from each form of intervention is complex and multidirectional. As a broad category of intervention (oppositional) we know that both should result in liberalizing, perhaps even democratizing outcomes. Yet, are the outcomes equal, or does one form of oppositional intervention yield more optimal democratizing results? This deeper analysis on foreign imposed regime change allows us to better understand the value of this tool of statecraft in the international system. The data suggest there is no observable relationship between rival interventions and democratization. In sum, opposing the sitting regime seems to matter for democratic outcomes. Rival interventions appear to further democratization goals, but the relationship is not significant.

### **External Military Intervention and Democratization**

Generally speaking, democratization is a process that takes shape within domestic political interactions between mobilized political factions. A common precipitant for a transition from autocratic forms of government towards democracy is an economic crisis that brings into doubt the value of the authoritarian deal (Cole & Lawson-Remer, 2013). Samuel Huntington (1984) further suggests that democratization *must* flow from internal forces in order for any semblance of real democracy to be retained over time. Inarguably, there are numerous domestic factors influencing the probability of successful democratization. These factors run the gamut from economic (per

capita income, export dependent economy) to political (history of democracy), to cultural (western, liberal values, ethnic homogeneity) (Pickering & Peceny, 2006; Russett, 2005) to name a few.

At the same time, external factors matter as well to the transition and consolidation of new democracies. For example, there are neighborhood effects wherein good neighbors may provide economic and technical assistance to assist fragile democracies through challenging times (Cole & Lawson-Remer, 2013, p. 10). Conversely, bad neighbors can foment fractionalization within a nascent democracy making it difficult to consolidate democratic gains (Cole & Lawson-Remer 2013, p. 10). Ukraine becomes a good example of this at the moment. In Ukraine there are widespread reports of Russian backed militias taking over police stations and local government offices in order to undermine confidence in the transitional government and its election processes.

Whereas the neighborhood can facilitate or hinder democratic transition, military interventions can remove roadblocks on the path of a state's internal shift towards democracy. Interventions can instigate regime change by removing dictators from power or breaking up old elite structures (Huntington, 1984). Additionally, the promise of democracy juxtaposed to the more recent bad memories of dictatorship is a sufficient force to stabilize a new democratic regime installed by an outside actor (Enterline and Greig 2008 p. 881). Militaries can also provide the infrastructure needed for a fledgling democracy to conduct safe elections (Peceny 1999).

In short, military intervention can aid regime change, and thereby assist democratization in a target state. This assertion should not raise controversy. Foreign imposed regime change is not necessarily inconsistent with domestic-level democratization processes. However, not all

interventions are the same in character, and thus not all interventions hold the same promise of democratization. A military intervention that supports an existing government tends to result in autocratic backsliding (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). Meanwhile, hostile interventions that challenge, and remove the existing regime can foster democratic transition (Williams & Masters 2011; Pickering & Kisangani 2006). The question is why the different outcomes?

### **Hostile Interventions: Oppositional and Rival**

Scholarship often defines a democratic intervention on the basis of stated, or revealed, interests of the intervening state (Meernik 1996; Williams and Masters 2011; Peceny 1999). That is to say, did the state intervene in order to promote democracy in the target state? Little attention has been paid to how the intervention is applied in the target state. The application of the intervention refers most directly to the direction of the intervention or the target of the intervention: the sitting regime or rival factions.

Oppositional intervention is a military intervention hostile to the sitting regime and/or in support of rival factions. The assertion is that hostile interventions have the greatest chance of producing liberalization and democratization in the target state. To date there is some evidence to support the outsider strategy. For instance, a study by Pickering and Kisangani (2006) finds that hostile interventions have an immediate democratizing impact on the target state, and the impact is traceable over ten years out from the point of the intervention.

It is natural to assume that a democratic intervention would be hostile to the sitting government. However, democratic interventions are not necessarily the same as hostile interventions. We are likely to observe three different types of democratic interventions. First is the insider strategy for democracy promotion, which includes a supportive intervention to prop up a sitting government (and/or oppose rival factions). The next two interventions are outsider

strategies for democratic intervention and are similar as forms of hostile interventions: a hostile-only intervention where the target is the sitting government, and a rival intervention, where the intervention supports rebel factions against the sitting government. It is the latter two types of intervention that show the greatest potential to democratize the target state. The former type of intervention, supportive interventions, usually results in a regime that is more autocratic post-intervention.

Accounting for why hostile interventions more likely produce a democratic result is challenging. There is little direct research on the issue of *directionality* of an intervention and its impact on the domestic political regime. There are two main points we can draw from within the literature: the broadly negative impact of military interventions, and the importance of regime change, and support for rival factions.

On the first point, interventions from the outside increase insecurity in the target state, which may justify more authoritarian responses to deal with the threat (Colaresi & Thompson 2003). Research shows that states with capable rivals score lower on their overall democracy score and show significant decreases in their democracy level (Colaresi & Thompson 2003, p. 394). We could assume that if an intervention is supportive of the existing government, the perception of threat is lower. However, an intervention to support the government suggests, at a minimum, some internal threat to the sitting government. Similarly, an external threat could prompt a supportive intervention to stabilize country seen as an ally to the intervening state. When a democratic intervening state props up a government against internal rebels or external rivals it may pressure the government to adopt liberal reforms. Usually the intervening state will back off liberalization before the process is complete and the regime backslides. However, we

should not assume that a supportive intervention would be interpreted as a less threatening to the supported government. The conditions surrounding the intervention are the source of the threat.

The second point is that hostile interventions produce deeper transformations in the target state's polity that more likely result in liberalization and democratization. The outsider strategy has the established goal of regime change. The intervention seeks to eliminate a current leadership structure and allow a new governing regime to emerge. The intervening state's actions result in weak political institutions in the target state. In the face of weak political institutions mobilized and aggrieved political groups begin to act and challenge in order to advance their interests. As new political institutions emerge, there is an opportunity for a redistribution of political power. Groups will mobilize in order to influence the shape of the new institutions and access to those institutions relative to their interests (Peic & Reiter 2010, p. 459).

These two points echo the arguments above to say that democratic interventions weaken the political institutions. But there are more subtle and fine grained differences between the two types of intervention. On the surface, the insider (supportive) and outsider (hostile) interventions represent an external threat to the state. But, the supportive intervention leaves the political leaders/institutions in place. The supported regime may receive some subtle pressure to liberalize, but otherwise the regime is left intact. Meanwhile, the hostile intervention removes the existing regime to allow a new one to take shape. From these competing conditions we observe:

- (1) Supportive and hostile interventions alike weaken the political institutions in the target state;
- (2) the supportive intervention results in a less democratic regime;
- (3) the hostile intervention results in a liberalized state, possibly even a nascent democratic state.

Moving deeper into the argument, the leadership in the supported regime is likely to emerge from the intervention in a threatened position. The intervention likely stabilized the

leadership's hold on power. However, let's assume the threat that prompted the intervention was an internal revolt. The intervention will leave those leaders feeling vulnerable and in need to take action to ensure the threats that prompted the intervention are dealt with. The likely response from the supported state is to clamp down, backtrack from liberalization, in order to stifle the capabilities of the rebels. The intervening state may indicate the purpose of the intervention is to democratize the target state. There may be sincere efforts to promote democratic reforms to integrate rebel factions into the normal political process and prevent the need for future interventions. However, the interest of the intervening state is in stabilizing the current regime. Liberalization and democratization may be a solution to internal instability, but it is likely a secondary interest to keeping the regime in place (Wolff and Wurm 2011).

Hostile intervention eliminates the current regime. Rival intervention provides support to rebel factions seeking to take control of the state. Why do these oppositional forms of intervention result in liberalization, even nascent democratization? By eliminating the existing regime, the possibility of autocratic backsliding is reduced. This is not to say that a new regime cannot be authoritarian. But that the potential for democratic shift is greater than under a supportive intervention. As the new regime comes together, challenger groups will act in ways that distribute power and expand access as they seek to advance their interests. The activity of the challenger groups is liberalization of the regime. A new regime is going to be less capable to resist these activities in the short-term resulting in short-term liberalization. Moreover, the new regime, if derived from internal revolutionary contenders, starts with more legitimacy to initiate the post-revolutionary transition. The grace period may be very limited. Legitimacy allows the regime to begin a process of putting new policies in place. The process outlined here does not preclude that as the new regime consolidates that authoritarian backsliding is impossible. In the



longer term the regime may construct choke points to demobilize challenger groups resulting in autocratic shifts. However, in the short-term liberalizing shifts are more likely, and the potential for consolidation of liberalized gains is greater than under a supportive intervention.

There is one additional layer to this discussion that requires some attention. At present we do not know if there is any observable difference in the outcome of an oppositional intervention when the direction of the intervention is hostile versus rival. The type of interventions we are speaking to are the ones that have dominated the landscape over the previous decade, including the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the intervention in Libya. As discussed above, a hostile intervention is defined by the intervening state forcing an existing regime out absent support for any unified contender ready to assume control of the state. Examples of this type of intervention include Iraq and Afghanistan. In this condition, the replacement regime must be constructed from various groups. The rise of the new regime is likely to be seen as an imprint that reflects the interests of the intervening state and lacks credibility within the broader population.

The rival intervention is when the intervening state/organization forces an existing regime from power in support of a unified revolutionary contender. This is the type of intervention observed in Libya. The presence of the revolutionary contender provides the intervening state with a popularly supported group that can take the reins of power during the transition phase in order to consolidate the regime change. The emerging regime exists separate from the intervening actor, and likely possesses more credibility and legitimacy in the early transition phase. As such, liberalization and democratization should be more likely post-intervention.

It would be naive to assume that the post-intervention government is certain to emerge as a consolidated democracy. Post-revolutionary governments face tremendous challenges as they

consolidate power. The certain fractionalization of unified revolutionary fronts provides ample alternative contenders seeking opportunities to displace the leadership that emerges during the revolution. We cannot assume that rival interventions are absolutely more likely to result in liberalized, even democratized, regimes over hostile interventions. But distinction between hostile and rival interventions is an even more fine grained than the difference between the insider and outsider strategies for democracy promotion. It is worthwhile to investigate whether or not there is an optimal form of the outsider strategy.

### **Research Design**

This study generally investigates the relationship between military intervention and democratization. More specifically, I investigate the relationship between oppositional interventions and democratization in the target state. The analysis will begin with a broad evaluation of oppositional intervention, and then narrow its focus to rival interventions.

Data on military interventions is taken from the International Military Intervention (IMI) Dataset (Kisangani & Pickering 2008), while data on political characteristics of target countries comes from the *Polity IVd* dataset.

The IMI dataset provides the most accurate and exhaustive list of international uses of military force. The dataset codes multiple variables in relation to the individual interventions, such as type of mission (e.g. humanitarian or border dispute among others). The IMI database defines military intervention as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, sea borne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute,” (Pearson & Bauman, 1993-1994). The IMI excludes actions taken by

covert forces, and is effectively broad enough to accurately reflect the limited military actions of the post-World War II period.

For purposes of this study observations are restricted to interventions that include conventional military forces that involve traditional (declared) wars and police actions. Clandestine missions and humanitarian interventions are excluded. Conventional military missions, regardless of intent, are fundamentally different from covert operations. Traditional military forces are visible and apparent to actors in the arena where they operate, and use overt force to advance their goals and objectives. Covert operations on the other hand are, by definition, not visible actors. Often covert operations involve arming insurgents or rebels within a state to carry out military actions. As such, covert military action is fundamentally different. At the same time, humanitarian missions provide aid and comfort to civilians, and almost always restrict forces from engaging in conflict, making them fundamentally distinct from traditional military action and thereby ineligible for this study.

In addition to identifying democratic interventions, the IMI dataset codes the direction of an intervention within the target state. This variable includes support/opposition to the target state's current regime, support/opposition to rebel forces, and support/opposition for a challenging group. In order to isolate oppositional interventions the "direction" variable in the IMI is collapsed into a dummy variable indicating either support (1) or opposition (0) to the government in power in the target state. Past research suggests that if the military intervention opposes the current regime, it will positively impact the democratic trajectory of the target state. If the military intervention supports the current regime, then it will negatively impact the democratic trajectory of the target state (Pickering and Kisangani 2006).

A final manipulation of the IMI is to further isolate oppositional interventions that support rival rebel factions as distinct from the broader category of oppositional interventions, or “hostile” interventions. To achieve this, the direction variable in the IMI is coded as a dummy variable indicating an intervention (1) in support of a rebel faction or opposition movement, and (0) for interventions that oppose the sitting regime. All other interventions are treated as neutral.

Democracy is measured using the *Polity IVd* dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2004). The core measurements of the Polity index focus on the openness of competition for executive recruitment, constraints placed on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation (Marshall & Jaggers, 2004). The polity variable measures a state’s political regime democratic features (+1 to +10) and autocratic features (-1 to -10) and then sums these separate scales to provide the Polity “Score” (-10 to 10). To measure the effects of military intervention on the polity of a target state, I coded the Polity score for the target state 1-year prior to the start date of the intervention and 1-year after the end of the intervention, and five years post-intervention.<sup>2</sup>

The aggregate Polity scores should not be treated, strictly speaking, as interval level data (Treier and Jackman, 2008). There really is very little distinction between states clustered in the highest ranges and those clustered in lower ranges of the polity scale (+6 to +10, and -6 to -10 respectively). The middle of the polity scale (-5 to +5) captures characteristics of an *anocratic* political regime, or a semi-democracy (defined by a mixture of democratic and autocratic traits) (Vreeland, 2008). Additionally, there is heteroskedasticity in the high and low measures of the polity score, which if not accounted for can risk inferential errors (Treier and Jackman, 2008). It is best to deal with these problems by either disaggregating the polity scale to correct the bias in the variable (see Treier and Jackman, 2008 for discussion), or by grouping states based on the

autocracy, anocracy, democracy categories. The latter method is a better solution when the polity scale is the dependent variable (as is the case in this study), the former solution is best when polity is an independent variable (Treier and Jackman 2008).

To incorporate “shifts” in a state’s polity each state is coded as an autocracy (-1), a democracy (+1) or an anocracy (0) in the year prior to the military intervention and again in the first and fifth year post-intervention. The score for the year prior to the intervention is subtracted from the year post and five year post-intervention. A positive polity shift is a condition where a state scores a +1 or more in the change from pre-intervention to post-intervention. Therefore, a shift from autocracy to anocracy, anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy would register as a positive polity shift. Negative polity shifts are reversed, with a -1 or more difference in the pre and post-intervention polity score. So any state that moves from democracy to anocracy, anocracy to autocracy, or democracy to autocracy will register as a negative polity shift. Positive shifts in the polity score are coded as 1, and negative shifts are coded as -1, no shift is coded as 0.

Control variables for this study include several concepts related to: historical-political contexts of particular importance to the polity of a state (colonial history, democratic history, and instances and degrees of state failure), direction of support in the military intervention, and finally population and gross domestic product (GDP). The history of colonization is included because past colonization of a state often results in a future where the previous colonial power is inclined to interfere in the politics and government of the state, even to the point of continuing to push for democratization in that state (Pearson & Baumann, 1994). Target states with any colonial history were recorded as “1”, while target states without a colonial history were recorded as “0”.

This study also includes a variable related to the democratic history of a target state. Previous research suggests that democratic history, more than any other variable, is a strong and positive predictor of democratic transition (Pickering & Peceny, 2006; Russett, 2005). There is a certain logical limit to the importance of democratic history for a target state. A democratic history that may be hundreds of years removed from the era under study would have any direct relationship to democratic transitions in the Post-World War II era. Therefore, to include a democratic history variable that is relevant to the time period under analysis this study uses a dummy variable where “1” indicates any target state with a history of stable democracy (+6 on the polity scale) at any time since the beginning of World War II (1936), but prior to the military intervention. Any state that did not demonstrate a history of stable democracy since the beginning of World War II is labeled as “0”.

A final political context variable relates to state failure. State failure serves both as a pretext for military intervention, and clears away political barriers from the previous regime that may prevent democratic political institutions and practices from establishing themselves. Thus, state failure is likely to correspond to regime change. This study does not make any *a priori* predictions on the direction of the relationship between state failure and regime change. The PITF-State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance (1955-2006) is used to measure state failure. The PITF measures four distinct types of state failures (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2008). The particular variable of interest is the Failure of State Authority scale (MAGFAIL), which measures state failure on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 as adverse regime change with no weakening of state institutions, 2 failure of state authority in limited part(s) of the country, 3 failure of state authority in substantial parts of the country, and 4 complete collapse (or near total failure) of state authority (Marshall et al, 2008, p. 12). A zero is added to indicate a

condition of no state failure in the year of the military intervention. Additional control variables include the GDP of the target state and population of the target state.

### **Analysis**

Democratic intervention is not the most prominent form of military intervention launched by democratic aggressor states. Since World War II democratic interventions (identified as Aggressive Democracy Promotion, or ADP in figure 1) clearly has periods of popularity. In the Post-World War II era, democratic intervention peaks in the late 1940s and early 1950s, rebounds in the 1960s, and again in the late 1980s to the late 1990s. The 1970s to mid-1980s appears to be the nadir of democratic intervention in practice. In comparison with general military interventions (e.g. border disputes, humanitarian interventions, etc.) democratic interventions are significantly less common as a type of military intervention. For example, during the Post-World War II era aggressive democracy promotion accounts for 34 percent of all military interventions. Additionally, the proportion of democratic interventions to all military intervention has declined in the Post-Cold War era (after 1991) accounting for only 23 percent of military interventions (See Figure 2). Hence, democracy promotion is a common foreign policy *goal* among established democracies, but it is not widely pursued via military means.

{Figure 1 about here}

{Figure 2 about here}

As a subset of interventions, we observe that hostile interventions peak during the 1960s, again the mid-1980' and post-9/11 (see figure 3). However, hostile interventions, like democratic interventions, never constitute a major proportion of military interventions, accounting for 24 percent of all military interventions. Rival interventions (not shown in graph form) account for

only 1.5 percent of all military interventions from 1946 to 2005. These data suggest that investigations into oppositional interventions explore the fringes of military interventions. Studying behavior at the fringes can still yield interesting results. Yet we need to be cautious of any generalizability associated with the findings.

{figure 3 about here}

The analysis to this point only sketches the universe of oppositional interventions. To examine any relationship between oppositional interventions and democratization this study employs an ordered probit analysis on all cases (423 for the 1-year post-intervention, and 406 for the 5-year post-intervention) (see Table 1). The main explanatory variable (hostile intervention) does perform well. The direction of the variable is negative, as predicted, to suggest that oppositional military interventions are negatively correlated to changes in a target state's polity and it is significant at the .01 level for both the 1-year and 5-year post-intervention periods. The analysis suggests the oppositional intervention do indeed have a democratizing impact on the target state.

{Table 1 about here}

The data suggest that a goal to eliminate the current regime and oppose the established elite structures is sufficient to produce a democratizing impact. In the wake of the intervention, positive changes are observed in the polity of the target state (shift from autocracy to anocracy, anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy). At the same time, if a military intervention is directed at stabilizing the existing political regime, and maintaining the existing elite structures, the intervention will militate against democratic potential within the state. In one sense, external forces do have the potential to shape the internal political systems of target states.



Turning attention to the historical-political context variables, the data indicate that the previous polity of the target state and democratic history of the target state, history of colonization, magnitude of state failure, population and GDP are not significant predictors of polity change post-intervention.

In sum this study suggests military interventions direct against the established government and political elite do produce positive changes to the polity of the target state. Moreover, the previous polity of the target state does offer information on the direction of change the target state is likely to experience post-intervention. Taken together, military interventions that oppose governments in autocratic political systems may yield positive shifts in the target state's polity, particularly if the target country has a democratic history. The change may be a shift from autocracy to anocracy, anocracy to democracy, or autocracy to democracy. However, military intervention for the sake of democratization will yield no discernable result.

Turning our attention, briefly, to the rival intervention, there are not enough examples of rival interventions in the data to support statistical analysis. As such, the logic of rival interventions cannot be examined within the confines of this analysis. It may serve us better to resort to case studies and comparative case studies to examine the rival intervention. What would seem to be a logical variation in oppositional interventions may yet prove interesting in the long run.

## **Conclusions**

Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century established democracies, and international organizations, have actively promoted democracy as a common foreign policy goal. The practice relates to the "Liberal Grand Strategy" idea that democratization will ultimately result in an international system

populated with stable and peaceful democratic states. Advancing democratic interests has led some states to employ military force in order to achieve their stated foreign policy goals. The question we are confronted with is, 'how well does military intervention work as a tool for democracy promotion?' The literature on Democratization is fairly clear that it is largely an internal process. At the same time, a separate body of research suggests external intervention is an important catalyst to the democratization process by removing certain barriers inside a state, thereby allowing a state to advance its own democratic features. The empirical record supports the claim that military interventions result in non-constitutional regime changes in the participating states, and are most pronounced in the states that lose a military engagement. What we are not certain of is whether or not military intervention serves as a successful foreign policy tool to bring about democracy in a previously non-democratic political system. The research is ambiguous on this conclusion.

This study does *not* definitively resolve the debate on democratic intervention. However, it does add the discussion by reinforcing the finding that oppositional interventions do yield democratic shifts in the target state. Further analyses into the types of oppositional intervention (rival versus hostile) provide no additional information. In short, oppositional interventions matter. However, it would seem more data, and perhaps qualitative analysis, is needed to better determine the value of rival interventions versus hostile interventions.

Notes:

1. It is not possible to positively assert that public statements on democratization truly underlie any military intervention. Other motivations may, and likely do exist, and we cannot dismiss the reality that democratization goals are mere rationalizations or pretexts for the military

intervention. However, democratization is a well established goal for the United States, and other major democracies and international organizations. Therefore, this analysis adopts the same rationalization as Meernik (1996) to assess if democratization is hindered or helped in cases where democratization is clearly articulated as a goal of the military intervention (p. 394).

2. In the Polity IVd dataset there are a range of numbers used to represent states in various stages of political transformation including interregnums or anarchy (-77), transition (-88), or outside interventions (-66). Such scores fall well outside the normal -10 to +10 range of the polity scale. For purposes of this study all such codings are treated as missing cases. This step does violate the norms of other studies, where -66 is treated as missing, while -77 is coded as zero on the polity scale, and -88 is transformed into an average of the pre and post intervention polity score (see, Hermann and Kegley, 1998; Peceny, 1999; Pickering and Peceny, 2006 for examples). The logic for our decision is that -77 represents failed states, which is captured by the MAGFAIL variable, and the transformation of -88 into a pre/post average does not really capture the nature of what is taking place during a transition, the average can actually misrepresent what is taking place in the target state at the time of the transition.

3. The coding convention adopted here replicates the scheme adopted by Meernik (1996) with a couple of caveats. First, the period of observation in the present study is one-year pre-intervention, one-year post-intervention, and five years post-intervention for each target state. Meernik's study observed target states 3-years pre-intervention and 3-years post-intervention. Second, Meernik's study focused on cases of U.S. intervention. This study incorporates all cases of established democracies and international organizations, providing for broader and more comprehensive analysis.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1:




Figure 2:




Figure 3:




Table 1: Analysis of Hostile Interventions on and Polity Shift in Target States

Model	1	2
	One Year Post-Intervention	Five Years Post-Intervention
Hostile Intervention	-.8191843 (.2042381)***	-.4495092 (.168023)***
Previous Polity Category	-.0719845 (.0541609)	-.0185028 (.0558644)
History of Colonization	.2806887 (.2354707)	.2808232 (.20227)
Democratic History	-.2169731 (.2135051)	.0733037 (.1954921)
Magnitude of State Failure	.1113613 (.0541609)*	-.0199819 (.0581277)
Population	-.000000000120 (.000000000103)	-.0000000000842 (.0000000588)
GDP	-.000000000319 (.000000000283)	-.000000000120 (.0000000003)
Observations	423	406
LR $X^2$ (8)	89.29***	92.36***
Pseudo $R^2$	.1633	.1428

Standard Errors in parenthesis

\*significant at the .10 level, \*\*significant at the .05 level, \*\*\*significant at the .01 level.