**Is Shinto a Nationalist Religion? Examining the Relationship between Shinto, Nationalist Sentiment, and Support for the LDP**

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**Abstract**

*Historically, Shinto has been associated with nationalist ideologies in Japan, not only because of the events surrounding World War II, but also because of the Shintoist beliefs in the divinity of the emperor and the idea that Shinto is part of Japanese national character. More recently, however, this assumption that Shinto is inherently nationalistic is increasingly challenged. By exploring the connections between Shinto religious practices, political preferences, and nationalism in Japan, this article aims to contribute to a more general understanding of how religious and political preferences are connected in Japan by testing these two competing arguments empirically. The Japanese Value Orientations Survey, which is conducted every five years in Japan since 1973, consistently asks a variety of questions regarding the opinions of people in Japan about political, religious, and sociological topics. Using this survey, I discuss how the average Shinto practitioner does not automatically have nationalist political ideologies and is not a useful predictor for nationalist sentiment or support for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Instead, this article finds that LDP support and nationalist sentiment are more directly related.*

**Keywords:**

Nationalism, Japan, Shinto, Liberal Democratic Party, Japanese Value Orientations Survey

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It is reasonable to assume that religion would be influential in forming the ideologies and values reflected in a society’s general public opinion (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Thus, religious beliefs are an important consideration when studying public opinion and political affiliation, even in a secular democracy. Based on Japan’s history of militant nationalism during World War II and its connection with State Shinto, the association of religious symbols with Japanese politics can create mixed reactions from the Japanese public. One of the most commonly discussed instances of religious symbolism in Japanese politics is when political officials make visits to Yasukuni shrine[[1]](#footnote-1). On the other hand, when considering how religion and religious affiliation might affect public opinion and political affiliation in Japan, the relationship is unclear. As for Japanese citizens, 70.4% of people stated they participated in Shintoist practices and 69.8% observed Buddhist practices in 2015 (CIA World Factbook). However, when asked which religion they belong to, 57% of people said they were unaffiliated with any religion (Pew Research Center).

Does Shinto predict support for nationalist policies and practices, or is there a desire for those who believe in Shintoist values to separate themselves from the association between Shinto and a Japanese national identity? Is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) trying to appeal to a religious base, or are they only utilizing Shintoist symbolism and iconography in order to relate their party with a sense of national identity by drawing on associations of the (constructed) past relationship between Shinto and the Japanese nationalist state?

This article questions the assumptions behind the idea that Shinto is a nationalist religion. The literature regarding this assumption is divided. With the creation of loaded terms, such as “State Shinto”, some argue Shinto, nationalism, and the state of Japan are naturally tied together (Josephson 2012; Azegami 2012). Because of Shinto’s historical ties with nationalism, it would seem plausible to assume people who engage in Shintoist practices would be more likely to adopt nationalist ideologies and politically support the LDP. Further Shintoist beliefs in the divinity of the emperor and the idea that Shinto is part of Japanese national character lend support to this argument. However, particularly more recently, other scholars are pointing to evidence that Shinto’s inherent nationalist tendency is a false narrative based on misunderstandings and oversimplifications of this history (Hardacre 2017; Thomas 2019). Thus, it is also possible the average Shintoist practitioners have a wide array of political views that are not associated with Shinto’s past.

Using the Japanese Value Orientations Survey, I aim to contribute to this discussion by empirically testing the ties between practicing Shinto, nationalist sentiment, and support for the Liberal Democratic Party. I find practicing Shinto is a poor indicator for predicting if a person has strong feelings of nationalist sentiment or is a supporter of the LDP. Instead, the more straightforward relationship is between strong nationalist ideology and LDP support, suggesting political groups use Shintoist iconography to motivate or signal nationalist sentiment, rather than Shinto practitioners being naturally inclined toward or against nationalist ideologies.

*Shinto, Nationalism, and the LDP*

 There is a historical association between Shinto and nationalism born out of the Meiji Era (1868-1912) and what came to be known as State Shinto. Ideals attached to Shinto fundamentalism, such as belief in the divinity of the emperor, desires of ethnic purity, and the aspiration for Shinto to represent a distinct sense of Japanese character, provided the government with effective tools to motivate a nationalist movement (Skya, 2009). The Meiji government decided to make a distinction between private (religious) Shrine Shinto and public (civil) State Shinto (Zhong 2016). Because of this history, the extant literature often treats Japanese politics and Shinto as being areligious (Josephson 2012; Azegami 2012).

Consequently, Shinto is frequently described as a civil ideology with nationalist underpinnings. After World War II, State Shinto was disestablished under the supervision of the United States with the writing of Japan’s constitution. Emperor Hirohito also made a declaration that he did not come from a divine lineage, and the imperial government became a constitutional monarchy. Further, while Shrine Shinto, separate from State Shinto, was allowed to still be practiced, all state funding was taken away from Shinto shrines (Pye 2003).

 More recently, this historical association between Shinto and nationalism has become increasingly challenged. Although these events did occur, such as the attempt to separate Shinto into a private and public sphere and attempting to use Shinto as a moral code, several scholars argue our understanding and interpretation of these events are flawed. For instance, the distinction of what Shinto meant was a fairly new concept, as it was only divorced from Buddhism during the Meiji era (Hardacre 2017). Further, Buddhist priests also participated in Japan’s effort to modernize and militarize its government during the expansion in World War II, so placing the attention on Shinto undermines the role played by other religious groups (Rambelli 2011; Victoria 2011). Another perspective is that pairing Shinto and nationalism implies blame for repression and militarism should be placed on Shinto as a state religion, rather than on the secularist government (Thomas 2019). Rather, the association of Shinto and nationalism exists because of the desires and efforts of Shintoist and nationalist groups, such as Jinja Honcho[[2]](#footnote-2) and Nippon Kaigi[[3]](#footnote-3).

However, as groups such as Jinja Honcho and Nippon Kaigi demonstrate, even though the origins of the association between Shinto and nationalism may not be as straightforward as saying Shinto is inherently nationalist, the consequences of this narrative are very much real (Guthmann 2017). Often framed as the Liberal Democratic Party’s lingering appeal to Japanese nationalism, it is hard to argue the political controversies surrounding Yasukuni shrine visits do not have religious undertones since Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine, even though it does not fall under the umbrella of Jinja Honcho (Breen 2011). As Yasukuni shrine is dedicated to all verifiable Japanese war dead, this includes honoring Japanese war criminals who have died. Thus, political visits to Yasukuni have an inherent risk of both international and domestic criticism.

 Figure 1 graphs the descriptive statistics for the national level election results (in percentages) for the Liberal Democratic Party for the 2000-2012 general elections, as well as the public approval ratings of visits to Yasukuni shrine for each of these years (Asahi Shimbun 2017; Pollmann 2016). The percentage of Japanese citizens who believe in Shintoist values according to the Agency for Cultural Affairs are also included for these five elections. It is worth noting the percentage of Shinto adherents, according to the Agency for Cultural Affairs, is very high, staying above 75% for this period of twelve years. Looking at Figure 1, the percentage of Shinto adherents stays relatively constant, despite the varying support for the LDP and Yasukuni visits. This figure suggests those who identify with Shinto are not necessarily connected to the same people who support the politically motivated visits to Yasukuni. Further, members of the Liberal Democratic Party might be utilizing Shintoist symbolism and iconography in order to relate their party with a sense of national identity by drawing on associations of the past relationship between Shinto and the Japanese state (Gentry 2020).

Figure 1:



In the subsequent analysis, I will empirically evaluate the following hypothesis on which competing expectations exist:

*H1: Shinto practitioners will be more likely to express nationalist sentiment.*

Since some teachings of Shinto share ideologies with Japanese nationalist groups, like the belief in the divinity of the emperor, it is possible that practicing Shinto would be good predictor for increased nationalist sentiment. However, if Shinto’s association with nationalism is false, as Thomas (2019) and Hardacre (2017) argue, there could be an inconclusive or even negative relationship between Shinto and nationalism.

At the same time, the effects of the narrative that Shinto is associated with nationalism could have an influence on party support preference:

*H2: Shinto practitioners will be more likely to support the LDP.*

Due to the Liberal Democratic Party’s history of supporting nationalist policies, Shinto practitioner would likely support the LDP if Shinto is inherently nationalistic. Yet, as with the first hypothesis, if Shinto practitioners do not support nationalist policies or wish to separate themselves from this association, they may be less likely to support the LDP.

Perhaps the more accurate association is more direct: a relationship between support for the LDP and nationalist sentiment:

*H3: Those who express nationalist sentiment are more likely to support the LDP than those who do not.*

Consequently, nationalist appeals by the LDP using Shinto iconography are better understood as a signal to a specific subset of Shinto followers and nationalists in general. As Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) argue, nationalism is created by the state in order to produce a sense of cohesion within society. Thus, while nationalist groups may draw upon ideas of Shinto to conjure nationalist sentiment, those with nationalist political leanings are not necessarily the same people who practice Shinto. Instead, it is these nationalist groups that reinforce these associations between political and religious elements, such as the shared memberships between Nippon Kaigi, Jinja Honcho, and the Liberal Democratic Party.

**Data and Methods**

This article draws from the Japanese Value Orientations Survey, which is conducted every five years in Japan since 1973[[4]](#footnote-4). The survey consistently asks a variety of questions regarding the opinions of people in Japan about political, religious, and sociological topics. The unit of analysis is at the individual level.

*Dependent Variables*

 For the first hypothesis, I test whether people who practice Shinto are associated with nationalist sentiment. The nationalist sentiment dependent variable is an indexed variable based on the response to three survey options: 1) Japanese people are superior to others[[5]](#footnote-5); 2) Japan is a first-tier country[[6]](#footnote-6); 3) There are many things to learn from other countries[[7]](#footnote-7). The first two responses are coded as 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement and a 0 if they disagreed. Conversely, the third response is assigned a value of 1 if the respondent believed that Japan had nothing to learn from other countries and a 0 if they indicated that there are many things to learn from other countries.[[8]](#footnote-8) These answers were then combined to create a nationalist sentiment index, with a minimum score of 0 (least nationalist) and a maximum score of 3 (highly nationalist).[[9]](#footnote-9) This hypothesis will help determine if religious participation has an impact on the likelihood of a person expressing nationalist sentiment.

The second hypothesis tests if those who have nationalist ideology are more likely to support the LDP; thus, the dependent variable for this hypothesis is support for the LDP. If the respondent indicated their support for the LDP, they are coded as a 1.[[10]](#footnote-10) Otherwise, a 0 indicates the choice for all other parties. The dependent variable for the third hypothesis is also based on this question regarding a person’s support for a particular party. Specifically, this hypothesis is interested in the effects of religious participation on support for the Liberal Democratic Party.

*Independent Variables*

 The Value Orientations Survey does not include questions that specifically ask if the respondent is a practitioner of Shinto. Thus, this article uses two related questions to create an indexed variable to try to relay the concept as closely as possible. The variable chosen primarily signify religious behaviors rather than beliefs. First is the question that indicates if the respondent practices religious things, with a 1 indicating practice and a 0 for not practicing[[11]](#footnote-11). I have coded those who also responded that they believe in Buddha as a 0 to increase the probability that the religious practices refer to Shinto. Further, because the population of Christians in Japan is less than 2%, the probability that these religious practices are associated with Christianity should be very low (CIA World Factbook). Thus, any inclusion of Christians in this variable should not have a notable impact on the variable.

The second religious variable in the index has a clearer association with Shinto. The respondents are asked if they own/believe in charms such as ofuda (fortunes) and omamori (talismans) that ward against evil, with a 1 signifying yes and 0 no.[[12]](#footnote-12) Although omamori and ofuda are greatly associated with Shinto, Buddhist temples can also distribute them. Thus, the respondents who stated their belief in Buddha were coded as a 0 for this question, as well.[[13]](#footnote-13) These two religious variables are combined to create an index from 0 to 2, with a 0 signifying no religious participation and a 2 being the maximum level of participation in Shinto.[[14]](#footnote-14) This index is used for hypothesis 1 that tests the relationship between religious practice and nationalist sentiment, as well as for hypothesis 2 that examines if Shintoist religious practices can serve as a predictor of support for the Liberal Democratic Party.

For the third hypothesis, the nationalist sentiment index – which tallies the respondent’s answers to the Japanese superiority, Japan as a first-tier country, and Japan has nothing to learn questions – is used as the independent variable. This hypothesis postulates that the more likely predictor for respondents who support the LDP is their level of nationalist sentiment, meaning as the level of nationalist sentiment increases, the likelihood that the respondent supports the LDP also increases.

*Control Variables*

 Control variables commonly associated with having an influence on nationalist sentiment or a person’s support of the Liberal Democratic Party include sex, age, education level, and city size. The variable for sex is binary, with a 0 indicating the respondent answered male and a 1 meaning female. Age is an ordinal variable with five-year age ranges from 16-74, and then 75 and over. The variable for level of education reflects the respondent has more than a high school education if the value is 1 and a 0 for high school or less. Finally, city size is divided into urban and rural, with urban meaning the city has a population of 300,000 people or more and rural being less than 300,000. An ordered logistic regression is used for the first hypothesis because of the nationalist sentiment index. A logistic regression model is used for hypotheses two and three due to the binary nature of the dependent variables.

**Results**

*The impact of practicing Shinto on nationalist sentiment*

 Overall, Table 1 indicates participating in religious activities has an inconclusive to a negative relationship with feelings of nationalist sentiment. Thus, the analysis does not provide support for the argument that those who practice Shinto are more likely to hold inherently nationalist ideologies. The relationship was only significant in the years 1993, 1998, and 2008, but in these years Shinto practitioners were less likely to identify with the nationalist statements. Instead, the strongest personal indicator of holding increased nationalist sentiment is age, meaning the older a person was, the more likely they were to have increased nationalist ideologies. Although not always significant, the control variables for education, and city size do fall into the expected direction when they are significant. However, women were more likely to have stronger nationalist sentiment than men when the variable was significant. In short, those who are female, less educated, and live in rural areas are more likely to have an increased nationalist sentiment throughout the years than their counterparts.

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| Table 1: Impact of Practicing Shinto on Feelings of Nationalist Sentiment |
|   | 1973 | 1978 | 1983 | 1988 | 1993 | 1998 | 2003 | 2008 | 2013 |
| Practicing Shinto | -.024(.080) | -.022(.079) | .093(.074) | -.060(.078) | **-.217\*\***(.082) | **-.265\*\***(.085) | -.033 (.081) | **-.187\*** (.090) | -.118(.089) |
| Sex | .126(.064) | .032(.065) | **.182\*\***(.065) | .010(.066) | **.190\*\***(.066) | .028(.068) | .028(.071) | .081(.074) | **.245\*\***(.074) |
| Age  | **.152\*\*\***(.011) | **.159\*\*\***(.019) | **.145\*\*\***(.011) | **.130\*\*\***(.011) | **.118\*\*\***(.010) | **.174\*\*\***(.011) | **.153\*\*\***(.011) | **.127\*\*\***(.011) | **.109\*\*\***(.011) |
| Education | **-.266\*\***(.089) | -.180(.122) | **-.302\*\*\***(.078) | **-.277\*\*\***(.077) | **-.301\*\*\***(.074) | **-.210\*\***(.074) | -.118(.076) | -.111(.077) | **-.178\***(.076) |
| Urban/Rural | .046(.068) | .055(.102) | **-.210\*\***(.068) | **-.194\*\***(.070) | -.051(.069) | .114(.071) | -.115(.074) | -.013(.075) | -.023(.075) |
| /cut1 | -.702(.087) | -.931(.093) | -1.239(.097) | -.812(.096) | -.574(.095) | .265(.103) | .095(.108) | -.252(.117) | -.934(.123) |
| /cut2 | 1.027(.087) | .844(.091) | .484(.093) | .775(.095) | .954(.095) | 1.875(.109) | 1.798(.114) | 1.394(.120) | .777(.121) |
| /cut3 | 3.192(.105) | 3.030(.107) | 2.770(.106) | 2.990(.112) | 3.260(.115) | 4.169(.135) | 3.931(.138) | 3.681(.143) | 3.095(.136) |
| N | 3,297 | 3,232 | 3,306 | 3,122 | 3,116 | 2,956 | 2,707 | 2,519 | 2,543 |
| $X^{2}$  | **228.54\*\*\*** | **227.11\*\*\*** | **247.53\*\*\*** | **201.90\*\*\*** | **200.90\*\*\*** | **348.62\*\*\*** | **232.70\*\*\*** | **167.36\*\*\*** | **139.67\*\*\*** |
| Standard Errors in Parentheses \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001 |

*The impact of practicing Shinto on support for the LDP*

 Similar to Shinto’s common association with nationalism, a connection is also often made between Shinto and the Liberal Democratic Party. Most notably, visits to Yasukuni shrine by LDP politicians, including former Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, have garnered domestic and international attention. However, when considering the relationship between Shinto religious practice and support for the LDP, those who are Shinto practitioners have an inconclusive relationship with those who support the LDP except for in the year 2003 (see Table 2). In fact, the impact for that year is negative, meaning those who practice Shinto were less likely to support the LDP in 2003. As with hypothesis 1, these results suggest that, at most, being a Shinto practitioner is negatively correlated with being a supporter of the LDP, if there is a relationship at all. Taken together the idea that Shinto is inherently nationalistic and that those who practice Shinto are more likely to support nationalist policies is unsupported.

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| Table 2: Impact of Practicing Shinto and Feelings of Nationalist Sentiment on Support for LDP |
|  | 1973 | 1978 | 1983 | 1988 | 1993 | 1998 | 2003 | 2008 | 2013 |
| Practicing Shinto | -.056(.097) | -.114(.095) | -.069(.087) | -.037(.095) | -.050(.109) | -.089(.122) | **-.389\*\***(.119) | -.001(.121) | -.128(.107) |
| Nationalist Sentiment | **.226\*\*\***(.043) | **.331\*\*\***(.045) | **.249\*\*\***(.045) | **.210\*\*\***(.044) | **.376\*\*\***(.048) | **.351\*\*\***(.053) | **.265\*\*\***(.055) | **.282\*\*\***(.055) | **.461\*\*\***(.053) |
| Sex | **-.194\*\***(.076) | -.054(.077) | **-.222\*\***(.076) | **-.197\*\***(.078) | **-.292\*\***(.084) | **-.228\***(.093) | -.123(.095) | .010(.095) | **-.289\*\***(.087) |
| Age | **.136\*\*\***(.013) | **.169\*\*\***(.014) | **.189\*\*\***(.013) | **.183\*\*\***(.013) | **.135\*\*\***(.013) | **.209\*\*\***(.016) | **.202\*\*\***(.016) | **.134\*\*\***(.015) | **.107\*\*\***(.013) |
| Education | -.041(.108) | -.108(.105) | -.025(.093) | .177(.092) | **-.193\***(.098) | -.001(.106) | -.144(.106) | -.106(.102) | -.019(.091) |
| Urban/Rural | **-.430\*\*\***(.082) | **-.329\*\*\***(.081) | **-.461\*\*\***(.080) | **-.560\*\*\***(.084) | **-.427\*\*\***(.090) | **-.414\*\*\***(.099) | -.154(.099) | -.020(.097) | -.098(.089) |
| Constant | **-1.421\*\*\***(.111) | **-1.732\*\*\***(.119) | **-1.638\*\*\***(.125) | **-1.665\*\*\***(.126) | **-2.036\*\*\***(.136) | **-2.094\*\*\***(.164) | **-2.790\*\*\***(.171) | **-2.473\*\*\***(.173) | **-2.036\*\*\***(.139) |
| N | 3,297 | 3,232 | 3,306 | 3,112 | 3,116 | 2,956 | 2,707 | 2,519 | 2,543 |
| $X^{2}$  | **229.93\*\*\*** | **327.60\*\*\*** | **385.56\*\*\*** | **338.89\*\*\*** | **277.25\*\*\*** | **370.10\*\*\*** | **312.33\*\*\*** | **156.89\*\*\*** | **204.27\*\*\*** |
| Standard Errors in Parentheses \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001 |

*The impact of nationalist sentiment on support for the LDP*

 If practitioners of Shinto are not the driving predictors for nationalist sentiment or support for the LDP, where does the connection actually lie? Table 2 also illustrates that a respondent with increased nationalist sentiment is positively correlated with that respondent supporting the Liberal Democratic Party. This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.001 level for all years available within the survey data.

As with hypothesis and Table 1, age is again a strong predictor. The model finds those who are older are more likely to support the LDP. This is the case in all years in the survey. Although they are not significant indicators for all years, sex and city size have a fairly consistent relationship with supporting the LDP, with men and people in rural areas being more likely to indicate their support for the LDP. Education is not a strong indicator for these hypotheses, as there is only a significant relationship between education level and support for the LDP in the year 1993. However, it is still in the expected direction that the respondent is more likely to support the LDP if they have a lower level of education. It may be worth noting that 1993 was one of two years where the Liberal Democratic Party lost power.

**Conclusion**

 Considering the findings of the three hypotheses together, these results suggest those who are practitioners of Shinto should not be automatically assumed as supporters of the LDP or nationalist ideals. Instead, the relationship between nationalist sentiment and support for the Liberal Democratic Party exists on its own. Although nationalist groups such as Nippon Kaigi arguably have Shintoist ties and although the Liberal Democratic Party’s use of Yasukuni shrine is arguably a nationalist gesture, we cannot argue Shinto and its followers are the foundation of nationalism.

As discussed above, this is not to say that Shinto practitioners are never supporters for the LDP or that Shinto practitioners never adhere to strong nationalist ideologies. It is worth noting that the inconclusive findings also means that the relationship between Shinto and nationalism is also not negative, other than in the year 2003. Rather, the reality is more nuanced than some coverage of historical events indicated. What is perhaps happening, then, is that there are possibly different groupings of Shinto practitioners. This is a logical conclusion, as there are different sects of Shinto, like what can be found in Japanese Buddhism.

This distinction that there are different types of Shinto practitioners would be important when thinking of why the LDP and nationalist groups use Shinto and its iconography, as they are likely trying to communicate with a subset of Shinto practitioners. Despite the misinformation surrounding the start of the association between Shinto and nationalism, that is a narrative that has persisted to this day, and it is bound to have some sort of effect or consequence.

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Appendix:

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| Question 42: Indicate party support (支持政党 ) |
| Liberal Democratic Party | 自民党 |
| Democratic Party of Japan | 民主党 |
| Komeito | 公明党 |
| Communist Party | 共産党 |
| Social Democratic Party | 社民（社会）党 |
| People’s New Party | 国民新党 |
| New Party Nippon | 新党日本 |
| Other | その他の政治団体 |
| No support for a particular party | 特に支持している政党はない |
| No answer | 無回答 |

1. Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine that houses those who have died serving is a war for Japan, so long as their war death can be verified. The controversy surrounding this shrine will be discussed below. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Association of Shinto Shrines, which oversees around 80,000 Shinto shrines and advocates for nationalist policies (Shibuichi 2017; Tawara 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The Japan Conference, a nationalist lobbying group that can trace its origins back to Shinto organizations (Mizohata 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The data for this secondary analysis, " The Survey on Japanese Value Orientations, 1973-2013, Public Opinion Research Division, NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. ナショナリズム：日本人は、他の国民に比べて、きわめてすぐれた素質をもっている [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. ナショナリズム：日本は一流国だ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. ナショナリズム：外国から見習うべきことが多い [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The correlation between the three variables is fairly minimal, with a score of 0.29 for the first-tier and superior country questions, 0.08 for the first-tier and nothing to learn questions, and 0.06 for the nothing to learn and Japan as superior country questions. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The resulting index has a mean of 1.34 with a standard deviation of 0.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See the appendix for a list of all parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. 宗教的行動：ふだんから宗教的な行いをしている [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. 宗教的行動：魔よけや縁起物を身の回りにおいている [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The correlation between these two variables is very minimal, at 0.04. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The mean for this variable is 0.19 and has a standard deviation of 0.42. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)