Working Paper: A Value-Laden Europe: The Influence of nationalism on party-based Euroskepticism

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***1. Introduction:***

 Integration has been a central aspect of European politics since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951). In acceding to the European Union, member states agreed to cede some sovereignty in numerous policy areas to the decision-making bodies of the EU. Despite the potential for Brussels to influence domestic policies, EU level politics have remained a secondary concern in domestic political contestation. However, EU level politics are not non-issues. As a result, most European countries have a party or parties that attempt to tap into these under represented issues by taking a position, often negative, on European integration. Each member state’s unique history, culture, language, and civic traditions often create the foundations on which these parties can voice concerns toward EU policy by demonstrating how it potentially poses threats to the nation identity. The parties that claim to represent national values or claims to act as the protector of the nation frequently operate on the fringe of the party spectrum. As a result they rely on nationalist and/or populist messages to engage the mainstream political parties and increase their vote share (Katz, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2005; Sitter, 2001; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008). As a result of this interaction between fringe and mainstream parties the potential for EU integration to emerge as a contested issue area increases.

 While the EU many aspects of integration that do not gain a great deal of domestic attention the resistance of Great Britain and Sweden to join the European Monetary Union, the failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, and the continued fear regarding the Euro crisis some of the examples of European issues and Euroskepticism emerging in domestic political contestation ("Merkel's Authority Is on the Wane," 2011; "Yes or No? The People vote on Europe's new constitution," 2004). The relationship between EU level and domestic level politics remains one of scholarly debate. Within this discussion nationalism is often considered as an influence, but frequently it is a static factor and differences in nationalism from state to state are not taken into account. The recent wave of moderate electoral success for nationalist parties that link their nationalist message to skeptical positions on European integration in some member states but not others suggests that nationalism may influence the introduction of EU level politics in domestic elections ("Europe Nationalist Resurgence," 2011). Improving our understanding of how nationalism influences party interest in European integration nationalism may help further our understanding of what causes variation in the degree to which the European Union emerges as a contested issue from country to country.

 In the majority of research nationalism as one component in determining the likelihood that a party will take an anti-integration position they tend to only consider the presence or absence of nationalist rhetoric and don not take into account that conceptions of nationalism are not the same cross-nationally. I contend that that the relationship between nationalism and European integration is more complex. Citizens’ beliefs about what it means to belong to the nation differ from country for country as a result, they will influence the way in which parties that claim to represent the nation are likely to use EU level politics in domestic political contestation. This, in turn, may influence overall salience of EU issues at the domestic level as the mainstream parties respond to the new issues introduced by fringe nationalist parties. My central research question examines how variation in citizen beliefs on belonging to the nation impacts the discussion of EU level politics within each state’s political system. This paper seeks to determine if different conceptions of nationalism influence variance in the salience of the European integration in domestic politics across the EU member states. In order to test this relationship it utilizes regression analysis of the Comparative Manifesto Data (CMD) regarding the number of statements related to European integration with an independently determined typology of state nationalisms. Before discussing the formal model used to address the research question this paper will provide a review of the literature regarding the relationship between EU level and domestic politics and the influence of fringe parties on this relationship. It will then discuss an approach on developing a typology of nationalism for use as the primary independent variable. Finally it will discuss the results of the regression analysis and the implications of the findings of the model for further research on the relationship between nationalism and European integration.

***2. EU Integration as an issue in Domestic Politics***

 European integration has been an issue largely avoided by mainstream parties; however, fringe parties have the potential to increase the salience of EU level issues in domestic politics by introducing news that force mainstream parties to respond or face the prospect of losing votes. The salience of EU level politics in the discussion of political parties has remained relatively limited; however, despite the efforts of mainstream parties to maintain the status quo the electorate does have preferences on European level issues. Recent elections, demonstrate how that in some countries parties have been able to used EU issues to increase their vote share; however, despite these success successes the extent to which integration emerges as a contested issue remains varied.[[1]](#footnote-1) As a result the exact relationship between European integration and established areas of domestic political competition is subject to debate: are EU issues a “sleeping giant” or a minor nuisance?

Historically, EU level issues have been a secondary area of concern for voters and thus of less concern for political discussion between parties. Peter Mair (2001) argues that the development of the European level of politics has actually had little impact on the structure of political parties. Specifically, he notes that pro-European integration and anti-European integration has not developed into an ideological divide in most domestic party systems in Europe. However, research suggests that EU level politics are an issue for the electorate and thus, in turn, has warranted some level of response from the political parties (De Vries, 2007; Gabel, 2000; van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004, 2007). Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) demonstrate that while integration has been politically irrelevant for parties, it is an issue among voters. They argue that mainstream parties prefer to compete on left-right policies while opinions among voters on EU integration vary across this scale. The result is an opening for new or fringe parties to capture voters whose position on the EU does not match with their position on the left-right scale that the mainstream parties use as the focal point for contestation. De Vries takes these findings and demonstrates that in some cases this process has an important impact on party positions toward the EU. She finds that variation exists regarding the extent that parties internalize EU issue voting and adapt their policies as a result. Furthermore, she finds that a significant influence as to which parties within each state will adapt their policies is based upon “their intrinsic position on European integration: parties that care about European integration and those that take an outspoken and unified stance on the issue are much more susceptible to EU issue voting” (De Vries, 2010: 110). In these findings she links the highest level of response to issue voting to parties on the extremes of the left and right. These findings suggest that the first parties to respond to EU issues are likely to be located at the fringes including those that use nationalism was one of the key pillars for building the party platform. However, fringe parties taking on the EU does not guarantee that the mainstream parties will succumb to these new electoral pressures which are required to increase overall issue salience.

 New or fringe parties can use new issue areas as a strategic way to capture votes but the issue also requires the engagement of mainstream parties to take hold. Budge and Farlie argue that new parties (parties capable of gaining significant votes) emerge when they are able to capture voters based on issues that established parties do not compete or show little variation (1977: 89). Even if voters have strong alliances to established parties voter preference on integration may challenge those loyalties. Fringe parties can use integration as a political issue to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Taggart, 1998). Since mainstream parties have been reluctant to take a position on integration the parties on the fringe of the political spectrum take the most vocal positions as a way to siphon votes from the established mainstream parties (Katz, 2008; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008: 2). Sitter (2001) demonstrates that European integration has become a way for opposition parties to strengthen their position in domestic political competition. As fringe parties use integration to capture votes, the potential to increase the political saliency of European integration expands. As a result, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004; 2007) argue that European integration represents a “sleeping giant” that can undercut current party competition structures. While this research demonstrates how fringe parties with nationalist messages may alter the saliency of EU level politics.

Meguid’s (2005) modified spatial model demonstrates a way in which mainstream parties ultimately play a crucial role in determining saliency levels. She argues that the strategic choice of mainstream parties to engage policy issues introduced by niche parties, such as anti-integration parties, plays a central role in determining both the salience of the issue in party competition and the success of the niche parties in domestic politics. She argues that voters take cues from mainstream parties, thus if the mainstream parties on the center-left and center-right choose to take a “dismissive approach” its serves as a signal to voters that the issue is insignificant and keeps saliency low. Alternatively, if parties decide to adopt a position on the new issue dimension, whether “accommodative” or “adversarial” it signals the legitimacy of the issue and increases its saliency (Meguid, 2005: 349). Nationalism has a role to play in this interplay based on its ability to tap into the values of the electorate in influence how fringe and mainstream parties respond to one another.

While European integration remains a secondary concern it is one that has the potential to continue to increase in significance when integration policies are perceived to infringe on the security of the nation. The relationship between mainstream parties and fringe parties introduces nationalism through the platforms of the fringe parties and their potential to influence the salience of European integration. If fringe parties develop platforms on European integration based in part on a perceived threat it places on the nation than we should further study if variation in nationalism is one potential influence in the variation in degree in which the European Union is discussed and contested in domestic politics. Further development of this argument needs a method for using nationalism as a variable for large-N quantitative analysis.

***3. Nationalism as the explanatory variable***

 Building a hypothesis that rests upon the idea that nationalism influences party based resistance to European integration requires the development of a nationalism typology that accurately captures the widely held beliefs in each state but remains useful for cross-national comparison. Creating a replicable typology for nationalism presents its own sets of challenges in terms of capturing unique state attributes while remaining generalizeable. Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction” (1970) helps to explain the challenge researches face when attempting to use a dynamic concept like nationalism as a variable for cross national research. Moving up the ladder of abstraction results in generalized categories, but the cost is a lack in specificity which can also increase the potential for concept stretching by placing observations in categories where they do not really fit. Alternatively, when scholars move down the ladder of abstraction to avoid concept stretching they move away from universal terms; here the cost is a sacrifice in comparability. Collier and Mahon summarize the challenges of moving up the ladder of abstraction by stating that “broad comparison is difficult, that political and social reality is heterogeneous, that applying a category in a given context requires detailed knowledge of that context and that it is easy to misapply categories” (1993: 846). This problem of a heterogeneous reality is an inherent problem when attempting to classify nationalisms.

 The civic-ethnic divide is one prominent method for distinguishing types of nationalism that focuses on different factors used to determine criteria for membership in the national group resulting in two primary categories. Civic nationalism emerged out of the notion that membership and equality could be obtained through political participation and shared political values – an inclusionary belief; whereas ethnic nationalism is rooted in cultural ties inherited at birth that cannot be earned or lost – an exclusionary belief (Brubaker, 1992; Ingnatieff, 1993; Kohen, 1945; Seiler, 1989; Smith, 2005). States can be categorized as civic or ethnic by examining the practices of the national group and how membership is determined, primarily by focusing on whether membership is open or closed. This method of categorization creates a clear ideological division of the primary factors influencing national beliefs concerning who belongs to or who should be excluded from the group. Using this divide would represent moving up the ladder of abstraction. In practice, however, the division is not normally as clear as these two categories represent. Many cases exhibit both civic and ethnic influences. Spencer and Wollman (2005: 197) and Kedourie (1994: 53) caution against this dualistic typology claiming that the world is extremely diverse and that attempts to place countries in two broad categories will result in a loss of essential complexity.[[2]](#footnote-2) This loss of complexity is the result of pushing cases that represent a mix of civic and ethnic influences categories where they do not truly belong. Thus, while a civic-ethnic divide useful for making generalizations in comparative research; the degree to which those categories truly represent the states they are designed to represent is limited.

 Many nationalism studies have sought to move down the “ladder of abstraction” moving further away from universal categories in an effort to include the multidimensional influences on conceptions of nationalism.[[3]](#footnote-3) The problem with more nuanced understandings of nationalism based on detailed country analysis is that a limited number of countries will share enough similar attributes to be categorized together. This results in too many categories with too few cases for large N statistical research. Thus, researchers are left to decide between losing the natural complexity of nationalism in which each group’s particular national values rooted in its cultural, political and historical experiences or an over-simplified classification system that encompasses enough cases to facilitate comparative analysis.

 The development of a categorization system for nationalism would benefit from using family resemblance categories because such categories represent a way to overcome some of the challenges of broad comparison discussed above. The unique mixture of political goals, historical influences, and civic and ethnic influences within every European state suggests that it would be difficult to develop rigid categories for examining the influence of nationalism on Euroskepticism. Collier and Mahon note that in social sciences “a category defined in a particular way, may fit a number of cases reasonably well, but on close examination it can become clear that for most cases the fit is not perfect” (1993: 847). This is evident when examining scholarly efforts to create a classification system for nationalism. However, they continue “nonetheless, the category captures a set of commonalities considered by the research to be analytically important” (1993: 847). Using the logic of a family resemblance approach in which countries are grouped together by sharing key attributes I sought to create an expanded categorization system of nationalism that better captures the mix of civic and ethnic attributes that exist in most state conceptions of nationalism is necessary for creating an effective nationalism typology for use as an independent variable in previous working paper (Dean, unpublished).[[4]](#footnote-4)

Creating categories of nationalism based on family resemblance required a two step process. First, I performed a factor analysis on citizen answers to survey questions regarding what it means to belong to a nation from the European Values Survey. This determined that there was a strong underlying dimension that influenced responses that matched the theoretical arguments of civic and ethnic nationalism.[[5]](#footnote-5) After establishing that responses to the questions concerning belonging to a nation are influenced by a civic-ethnic dimension, I turned to placing countries along this dimension by calculating the factor scores for all countries included in the survey. The factor scores demonstrated that countries did in fact range from highly civic to highly ethnic with country scores covering the entire range between the two extremes. While the analysis provided evidence that a system of classification that includes a higher degree of variance than the civic-ethnic divide it raised the question as to if the factor scores suggest that if a scale of nationalism or family resemblance categories would be more useful when using nationalism an independent variable.

In an effort to determine if family resemblance categories exist, and if so, how many nationalism catigories to include in my regression model I conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis using complete linkage and Euclidian distance measure of dissimilarity. Complete linkage determines the distance measure used for clustering by calculating the largest distance between objects. This calculation is effective when the distance between values is small as was the cases with country factor scores which ranged from 2 to -2 (Everitt, Landau, Lesse, & Stahl, 2011: 79). The cluster analysis resulted in three or four nationalism categories depending on the cut point used with the dissimilarly measure; using a cut point based on a higher dissimilarity measure results in more inclusive categories while using a lower score on the dissimilarity measure results in more exclusive groups. For more inclusive categories I used a cut point between 1 and two on the dissimilarity measure. The result was countries placed in three categories of nationalism (Table 3.1).

*Table 3.1:* Countries placed in each cluster based on a cut point > 1 but <2 on the dissimilarity measure

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Cluster 1 N = 13 (**N = 5**) | Albania, Russian Federation, **Greece**, **Ireland**, **Poland**, Romania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Turkey, **Malta**, Macedonia, **Cyprus**, Georgia | Ethnic Nationalism |
| Cluster 2N =25 (**N = 15**) | Azerbaijan, **Estonia**, **Hungary**, Bosnia Herzegovina, **Latvia**, Croatia, northern Cyprus, **Great Britain, Czech Republic**, Ukraine, **Lithuania**, Moldova, **Portugal**, Northern Ireland, **Austria**, **Germany** ,Belarus, **Italy**, **Spain**, Armenia, **Slovenia**, **Serbia**, **Finland**, **Slovakia** | Mixed Nationalism |
| Cluster 3N = 9 (**N= 6**) | **Belgium**, Iceland, Switzerland, **Sweden**, **Denmark**, Norway, **Luxemburg**, **Netherlands**, **France** | Civic Nationalism |

Note: EU countries included in regression analysis in bold

This finding supports the literature which demonstrates that the majority of the countries are likely to display a mixture of civic and ethnic nationalisms, in this case 25 out of 47 of the countries in the European Values Survey fall within this group. While this presents potential families we can use for large N studies of regarding the salience of European integration for political parties.

*Table 3.2:* Countries placed in each cluster based on a cut point >0.5 but < 1 on the dissimilarity measure

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Cluster 1N = 13 (**N= 5**) | Albania, Russian Federation, **Greece**, **Ireland**, **Poland**, Romania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Turkey, **Malta**, Macedonia, **Cyprus**, Georgia | Ethnic nationalism |
| Cluster 2N = 14 (**N= 7**) | Azerbaijan, **Estonia**, **Hungary**, Bosnia Herzegovina, **Latvia**, Croatia, northern Cyprus**, Great Britain**, **Czech Republic**, Ukraine, **Lithuania**, Moldova, **Portugal**, Northern Ireland | Dominate ethnic, secondary civic nationalism |
| Cluster 3N = 11 (**N= 7**) | **Austria**, **Germany** ,Belarus, **Italy**, **Spain**, Armenia, **Slovenia**, Serbia, **Finland**, **Slovakia** | Dominate civic, secondary ethnic nationalism |
| Cluster 4N = 9 (**N= 6**) | **Belgium**, Iceland, Switzerland, **Sweden**, **Denmark**, Norway, **Luxemburg**, **Netherlands**, **France** | Civic nationalism.  |

Note: EU countries included in regression analysis in bold

Using a more stringent measure of closeness that divides the countries into four groups results in a more equal breakdown of the countries between the four families. These findings demonstrate that while the citizens of each country have a unique set of beliefs as to what constitutes membership in the national group the countries can statistically be divided into groups in which they are reasonably similar with one another for use in cross-national statistical analysis. Developing this measure allows for the creation of a testable hypothesis regarding the relationship between nationalism and European integration in domestic politics:

H: A change in nationalism typology from civic nationalism to mixed nationalism and from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism will result in a change in the salience of European integration in domestic political competition.

The remaining sections will: develop a model for testing this hypothesis, discuss the findings and the potential implications for further research into the relationship between nationalism and European integration.

***4. Methodology:***

 In order to test my hypothesis that variation in state nationalism influences the salience with which European politics, specifically European integration, in a country’s domestic politic. I utilize OLS regression analysis using the Comparative Manifestos Project data (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) and my previously constructed nationalism typology. The CMP provides data on the percent of manifestos dedicated to a wide range of political issues covering several broad categories: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, society and social groups. Included within external affairs are variables for positive statements on European integration and negative statements on European integration. This collection, updated in 2012 (Volkens et al., 2012), includes data for all EU member states including sufficient date for most Eastern European countries.[[6]](#footnote-6) These two variables along with information regarding the election year and vote shares for radical right parties act as the primary data for this model.

 There are a number of concerns associated with using manifesto data for analysis that uses European integration. Ray (2007) notes that one of the biggest concerns regarding parties and European integration with manifestos is that not all parties have manifestos and not all manifestos include positions on European integration. This is due in part because of the low salience of integration in domestic politics; however, he does note that over time the salience has been increasing. My interest in overall salience is still impacted by parties without manifestos, but a lack of discussion of integration is useful for determining salience and presents a greater problem when trying to determine party placement on the issue. A second option would be to use expert survey data. Marks et al. (2007) provide a strong discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach as they develop their own argument that generally favors expert surveys. However, given my interest in elections that cover a wide range of dates and a specific interest in salience at the state level of the position of parties toward European integration the benefits that manifesto date provides overcome some of the potential drawbacks, especially when accounting for these concerns through data adjustments and controls.

 Constructing the data for the model required two primary alterations to the CMP data. First, I reduced the size of the data set by focusing on elections held from 1979 to 2012. I used this range of dates in order to capture one election cycle before the Single European Act. The SEA represents a massive jump forward in both the speed and depth with which Europe has integrated, thus I sought to capture any potential party discussion on integration leading up to the signing of the act. In addition, before the 1980s parties paid even less attention to integration than they do today where it is still regarded as distant secondary concern. There are select years (early 1950s) and parties (MR Reformers’ Movement in France and RW Walloon Rally) where discussion of integration spikes, but on as a whole discussion remains limited. Given my interest in country averages focusing on a period of EU history where the widening and deepening of Europe rapidly increased results in the discussion of integration in manifestos for the majority of parties in each country. This adjustment also addresses one of Ray’s concerns with manifesto data by focusing on a time frame when the majority of parties are likely to include statements on this issue.

 Second, my model also required the creation of national averages for all the variables in the data set, specifically those that focus on percentage of quasi-sentences dedicated to European integration. This was a necessary step in order to transform party level data into values useful for a state level analysis. Therefore, for each every election in all EU member states I averaged the percentage of spaced dedicated to each variable in the CMP across all parties included in that election.[[7]](#footnote-7) Averaging is not without its drawbacks. If one party is skewed toward either end of the distribution for any variable it can decrease the representativeness of a state average. Limiting the time frame of the model to a period when most parties discuss integration is one way in which I attempt to mitigate this effect by focusing on elections where most parties discuss integration to some extent. I also try to limit any potential over valuation of the salience of European integration by controlling for the presence of an electorally successful radical right party.

*A) Dependent Variable: Salience of European Integration*

 My hypothesis that variation in nationalism will result in different levels of the salience of European integration in domestic politics across the EU member states, thus, to create my dependent variable of salience of European integration I totaled the CMP’s variables for positive EU integration statements and negative statements (europsal = 108 + 110). By doing so I created a variable that captures the total percent of space dedicated to EU integration in each party’s manifesto for any given election year. For many parties their manifestos contain only positive or negative statements; however, there are a number of parties’ manifestos that contain both positive and negative statements. By averaging my European salience variable, I created a state level salience variable for all countries elections after 1979.

*B) Independent Variable: Nationalism typology*

 My primary independent variable is in formed by the factor analysis and cluster analysis described above. For this model I used the cutoff point from the cluster analysis using the higher value of the dissimilarity measure resulting in three, more inclusive nationalism groups – civic, mixed, and ethnic – for my primary independent variable. Given that the independent variable is a categorical variable it was necessary to create a set of *k* -1 dummy variables with civic nationalism set as the base setting for the model and dummy controls for mixed nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

*C) Controls*

There are number of additional factors that may impact the degree to which parties discuss European integration in their manifestos included in the model that need to be controlled in an effort to isolate the potential effect of nationalism on the salience of European integration.

 *EU events:* Research demonstrates that there is an effect between EU level elections and referenda and the degree that EU issues are discussed domestically. De Vries (2009) notes that there is a considerable difference in the degree to which citizens vote based on EU issues following the expanded roles of referenda, citing the Dutch case as a primary example as the growing importance of EU issues for voters. If parties take cues from voters regarding issues relevant to the election than we can expect that major EU referenda will influence the salience of EU integration if there is a domestic election in close proximity to the referendum. To account for this I created a dummy variable (euevent1) coded 0 for the absence of a referendum near a domestic election and 1 if there was a domestic election with six months of either two types of EU referenda: EU constitution ratification and referenda for joining the EU.[[8]](#footnote-8) All potential new member states held public referenda determining if the state would accept the EU’s invitation for membership. Discussion of the costs and benefits of membership would likely influence party manifestos for elections held around the time of acceptance referenda.

 While EU referenda represent an infrequent connection between EU level issues and domestic politics, European Parliament (EP) elections offer a second instance in which an interaction between the two levels may occur. Gabel (2000) notes that EP elections do have some impact in the discussion of EU issues at the domestic level. In particular, he finds any effect is the strongest if the domestic election occurs within three months of the EP election. To match time frame I used for the referenda based dummy variable I extend my criteria for a positive (1) relationship to a domestic election within 6 months of an EP election resulting in this second EU event dummy variable (euevent2). These two controls allow for two models that vary in their sensitivity toward capturing any impact that EU elections have on domestic politics.

*Presence of an effective Radical right party:* Based on the party competition literature discussed above fringe parties can, though not always, influence the political issues that mainstream parties engage in domestic political competition. Therefore when isolating the influence of nationalism it is necessary to control for otherwise like countries where one state may have an electorally successful radical right party while the other does not. The impact of a successful radical right is likely to impact the mainstream parties in the election following the initial success of the radical party because they have been able to demonstrate that their program can sway voters that in the past may have voted for the mainstream parties. Thus, I created a lag dummy variable in which I coded 0 for the absence of a significant radical right party and a 1 if a radical right party received 5% of the vote or higher in the previous election cycle.[[9]](#footnote-9) There are two potential concerns with this variable. First the relationship between nationalism and the radical right, it is possible that specific types of nationalism may result in more votes for radical fringe parties. However, election results show electoral success for radial right parties for states in all three nationalism categories within the 1979-2010 timeframe. Second, the radical right is highly dependent on leadership and is frequently subject to higher turnover of leadership even after electoral success. This variable does not account for if there was a leadership change between the elections which could have weakened the far right party and thus any potential influence they might have gained in the previous election may not be relevant.

*Effective Number of Parties:* Controlling for the size of the party system is also important. Party competition and interaction is influenced by any number of factors associated with the parties and the electoral system. The effective number of parties for every country going back to 1979 was obtained using the Comparative Political Data sets (Armingeon et al., 2012a, 2012b). The purpose of this variable is to create a measure that allows for the comparison of party systems that accounts for party fragmentation and the dominance of a few parties that may not be capture by using the actual number of parties in a system (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). Differences in party systems influence competition between and interaction among parties; as the interaction between fringe and mainstream parties represents a central component in building my hypothesis it is necessary to account for differences in effective number of parties for otherwise similar cases.

*Election Year:* Since each election for each country is treated as an independent observation it is necessary to control for election years. As noted above the percent of space dedicated to the EU has fluctuated since 1979 with a general trend upward, as a result, by including an election year variable into the model I can further control for this change and attempt to capture any other external factors that may increase salience (international conflicts, global financial conditions, etc.) that would impact all EU member states, though not necessarily equally.

***5. Findings:***

 Overall the regression model demonstrates that a relationship does exist between nationalism typologies and the salience of European integration in domestic politics, although the relationship does not have a strong level of statistical significance. What the models shows is a decrease in salience of European integration when nationalism shifts from civic to ethnic. When changing the independent variable from civic nationalism to mixed nationalism there is slight decline in the salience of European integration; however, in the models that include controls for EU events this change is largely eliminated. While the this change is minimal there is a more noticeable change when we move from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism that is statistically significant, though this significance decreases as more controls with the introduction of controls for EU events. To determine this outcome I ran three variations of my model in an effort to explore the potential relationship between nationalism and the salience of integration.

 The first regression analysis focuses on the relationship between nationalism and salience controlling for the presence of a radical right party, effective party size and the election year. In the first model I did not include a control of EU events which I test in later regressions. This model provides the strongest and most statistically significant evidence of a linear relationship between nationalism and the salience of European integration.

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| *Table 5.1:* Regression Model of European Integration Salience |
|  | Coef. | *SE* | *p* |
| *Nationalism Mixed* | *-0.47* | 0.28 | *0.087* |
| **Nationalism Ethnic** \* | **-0.86** | 0.35 | **0.016** |
| Radical Right | 0.03 | 0.27 | 0.927 |
| Election Year \*\*\* | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.000 |
| Effective Party Size | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.312 |
| Constant \*\*\* | 1.34 | 0.56 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | N = 192 |  |
|  |  | Prob > F=  | 0.001 |
|  |  | R-squared = | 0.1028 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Notes:* Significance levels: \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.  |

We can see that moving from civic to ethnic nationalism resulted in a decrease of 0.47 percent of manifesto space dedicated to European integration with a p-value of 0.087. Moving from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism results in a 0.86 percent decrease in manifesto space dedicated to European integration with statistical significance, thus as nationalism moves from being predominately civic to predominantly ethnic the salience of European integration declines.

While less than one percent changes seems minimal when we consider the number of topics manifestos cover and recall that EU politics remain a secondary concern, the average amount of space dedicated to integration over all states for all elections between 1979 and 2012 was 2.77% and the average space dedicated since 2000 is 5.68%, these values represent a significant change. While the base model demonstrates aspects of a linear relationship including the control for EU election effects demonstrates that the primary difference occurs when moving civic nationalism and mixed nationalism to ethnic nationalism.

 For the second model I included my first EU election controlling for any potential influence of EU referenda on the salience of European integration. The results again demonstrate that there is a decline in space dedicated to integration when moving from civic nationalism to ethnic (-0.78); however, the difference between civic nationalism and mixed nationalism in the first model dropped to virtually no change (0.07) (Table 5.2). In this model the p-values for both for the dummy variables for nationalism indicated statistical significance; however, the p-value for ethnic nationalism indicates a higher degree of salience than mixed nationalism and other controls. This model suggests that the minimal decreased in salience between civic and mixed nationalism found in the first model may be explained by external factors including EU events leading to increased discussion in mixed nationalism countries more so than in ethnic nationalism country.

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| *Table 5.2*: Regression Model of European Integration Salience with major EU event |
|  | Coef. | *SE* | *p* |
| Nationalism Mixed | 0.07 | 0.33 | 0.819 |
| *Nationalism Ethnic* | -0.78 | 0.46 | *0.097* |
| Radical Right | 0.23 | 0.34 | 0.501 |
| Election Year | -0.21 | 0.14 | 0.125 |
| Effective Party Size | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.706 |
| EU event | 0.53 | 0.32 | 0.100 |
| Constant \*\* | 2.23 | 0.72 | 0.002 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | N = 131 |  |
|  |  | Prob > F= .189 |
|  |  | R-squared = 0.06 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Notes: Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.*  |

Expanding the model to include EP elections that occur around the election time may provide further evidence of this trend.

 In the third regression model I replaced the limited EU event control with an EU election control that covers both referenda votes as well as EP elections. The purpose was to examine if any EU level election influences the relationship between nationalism and salience of European integration. The findings are very similar to those in model two (Table 5.3). Changing from civic nationalism to mixed nationalism results in nearly zero change in the percent of space dedicated to integration. Changing from civic nationalism the ethnic nationalism resulted in a 0.7 percent decrease in space dedicated to integration, a change of only 0.08 from the second model. However, in the third model the statistical significance of this coefficient decreases (p-value of 0.109).

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| *Table 5.3:* Regression Model of European Integration Salience with any EU event |
|  | Coef. | *SE* | *p* |
| Nationalism Mixed | 0.08 | 0.33 | 0.802 |
| Nationalism Ethnic | -0.75 | 0.46 | 0.109 |
| Radical Right | 0.21 | 0.34 | 0.545 |
| Election Year | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.161 |
| Effective Party Size | -0.03 | 0.09 | 0.728 |
| EU event | 0.51 | 0.30 | 0.088 |
| Constant \*\* | 2.23 | 0.72 | 0.002 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | N = 130 |  |
|  |  | Prob > F= .183 |
|  |  | R-squared = .068 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Notes: Significance levels: \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.*  |

Take the three models as a whole we can see that a decrease in the salience of European integration when moving from civic to ethnic nationalism remains consistent. The linear relationship with a slight decline in relevance between civic and mixed and larger decline between civic and ethnic nationalisms that exited in the first model does not remain with the introduction of controls for EU election. This suggests that a trait either within ethnic nationalism or civic may be responsible for the decline in salience of European integration that we see across European states when we move from civic and mix nationalisms to ethnic nationalism. However these preliminary findings are only the first step in determining the relationship between nationalism and EU integration.

***6. Discussion:***

 The findings of the three regressions discussed above indicate that variation in nationalism does have some influence on the salience of European integration on domestic politics. Holding other factors constant states changing from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism results in nearly a percentage drop in the average space in party manifestos dedicated to European integration across all parties for a given election.[[10]](#footnote-10) The findings might go against expectations that the countries that exhibit dominant ethnic nationalist tendencies would increase discussion of integration. The idea that the exclusionary nature of ethnic nationalism that seeks to protect the group identity easily lends to the logic that nationalist fringe parties taking a strong stance against EU integration would resonate with the electorate forcing mainstream parties to take a position in agreement or against the fringe party raising overall salience levels of integration. However, based on these finds this narrative does not hold true. What then accounts for a decrease in the salience of integration in states categorized within ethnic nationalism? Looking at the specific characteristics inherent within either ethnic or civic nationalism may provide insight into the findings of this model.

 Examining what is going on within the exclusionary principles of ethnic nationalism might provide an explanation for why transitioning from civic to ethnic nationalism results in a decline of the salience of integration. One point to consider is that preservation of national identity is likely to be inherent throughout party manifestos, and therefore, the focus is taken away from European integration and captured through any number of domestic level policy positions, such as immigration, position on freedom and human rights, and economic protectionism. Essentially the fringe parties do not develop a party strategy based upon gaining votes by focusing on EU issues. This might be magnified by the fact that many of the countries that fall within the ethnic nationalism category are receivers of EU funds. The financial benefits of EU integration may further force the influence of exclusionary based nationalism to a focus solely on domestic political issues.

 Alternatively, looking at the influences of civic nationalism may explain why the averages pace in manifestos from countries classified as having a civic or mixed nationalism have a higher percentage of space dedicated to European integration. Civic nationalism is based upon the belief that group membership is determined by civic engagement and respect for the laws and customs of the state. While it is not exclusionary the focus on respect for laws, institutions, and other identifies, such as Scandinavian welfare policies, and having a national currency, help distinguish the group from others.[[11]](#footnote-11) To this extent parties may be likely to address integration as it potentially infringes upon these indicators of the group. Furthermore, many states categorized within civic nationalism are also net contributors to EU funds, might have the opposition impact of parties in states receiving EU funds. Fringe parties in net contribution states can highlight instances where state funds have been used to improve conditions or stabilize other countries with civic practices that could potentially threaten the civic institutions most valuable to the national group. This was a key component of the approach the TrueFinns took in 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections where they greatly increased their vote share.

 Expanding the model to include a wider range of controls may provide additional clarification for findings in this study. First, this discussion has touched on one primary variable to introduce into future modification to the model. Including a variable for if states are net contributors or net receivers of EU funds may further demonstrate the mechanism which leads to the decline in salience of integration for countries categorized within ethnic nationalism. Data concerning a state’s net contribution to the European Union is readily available only back to 2000. Improving this model requires developing a control for contributions to the EU covering the entire period included in the model. Second, for many of the established Western European democracies, European integration represents a new issue that emerged after the formation and consolidation of party systems. This is not the case for many Eastern European countries where the democratic party systems emerged after European integration (Mainwaring, 1998). The result is differing cleavage structures that impact the primary issues dividing the electorate that shape the nature of party competition. Kitschelt (1995) and Evans and Whitefield (1993) note that the nature of economic and democratic transition in Eastern Europe has resulted in cleave points with different influences than those found in Western Europe. Therefore, a dummy variable control for post-Soviet countries may further distinguish between otherwise similar observations.[[12]](#footnote-12) Finally controls for economic performance need to be included to control due to the relationship between economic performance and EU level politics that has been highlighted by the ongoing Euro crisis.[[13]](#footnote-13) The inclusion of these additional controls will provide a model that may further isolate the influences of nationalism from external factors that remain unaccounted for in the present model and provide additional insight into the potential causal mechanism with nationalism that shape the level and nature of discussions of European integration in domestic politics.

 Given the questions raised by the discussion of the findings of this study as well as the discussion of how to improve the validity of the model answer the questions requires improved information for state level analysis as well as regression analysis at the party level. Party level analysis will help our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and salience in two ways. First it provides a similar analysis of salience while removing the potential variation that was lost in averaging across parties in all the cases. If the findings remain similar while controlling for like similar parties it provides further support for these findings. Second, it allows us to test party position on specific EU integration policies. By dividing European integration into more specific categories of economic integration, political integration, and social integration, regression analysis can examine if each type of nationalism is particularly influential in raising or lowering the salience level for each specific aspect of integration. This analysis would allow us to further our overall understanding of how nationalism will continue to interact with and influence European integrative polices as the EU continues its long process of integration.

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1. The TrueFinns in Finland provide a strong example of this as the received 19% of the vote in 2011; however, other nationalist parties with recent electoral success include: National Front (France), The Dutch Freedom Party (Netherlands), the Danish People’s Party (Denmark) and the Sweden Democrats ("Europe Nationalist Resurgence," 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Collier and Mahon (Collier and Mahon, 1993) refer to this as decreasing intension (the meanings and attributes that define the category) to increase the extension (the set of cases the to which the category refers) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Many scholars that have attempted to create nationalism typologies have done so by examining specific cases, starting in Europe (Wirth, 1936), and expanding to new cases (Hecter, 2000; Smith, 1978; Symmons-Symonolewiez, 1965). As the number of cases increases often the result is a more complex typology which reflects the unique combination of historical and cultural influences that shape a state’s national identity. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. My previous work on creating a nationalism typology and this model testing the relationship between nationalism and the salience of European integration are part of a larger dissertation project examining nationalism and party positions on European integration. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Principle component factor analysis resulted in a single underlying dimension. The factor loadings for this dimension fit a civic ethnic divide with responses indicating membership determined by civic participation and respect for the values and laws of the country loading together and responses for exclusionary beliefs such as place of birth and ancestry loading together. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The CMP data is incomplete for several EU member states included in this model. The following includes the range of dates included in the data for each country: Greece 1981-2000, Cyprus 1996-2000, Latvia 1993-2002, Lithuania 1992-2004, and Malta 1996-1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. While Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in the most recent wave of expansion both were omitted from this model due to the large amount of missing election data necessary for the control variables. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Not all states had an open public referendum on the EU constitution; instead many sought to ratify the constitution through parliamentary votes. Furthermore, many states cancelled their scheduled referenda following the failure of the constitution in the France and Denmark. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Parties were designated as radical right parties based on the research of Mudde (2007), who provides a table of radical right parties in Europe. While any party designation is debatable using the classification of a single author insure that the same set of criteria were used in determining if a party falls within the category of the radical right for all European states. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. A regression analysis using the four groups of nationalism determined by using the lower cut point on the cluster analysis yielded similar findings to the models included in this discussion when comparing the change for strong civic to strong ethnic nationalism. Furthermore there is no statistical significance of the findings for the two mixed nationalism categories (dominant civic secondary ethnic and dominant ethnic secondary civic) when EU events were included in the model. While not significant, there is a unique finding which shows that the two mixed nationalisms had minimally positive coefficients. Further research and modeling will explore any potential significance in this finding. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Sunnus makes a strong connection between the positive civic identity of the Swedes and Euroskpeticism claiming that “Swedish Euroscepticism is largely inspired by a positive national self image. The Swedish ‘model’, which stresses democracy, equality and social welfare, is believed to be besieged by backward European laws and directives. Thus, the European Union functions as the ‘significant other’, confirming and enhancing a complacent sense of Swedishness and invoking a nationalist, defensive ‘cultural flow’” (Sunnus, 2004: 202). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Preliminary regression results suggest potential correlations between ethnic nationalism and post-Soviet states due to the large number of post-Soviet states that fall within the ethnic and mix ethnic nationalism groups. It is necessary to test these for any correlations before including this control in the full model. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Economic controls were omitted from this variable due to substantial missing data of economic data for many of the post-Soviet countries during the early transition years. To fully develop these variables requires merging various economic data sets in order to account for the missing variables. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)