The President, Congress, and Foreign Policy:
An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Foreign Policy, 1963-2008

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Introduction

The United States has come a long way since the framers of the Constitution convened to decide how to move America into the future. In the arena of foreign policy, the framers envisioned an interaction between Congress and the president, where one body would check and balance the other so that neither institution could become too powerful. The architects of the Constitution envisioned a system whereby the president would share critical information with Congress, keeping said body knowledgeable about foreign affairs, and informed about potential threats – after all, Congress does wield the power of the purse and can essentially handcuff the president's agenda. Theoretically, then, all policies in need of funding must make their way through the legislative branch in order to be enacted. Yet, this idealized goal of inter-branch dealings was not to be realized. Not even George Washington fully observed the mandate – Washington himself ventured into foreign affairs without the oversight of Congress, utilizing executive agreements in lieu of the congressional policy-making (Caruson and Farrar-Myers, 2007).

Not much changed as years passed: presidents continued to circumvent Congress in foreign affairs, expanding the power of the office and yielding the president enormous power. The commander-in-chief became, in a real sense, the sole purveyor of foreign policy-making. Congress continually looked to the president to set the agenda on foreign affairs, and would continually let the president have his way (Hinckley, 1994). The same was not true on domestic issues, as is apparent in the over 300 years of heated political rhetoric. In the domestic arena, the president would have to bargain with Congress to get favored items off the agenda and into law, oftentimes failing. History is rich with evidence of this, and one would be hard-pressed to find a time where Congress took a backseat to the president on domestic issues (outside of instances of

conflict – e.g., 9/11). This dichotomous policy-making phenomenon has caused some scholars

to believe that there are actually two presidencies, veiled behind one president. As Aaron

Wildavsky put it, "The United States has one president, but it has two presidencies; one

presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and foreign policy"

(Wildavsky, 1966).

It should be noted that Wildavsky was the first to articulate the notion of dual

presidencies, but he certainly was not the last. In the literature that followed, several have picked

up Wildavsky's claim, noting that while the president certainly has a difficult time gaining

support in Congress for his domestic agenda (naturally much more from his political opposition),

few question his agenda relating to foreign affairs. That is not to say that the president will go

unimpeded in foreign policy endeavors – certainly keen members of the Committee on Foreign

Affairs/International Relations (and elsewhere) will question particular cases of interest to them

personally, but by and large, the president will not face many obstacles, at least according to

much of the literature. Yet, for the most part, most of the scholarly research since Wildavsky has

focused on either rebutting his claims or asserting in his favor. But there are still questions to be

raised with regard to the president's role, and his interaction with Congress. This paper aims to

ask – and answer – some of those questions.

That is, the research presented here seeks to come to a more complete understanding of

what influences the passage of foreign policy. If we take for granted the notion that presidents

typically get their way, as Wildavsky and others have asserted, then there are multifold questions

to be raised: What role does the president's approval rating play? Do Republicans pass more

foreign policy legislation than Democrats, or vice versa? Do unified governments (unified in the

sense that Democrats or Republicans possess the presidency and House, simultaneously) produce

more foreign policies? Does the media influence foreign policy legislation? These are some of the questions this research aims to solve. It should be noted for clarity purposes before proceeding, however: the variable I employ to signify uniformity is specifically focused on the House, and not the Senate. Because the House is where all bills originate, and because I am interested in the amount of foreign policies passed, I was more concerned with whether or not the president's party matched that of the House, and not the Senate. Although this does introduce some bias, for the most part (with the exception of the 97th, 98th, 99th, 107th, and 110th Congress – that is, five of the twenty-three), if Republicans/Democrats had control of the House, they also controlled the Senate.

The outline of this study is as follows: I will start by briefly touching on the literature that inspired this research in order to plot how the field got to its current location, and how it can move forward. Secondly, I will expound upon the variables I have chosen for my model, and explain why they are important in terms of the model's specifications. I should be clear here: my model is strictly focused on answering the question of what influences the passage of foreign policy. While there are likely a plethora of variables that I have omitted, I have chosen to narrowly focus on just a few – public opinion, political parties, media representation, and a very narrow component of institutionalism: unified party government. In the data portion of this analysis, I will explain why each are important, and how I came to choose such variables.

After discussing my model's specifications, I will discuss the results that my equation has garnered, and will explain its importance in the foreign policy literature. Lastly, I will spend some time elaborating on where future research could reside. I should note here: although I am giving the benefit of the doubt to Wildavsky's claims, scholars in the future should press further to examine the latitude of the dual presidencies theorem in light of modern political parties, and

the change in the ideological structure of Congress. I am not suggesting that Wildavsky was incorrect in his assessment in 1966, I am only suggesting that the composite of Congress has since changed, at least in measuring how ideologically stringent members of Congress currently are (Poole, 2007). Such an argument is not part of the design I have decided to move forward with, however.

Prefacing the Study

As noted, Aaron Wildavsky was the first to advance the claim that there is not one, but two presidencies – one for domestic affairs, and one for foreign policy. Wildavsky's thesis is where this research begins. Because the two presidencies claim became a central tenet of foreign policy research, insofar as it pertains to the interaction between Congress and the president in the foreign affairs spectrum, I will pivot to discuss some of the research that followed. Said research has influenced the formation of this design. I will begin by discussing John Manley's piece, "The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making," not so much because it is oft cited in the foreign policy literature, but because it takes on Wildavsky's two presidencies claim.

In Manley's piece (Manley, 1971), the author begins by discussing the decline of Congress in foreign policy legislation, noting that in the post World War II era, Congress has afforded the president much more leniency, allowing him to have his way on roughly 70% of legislation pertaining to foreign affairs. Yet, Manley claims that by looking at it in this perspective, we are ignoring the reality in Congress. To Manley, even though Congress has yielded more and more to the president's discretion, it has heightened its disapproval of defense spending measures. That is, even though Congress has been willing to give the president what he wants on foreign affairs, it has been less lenient on defense spending issues. What's more, Manley questions the role of the public's perception of the foreign agenda – please note: the

author was writing during the Vietnam War – positing that even if the public does not approve of the direction of foreign affairs, it will have little impact on the steps the president (and Congress) chooses to take. Still, the author is quick to assert that even though public opinion does not play an overwhelming role, the public can still put pressures on the government. Manley's piece is seminal to the work presented here in that I will test whether or not public perception does play a role. Although the author bluntly states his hypothesis, he does not test it empirically – this research will.

Moving forward to 1994, Barbara Hinckley's seminal book, *Less Than Meets the Eye*, points out that even though members of Congress often display their disapproval of the president's foreign policy agenda, they will almost always side with him. To Hinckley, members of Congress will posture and put on a show of symbolic action, but they will not question the president in most cases. Hinckley is sure to note that this is not the case in the domestic sphere, signaling the lessons of Wildavsky. Still, the author does suggest that even though Congress often turns a blind eye on foreign issues, they are doing so out of compromise – the president can have his way on foreign affairs, but he must reach across the aisle on other domestic legislations. Because of bicameralism, the government will not function without inter-branch interaction, and so when the president wants something (foreign policy), Congress typically ascends; yet, when Congress wants something in the domestic arena, the president will likewise come to terms with an agreement. Although this is not the case all of the time, compromise is at the heart of the American system, according to Hinckley. However badly it is misused, compromise is the lifeblood of the American politics.

Although Hinckley's book is wide ranging and makes a number of well documented assertions, the author does not provide vital statistics as to whether or not her claim about

bicameralism is statistically significant. As such, this study aims to dig deeper into Hinckley's

hypothesis – that is, if bicameralism necessarily leads to compromise, does it follow that a

unified government (unified insofar as the House and president's party are the same) will pass

more legislation in the way of foreign policy? Even if the president normally gets his way, it can

stand to reason that with divided government, there will be less compromise, even with regard to

foreign policies. Because this study is focused on the inputs that affect foreign policy outputs, it

is important to take a close look at how institutional features of government shape the passage of

foreign policies; how institutional features can alter the nature of compromise.

While there are many more articles that analyze the interaction between Congress and the

president in foreign affairs (see also Carter, 1986; Lindsay and Ripley, 1994; Rockman, 2000), I

will move now to discuss Matthew Baum's 2004 piece, "Going Private: Public Opinion,

Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy

Crises." In it, Baum suggests that, "presidents are concerned less with what the public thinks

about a policy today than with what it is likely to think over the long run, especially at the time

of the next election" (Baum, 2004, p. 606). Baum's research, then, has several implications: if a

president calculates that a given foreign policy – whatever the nature of the policy – will not

reverberate well in the media and the boundaries of public opinion, he will be less likely to press

hard for it; if it is perceived that the policy will go unnoticed, he will likely push for it without

much hesitation. More succinctly: with foreign policy initiatives, a president must think

critically about how the public will perceive his agenda.

Thus, it is in a president's best interest to pay close attention to the salience of a particular

issue. If a foreign policy has the attention of the media, the president would have to think about

how its passage would affect his long-term legislative goals. If a foreign policy were largely out

of the public's perception, he will not have to worry much about his long-term political ambitions. In other words, public opinion and issue-specific salience seem to influence the passage of foreign policies, at least according to Baum. Yet, Baum was concerned with specific crises across a 48-year time period – not with all foreign policies in that 48-year span. The research conducted here aims to build off of Baum's work, and expand it to determine how salience and the public's perception influences the passage of *all* foreign policies over a given number of years.

Changing focus quickly, I will briefly discuss Gary King's piece, "Political Parties and Foreign Policy," as it is an important piece in the foreign policy literature, and is vital to fully understanding my model's specifications. In his article, King discusses the nature of inter-party dealings as it relates to foreign policy-making, noting specifically that when there is less partisanship in Congress, we can expect bipartisanship in the foreign policy arena; however, in times of high polarization (i.e., the current day), we can expect partisan politics even with regard to foreign affairs (King, 1986). King's analysis is important because it goes against most of the literature on the topic – most before him speculated forcefully that, no matter the levels of partisanship in Congress, the president will almost always get his way, at least with foreign policy issues.

Yet, for all of its merit, King's work looks at roll call data across a small time period (1961-1977), investigating congressional votes from only post-presidential election congresses. Further, King's data analyzes the behavior of specific members of Congress (along with their given party), and makes longitudinal claims about representatives' foreign policy voting behavior. What's important, though, is the difference in the units of analyses between King's work and the one proposed here – King is looking at individual role call votes, I am interested in

what finally passed. Please note: I am not implying that by using a different sample that King's data is inherently flawed, I am simply drawing notice to the different design between his model and my own. King's work undoubtedly influenced the research conducted here, especially with regard to his notion on partisanship/bipartisanship in the avenue of foreign policy – an idea infrequently expressed in the literature.

I should be clear to point out here before moving forward: much like King's work, Mark Souva and David Rohde's excellent piece, "Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975-1995" played a dynamic role in influencing this study. Although Souva and Rohde's article is similar to King's, Souva and Rohde look in a slightly more in depth manner at the role party elites play in the build-up of partisanship/bipartisanship. The authors find that "the more party elites differ in their views on a particular foreign policy issue, the more partisanship we should observe" (Souva and Rohde, 2007, 116). What's more, the authors find that, although domestic policies are more bipartisan than foreign policy issues, party leaders play a statistically strong role in the passage of policies concerning foreign affairs. Like King, Souva and Rohde conclude that party pressures influence the passage of foreign policy issues; unlike King, Souva and Rohde do not find evidence that the president will not continue to get his way, at least with regard to the foreign affairs domain.

Certainly the authors mentioned above are not the only scholars writing about the interaction between Congress and the president in the foreign policy arena – there are boundlessly more (see also Bartels, 1991; Lindsay, 1994; Garrison, 2001; Prins and Marshall, 2001; Farnham, 2004; Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007). Yet, I have specifically chosen to elaborate on these select few because they provided a thoroughfare of insight into various topics researchers have already focused on at great length. Notwithstanding their expertise, however,

none of them built a model in the same fashion I have. By the benefit of writing at a later time period, I have been afforded the opportunity to study the significance of both included and excluded aspects of their models. As such, I was able to group variables that were either studied or left unstudied, and combine them into research that builds off of previous investigations. In what follow, I will elaborate more thoroughly on my chosen variables.

Statistical Investigations

Data & Methods

Foreign Policies Passed. I will begin by explaining my dependent variable. Because most scholarly attention has focused on the impact of major foreign policy legislations over a given time period (some ranging as long as fifty years, others as short as fifteen years), I have chosen to expand the horizon of my study. In order to do this, I look extensively at thirty-five years of *all* foreign policy legislation that has been approved by Congress, from 1963-2008. By looking at all foreign policy legislation over the given time period, the external validity of my research will be strong. That is, by compiling all of the data from the aforementioned period of time, I am not intentionally or unintentionally excluding information from my model, thus giving a more vivid portrait of foreign affairs throughout time. I should specify here, as well: my model will be run using a Poisson regression, rather than with Ordinary Least Squares. A Poisson analysis will allow for a count dependent variable – this is critical in explaining the number of foreign policies passed.

To gather said data, I utilize the Committee on Foreign Affairs' published document, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2008*, which contains a list and summary of each foreign policy from 1926-2008. From there, I scoured and documented all foreign policies passed from 1963-2008, keeping meticulous documentation along the way. Over the years, there

have been a wide variation of foreign policies passed – in the sample I draw from, the minimum is 4, and the maximum is 44, with a standard deviation of 10.69, and a mean of 18.78. It is my hope that by including all foreign policies passed, I will be better able to draw conclusive evidence about the nature of foreign policy legislation, as it pertains to the interaction between Congress and the president. Because the foreign policies passed over time are presumably independent from one another, a Poisson regression will be adequate.

Mentions in the New York Times. The first independent variable I have included in my model is a variable for how many times the *New York Times* mentioned "foreign policy" over the course of thirty-five years. To gather this data, I referenced *LexisNexis*, and compiled results based on a comprehensive search of their *New York Times* database. While the results gathered are naturally skewed (not every article discussing foreign policy will mention the terms "foreign policy" in the writing), such a search was the best indicator of how the media covered foreign policy issues. What is more, by using the *New York Times*, I utilized the most predominant newspaper over the given time period. Gathering data with regard to foreign policy from the *Times* allows for an investigation of whether or not saliency in the media influences the quantity of foreign policies passed. I expect that as mentions of foreign policy increases in the *Times*, more foreign policies will be passed. That is, as media saliency increases, so too will foreign policies passed.

Presidential Approval Rating. I chose to include an explanatory variable denoting presidential approval ratings because it would proffer information about whether or not a popular president gets his way more often than an unpopular president, or vice versa. Further, by delving into presidential approval ratings, I will be able to infer results about whether or not presidential popularity matters. That is, the literature to date (by and large) suggests that presidents typically

get their way in foreign affairs, no matter the circumstances, so by controlling for popularity, I can determine whether or not a president's popularity plays a role in the passage of foreign policies. What's more, because popularity seems indicative of whether or not a president can muster enough votes in Congress (at least for domestic issues; here I will test for foreign affairs), I have included it in my model. To gather this data, I compiled information from the Roper Center, which contained data predominantly from Gallup. I should note, however: Roper specifies that from President Clinton (1993) onward (for us, until the end of the George W. Bush term), data is provided from a conglomerate of sources, including Fox, ABC/*Washington Post*, Pew, the American Research Group, CNN/ORC, WG/New Models, CBS/*New York Times*, McClatchy/Marist, and Quinnipiac University. To account for this, I averaged out all polling data over a given year.[1] I expect that as a president's popularity rises, more foreign policies will be passed. As a president becomes more popular, he is more able to weigh in on foreign affairs, getting much more of what he wants.

President's Party. To account for the president's party, I employed a dummy variable to my dataset – if the president during a given year was a Democrat, I coded it accordingly as 1; if they were a Republican, they were coded as 0. This will allow my model to observe whether or not the president's party matters in the outcome of foreign policy-making. To my knowledge, this particular topic has not been researched fully in the literature to date – that is, the influence that the president's party plays in the passage of foreign policy. Most have looked at how successful presidents were in general, or how prominent elite party leaders in Congress were; few have researched my proposed route. I expect that if there is a Republican in office, there will be more foreign policies passed. I make this hypothesis based merely on party reputation:

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[1] Information is contained in the Appendix.

Republicans are widely seen as better on defense, war, and foreign affairs; Democrats, up until very recently, have been viewed as weak in those areas. As such, if there is a Republican in office, I expect that said president would be more active in the foreign affairs arena.

Is a Unified Government in Place? Taking into consideration institutional features, I employed another dummy variable to account for unified and split forms of government. More succinctly: if the president's party matched that of the House (that is, matched the majority party in the House) for a specific year, that particular observation was coded with a 1 (signifying yes); if the president's party did not match the majority party in the House, it was coded with a 0 (signifying no). Again, for the sake of full disclosure: I am only concerned with whether or not the president's party matched the majority party in the House, not the Senate. While this does introduce some bias, all but five of the twenty-three Congresses I observed were unified in both the House and the Senate, respectively. Notwithstanding this, I chose to include this variable because it would account for the various levels of obstruction presidents would be forced to work with in their term(s). What to say about having the same party in both executive and legislative positions? Certainly, if the literature is correct, it would not seem to matter whether or not the House and the presidency were unified in a given year – the president would still get his way, at least with regard to foreign policy enterprises. This research aims to see if uniformity matters in the passage of foreign policies. I expect that if there is uniform government in place, more foreign policies will be passed – after all, if there is unified government, there is little to stop a party from passing legislation.

Results

It should first be noted that all of my variables, with the exception of uniformity, are statistically significant at .01 or less. This is telling for a number of reasons, the first of which is

simple: it does not seem to matter whether or not the majority party in the House matches the party of the president – theoretically, this could be indicative of the fact that presidents seem to get whatever they want most of the time, with regard to foreign policy pursuits. Statistically, it does not make a difference if a Republican president must work with a Democratic House, or vice versa – foreign policies still get passed. Figure 1 shows the distribution of foreign policies passed over time. As the histogram shows, there are a wide variety of foreign policies passed over the course of 1963-2008 – in fact, on the whole, congress passes between 5-15 foreign policies per year, and often exceed that (the next highest range is between 25-30). What the histogram does not tell us, though, is how each of the independent variables in the model influences the passage of foreign policies. In what follows, I will explain just that.

FIGURE 1

TABLE 1. POISSON REGRESSIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICIES PASSED

VARIABLES	Model 1 *Poisson*	COEFFICIENTS Model 2 *Poisson w/ IRR*
Mentions in *NY Times*	0.000425***	1.000425***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
President's Approval Rating	0.0147***	1.014823***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
President's Party	0.304**	1.355009**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Uniformity	-0.0654	.9366716
	(0.452)	(0.452)
_cons	1.663***	5.272805***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	36	36
pseudo R^2	0.114	0.114

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 1 above gives the outputs for both a regular Poisson regression (model 1), and a

Poisson regression using Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) (model 2). I chose to include the IRR

model for ease of interpretability – the IRR simply exponentiates the Poisson regression

coefficients to give the incidence rate ratio, which can be more easily understood (Annotated

Stata Output). In terms of the number of mentions in the *New York Times*, it follows that,

holding all else constant, a one-unit increase in the number of times the *Times* mentions "foreign

policy" leads to an expected increase in the number of foreign policies passed by a factor of

1.0004. In other words, each time the *New York Times* mentions "foreign policy" corresponds to

an increase of 1.0004 times the number of foreign policies passed (or .04%). While the overall

rate is not striking, it does indicate that media saliency (and thus, public perception) plays a role

in the passage of foreign policies, at least marginally. We can reasonably expect, then, that as the media covers foreign affairs more, there is a slight up tick in the number of policies passed. It could stand to reason, however, that this is only possible because as conflicts emerge, there is more of a necessity for policies to be passed. Thus, if there is more conflict, there will be more foreign policy legislation. I should mention here: although it would make sense to include a variable indicative of conflict, I chose to exclude it from my model due to the possibility of collinearity with my *New York Times* variable – that is, it would seem that the two are highly collinear: as the *Times* increases their mentions of foreign policy, there is likely to be conflict. It is indeed for this reason that I have excluded it from my model. Perhaps future research can find a way to code a conflict variable appropriately within the constructs of a similar model.

The variable for presidential approval rating contains important results. Holding all else constant, a one-unit increase in a president's approval rating corresponds with an increase in foreign policies passed by a factor of approximately 1.015. Thus, as presidents grow more popular, they pass more foreign policies (holding all else constant, at a rate of 1.015 times greater). This is important knowledge for political studies: if presidents are popular, they will pass more foreign policies. None of the literature to date, to this researcher's knowledge, has tested for this – most focus on *major* foreign policy legislations. Here, it is evident that, at least from 1963-2008, popularity played a dynamic role in the passage of foreign policies. To put this evidence into perspective, consider this: if a president increases his popularity from 40 to 41%, we can anticipate a rate increase of foreign policies passed of approximately 1.015 (1.5% more), holding all else constant. Little needs to be said to gather a more complex picture about the passage of foreign policies during a time of war, conflict, or terror, when presidents typically have an upswing in approval ratings (Mueller, 1970, 1973).

Recall now that my original predictions about the signs on the coefficients have all been correct – except for the variable denoting a president's party. Originally, I predicted that Democratic presidents would pass a smaller number of foreign policies than their Republican counterparts; on the contrary, Democrats pass more foreign policies than Republicans. In fact, if a Democrat is president, holding all else constant, we can expect an increase in foreign policies at a rate of 1.355 times higher than his Republican counterpart. In other words, if a Democrat is in office, he is expected to pass foreign policies at a factor of 1.355 times higher than his Republican counterpart (approximately 36% more). This finding goes against popular perception, which holds that Republicans are more active in the foreign affairs arena. Again, it should be noted: this model is specifically designed to gather a more complete understanding of all foreign policies passed over a thirty-five year period – I am not interested in major conflicts, or what is considered major legislations; rather, I am interested in understanding the number of foreign policies passed over a given year. As such, this model holds that, all else remaining constant, Democratic presidents pass a larger sum of foreign policies.

Still, it should be noted that Republicans have held the executive office more than, and for a longer period than Democrats. This could account for some of the skewedness in the data, but it still remains statistically significant that Democrats, by and large, turn out more foreign policies than their Republican counterparts. One alternative reasoning for this finding could be this: with Democrats controlling the House for the good part of this study's time series, they almost always faced a unified situation – with the exception of the Clinton administration from 1994-2000 – and as such, were able to pass more foreign policies, without much interference from their Republican colleagues. If this is the case, future research should look toward the Senate, which had a higher degree of variation during the given time period and thus might

provide further insight – how do these findings hold up if the major point of interest is the Senate, rather than the House?

Conclusion

The results from the analyses conducted here suggest that, although the president must battle with Congress to pass any type of legislation, he is certainly aided by increased popularity, media saliency and public perception, and if he's a Democrat, his party. What's more, it seems that, regardless of the situation, a president will still pass foreign policy legislation (see Figure 1) – this could perhaps be indicative of the notion that, by and large, presidents will get their way on foreign affairs. Whatever the case, foreign policies will continue to be passed, but the research done here suggest that it is helpful to have certain criteria in a president's favor. That is, if the president is popular, and if the media portrays foreign affairs in a salient fashion, more foreign policies are likely to be passed. What is more, if the president is a Democrat, more will likely be done.

Yet, one issue that a reader may pose with regard to this study may be this: how reliable are the results proffered, given the small sample size? My answer is simple: given the nature of rare events, and that of time series data concerning rare events and count dependent variables, I suggest that my results are quite robust. Given the fact that a Poisson analysis was used to estimate expected outcomes, rather than an OLS regression, which would have rendered inaccurate, inconsistent, inefficient, and biased results, the given results are consistent, even given the sample. That is not to say that future research should not look to implement more observations into the dataset. In fact, even though the passage of foreign policy prior to 1963 may have been relatively sparse, more can be learned by implementing said data. Future research should thus look to expand the limits of this study.

Although the research conducted in this paper is only concerned with what impacts the passage of *all* foreign policies, there are boundlessly more studies that can stem from this – for instance, what is the role of conflict? Being that this study did not code for said variable (for reasons previously explained), future research can investigate conflict more thoroughly in the context of *all* foreign policies passed over a given time period. Further, others can study the impact of presidential position taking – how would position taking influence the possibility of a foreign policy being passed? Likewise, other scholars can study the impact of uniformity in both the House and the Senate on the passage of foreign policies (this study looked only at the impact of the House). How would a unified Congress (both the House and the Senate) alter the passage of foreign policies over time? Would it?

In any case, this research provides a good point of reference to the study of the interaction between Congress and the president in the foreign affairs arena. More specifically, this paper, if only vaguely, reinforces Wildavsky's famous two presidencies claim, especially if a president can remain popular and have a relatively high level of media saliency on his side (and especially if he is a Democrat). Moreover, it seems to remain true: because presidents have been granted almost unrestricted levels of authority over foreign policy (Hinckley, 1994), regardless of the party in power in the House, the president will get foreign policies passed.

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Appendix

Year	FPPASSED	MENNYTIMES	PZAPPROV	PRESPTY	PRESPARTYMATCH
1973	11	340	41.8	0	0
1974	8	368	25.71	0	0
1975	7	386	42.95	0	0
1976	10	477	47.55	0	0
1977	9	255	62.46	1	1
1978	17	227	45.6	1	1
1979	12	242	37	1	1
1980	24	1167	40.65	1	1
1981	5	1694	57.53	0	0
1982	14	1526	43.79	0	0
1983	21	1292	43.86	0	0
1984	24	1676	55.29	0	0
1985	25	1316	60.33	0	0
1986	15	1560	60.62	0	0
1987	20	1583	48.18	0	0
1988	36	1484	51.88	0	0
1989	16	1111	63.35	0	0
1990	37	965	66	0	0
1991	19	925	71.77	0	0
1992	34	1031	40.04	0	0
1993	27	885	47.61	1	1
1994	8	894	47.75	1	1
1995	15	756	47.75	1	1
1996	23	779	54.31	1	0
1997	5	750	58.3	1	0
1998	36	734	63.42	1	0
1999	26	916	60.49	1	0
2000	44	986	60.13	1	0
2001	11	892	70.17	0	1
2002	30	1065	68.29	0	1
2003	12	1102	58.64	0	1
2004	28	1155	49.16	0	1
2005	28	859	44.85	0	1
2006	7	1064	37.8	0	1
2007	4	921	32.97	0	0
2008	8	1126	28.36	0	0

```
. poisson fppassed $xlist

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.56816
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -168.56801
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -168.56801

Poisson regression                              Number of obs   =         36
                                                LR chi2(4)      =      43.55
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -168.56801                     Pseudo R2       =     0.1144

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       fppassed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
     mennytimes |   .0004249   .0001175     3.62   0.000     .0001946    .0006552
       pzapprov |   .0147138   .0036286     4.05   0.000     .0076018    .0218258
        prespty |   .3038081   .0933802     3.25   0.001     .1207862      .48683
 prespartymatch |  -.0654226   .0870122    -0.75   0.452    -.2359633    .1051182
          _cons |   1.662563   .2319809     7.17   0.000     1.207888    2.117237
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. poisson fppassed mennytimes pzapprov prespty prespartymatch, irr

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.56816
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -168.56801
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -168.56801

Poisson regression                              Number of obs   =         36
                                                LR chi2(4)      =      43.55
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -168.56801                     Pseudo R2       =     0.1144

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       fppassed |        IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
     mennytimes |   1.000425   .0001176     3.62   0.000     1.000195    1.000655
       pzapprov |   1.014823   .0036824     4.05   0.000     1.007631    1.022066
        prespty |   1.355009   .1265311     3.25   0.001     1.128384     1.62715
 prespartymatch |   .9366716   .0815018    -0.75   0.452     .7898096    1.110842
          _cons |   5.272805    1.22319     7.17   0.000     3.346411    8.308148
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```