Non-Violent Resistance Campaigns – A Temporal Examination

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Abstract.
Are nonviolent resistance campaigns temporally durable? This paper extends on nonviolent resistance literature, arguing that while such campaigns do achieve in the moment success in terms of campaign objective achievement, NVRCs do not sustain long-term success. Specifically, if a campaign utilizes nonviolent resistance means and encounters state-sponsored repression, whatever success it achieves in the moment, will not last in the long-term. This paper explores this theory through a mixed-method approach, utilizing both comparative case analysis and statistical analysis. Through analyzing Lebanon and Nepal's NVRCs in 2005 and 2006 respectively, I find that both campaigns did not sustain long-term success and even had increased protest activity later on, with similar if not identical grievances protested ten years post-initial campaign success. Future iterations will explore the degree to which repression will affect long-term NVRC success, expand the scope coverage, and consider spatial element effects.

Keywords: Nonviolent Resistance · Protest · Social Movements · Repression · Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns.

1   Introduction

In 1913, the Suffrage Parade revealed over five-thousand women marching for the right to equal political participation [51]. In 1930, Mahatma Gandhi directed a peaceful demonstration against certain British laws that hindered the civil liberties of Indian peoples. In 1986, millions of Filipino citizens peacefully protested against their tyrannical regime. With each case, peaceful and nonviolent civilian resistance has proven to achieve tangible and radical political, social, and economic reform [9]. These narratives – and so much more like them – provide opportunities for interesting empirical puzzles [1, 5, 9, 23, 24, 29, 46, 47]. Consider Chenoweth Orion (2013) and their Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, where 323 instances of violent and nonviolent resistance from 1900 and 2006 are accounted for. Among these accounted instances are "over one hundred major nonviolent campaigns . . . whose frequency has increased over time" [9]. The authors claim that in addition to this identified frequency, the "success rates of nonviolent campaigns have [also] increased" [9]. This statement provides a unique opportunity to study the temporality of these 'success stories'; that is, the long-term implications of the nonviolent resistance campaign (NVRC) achievements. For example, if two campaigns of nonviolent resistance are examined – with countries that are politically, economically, and socially diverse – are their successes temporally durable? Thus, this paper's research question examines whether the successes of nonviolent campaigns can be sustained long-term.

Why is it important to look at the long-term impact of cases? These cases – and others like them – form the basis for theoretical frameworks, research analyses, and policy formulations and implementations. To put it simply, if a success case has no long-term longevity, then any findings and deductions made from this case will be temporally limited and therefore may not provide accurate conceptualization and operationalization of the phenomena at hand. Further, it may create issues of analysis validity, sensitivity, and robustness. In order to conceptualize and analyze the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance campaigns, this paper will use Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) article to conduct a small-N analysis of two case studies– that are significantly different from one another in terms of their political, economic, and social structure – for a comparative analysis. These cases are Lebanon and Nepal.

In March 2005, an estimated one million Lebanese citizens took to the streets of Beirut to peacefully demonstrate for a free and independent Lebanon [23]. Commonly referred to as the Cedar Revolution, this nonviolent campaign of resistance was unprecedented in Lebanese history [23]. Its initiation was a culmination of several factors; present anti-Syrian sentiment, opposition to a recent constitutional amendment that extended the Lebanese President's term by three additional years; and most importantly, the assassination of the former Prime Minister. What started as a fairly small protest that was fumed by such grievances, developed into a larger-scale movement that called for state-wide policy and institutional change, and the removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. What followed was the complete withdrawal of Syrian troops by the end of April 2005 [25], the creation of a commission to investigate the Prime Minister's assassination, and a broad triumph for anti-Syrian proponents in the parliamentary elections of May-June of 2005.

Comparatively in another region, April 2006 commemorates a relatively significant turning point in Nepal's political history [47]. The Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPNM) had previously launched a decade-long (1996 to 2006) violent resistance against the monarchy that resulted in at least 13,000 people killed and 200,000 internally displaced peoples [32]. In 2002, the entire royal family was assassinated, leading to the crowning of Prince Gyanendra, who would later on dissolve the elected parliament of the time and assume a more centralized role within the state. It was during this political crisis that thousands of people [7] took to the streets in 2006 in order to carry out a nonviolent campaign of resistance against the tyrannical leader and the royal regime. This campaign – later referred to as the April Uprising, was a movement that united the Nepalese against the monarchy. Despite the extreme repression shelled out by the King and the state security forces, the nonviolent resistance proved successful when the King abdicated his thrown, reinstated the previously-dissolved parliament, and allocated state power to elected representatives [44].

As the sub-field of nonviolent resistance grows, scholarship is increasingly focusing on the effectiveness of nonviolent civil resistance, both in its capacity to prevent future conflicts and as a tool of political, economic, and social change. Nonviolent resistance works, we have seen its effectiveness in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution, The April Uprisings of Nepal, the Cedar Revolution of Lebanon, and to some extent, the Arab Spring in its initial formulations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. From the years 2000 to 2006, organized civilians efficiently employing nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, and boycotts in cases such as Serbia, Georgia, Lebanon, Nepal, and Madagascar to name the least [46]. The "success" of these cases is particularly interesting as each case is unique in its campaign goals, size, target, and method. For example, while Lebanon and Nepal both em-

ployed nonviolent tactics of resistance, and both achieved [relative] success in their campaign goals, Lebanon has – and continues to – experience subsequent political, economic, and social turbulence. Accordingly, are the successes of nonviolent campaigns sustained long term?

With Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) article, I identify two issues at hand. First, while the paper provided in depth and detailed examinations of the selected case studies, the authors failed to consider and account for the temporality variable. That is, are their findings relevant when applied to the same countries in today's international landscape? Second, how would their temporality issue(s) effect the derived policy implications? In utilizing the comparative method and a most-different systems design (MDSD) for the examination of the two stated case studies, I will be able to ascertain a broader and interpretive understanding of the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance and accordingly, a better understanding of the robustness of Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) article findings. This study is theoretically driven by a key variable, repression. I argue that there is both a direct and indirect causal linkage between NVRCs and repression, and that while existence of state repression fuels in-the-moment campaign goal success, repression does not yield long-term success. Rather, I argue that repression will lead to an increase in future protest activity. This paper finds support for the temporality argument, both Nepal and Lebanon show that NVRC success is not sustained long-term.

2 Literature Review

2.1 *Revolutions and Resistance*

Revolts are as old as time. All throughout history, we can observe occurrences of popular uprisings whose aim(s) varied from the acquisition and assumption of power to dismantling corruptive regimes that obscured civil liberties. Revolutions and campaigns of resistance have occurred all over the world; with historical, economic, sociological, and political disciplines covering a multitude of causal and correlative factors that attempt to explain the phenomena of revolutions and resistance movements. Current scholarship envelopes a variety of theoretical elements such as military might and its effect on revolution success [50], with the finding that the more military capabilities a state has, the more likely the revolution will be hindered; anti-communist revolutions and their impact on soviet countries [39], with the author arguing that because of the paternalistic nature of the USSR revolutions were inevitable in former soviet nations; technological revolutions and their effect on cultural histories [45], with Slauter (2010) examining the effect of social media on revolutionary success and arguing how that in turn shapes the cultural history of the revolting state; and spontaneous vs. planned revolutions [49], with planned revolutions concluded to be more likely to succeed, to name a few examples.

Across discourses, a myriad of conceptualizations and operationalizations for revolutions and resistance exist. Hollander Einwohner (2004) detail the core elements of revolution and resistance; Roberts (1991) argues how resistance is rooted in everyday grievances, and finds support in specific case studies; Lahiri-Dutt (2003) contends four elements that point to 'authentic' resistance and examines well-known resistance campaigns to test the elements' validity; and Davies (1962) adopts a Marxist explanation for why revolutions occur, with the finding that revolution-prediction is still out of reach within academia. Similar to many social science concepts, revolutions, and resistance – resistance in particular – typology has

little consensus regarding definition. This allows for a wider-scope application of cases but also limits the circumstances through which specific phenomenon can be examined to the warranted extent. Scholars utilize the term resistance to many behaviors, actions, and events in numerous geographical locations and political systems.

2.2   *Nonviolent Resistance Movements and Campaigns*

Throughout history there have been numerous instances of civilian-based resistance movements that call for social, economic, and political justice without the use of violence. With the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Colors Revolutions in former Soviet Union countries; and most recently, anti-austerity protests in Europe, scholarly interest in nonviolent resistance movements has risen. Then again, this interest still shadows prevailing literature and academic interest in violent resistance movements and war. Put differently, notwithstanding the expanding interest, academic study of nonviolent resistance remains quite new and under-explored. Therefore, current empirical and theoretical knowledge on the topic of is within its early stages of growth. With this in mind, there are numerous works that have generated and supplied grounded theoretical assertions regarding topics such as: the factors that influence the trajectories of nonviolent resistance [30], with the author finding that security-force defections were important for movement success; the strategy behind nonviolent campaigns [13], with Cunningham (2013) finding campaigns to be more likely to occur when self-determination groups are smaller and are continuously excluded from political power ; structural conditions of nonviolent uprisings [11], with the finding that nonviolent campaigns are more structurally sound than their violent counterparts and therefore more likely to succeed; the dynamics of civil resistance [14, 40, 10]; and the methods of nonviolent action [28, 22, 34].

Although the systematic examination of nonviolent resistance movements is not novel [2, 40, 42, 43], Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) findings are pivotal in the understanding of nonviolent campaigns, specifically, the discovery that nonviolent protest campaigns – major ones in particular – are found to be more successful than their conventionally violent counterparts. This revelation in academe has – and continues to – lead to new perspectives into how nonviolent mass protest activities and social movements achieve their objectives.

3   Theory and Hypothesis

Are the successes of nonviolent resistance campaigns (NVRCs) sustained in the long run? I argue that repression is a key variable to determining the likelihood of long-term success for NVRCs. Specifically, if NVRCs experience repression byway of the state, then the country risks experiencing increased protests activity in the years following the original NVRC. Existing scholarship has discovered the presence of a reciprocal relationship between repression and protests [1] [6, 35]. Governments utilize repression as a strategic tool to quash dissent and protest [35]. Moreover, repression has been found to have both an indirect and direct negative effect on protest activities and campaigns [6, 11, 35]. This line of thinking is established because repression is interpreted as a cost by protest activists and engagers [33]. Further

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[1] *Protests* refers to violent resistance campaigns.

literature explores what is considered a dynamic relationship between protest and repression, with a focus on comparative analysis of democratic and nondemocratic states [6, 15]. This reciprocal relationship is limited to protests as there is a lack of scholarship regarding the consideration of nonviolent resistance campaigns. I argue that the direct and indirect causal linkage established with protest and repression can be replicated with NVRCs. Furthermore, this linkage explains why some campaigns were either successful or unsuccessful when their success was examined years post-initial success. To determine whether NVRCs are successful or unsuccessful in the long term, I look to whether the country experienced an increase in protest activity years after the initial campaign occurred and considered to have succeeded in their objective obtainment. See *figure 1.*


Fig. 1: Theoretical framework illustration

Hypothesis 1: Nonviolent resistance campaigns that experience state-repression are less likely to have long-term success

Recall the Nepalese 1996-2006 conflict, protesters were subjected to detention and state security forces utilized excessive force to disperse protest activities [22]. Followingly, reports of gender-based, indigenous peoples, discrimination, torture and illegal detainment, disappearances, and forced interrogations emerged (Amnesty International, 2006). Survey of present literature has argued that when faced with state repression, protest campaigns will become re-energized with their commitment to their cause because they belief that if issues they are protesting against, are left unprotested things will only become worse. Therefore, they must continue with protesting, when this happens said campaigns are likely to receive concessions or complete achievement of their objectives. As the literature has established, there is a relationship – both direct and indirect – between protests and repression. Additionally, Chenoweth Stephan (2011) have found that when NVRCs experienced repression, the campaigns succeeded; thus, inferring that repression experience leads to NVRC success. However, does this success withstand the test of time? I explore this inquiry in this paper by applying the repression term to NVRCs with my case studies and argue that while repression may fuel in-the-moment success, it does not fuel long-term success.

4   Research Design

The research goal of this paper is to determine whether the successes of NVRCs [2] are sustained long-term. To evaluate this goal, I utilize a comparative case study design. Case selection was carried out through a Most-Different Systems Design (MDSD), where the cases are different on specified variables other than the causal factor of this paper's theoretical interest [4, 27, 41].

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[2] Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns

	Lebanon	**Nepal**
Geographical Region	Middle East	Southern Asia
Regime Type	Parliamentary Democratic Republic	Autocracy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	21.5 million USD	9.044 billion USD
Conflict Type	Independence Revolution	Civil War
Campaign Goal	Regime Change	Policy Change
Resistance Method	Nonviolent Resistance	Nonviolent Resistance

Table 1: Logical structure of MDSD case selection between Lebanon and Nepal. Retrieved from NAVCO dataset (version 2.0).

Table 1 observes two countries that are different on all variables with the exception of one; the original resistance method employed to carry out campaign objectives. Both countries employed nonviolent means to carry out regime and policy changes respectively. Henceforth, a qualitative comparative case study of Lebanon and Nepal will be employed to explore the independent and dependent variables.

4.1   Independent and Dependent Variables

The independent variable is a successful nonviolent resistance campaign. For a campaign to be considered a "success", I utilize Stephan Chenoweth's (2008) definition where the campaign must meet two criterion: (i) campaign objective must be fulfilled within two years from the end of the campaign; and (ii) campaign must have had an effect on the outcome. The dependent variable is protest activities that occur after initial campaign achieved success. I measure protest occurrence post-initial campaign by using the Mass Mobilization Data Project (MM dataset) [12] which tracks protest actions and provides data descriptions for protest activities carried out against state governments. Control variables that were selected are: geographical region; regime type; Gross Domestic Product (GDP); conflict type; and original campaign goal(s).

4.2   Additional Variables

I look to Change in goals and whether a campaign has altered or shifted its original objectives within a calendar year. Progress and whether the campaign in question has managed to achieve some or all of its originally stated political objectives. Protest demands to examine whether there is a trend in campaign demands made throughout the temporal scope, and whether the same demands resurface years after initial success. State response looks at the actions taken by the state in response to the NVRCs. Protestors' Identity looks to the identity of the group or organization involved in the NVRC. Finally, Repression looks at whether the state actor repressed the campaign or campaign activities [8]. Repression is the causal mechanism, so its presence in both campaigns is key to this paper's theoretical inferences. Table 2 summarizes the initial findings for these variables.

	Lebanon	**Nepal**
Primary Method of Resistance	Nonviolent Resistance	Nonviolent Resistance
Camp Goals	Regime Change	Policy Change
Change in Goals	No change	Change
Progress	Complete Success	Significant Concessions Achieved
Repression	Mild Repression	Extreme Repression

Table 2: - Initial variable findings between Lebanon and Nepal. Retrieved from NAVCO dataset (version 2.0).

4.3   Variable Measurement

The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) [3] is used for data collection and analysis. This project gathers systematic data on violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns and provides global coverage of resistance campaigns [4]. The version of the dataset utilized for this project covers 250 violent and nonviolent campaigns with a temporal scope of 1945 to 2006 (Chenoweth Orion, 2013). The temporal scope for this analysis will be 2005 to 2019. Scope is established to consider the initial campaign occurrence and its peak success – the years 2005 for Lebanon and 2006 for Nepal. To evaluate my dependent variable, I look to the Mass Mobilization Data Project (MM dataset) [5] . The dataset tracks protest-country-year observations where protest occurrence is coded individually within each country and year. The MM project also tracks protest demands, government response to campaigns, and protest targets. This dataset accounts for all 162 countries and has a temporal scope of 1990 to 2021.

4.4   Hypothesis Testing

To evaluate this paper's hypothesis, I employ a mixed-method approach. I will qualitatively pursue a critical comparative case analysis of Lebanon and Nepal through an MD systems design. I compare the dynamics and outcomes of the NVRCs in each country from 2005 through 2019. Both countries' campaigns were considered successes during their respective peak years; however, the variables detailed will allow a closer look into the degree of success initially achieved, and whether the causal mechanism rings true in its effect on long-term success. Then, I will supplement the qualitative findings with a quantitative statistical analysis. Specifically, I will examine the correlation between: (a) repression and campaign success; (b) repression and campaign goal change; and (c) campaign goal change and campaign success. For success, I look to the peak campaign success, which was during 2005 for Lebanon and 2006 for Nepal. I will then test the significance of the correlation – if one exists – to determine the probability of the correlative relationship being a real one and not a chance occurrence.

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[3] Version 2.0 is used for this paper
[4] Does not include maximalist campaigns
[5] Version 2021 is used for this paper

5   Results

5.1   Protest Occurrence

Figure 2 displays and tracks the total number of protests observed in both countries throughout the temporal scope. Looking to the total number of protests observed per year, we notice Lebanon and Nepal exhibit starkly different experiences ten years post original NVRC. Lebanon's protest experience was sparse until the year 2019. After an initial decline after the success of the Cedar Revolution in 2006, the country did not exhibit significant protest activity or social movements presence for ten years until 2019, where a significant jump of sixty-two protests were held during that one year. The 17 October Revolution accounts for that jump. This movement was series of national protests that were triggered by and condemned increases in tax, gasoline, tobacco and Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIP) [38, 19]. The protests quite rapidly evolved throughout the year to protest sectarian rule, unemployment and economic stagnation, and endemic state corruption [31, 48, 26].


Fig. 2: Protest Occurrence

Similarly, Nepal shows a decrease in protest activity post NVRC success in 2007, it hits a high of eighteen protests during 2015 but then decreases afterwards once again. A blockade,

and economic, and humanitarian crises triggered the 2015 protests [21, 36]. Concerns regarding statehood demands by an ethnic minority group that had the backing of India [16], accusations regarding the ethnic marginalization of the Nepalese constitution [3], cascading shortages of hard currency and basic goods [18];and the post-earthquake vulnerabilities.

5.2 Protest Demands

Fig. 3: Protester Demands

Figure 3 looks to the protest demands made by campaigns over the years, both Lebanon and Nepal had similar concerns with regards to the political behaviors and processes of the incumbent government. This is the Mass Mobilization dataset's broadest category because it encompasses a multitude of political processes that (a) defines who rules and how they rule; (b) who can participate in electoral processes and decisions; and (c) he overall decisions made by regime leaders that have an effect on a variety of political and economic outcomes ranging from domestic subsidies to foreign affairs policies (Clark Regan, 2021). Nepal's second highest protest demand was regarding the removal of a reviled or corrupt political individual and its third highest demand was over tax increases and subsidies such as the

cost of food, utilities, and other living expenses. Lebanon's second demand was where the people had demands against state labor conditions or wage rates such as labor safety and working hours and rates policies. The country's third highest protest demand was over the removal of a political individual over concerns of corruption.


Fig. 4: Initial Campaign Demands

Both countries expressed the same campaign demands made during the first campaign year – in fact both campaigns expressed political behavior/processes as the primary campaign objective. In 2006 of the total protests held in Nepal, seventy-eight percent of protests expressed political behavior and/or processes as their goal. During 2005, one hundred percent of Lebanon's protests expressed political behavior and/or processes as their primary and only objective. With *figure 4*, the frequency of the most protest demand categories can be observed. Accordingly, through the progression of protest activities through the temporal scope, it can be seen that both countries' protest demands diversified over the years and grew to encompass some – if not all – the categories. However, the initial campaign goals for both countries remain to be the most frequent demand more than ten years later.

5.3   State Response

Fig. 5: State Response to Protests, 2005 to 2020

State actions or inactions taken in response to protest activities is tracked in *figure 5* for both countries, tracked from 2005 to 2019. When it comes to protest activities and social movements, governments will often respond in a multitude of ways, Clark Regan's (2021) seven categories is used to differentiate between the different regime responses in both countries. With Lebanon, over seventy percent of responses were crowd dispersal. That is, the majority of state responses to protest in the country were attempts made to mobilize the protestors away from their campaign location, break up the gatherings – short of violent means. This response includes the issuing of warnings, positioning state troops and physically moving protestors, and the deployment of tear gas. The second highest response category through the years is ignoring the protest activity. This can mean one of two things: (1) the state did not publicly react to the protest activity; or (2) the local, national, and international media sources ignored the state response [12]. With Nepal, a less obvious observation is detected. State response seemingly varied across all categories, with over thirty percent of responses were the state ignoring the protest activities in question. The second highest was crowd dispersal; interestingly, a one percent difference between killings and/or shootings as well as

arrests and/or beatings responses is observed.

5.4   Protesters' Identity

With *figure 6*, the specific name or identity of the group that either joined or organized the protest is tracked. Identities are tracked from 2005 through 2019, to examine whether one group or organization is involved in protest participation more than others. With Nepal's case, the Maoists – a political party in Nepal – are the most frequent group to protest through the years, with the group accounting for twenty-two percent of protest organization and presence. The group with the second largest presence is the Seven Main Political Parties – a coalition of seven political parties within the Nepalese government, they accounted for thirteen percent of protest organization and presence. Lebanon shoes regular protests are the majority protesting group throughout the years, with the group representing sixty-eight percent of protest organization and presence. With an eleven percent presence, Hizbullah is the second largest group in Lebanon to organize protest activities and engage in protest through the years.


Fig. 6: Nepal and Lebanon's Protester Identity

5.5   Correlation Tests

The second portion of the hypothesis testing was the correlative examination between: (i) repression and campaign success; (ii) repression and campaign goal change; and (iii) campaign goal change and campaign success.

Fig. 7: Correlation between Goals Change, Repression, and Success

For the goals change and repression as well as repression and success relationships, a negative correlation is examined. This means that there is no correlation between a campaign changing its goals and the state's repressive response; and there is no correlation between repression and a campaign's success. For goals changes and campaign success, a low degree of correlation is found, with a coefficient of 0.028 denoted. See *figure 7* for more details. It must be noted that these observations are restricted to this paper's case parameters, a future large-N study could shift the correlative findings in a more positive direction.

5.6   Case Analyses

When applied to both Nepal and Lebanon, the success attained through NVRCs was not temporally durable. Both countries still experienced protest activities in the years following the original campaigns. However, Nepal seems to have suffered from less protests than its Middle Eastern counterpart, with an eleven percent difference in protest occurrence. It must be noted, that both countries NVRCs were carried out with different objectives and arose in response to different catalysts. With the case of Nepal, the NVRC arose in response to its Monarchy's electoral overreach while Lebanon was protesting foreign presence and electoral corruption.

At the time of Lebanon's campaign, Chenoweth Shay (2019) observe the opposition campaign to have experienced "mild repression", which entails the exercise of violent or physical action conducted by the state against the campaign with the goal of coercion. Additionally, campaign members would have experienced harassment and imprisonment; however, the state would not have the intention of killing or fatally harming anyone at this level. Although the state's response to the revolutionary campaign was concessionary, the country faced consistent state repression in the years after. Specifically, Lebanese citizens experienced extensive imprisonment, executions, brutality, as well as unlimited and unlawful detentions, at the hands of the state [17] ten years after the Cedar Revolution.

Nepal's NVRC was observed to have undergone "extreme repression" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019), with severe mass violence and killing taking place. When the campaign began, civil and political rights violations extended to the entire population and no longer limited to the protestors. Occurrences such as disappearances, torture, and murder were common and the overall level of terror within the country primarily affected those who were political involved [17]. However, with the following years, the level of political terror consistently decreased, with the lowest having been experienced in 2013. During that year, there was a limited amount of imprisonment of nonviolent protesters and torture/beatings occurred exceptionally. It is not until 2015 that repression and political terror started to increase once more but never to the same level that of the NVRC year [17].

5.7   Consideration for Crises

Two important events must be explored when interpreting the results of both countries in the years after their campaign successes: Lebanon's October Revolution and Nepal's earthquake disaster. Both are cases are starkly different, but they had similar effects; in that, both events triggered nonviolent – turned violent – protests in their respective countries. I examine these events effects and outcomes, and how they triggered and resulted in both nonviolent and violent protest resistance.

In 2015, a natural disaster struck central Nepal. An earthquake that resulted in over 8,000 deaths, more than 21,000 injured, and approximately 2 million internally displaced [20]. As a result of this event, healthcare; sanitation and hygiene issues and reconstruction challenges were unearthed. In addition to the economic and humanitarian evoked crises, concerns about the country's long-stalled constitution were a main issue for consideration. The constitution – which passed with over 90% of the electoral vote. However, concerns over how the legislation further marginalized ethnic groups within the country and how its passage further ignited tensions within the Nepalese diverse community, was a major protest issue during this time [37]. With the case of Lebanon, the 17 October protest is an ongoing protest that began in 2019 in Lebanon. This continuous NVRC protests austerity measures; political corruption; the liquidity crisis and economic recession; and rising unemployment (Report Syndication, 2019). Methods utilized are demonstration, sit-ins, barricades, and internet activism [38]. The protests created – and continue to pose – a political crisis for the country.

It must be addressed that the original objectives and concerns of both NVRCs did resurface post-original campaign occurrence. With the Nepal case, the constitutional reform issue was one of the main objectives of the 2006 campaign, its resurfacing ten years in the future exhibit that the objectives of the main campaign regarding efficacy and ethnic consideration were temporally addressed but not temporally sustained. Similarly with Lebanon, political corruption, economic and overall political unrest were the focus of the Cedar Revolution; however, these same issues resurfaced in present years and continue to pose issues for the stability of the country in the modern landscape. Note, that if not for Nepal's earthquake in 2015, it is plausible to assume that the protest decline would have continued. However, such theory will remain to be seen, as theoretical models cannot account for natural, humanitarian disasters such as Nepal's 2015 earthquake and Lebanon's Explosion of 2020.

6 Conclusion

This paper's objective is to determine whether the successes of NVRCs are temporally durable; specifically, whether the campaign success is sustained long-term. Nonviolent protest activities and their success-rate advantage over their violent counterparts forms the basis for theoretical frameworks within current and future scholarship, policy formulations and implementations. Expressly, cases that have been found successful but have no long-term longevity endanger the stemmed findings and deductions and will temporally limit any research analyses that result. What is the purpose of utilizing nonviolent means when the success attained is not sustained in the long run? To test this puzzle, I extend on Chenoweth Stephan's (2012) original scholarly contribution, and conduct a comparative case study. Both countries were selected through a MDSD where the cases were different on all variables except the independent variable. I utilized the NAVCO dataset to select two countries that were labelled as 'successful' NVRCs and employed the Mass Mobilization Project's dataset to test my dependent variable; that is, total number of protests held post initially coded NVRC success. Accordingly, I compared the dynamics and outcomes of the NVRCs for both countries from the years 2005 through 2019 utilizing a mixed-method approach. Finally, I looked to and tested for correlative relationships between some key variables.

Recall that this project looks to repression as a key variable when examining the long-term success for NVRCs. As with Chenoweth Stephan's (2011) study, campaigns that experienced state repression did end up succeeding as an immediate result; however, this paper extends on those findings by challenging the temporality of Chenoweth Stephan's study. I argue that as rational actors, when faced with repression, a campaign will alter its goals to avoid incurring further repression. Accordingly, they will recalculate their strategic plans and redevelop their movement's operations to better address the altered goals and their fulfillment. The case of Nepal and the People's Movement illustrates that.

This paper's main finding is that NVRCs that achieved success did not retain that success long-term. A limitation of this study is that it is only two countries and therefore the validity is restricted. Additionally, the results can be further explained in that both countries experienced completely different conflicts whose issues varied greatly – one was a civil war and the other was a fight against foreign presence, and electoral corruption. Additionally, both experienced varying degrees of repression. Further research could explore the degrees of repression that prompt long-term failure of NVRCs.

Chenoweth Shay (2019) contributed significantly to protest literature and the discipline when they proved that NVRC are more successful than their violent counterparts. This scholarly contributed was able to fill a noticeable gap within protest and peace literature; the investigation of the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent protest campaigns is explored with historical investigative case studies and statistical analyses. While Chenoweth Shay's (2019) finding is unobjectionable, this paper questions the temporality of Chenoweth's inferences; chiefly, while the NAVCO data considers all elements up until the success of the NVRC, this paper replicates and extends by looking at the campaign years after its success. Specifically, if the campaign achieved its original objectives, we assume that protests would decline moving forward. I find the opposite effect in that for both considered cases, protests not only remain present but also increased – dramatically in the

case of Lebanon.

Similar to the original Chenoweth Stephan (2011) article, there are several policy litera-
ture implications that can be derived from this paper's line of questioning. First, I concur
with the original statement that there is no blueprint for success. While both of these cases
were considered successful, findings point to a lack of temporal endurance when it comes
to campaign goal success. While nonviolent resistance campaigns remain to have a higher
success rate than their violent counterparts, the implications derived from this significant
result can be called into question seeing as how the success rate is not held long-term. Sec-
ond, with both examined cases, issue recurrence is prevalent with the modern NVRCs. Both
Nepal and Lebanon's modern protest activities and campaigns were objecting to similar if
not identical grievances that the original campaigns were dissenting against. In the case of
Nepal, the fairness and equity of the constitution was a primary concern for the protestors
while Lebanon primarily protested against economic and political exploitation and corrup-
tion. Further study needs to go into why such objectives were not realized long-term and
what policies and further actions could be taken to extend the durability of the objectives'
initial and long-term success. Finally, the role of repression with NVRCs needs to be further
explored and to a fuller extent. Significant portion of protest and dissent literature focuses
on the role of repression but with the sole scope of violent protests. More research needs to
go into the role of repression, how it effects the longevity of nonviolent campaign success,
and how repression plays a role in objective completion and issue eradication.

For the further improvement of this study, expanding the scope of this paper to include
multiple countries and not just a comparative case analysis is critical. This will increase
the validity and generalizability of the paper as it would be applied to other countries of
different conflicts with different historical causalities and institutional makeups. Addition-
ally, further exploration of the causal mechanism would need to be undertaken; specifically,
whether variables other than repression can be applied with similar results. Furthermore, the
analysis of social movements would need to be narrowed to established whether all involved
movements are the same. Finally, as this paper has argued; NVRCs have a temporality issue
and I would like to explore whether spatial elements also have an effect on the durability
and longevity of successful NVRCs.

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