Political Violence under the Domestic Democratic Peace: How Democratic Consolidation and Representation Curb Violent Challenges against the State

Konstantin Ash
University of California – San Diego
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Abstract

The role of representative democracy is underspecified in studies of political violence. Studies of terrorism and insurgency have promoted atomized explanations for the role of representation and democratic consolidation in either promoting or deterring each tactic. These explanations are contradictory and do not adequately consider the interrelated nature of tactics used by violent challengers to a state. I argue that challengers to a state are presented with an arsenal of possible tactics that include insurgency and terrorism and their use of either one or both is constrained by the strength of representative institutions and that these institutions also limit the scope and duration of ongoing campaigns of political violence. I design a statistical model to explicitly model the likelihood of transitioning both to and from different tactics of political violence in a given year by violent challengers to the state. I find that representative government limits groups to using terrorism, while political exclusion and a lack of political freedom lead to the use of insurgency. I also find that more features of representative government lead groups to transition from insurgency and to periods of non violence at higher rates.

Developed democracies, especially those in Western Europe and North America have experienced an unprecedented period of internal peace since the end of the Second World War. This internal peace has been characterized by an absence of any large-scale armed movement to overthrow an incumbent government or of any major repression against the population. At the same time, democracies, especially those in Western Europe and North America, have experienced frequent sustained campaigns of low-level clandestine violence – terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg 1994). While visible features, like regime type, are evidently driving this dichotomy, it is not clear what underlying factors lead to such a difference in national experiences with political violence. Why do developed democracies experience far more active terrorist movements and attacks than their autocratic counterparts? At the same time, why are insurgent groups that conduct organized armed rebellion, a more serious challenger, largely absent from these same developed democracies? In this paper, I examine whether there is a trade-off between the two phenomena and whether violent groups that have decided to turn to violence choose to employ terrorism more often when their country has the attributes of a consolidated representative democracy.

In order to test how groups respond to varying internal conditions, I model initiation of any form of political violence within a country as a choice faced by challengers to the state to either turn to violence through terrorist attacks, insurgency or to use both tactics interchangeably. I believe this approach is most appropriate for capturing the inception of a certain tactic as it explicitly models the transitions from peace to violence, between various types of violence and the return to peace instead of merely the incidence of political violence at a given time; presenting terrorism, insurgency and a mixture of the two as alternate choices for prospective

groups to take up when pursuing conflict. I combine this design with a disaggregation of representative democracy; breaking apart the concept into several indicators that are more apt to capture how different features of representative democracy affect the choice of tactics by violent group challengers. By virtue of this identification, I believe this paper's findings can improve the general understanding of political violence and, in particular, the motives of violent domestic challengers to the democratic state - connecting existing empirical findings to policy-relevant prescriptions.

One of the guiding theories behind the absence of repression in democracies is that of a domestic democratic peace. The domestic democratic peace identifies three mechanisms for the relatively pacific internal politics of developed democracies: (1) Democratic institutions increase the costs of repression, (2) individual citizens embrace values that are contrary to supporting repression and (3) democratic contestation reduces the likelihood of conflict and facilitates the conveyance of grievances (Davenport 2007). I focus on the third point as a mechanism that not only prevents repression by the government, but also provides citizens with incentives against a violent challenge of the state. As such, I believe that states with a longer history of democratic contestation, legitimately chosen leaders and a representation for all major political groups can successfully deter most citizens from mobilizing to overthrow the existing political order. Nevertheless, these features cannot deter all individuals within a country, who, due to a lack of recruits and capacity to organize an armed rebellion turn to terrorist tactics. I test this proposition by looking at the likelihood that a potentially violent movement transitions to using either terrorism, insurgency or both in a given year. I find that challengers in countries with leaders who gained power through legitimate means and who have a longer experience with democracy

are more likely to employ terrorism. On the other hand, challengers that represent more politically excluded groups in countries that have lower media freedom are more likely to use insurgency. Taken together, these findings confirm a divergence between the use of terrorism and insurgency along the lines of democratic institutions.

The rest of this paper is divided into five parts. First, I bridge several different lines of scholarship on political violence and democracy, identifying where my contribution can improve both theoretical and empirical understanding of both subjects. Second, I outline a theory on tactical selection by violent challengers to the state that explains the choice faced by challengers to any state and how that choice is affected by the presence of representative institutions. Third, I explain the sources for my data and my statistical model: a multinomial logit application of a first-order Markov transition model. Fourth, I present results from analyzing that data with my statistical model and a few extensions using the same data. In the final section, I interpret the results and analyze their implications for future research.

Prior Work on Terrorism, Insurgency and Democracy

While they are seemingly interrelated concepts of political violence, terrorism and insurgency are usually examined separately, with few studies placing the two tactics on a larger spectrum of political violence. The definition for terrorism is traditionally nebulous,[1] generally distinguishable by symbolic low levels of violence, perpetrated by a clandestine organization to achieve political change (Crenshaw 1981). Terrorist attacks are not designed to maintain or establish control over territory for military purposes, nor are the targets usually of any military value (Merari 1993). Insurgents, like terrorists, still employ violence for political purposes, but are less constrained in their mobilization for violence. This increased mobilization makes

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1   Weinberg et. al. (2004) identified little overlap between definitions of terrorism used in academic articles.

insurgents capable of holding territory and prosecuting a sustained and organized armed movement that can challenge government forces directly (Sambanis 2008). Kalyvas' (2006) conceptualization of violence during civil wars implies a third category, which I fully distinguish from both terrorism and insurgency. Kalyvas argues that while insurgent groups use violence deliberately when holding or aiming to capture territory, insurgent groups resort to indiscriminate violence or terrorism against territories that are under full military control of the government. Adopting terrorism to compliment insurgency implies a third category of political violence; one where groups may engage in territorial conflicts in one part of a country, but use terrorist attacks to influence political opinions outside of that conflict zone. Examples of such groups abound, from Chechen rebels who used bombings and other attacks against Russian civilians in Moscow and across the North Caucasus region (Kramer 2005), to attacks on Turkey's wealthiest cities by the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK (Criss 1995). I expect that each of the choices to take up any of these three tactical categories will be influenced differently by representative features of democracy.

Democracy can also be defined in several ways. One tradition, stemming from Schumpeter (1950) and culminating in the work of Przeworski et al. (2000), distinguishes democracies from autocracies solely by the occurrence of regular competitive elections and alternation of power between political forces, essentially dichotomizing the concept. This definition does a disservice to the complexity of the concept of democracy. The apex of competition and representation can still be achieved while intrinsic features of democracy, such as the rights to free assembly or free press, are undermined or some groups are discriminated against by either being denied citizenship or political representation. Dahl's (1971)

conceptualization of democracy, which stresses variability in democratic systems along the competitive and representative lines is more amenable to this issue. In essence, Dahl requires that competition and full participation be reached before a state can achieve the ideal of polyarchy – functioning representative government for all residents of a country, while highlighting the role of intrinsic freedoms of association, press and speech in maintaining this ideal. Through this definition, the role of representation and participation for all individuals in a given country is enshrined into a definition, providing richness and variability to the concept of democracy.

Democracy and, more narrowly, political representation, has been applied to explaining political violence in several ways. Nevertheless, the ideas proposed by researchers of terrorism and insurgency often fail to take the overlap of the two concepts into account and are consequentially diametrically opposed to one another. For terrorism scholars, the empirical observation, initially anecdotal, that democracies experience substantially more pure terrorist movements is overpowering.[2] Justifications for this empirical regularity mostly argued that democratic governments were inherently weaker and thus harder-pressed to deter and eliminate terrorist groups (Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). Specifically, the civil liberties that formed necessary components of liberal democracies also limited the ability of democratic governments to deter terrorist movements. The tactics that were necessary to eliminate terrorism also compromised civil liberties and thus allowed terrorists to flourish in democracies. On the other hand, autocrats, who had a free hand at dealing with terrorism were better able to avoid it altogether (Enders and Sandler 2006).

The possibility that democracy itself was responsible for terrorism was attractive to those

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2   There are numerous examples, but key inferential results at the cross-country level include Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 2001), Li (2005), Clauset et al. (2007).

who advocated greater restrictions on civil liberties for the elimination of terrorism, but neglected the role that denial of civil liberties and representation play in inciting insurgent violence. Traditional theories of the roots of insurgency highlight political and economic deprivation as factors in both participation and initiation of political rebellion. Individuals and groups may observe the success of other groups and feel individual resentment that eventually coalesces into collective resentment against a rival group of individuals that is advantaged in both economic and political status (Gurr 1970). These tensions are particularly heightened in ethnically divided societies where one group is excluded from the political process and is simultaneously economically worse off, relative to other groups in the country (Horowitz 1985). This pattern of research extends to recent empirical work, as politically excluded (Cederman et al. 2010; 2011) and economically deprived (Ostby 2008) groups have been shown to have a higher propensity of engaging in civil war. However, these results represent a clash with explanations of terrorism in liberal democracies. If terrorism is a manifestation of the weakness of liberal political institutions, then why does the alternative to liberal democracy seem to produce more rebellion on a greater scope?

The argument that terrorism is negative consequence of democracy is a by-product of a lack of communication between scholars of terrorism and insurgency. These scholars treat their respective form of political violence of interest as a unique incidence of a phenomenon and not as part of wider array of tools used by like-minded individuals across a broad set of environments. This perspective produces arguments, such as that democratic institutions invited terrorism, that are mistaken in both their limited scope and their conceptualization of political violence. Terrorism is part of a larger arsenal available to violent actors that runs along a

spectrum of political violence, with insurgency operating along the same spectrum. In fact, the two phenomena can overlap, with insurgents in some countries committing high numbers of terrorist attacks against civilian targets while conducting military operations (Findley and Young 2012). It follows that treating terrorism and insurgency as choices in an arsenal of political violence allows for a more complete picture of the effects of both structural and situational features on those choices and on combating and eliminating political violence after it has begun. By explicitly modeling this choice in both a theoretical and statistical model, my study improves upon prior work on terrorism and insurgency, looking at a complete picture of political violence to trace its sources across both space and time.

Theory and Hypotheses

At the most fundamental level, I propose that there are always violent challengers to the authority of any state. The threshold for both rebellion and contention, as a whole, varies among individuals (Kuran 1991). Individuals may become radicalized against the government as a result of either perceived victimization or political grievances. They may ascribe to a larger cause, but commit violent acts alone – exemplified by Theodore Kaszynski - the Unabomber, John Allen Mohamed - the D.C. Sniper, or Norwegian mass murderer Hans Anders Brevik. In essence, while most individuals may not turn to radicalism as quickly as these few, the existence of lone radicals is largely unavoidable (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008) . Group radicalization occurs through a diverse set of pathways, from social networks that draw in individuals to a common violent cause (Peterson 2001), to social or material threats to an already a group in an already high state of cohesion (Horowitz 1985). Thus, while any state authority may be met with challenges, the veracity of those challenges can be mitigated by forces that undermine the mobilizational

capacity of violent groups.

Before addressing what forces undermine violent groups, it is necessary to explain what drives violent movements to organize successful armed uprisings against an existing political order. Economic deprivation, either of sub-national groups or social classes,[3] is seen as the primary driving factor for conflict inception. Nevertheless, this deprivation often has roots in political exclusion, itself tied closely to autocracy. Autocratic leaders do not hold power by way of regularly contested elections, instead ruling through two alternative mechanisms: repression and loyalty. Repression restricts the rights of citizens in autocracies, while loyalty is purchased through material benefits (Wintrobe 1998). Nevertheless, these material benefits are scarce and can only be afforded to a select few individuals and groups that are crucial for keeping autocratic leaders in power (Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003). As such, large portions of an autocratic country's population are not only deprived of political representation, but government provisions of public goods. Repression may be the ultimate equalizer as many autocratic states are capable of suppressing dissent through effective use of policing and rights violations that deter challengers. This is exemplified by the complex network of informants and strict controls on movement and expression established by Soviet authorities in both the USSR and across Eastern Europe before the fall of the Iron Curtain. By virtue of these controls, nascent anti-communist insurgencies in the Baltics, Ukraine and Hungary were swiftly suppressed after the end of the Second World War (Statiev 2010). Nevertheless, not all autocracies have the capacity to suppress potential dissent as effectively as authoritarian states.[4] In these cases, political and economic grievances by excluded sub-national groups and a less than absolute government capacity to

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3   i.e. tranditional arguments about revolution made by Moore (1966) and Skocpol (1979).
4   In fact, low state capacity has been linked to civil war incidence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Theis 2010).

repress mobilization are more likely to combine for a rebellion against the incumbent government.

There are several features of democracy that are able to mitigate both political and economic exclusion, while decreasing the likelihood of violent mobilization by large sub-national groups. Chief among these features is political representation. Political representation is a process that is unique to democratic states: voters in democracies elect representatives to legislative or executive bodies so that those representatives make policies that reflect the preferences of the voters. Although these policies will not ultimately reflect the will of all of the voters or event the voters that supported the representatives (Pitkin 1967), these same voters have the chance to hold their representatives accountable in further election cycles (Manin et. al. 1999). Representatives thus feel the need to both include their constituents in the political process and address their grievances in order to win re-election. The possibility for voters to affect the composition of government is a crucial feature of democracy and, over time, helps to engage more individuals and groups in the democratic process. Investment in the democratic process requires that groups abandon extra-democratic ambitions and recognize the legitimacy of democratic rule in exchange for the benefits of having some policies and some interests recognized by representative government. This process is termed democratic consolidation, or the point where all major political actors within a country abandon extra-democratic aspirations and make a binding commitment to democratic rule (Gunther et al. 1995).

The commitment to democracy not only cements representative government, but also hampers mobilization of sub-national groups toward political violence. Representative government makes individuals more likely to feel invested in the political process and connected

to their representatives, thus making it less likely for those individuals to join violent

movements. Moreover, major political actors, including minority groups find themselves in the

same position, with minority groups often receiving extra political rights and guarantees in

highly plural democracies with the express purpose of avoiding alienation and conflict (Lijphart

1977). It is at this point, where representative government is highly consolidated, the effect of the

domestic democratic peace become more clear. While Davenport primarily discusses the

relatively muted nature of political repression in developed democracies, the absence of

repression is vital for limiting political radicalism and support for anti-government violence.

Individuals who feel threatened or who strongly ascribe to a group that has felt repression are far

more likely to support instances of political violence by that group (Moskalenko and McCauley

2009). Thus, by eliminating potential sources of support for political violence, consolidated

democracies face a far more muted set of challengers than either semi-democratic or autocratic

states. Nevertheless, some challengers simply cannot accept the legitimacy of the political order

and turn to violence. However, given their limited mobilizational capacity, an insurgency is out

of the question. Even if hundreds or even thousands of individuals support the cause of

challengers to the state, far fewer are willing to take up arms in an insurgent campaign against

the government. Thus, challengers to consolidated democracies are left with terrorism - small-

scale clandestine attacks - as the only violent means to send their political message. Bombings,

assassinations or even hijackings are relatively simpler operations that can be executed with far

fewer costs than an armed campaign designed to wrest both territory and public support away

from the government. For instance, while Spain's Basque separatist group ETA (Basque

Fatherland and Freedom) never held any part of the Basque country through military force, their

repeated bombings and assassinations caused substantial economic and political disruption for decades after Spain had transitioned to democracy. While ETA had considerable support among the Basque population, insurgency was never in the realm of possibility. The Spanish military was far too capable and an armed movement may have compromised the political wing of the group, which operated nominally under the democratic process of the Basque regional government (Shabad and Llera 2001).

The role of the strength of the Spanish armed forces in shaping ETA's actions implies that military capability among democracies also plays a role in tactical choice among violent challengers. While terrorists are adept at hiding in plain sight from even the most well-trained and well-resourced militaries, insurgents thrive in environments where they can exploit the weaknesses of the government's armed forces. Chechen insurgents were especially adept at this practice for the duration of their insurgency, routinely bribing Russian officers and even purchasing weapons from the same soldiers they then fought on the battlefield (Bivens 1995). Corruption among a country's military force is endemic in autocratic states. Autocratic armies have worse morale and more likely to use arbitrary repression and are more likely to have competent military command structures and leaders (Reiter and Stam 2002). Weak military leadership is especially characteristic of autocratic states as autocrats frequently engage in 'coup-proofing,' - dividing and weakening the operational structure of their militaries to hamper potential coup plotters – a practice that weakens overall military effectiveness (Pilster and Bohmelt 2012). Autocracies also face far fewer incentives to maintain an effective and efficient military force than representative democracies. As mentioned before, democratic leaders are held accountable by voters who demand that their representatives are in tune with their policy

preferences. Security is generally chief among those preferences, forcing democratic leaders to pass policies that strengthen the provision of security to all of a nation's citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003). The need for security translates to the creation of an efficient professional military that eschews corruption on a wide scale, is led by professional and competent officers and generals and whose soldiers are more connected to their state, drawing on the same deeper connection formed among all citizens of representative democracies. The contrast in military effectiveness between autocracies and democracies is also easily observable. Violent challengers can see how past challengers have fared and the extent to which either terrorist movements or insurgent movements have survived against a certain military. These observations, combined with the effectiveness of recruitment efforts then factor into violent challengers' ultimate choice of tactics.

Two groups of implications can be drawn from the theoretical line of reasoning I have laid out. However, before specifying these implications, I must highlight the different modeling approach under which these hypotheses operate. Rather than examining the frequency in which violent challengers employ a tactic, I am interested in the circumstances of the adaptation of a tactic: moving from inaction to a form of violent contestation. Thus, in a departure from past work on conflict, the hypotheses I derive will reflect predictions about transitions to tactical use of a form of political violence, rather than frequencies of incidence of those forms.

Foremost, this analysis asserts that types of transitions to political violence by violent challengers to a state are associated with whether that state is a representative democracy. I propose that:

H1a: Violent challengers to states with more characteristics of representative

government are more likely to initiate a terrorist movement.

H1b: Violent challengers to states with fewer characteristics of representative government are more likely to initiate an insurgent movement.

While these hypotheses address two possible tactics for violent challengers, a third – the use of both insurgency and terrorism – is omitted from the hypotheses. While some empirical works have connected the simultaneous use of the two tactics (i.e. Fortna 2011), not enough is known about why these tactics are adapted jointly to warrant a theoretical assertion. Following the previous hypotheses, I believe that given the intermediate status of insurgent terrorist groups, the processes by which groups choose both tactics simultaneously should reflect the process by which they choose to use one tactic individually. Joint use of insurgency and terrorism may be an intermediate state that follows an deescalation of political violence in the form of a transition from terrorism or a scalation in the form of a transition toward insurgency. Following these patterns, more democratic governments may be more likely to force their challengers to switch tactics away from more organized violence, while less democratic states are incur escalation, in the form of more violence and the evolution of terrorist challengers into insurgents. Following this logic:

H2a: Violent challengers to states with more characteristics of representative government are more likely to transition from an insurgency to either insurgent terrorism or a only terrorism.

H2b: Violent challengers to states with fewer characteristics of representative government are more likely to transition from a terrorist movement to either insurgent terrorism or only insurgency.

A final expected effect emerges from the superior military efficiency of democracies. Once again, this hypothesis explicitly involves transition, this time away from a violent tactic. I propose that:

H3: Once violent challenges have begun, they are more likely to end in states with more characteristics of representative government.

Combined, these three hypotheses make strong separating predictions about both the environments that dictate choices for political violence and the termination of a period of anti-government conflict.

Statistical Model and Data Sources

Before outlining the design of the statistical models that I use to test my hypothesis, I must explain how I will operationalize both political violence and representative democracy.

Operationalizing Political Violence Choices

This study is concerned with explaining the choice of tactic for organized political violence by a violent challenger to the state. The unit of analysis is the behavior of a declared political violence group in a year: any group that has engaged in political violence at any point in the duration of the study (1970-2004) is analyzed. I am concerned with three potential choices that groups have for political violence: terrorism, insurgency and a combination of both. I operationalize each as separate, unordered choices that are not affected by the removal or addition of one or more choices. Since I am focused on incidence, the magnitude of each choice (i.e. the number of terrorist attacks) is not included. Groups are classified as engaging in terrorism in a given year if they commit one or more attack within the country where they committed their first attack,[5] according to the Global Terrorism Database (START 2011). Groups

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5   Groups that commit attacks in multiple countries are only analyzed in the countries where they committed their

are considered to be engaging in insurgency if they are recorded as having participated in an armed conflict against the government that leads to 25 or more casualties, according to PRIO's Armed Conflict Data-set. Groups are coded as engaging in both terrorism and insurgency if they conduct a terrorist attack and are listed as having an insurgency within the same year.

Operationalizing Representative Democracy

The idea of representative democracy is rather diffuse and requires multiple variables to capture its various definitional aspects. While conventional indices, such as POLITY IV, provide a cumulative measure of democracy across countries, this measure cannot examine the separate impact of specific attributes of representative democracy and may miss some crucial factors of the subject. Additionally, the measure partially comprised of indicators of political violence in a country, making it a poor independent variable for this study given the dependent variable also captures modes of political violence (Vreeland 2008). Instead, I operationalize representative democracy through four measures that gauge representativeness and government responsiveness across both democracies and autocracies. The first is *age of democracy*, a measure first conceptualized as a way of examining corruption in younger democracies (Keefer 2007). I expect that, in much the same way more experience with democracy decreased the likelihood of corruption, more experience with democratic rule also increases consolidation among democracies, uniting political forces and decreasing incentives for extra-electoral exchanges of power. The measure explicitly captures the number of continuous years that a electoral democracy has been in power in a given year, using the definition of electoral democracy by Przeworski et. al. (2000).[6] The second representation variable deals directly with transfers of

first attacks to avoid conflation between domestic and international political violence and to focus on countries where groups primarily have political grievances.

6   There are three features to the definition: Elected legislature, elected executive and alternation in political power.

power by measuring whether the leader in power in a country at a given time gained power through a regular or *irregular transition of power*[7] (Goemans et. al. 2004). Leaders that gained power through irregular transitions are less likely to be seen as legitimate by a population, less likely to adhere to democratic principles and and as such, would be more likely to provoke wider mobilization and insurgency. The variable is coded dichotomously.

The third variable addresses representation most directly by connecting violent challengers to ethnic groups[8] and employs the Ethnic Power Relations Data-set to measure the extent to which those ethnic groups are politically marginalized and repressed by the incumbent government. The degree to which groups are represented in the national government is ordered: the lowest rank is for groups with either some or total government representation (including as coalition partners). Groups that are in some way excluded from central power (according to the data-set) are ordered based on the degree of exclusion. Regional autonomy is ranked lowest as group elites may retain some regional power without any say in national government. Groups that are powerless are next lowest, as they have no power at any level. Finally, the highest level of group exclusion is discrimination, where groups are actively subjected to "active, intentional and targeted discrimination" (Cederman et al. 2009). I expect that higher levels of *ethnic group exclusion* will lead associated violent challengers to choose insurgency more frequently due to the mobilizational advantages such a situation presents. The final representational variable is *media freedom*. Media freedom is representative of some of the intangible features of representative democracy highlighted by Dahl and is strongly associated with overall freedom of

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7   Irregular transitions take place "outside of prevailing rules, provisions, conventions and norms of a country." This often takes place through the use of force.
8   Violent challengers were connected to ethnic groups if the group in question explicitly claimed to represent the national ambitions or fought against injustices of a the ethnic group in question in its goals, or if the ethnic group's name was in the name of the violent challenger (i.e. Palestinian Liberation Organization represents Palestinian Arabs).

political expression. This variable is derived from two different measures of media freedom, Van Belle's (1997, 2000) media freedom index, which covers 1946 to 1995 and Freedom House's Freedom of the Press index, which covers 1981 to 2010. To combine overlapping years, the measures are standardized and compressed, taking the mean whenever there is a conflict.[9]

Control Variables

In addition to degree of democratic representation, several other factors could influence tactical choice by violent challengers to the state. Higher levels of capacity and political reach (state penetration in the economy) should constrain the ability of potential challengers to mobilize. *Relative political reach*, an aggregate measure devised by Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (2011), is a standardized measure of the capacity of governments to mobilize the populations under their control, thereby serving as countervailing movements to competing challengers.[10] I include two additional measures to access a government's ability to constrain armed mobilization by challengers. The first is a measure of *military spending as a percentage of GDP* obtained from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Data-set (Singer et. al. 1972). Since the effectiveness of military forces, no matter how large, may be contingent on how democratic a government is, I also include an interaction term of military spending and age of democracy in the model. I expect that older democracies that spend more on their military are more likely to drive challengers toward terrorism rather than insurgency. Additionally, since it is thought that coup-proofing measures in the form of division and fragmentation of military command

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9   Freedom Scores were ranked as 1 for "Free", 2 for "Partly Free" and 3 for "Not Free." Van Belle's index was converted into a similar 1 to 3 scale where 1 retained its value, zero, indicating no significant press took the two value and four, the most extreme "not free" measure took the value of three. Since the values of 2 and 3 related closely to the values of 1 and 4, respectively, in the original index, they were converted into 1.5 and 2.5, again respectively.

10 Relative political reach (RPR) is calculated by participation in the labor market divided by average participation in a basket of similar countries (determined by those countries' GDP values).

structures make the military less effective (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011), I include Pilster and Bohmelt's measure of *number of effective military structures* in a country, with more effective structures expected to lead to more insurgency. This measure is included in a separate model because it is only available through 1999 and has large amounts of missing data.

I also include a set of demographic factors as control variables, such as measures for *national population*, *per capita GDP*, *urbanization* and the *percentage of the national population comprised of excluded ethnic groups* in a country. The two former measures were obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2010), urbanization data was derived from urban population data from COW National Capabilities data and excluded population data was obtained from the Ethnic Power Relations data-set. Finally, I included a measure of *total violent challengers* in a country in a given year to account for a potential crowding out effect among violent actors (Findley and Young 2012).

Statistical Model

The outcome variable for this study is a set of four unordered categories, which represent a choice made at a given time. In order to model such a process, I employ a multinomial logistic regression model to explain the tactics chosen by challengers to the state at a given time. Since I am primarily interested in transitions to and from different types of violence, a statistical model that examined the likelihood of incidence of one type of violence over another would not tell a complete story. As such, I model transition from one of four states to any of the others as a first-order Markov process. The transition matrix in Table 1 shows the frequencies of transitions from each state to the other. What is especially notable in the transition matrix is the large number of transitions from either insurgency or terrorism to the use of both tactics by violent challengers,

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indicating alternation between the two tactics. The assumption that choice of political violence

tactic is a first-order Markov process entails presuming that the choice of a tactic at any time is

only dependent on the state in the prior time period and that any further dependence is captured

within that state (i.e. dependence dissipates after the first order) (Shirley et. al. 2010). While the

assumption of a diminishing shadow of past choices is not unreasonable for a time-sensitive

process like political violence, I employ two measures to allow for and then explicitly model

temporal dependence in the statistical analysis. First, I cluster standard errors by group over time,

allowing for serial correlation within group panels of temporal data. Then, I account for serial

correlation in choices of political violence tactic by a group over time using the cubic polynomial

approximation proposed by Carter and Signorino (2010) and modified for the multinomial logit

specification.[11]

Table 1: Transition Frequencies Matrix for Violent Challengers 1970-2010

From:	To: No Violence	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insurgency and Terrorism
No Violence	15161	587	186	41
Terrorism	586	890	15	36
Insurgency	158	15	364	108
Insurgency and Terrorism	37	34	96	419

I structure my multinomial logistic regressions as a multi-state Markov transition model,

creating four different regression analyses to explain each row of the transition matrix. This is

accomplished by regressing on cases whose previous year's choice was 'no violence' in the first

model, 'terrorism' in the second, and so on. The model of interest for the testing first hypothesis

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11 The modification involves creating duration trends for incidence and non incidence of each of the three choices
of political violence (with time since last incidence being the operationalized variables). Then, two additional
variables for each of these trends, a squared and cubed term are introduced. Finally, each class of polynomials is
then interacted with each other class, creating three additional cubic polynomials and (t, t^2, and t^3) and six total
classes of polynomials.

Table 2: Fixed-Effects Multinomial Logit of Political Violence Choice following a Year of No Violence

Model Number	(1)			(2)		
Choice Type	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insurgency and Terrorism	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insurgency and Terrorism
Age of Democracy	-0.059***	-0.007	-0.1005*	-0.056	0.002	-0.099
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.051)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.059)
Leader Gained Power Irregularly	-0.342	0.5647	-0.245	-0.501*	0.803	-0.526
	(0.186)	(0.360)	(1.166)	(0.213)	(0.431)	(1.390)
Political Exclusion of Ethnic Groups	-0.1094	1.034***	0.916	-0.018	1.027***	1.222
	(0.178)	(0.196)	(0.675)	(0.213)	(0.222)	(0.961)
Media Freedom	-0.063	-0.637**	-0.245	0.021	-0.878**	-0.781
	(0.159)	(0.239)	(0.388)	(0.191)	(0.276)	(0.518)
Relative Political Reach	-0.409	0.934	-5.352*	-0.531	0.903	-7.263
	(0.678)	(1.302)	(2.459)	(0.713)	(1.490)	(3.929)
Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	-0.0143	0.873***	0.4423	-0.064	0.917	0.815
	(0.279)	(0.215)	(1.511)	(0.286)	(0.212)	(1.499)
Age of Democracy * Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	-0.131***	0.096	0.178	-0.098*	0.917	0.815
	(0.034)	(0.076)	(0.244)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.182)
Effective Number of Armed Forces				-0.316**	0.036	0.470
				(0.146)	(0.244)	(0.532)
Log of Per Capita GDP	0.655*	0.130	1.890*	0.589	0.644	1.913
	(0.268)	(0.459)	(0.869)	(0.305)	(0.516)	(1.013)
Urbanization (pct. of total pop.)	0.039	1.083***	-1.562	-0.023	6.091***	-1.191
	(0.116)	(0.294)	(2.071)	(0.690)	(1.029)	(2.990)
Log of Total Population	-0.457	0.972	0.727	0.130	-0.060	1.021
	(0.560)	(0.911)	(2.807)	(0.646)	(1.131)	(3.367)
Total Excluded Population (pct. of total pop.)	0.798	-1.788	-0.958	0.244	0.163	-1.827
	(0.513)	(0.987)	(3.48)	(0.581)	(0.990)	(5.219)
Total Active Challengers	0.190***	0.145***	0.340***	0.204***	0.163***	0.385***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.058)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.072)
Constant	-3.458***	-3.544***	-6.067***	-3.011***	-3.749***	-6.375***
	(0.391)	(0.612)	(1.378)	(0.469)	(0.765)	(1.868)
Number of Transitions	552	169	38	468	136	32
Number of Observations	12359			9819		
Number of Groups	464			462		

Baseline category is "No Violence." Fixed effects at the group level. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level. Cubic polynomials and interactions omitted from table for space considerations.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

would examine cases without violence in the prior year as it explicitly models transitions from 'no violence' to any form of political violence. The second hypothesis, on the other hand, must be tested by using the three other transitions to account for a return to a state of 'no violence.' A restrictive feature of multinomial logistic models is the assumption that omitting a valid choice from the model will not systematically alter the remaining estimates. The restriction is known as independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Hausman and McFadden 1984). While this is a source of potential concern given the close connection between types of political violence, Hausman tests for IIA on all of the choices in each model specification reveal no significant effect from omitting one of the choices. Finally, the panel nature of the model is subject to unobserved heterogeneity at the group level. As such, I introduce a conditional fixed-effects specification to account for special characteristics of terrorist or insurgent groups that may not be captured by the independent variables.[12]

Results

Results from tests of the first hypothesis appear on Table 2, which models the likelihood of transition to a tactic of political violence by a potential challenger after having experienced no violence in the previous year. While the coefficients of many of the variables that stand in for aspects of political representation are not individually significantly different from zero, the cumulative effect remains clear. Jointly interpreted, groups in younger democracies that spend more on their military as a percentage of GDP are more likely to choose terrorism.[13] Holding that aspect constant, groups in countries with leaders that gained power from regular transitions, abiding by the rule of law or the constitution, are also more likely to choose terrorism. Finally,

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12 Conditional fixed effects were applied following Chamberlain (1982) as unconditional fixed effects in non-linear models are subject to incidental parameters bias, which can produce unstable regression coefficients.
13 The interaction term removes limits the zero term from age of democracy in analysis, effectively eliminating analysis of autocratic states.

Table 3: Fixed-Effects Multinomial Logit of Political Violence Choice following a Year of Terrorism

Model Number	(1)			(2)		
Choice Type	No Violence	Insurgency	Insurgency and Terrorism	No Violence	Insurgency	Insurgency and Terrorism
Age of Democracy	-0.037	-0.062	0.029	-0.278	-0.014	0.001
	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.067)
Leader Gained Power Irregularly	-0.030	-0.492	-0.285	0.176	1.570	-0.955
	(0.309)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.325)	(1.440)	(1.581)
Political Exclusion of Ethnic Groups	0.209	-1.844	-0.839	-0.214	-2.144	-1.330
	(0.299)	(0.959)	(1.421)	(0.391)	(1.313)	(1.305)
Media Freedom	0.167	1.298	-1.567	0.012	1.570	-0.955
	(0.205)	(0.670)	(1.049)	(0.213)	(0.830)	(1.083)
Relative Political Reach	0.309	-7.028	3.935	2.775	-0.086	4.885
	(1.293)	(7.973)	(3.149)	(1.506)	(10.555)	(3.590)
Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	-0.209	-9.348*	-0.914	-0.716	-8.652*	-1.122
	(0.671)	(4.142)	(1.832)	(0.749)	(3.911)	(2.108)
Age of Democracy * Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	0.011	1.797*	0.733**	-0.079	0.314	0.865**
	(0.072)	(0.795)	(0.246)	(0.093)	(1.433)	(0.315)
Effective Number of Armed Forces				0.659	0.670	-1.405
				(0.360)	(4.507)	(0.870)
Log of Per Capita GDP	0.950	1.427	0.489	0.967	1.048	1.729
	(0.540)	(1.996)	(1.280)	(0.535)	(3.428)	(0.870)
Urbanization (pct. of total pop.)	4.355	1.427	0.489	4.635*	0.388	6.105
	(2.147)	(7.695)	(6.278)	(2.009)	(14.504)	(6.676)
Log of Total Population	1.766	4.150	-1.432	2.063	7.100	-2.367
	(2.147)	(3.811)	(4.219)	(1.102)	(6.068)	(4.763)
Total Excluded Population (pct. of total pop.)	-1.208	14.961*	2.110	-1.229	19.383*	3.009
	(1.927)	(6.231)	(5.801)	(2.353)	(7.792)	(5.439)
Total Active Challengers	-0.489***	0.033	0.267**	-0.524***	-0.679	0.321**
	(0.073)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.073)	(0.374)	(0.119)
Constant	-0.298	-2.591	-3.120**	-0.625	-3.250	-2.612
	(0.406)	(1.487)	(0.959)	(0.525)	(3.856)	(1.139)
Number of Transitions	549	14	36	446	9	34
Number of Observations	1434			1220		
Number of Groups	305			266		

Baseline category is "Terrorism." Fixed effects at the group level. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level. Cubic polynomials and interactions omitted from table for space considerations.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4: Fixed-Effects Multinomial Logit of Political Violence Choice following a Year of Insurgency

Model Number	(1)			(2)		
Choice Type	No Violence	Terrorism	Insurgency and Terrorism	No Violence	Terrorism	Insurgency and Terrorism
Age of Democracy	0.067	0.204	-0.097	0.194	0.326	-0.217*
	(0.105)	(0.188)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.232)	(0.105)
Leader Gained Power Irregularly	-2.024**	-3.427**	-0.294	-2.167***	-3.315*	-0.173
	(0.621)	(1.220)	(0.712)	(0.755)	(1.313)	(0.751)
Political Exclusion of Ethnic Groups	0.082	-0.200	-0.005	-0.553	-0.191	-0.139
	(0.517)	(0.463)	(0.407)	(0.618)	(0.614)	(0.502)
Media Freedom	0.720	0.371	0.611	0.426	-0.098	-0.017
	(0.532)	(0.869)	(0.743)	(0.730)	(1.002)	(1.079)
Relative Political Reach	-7.206*	-7.951	2.237	-7.639	-9.641*	4.313
	(3.326)	(4.295)	(2.862)	(3.969)	(4.581)	(3.708)
Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	-0.288	-0.677	-0.690	-0.444	-0.657	-0.739
	(0.317)	(0.518)	(0.441)	(0.324)	(0.429)	(0.486)
Age of Democracy * Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	2.765***	-1.112	-0.164	3.126	-0.990	3.515
	(0.961)	(1.228)	(0.991)	(2.172)	(1.457)	(2.021)
Effective Number of Armed Forces				0.794*	0.467	0.602
				(0.391)	(0.562)	(0.447)
Log of Per Capita GDP	1.821	0.075	0.653	2.090	-0.253	0.685
	(1.037)	(1.538)	(1.265)	((1.072)	(1.867)	(1.430)
Urbanization (pct. of total pop.)	-4.803	-11.593	3.222	-1.149	-15.469	0.860
	(10.471)	(9.992)	(6.006)	(10.126)	(14.0312)	(6.191)
Log of Total Population	5.103*	5.980	3.845	2.704	7.895	6.103
	(2.309)	(6.024)	(3.050)	(2.901)	(8.403)	(3.123)
Total Excluded Population (pct. of total pop.)	-9.830*	-9.246	-1.789	-12.526	-20.110*	1.256
	(4.529)	(5.331)	(3.297)	(7.707)	(9.383)	(5.358)
Total Active Challengers	-0.253*	0.045	0.275***	-0.309***	0.057	0.310***
	(0.111)	(0.180)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.201)	(0.093)
Constant	1.078	-0.589	-0.163	0.394	-1.781	-1.056
	(0.695)	(1.317)	(0.810)	(0.932)	(1.436)	(0.966)
Number of Transitions	143	14	104	108	12	86
Number of Observations	583			477		
Number of Groups	173			151		

Baseline category is "Insurgency." Fixed effects at the group level. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level. Cubic polynomials and interactions omitted from table for space considerations.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

groups in countries with military forces that have been less divided by coup proofing and have fewer effective branches, another characteristic of representative democracy, are also more likely to choose terrorism as their sole tactic when challenging the government.

Challengers to the state are more likely to choose insurgency when they are connected to more politically excluded ethnic groups, by far the strongest effect of the model. Additionally, less media freedom and more military spending by the central government are also more likely lead challengers toward a choice of insurgency. The final choice of using insurgency and terrorism did not seem to show a pattern of selection based on factors related to representative democracies. While challengers to younger democracies or wealthier states were more likely to use both insurgency and terrorism, the effect was weak and volatile, losing significance with the addition of effective number of armed forces. The comparatively small number of transitions from no violence directly to use of both insurgency and terrorism may be culpable in this lack of statistical significance and examining the other three rows of the transition matrix yields more promising findings on insurgency and terrorism.

Table 3 shows the results of the identical model from Table 2, only using cases that were preceded by a year of terrorism. Transitioning to a period of no violence in this case represents an end to hostility, while transitioning to either insurgency or insurgency and terrorism indicates escalation of conflict. The results show that political representation does not play a substantial role in terminating terrorist movements. However, one finding does bolster hypotheses about the role of insurgent terrorism, as groups in younger democracies (interpreting the interaction term with autocracies set to zero in the multiplication) are more likely to transition from terrorism to using both insurgency and terrorism.

Table 4 displays results from the model for transitions from insurgency in the previous year. As in the previous model, few predictors relating to representative democracy were significant. Nevertheless, the presence of leaders that gained power through a regular transition is more likely to facilitate transitions back to periods of non-violence, lending additional support to the main hypothesis. Groups in younger democracies and autocracies were also more likely to transition to insurgent terrorism from terrorism, in line with the second hypotheses' predictions. Additionally, fewer cumulative excluded groups members appear to deprive insurgents of a base of support and make them more likely to either terminate the conflict or to transition to terrorist violence. Finally, Table 5 shows that, most likely due to a small number of positive cases and overall cases, the model for transitions from insurgent terrorism found few, if any of the predictors significant. For this reason, this table is omitted from the body of the text and shown following the end of the text. .

Conclusion

Representative democracy, although of varying strength across its many facets, is a likely factor in mitigating the scope of political violence among violent challengers to the state. Even violent challengers that were not deterred by the military strength and greater political opportunity of democratic states or absorbed into the democratic political process are ultimately limited in the scope of their violent conduct. This limitation is directly related to the attributes of representative democracy, which selectively constrain choices of tactics by violent challengers. For instance, higher military spending in younger democracies is likely to force challengers to adopt terrorism rather than insurgency or a combination of the two. Leaders that gained power through legitimate and regular transitions were also more likely to force challengers into

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terrorism and to ultimately force a transition back to non-violence. A freer media and fewer connections to politically excluded ethnic groups prevents groups from turning to insurgency. Together, these findings indicate an additional benefit from a fully consolidated representative democracy, adding to existing research on the external and domestic democratic peace.

My results also lend credibility to the view that terrorism and insurgency are trade-offs among the tools used by violent challengers to the state. While the circumstances under which groups adopt each tactic vary widely, looking at transitions from one tactic to the other, or both, shows widespread alternation between the use of terrorism and insurgency. The empirical observation that the same groups regularly switch from terrorism to insurgency and to both combined with the differences in environments that drive each shift imply that the two concepts should no longer be treated as totally separate. Thus, research on political violence should strive to integrate the two concepts, focusing on both their similarities, differences and the reasons for their overlap. Not only does treating terrorism and insurgency as two sides of the same coin allow for more precise empirical analysis, it also allows for a more complete theoretical depiction of political violence. Whereas studies of both terrorism and insurgency have largely ignored one another and often produced contradictory theories, a more cohesive avenue of research would give researches an opportunity to explore both concepts together and develop theories that give a more complete and complimentary view of each tactic.

Finally, my study also makes use of a modeling tactic that, while useful, is often neglected by political violence researchers. Explicitly modeling transitions to states of political violence, rather than the frequency of its incidence or the number of terrorist attacks a country experiences represents an improvement in statistical examination of group violence. This more

precise technique allows for a more realistic representation of how groups choose violent tactics and how those changes are affected by annual variation in representative government or a host of other factors. While other models may be able to capture temporal dependence, the advantage of using a Markov transition model is in the way it treats prior instances of political violence as separate processes.

Taken together, my analysis has shown the intricate role of representative government in structuring the choices of violent challengers to the state and further constraining those challengers once conflicts have begun. These findings provide insight into both the function of representative government and the interconnected nature of different modes of political violence. Future studies of political violence would markedly benefit by considering this interconnection rather than current, atomized, conceptualizations of terrorism and insurgency.

Table 5: Fixed-Effects Multinomial Logit of Political Violence Choice following a Year of Insurgent Terrorism

Model Number	(1)			(2)		
Choice Type	No Violence	Terrorism	Insurgency	No Violence	Terrorism	Insurgency
Age of Democracy	-0.020	-.111	0.042	0.085	-0.014	0.066
	(0.055)	(0.116)	(0.038)	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.049)
Leader Gained Power Irregularly	0.496	-0.355	0.053	0.272	-0.143	0.0723
	(0.957)	(0.874)	(0.463)	(0.702)	(1.053)	(0.500)
Political Exclusion of Ethnic Groups	-0.105	-0.858	0.425	0.652	0.821	0.835
	(0.589)	(0.962)	(0.405)	(0.779)	(0.678)	(0.576)
Media Freedom	-0.927	0.497	-0.183	-1.009	0.773	0.003
	(0.660)	(0.443)	(0.303)	(0.692)	(0.655)	(0.456)
Relative Political Reach	4.372	0.273	0.906	4.774	-2.934	-2.164
	(4.551)	(4.264)	(2.049)	(5.509)	(5.565)	(2.352)
Military Spending (pct. of GDP)	-1.208	0.068	-1.071	-1.572	-0.643	-1.407
	(2.202)	(0.941)	(1.159)	(2.220)	(1.617)	(1.467)
Age of Democracy * Military Spending (pct of GDP)	0.894	-0.176	0.301	1.246	-0.837	0.233
	(0.941)	(0.922)	(1.030)	(1.563)	(0.830)	(1.278)
Effective Number of Armed Forces				0.134	0.419	0.795
				(0.773)	(0.523)	(0.438)
Log of Per Capita GDP	-0.597	2.736	0.899	-0.527	0.961	1.721
	(2.312)	(3.069)	(1.306)	(3.283)	(3.182)	(1.632)
Urbanization (pct. of total pop.)	-2.001	-7.436	0.899	-2.637	-10.474	-6.644
	(2.312)	(3.069)	(1.306)	(12.422)	(14.044)	(6.620)
Log of Total Population	6.034	1.864	-0.008	5.864	5.187	-0.6926
	(4.954)	(5.027)	(2.732)	(5.863)	(6.386)	(3.672)
Total Excluded Population (pct. of total pop.)	-1.911	3.935	1.565	0.1672	-2.452	1.588
	(1.500)	(2.890)	(1.388)	(2.554)	(2.256)	(1.837)
Total Active Challengers	-0.394**	-0.062	-0.385***	-0.381*	-0.068	-.421***
	(0.136)	(0.111)	(0.084)	(0.161)	(0.105)	(0.098)
Constant	-1.275	0.928	1.309	0.615	1.571	1.895
	(1.481)	(1.578)	(1.279)	(2.464)	(2.060)	(1.978)
Number of Transitions	34	33	94	27	25	75
Number of Observations	575			441		
Number of Groups	90			83		

Baseline category is "Insurgency and Terrorism." Fixed effects at the group level. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level.
Cubic polynomials and interactions omitted from table for space considerations.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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