**Hobbes smashes Cromwell: An interpretation of *Leviathan***

It is common to interpret Hobbes’s *Leviathan* as justifying Cromwell’s usurpation. To support this view, scholars sometimes reference the arguments of Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon or John Wallis, a Presbyterian mathematician; both interpreted Hobbes’s heterodox political and religious claims as lending support to Cromwell and the radicals.[[1]](#footnote-1) More recently, Skinner argued Hobbes’s de facto theory of political obligation, published within the context of the Engagement controversy, legitimated Cromwell’s rule. Moreover, according to Springborg and Hoesktra, in supporting Cromwell, *Leviathan* revealed Hobbes’s political opportunism, making him the fool—the character in *Leviathan* who refutes the claim that justice means keeping covenants and who reduces justice to opportunism.[[2]](#footnote-2) Taking a different tack Collins examined Hobbes’s evolving religious thought. Drawing on cues from Tuck, he concluded that Hobbes’s obsessive fear of the independent power of the Church gradually moved him away from royalism towards Cromwell, as Charles I martyred himself for Anglican clerical dualism, and Cromwell eventually embraced an Erastian church settlement.[[3]](#footnote-3) Collins also maintains *Leviathan* counsels sovereigns to respect liberty of conscience and to embrace congregationalism; *Leviathan* is therefore open to tenets embraced by Cromwell and the Independents.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Not everyone agrees that *Leviathan* supports Cromwell and the radicals, however. Hobbes for one denied the allegation and presented the work to Charles II in 1651.[[5]](#footnote-5) Burgess struck at the heart of Skinner’s argument, claiming that Hobbes first formulated his theory of political obligation in the early 1640s when royalists could use it to best advantage.[[6]](#footnote-6) Burgess insists Hobbes did not intend his de facto theory to support Cromwell (even though it could serve this purpose). He is also skeptical of arguments that rely heavily on the ‘Review and Conclusion’ as the latter was omitted from the Latin translation and Hobbes probably considered it “a rather ephemeral *piece d’occasion*.” [[7]](#footnote-7) Sommerville challenged the view that *Leviathan* supports Cromwell by claiming the war was still raging when Hobbes wrote and published *Leviathan*. Armed royalists were fighting for Charles II against Cromwell in Ireland between 1649 and 1650 and again in Scotland between 1650 and 1651.[[8]](#footnote-8) There is therefore no reason to assume Hobbes’s de facto theory supported Cromwell. Sommerville also pointed to many royalist tenets in *Leviathan* and claimed Hobbes’s allegiance to traditional Anglicanism (of the Jewel and Foxe [Erastian] variety)undermined any interpretation of the textas supporting Cromwell, a religious Independent who embraced some degree of decentralized religious liberty.[[9]](#footnote-9)

I argue that Hobbes’ *Leviathan* does not support Cromwell and the radicals. My argument rests on two basic assumptions. First, following Burgess and Collins, I assume *Leviathan* was written as a response to the gradual rise of Cromwell, after his separation from the more conservative Presbyterians in Parliament and the Army.[[10]](#footnote-10) Cromwell’s power was increasing when Hobbes wrote and published *Leviathan,* but his victory over the Presbyterians and the royalists was not yet definitive. Cromwell’s power did not simply “exist” as Quentin Skinner declares; the radicals were not yet in a position to guarantee the people protection. Second, following Sommerville, I assume if Hobbes favored--or even accepted--Cromwell’s rise to power*,* he would not have gone out of his way to subvert opinions justifying his rise or his authority, as power ultimately rests on public opinion.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The relationship Hobbes forged between power and public opinion is as follows: No one acquires power over others by themselves because men are equally powerful.[[12]](#footnote-12) A man acquires power over others through the help of well-affected persons who supply him with arms, treasure, and other kinds of support. The well-affected place their strength in one man and their support makes him powerful.[[13]](#footnote-13) The well-affected are inclined to empower a particular man because they believe that he has some particular claim upon rule.[[14]](#footnote-14) Power rests on legitimizing public opinions.

In the first section of this article, I unearth the popular religious justifications Hobbes’s contemporaries claimed generated support for Cromwell. I focus on religious justifications because Hobbes in *Behemoth* maintained the most politically effective arguments for Cromwell were rooted in religion. There is no overriding reason to assume Hobbes thought differently on this point when writing *Leviathan*, even though *Behemoth* is a Restoration text and *Leviathan* is not.[[15]](#footnote-15) In the second section, I turn to *Leviathan* and show Hobbes undermining the religious claims Cromwell’s followers used to marshal support for his political authority as well as the radicals’ claim to power. Hobbes, of course, is known for mocking and casting doubt upon religious claims. He is also known for using religion strategically to advance his political and religious agenda. I try to focus on the details of Hobbes’s attack on religion in *Leviathan*. Given the historical context, I argue that his attack specifically targets the religious justifications for authority offered by Cromwell’s supporters during the civil wars.

I conclude Hobbes did not write *Leviathan* to support Cromwell. If he intended the work to serve an immediate political end,then he intended it to undercut the religious arguments and the policy positions at the heart of Cromwell’s claim to authority. Interpreted as a politically engaged text, I argue that *Leviathan* serves to smash Cromwell and the radicals by breeding disaffection for both.

In other words, *Leviathan* does to Cromwell and the radicals what texts and pamphlets written by Parliamentarians, Presbyterians and their allies did to Charles I in the early 1640s. Rebels disempowered the King by undermining his claims to absolute authority. In *Behemoth,* Hobbes claims that the rebels’ arguments led the people to hate Charles I; their hatred led them to withdraw support from the King. [[16]](#footnote-16) Without their support, the King was powerless against his enemies, and he could no longer protect his friends. He lost the war. In the same fashion, I argue that *Leviathan* intends to *disempower* Cromwell and the radicals by challenging the religious foundations supporting their resistance and their claim to rule. The text also intends to empower the Stuarts by defending the conservative royalist claim that the sovereign possesses absolute right over civil and spiritual affairs.

**The religious justifications supporting Cromwell’s rise to power**

According to Hobbes, sectaries who espoused “liberty of conscience” during the wars supported Cromwell’s rise.[[17]](#footnote-17) Two important demands followed from this appeal to liberty. The first was ecclesiological; specifically, the demand pertained to Church governance. Radical sectaries demanded freedom from national or international Church authority. This demand stemmed from a commitment to decentralized congregationalism. Cromwell and the radicals did not tolerate the Catholics, the Anglicans, and the conservative Presbyterians in part because they tried to control religious matters at the national level (with Anglican archbishops and Presbyterian national synods) or at the international level (with the Pope in Rome). Radical sectaries were willing to use the arm of the state to prevent Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians from imposing their illegitimate conception of church governance upon the people.[[18]](#footnote-18) ‘Liberty of conscience’ meant freedom from top-down religious impositions. It was a demand to give the sectaries and their localized form of governance sovereignty over spiritual matters.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The second demand following from “liberty of conscience” concerned the polity’s relationship with the emerging radical sects and with the discredited Catholics and High Anglicans. For some of Cromwell’s supporters and for many of his critics “liberty of conscience” was a call to tolerate the radical sects. Cromwell’s adherents were known sectaries; Cromwell was thought to be one.[[20]](#footnote-20) Most important, Hobbes identified Cromwell’s supporters as members of these radical sects.[[21]](#footnote-21) Anabaptists, Independents, Fifth Monarchists, Antinominans, Enthusiasts, Brownists, Ranters, Quakers, and Seekers supported him. The sectaries demand for toleration was not limitless, however. As Blair Worden has shown neither General Cromwell nor his son-in-law Henry Ireton tolerated Catholics and High Anglicans. Nor did they tolerate all the radical sects. They clearly supported greater religious diversity and less intrusion, but they also acknowledged the importance of religious unity and were willing to use the arm of the state to unite the godly.[[22]](#footnote-22)

However, those who opposed Cromwell and his supporters did not always recognize these distinctions. They construed “liberty of conscience” to mean the toleration of devilry, heresy and licentiousness, as they ascribed these qualities to the sects and delivered this message to popular audiences. They also argued toleration of diverse faiths created religious disunity and disorder within the nation. Moreover, they said the sects’s call for toleration amounted to political suicide as it would lead to disagreement, disaffection, and eventually war.[[23]](#footnote-23) For many men who opposed Cromwell and the sects, a national (not congregational) church was the best way to keep the peace.[[24]](#footnote-24)

What religious arguments did the radical sects offer to justify their support for Cromwell? How did they justify their own political actions? These questions are difficult to answer because it is hard to distinguish the sects’ religious justifications for authority from those advanced by members of more established churches (Anglican or Presbyterian). Thomas argues that by the late sixteenth century clear distinctions between sectarian and more orthodox Protestant outlooks can be drawn.[[25]](#footnote-25) Walsham, however, claims these differences are not so easy to detect, at least between 1560 and 1640. However, both traditional and revisionist accounts agree that during the period Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* the sharp differences between sectarian and nonsectarian outlooks were forming in the popular imagination.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Englishmen between the mid-1640s and early 1650s identified the radical sects as “new lights” in popular and academic literature.[[27]](#footnote-27) The sects were said to craft unorthodox arguments to ground their political and religious beliefs.[[28]](#footnote-28) They were known to offer men unusual or heterodox methods for accessing God and divine truth. Hobbes, for example, in *Behemoth* identified the sects’ religious justifications for Cromwell’s rise as “strange.” He also said that the sects were “all commonly called by the name of fanatics.”[[29]](#footnote-29) In the second section of this paper I will demonstrate *Leviathan* shares this view. Thus, despite the difficulties, Englishmen like Hobbes distinguished sectarian from nonsectarian outlooks and they popularized these distinctions, even though revisionist historians have shown us that the distinctions were not clear-cut and there remained considerable overlap between religious views.

The second reason why it is difficult to isolate the sects’ religious justifications for Cromwell and their own political actions stems from the sects’ ambiguous and fluid nature.[[30]](#footnote-30) Presbyterians Thomas Edwards and John Bastwick wrote extensively about the sects during the civil wars and both complained (perhaps for rhetorical effect) that it was extremely difficult to distinguish one sect from another. Consequently, they decided to clump the sects together like Hobbes does in *Behemoth* and *Leviathan*.[[31]](#footnote-31) In the popular literature it was common to identify all the sects as “Independents” even though the Independents were a particular sect. Moreover, when today’s historians describe the radical sects they are quick to point out they were not static groups with fixed identities, crystallized doctrines and settled practices.[[32]](#footnote-32) They were emerging groups whose positive identities were in flux. Nevertheless, Englishmen associated the sects with some common themes and they presented them to the public. One theme related to the justifications the sects offered for Cromwell’s and their own authority. It is to these justifications I now turn.

One argument the sects used to justify Cromwell’s authority rested on the assertion that Cromwell and his followers were saints.[[33]](#footnote-33) This assertion was frequently ascribed to Independents and Anabaptists, but we find it ascribed to Enthusiasts, Familists, Quakers and Antinomians as well. [[34]](#footnote-34) Through the process of divine anointment the spirit of God was literally *within* them; the Holy Ghost entered the saints by “effusing”, “pouring”, or “passing” Himself into their soul.[[35]](#footnote-35) Independent theologians quibbled over whether the saints received a transcendent “irradiating motion” from God or whether they received some immaterial “species, whereby supernatural things are conveyed to the natural faculty.” St. Paul seemed to support both views.[[36]](#footnote-36)

The sects placed tremendous epistemic and political significance upon the assertion that the spirit dwelled within the saints. With respect to knowledge, in a sermon delivered in St. Paul’s Church, the Baptist (later Quaker) William Ames (who joined Cromwell’s army on the Irish campaign in 1649) stated the saints were uniquely “capable and able to understand [Christ’s] will…clear[ly],...full[y] and undoubted[ly].”[[37]](#footnote-37) Ames ascribed certainty to the knowledge the saints acquired not by reading the Scripture, but by divine anointment. Sectaries like Ames frequently denied the utility of the Word. Scripture was a dead letter because God spoke to the saints directly in new and extraordinary ways.[[38]](#footnote-38)

To challenge the saints’s claim to knowledge some conservative Presbyterians reduced its substance to self-conceit. For example, Bastwick wrote, “[The saints] are grown to that height of pride and impudencie that they vent their singular knowledge of divine mysteries above others.”[[39]](#footnote-39) Bastwick urged men to listen to the elites, specifically university- educated presbyters who knew God through a careful and long study of the Word.

With respect to politics, several implications followed from the fact that God dwelled within the saints. First, divine anointment positioned the saints above existing civil authorities.[[40]](#footnote-40) Second, the anointment rendered them (and not the King) God’s instruments (possessing divine right), and consequently worthy of civil honor, respect and obedience. Third, their anointment forbade others “to stretch forth [their] hand against” them, because as Psalm 105:15 said it was wrong to touch God’s Anointed. Fourth, their anointment “left [them] at liberty to touch and harm kings” and to order the political landscape according to their divinely inspired understandings.[[41]](#footnote-41) Sainthood therefore challenged the saint’s commitment to “liberty of conscience” because it justified a godly theocracy (with the godly in power) and collapsed the distinction between church and state. It rendered all Englishmen subject to the saints who exercised control over spiritual and civil affairs.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Aware of the political dangers attending the justification from sainthood, conservative critics warned men that Cromwell and his adherents could easily use the sainthood justification to “confound magistracy…induce anarchy, [and]…extirpate prelacy.”[[43]](#footnote-43) Bastwick explicitly said those who claimed sainthood for themselves were proud men who presumed their authority. “It is their [the sects in the Army] maxime, that the Saints only ought to rule the world, and to have the sword in their hand.”[[44]](#footnote-44) Unlike the old Puritans, who were humble and obedient, the saints were not afraid “to write and publish against Kings, nobles, and Judges of all sorts, both civil and ecclesiastical, and divest them of all their authority…assuming sovereignty to themselves, & that from God himself.”[[45]](#footnote-45)

A second argument the sects used to justify Cromwell’s rise and authority rested on millenarianism (chiliasm). Lamont has argued millenarian assumptions informed English thinking generally up until Cromwell’s rise. During his ascent, millenarian assumptions were associated more exclusively with the sects and with Cromwell; by the 1660s, millenarianism ceased to be a formative influence on English political and religious thought.[[46]](#footnote-46) With respect to Cromwell, millenarian assumptions led his followers to claim they were called to establish the Kingdom of God on earth, because this was either the end of days (i.e., the apocalypse before the millenium), or the halcyon millennium before the end (i.e., the Fifth Monarchy). Those who professed this prophecy somehow knew that Cromwell and his adherents had been called by God to rid England, Scotland and Ireland of the Antichrist and to establish a new, utopian kingdom on earth where the saints, seated at the right hand of Jesus and called by Him, would organize themselves internally like a congregation and govern the commonwealth with or under Christ.

Theologian John Owen, Cromwell’s chaplain during the Irish campaign, a divine he appointed Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University in 1652, presented this prophecy to Parliament in 1651. Owen told the MPs that Cromwell and his allies were “setting up the kingdom of Christ.” Their work was what God “call[ed] his people [to perform] in such a season.” Owen is not touting Erastian sentiments here; he is calling for theocracy.[[47]](#footnote-47) Bringing down “a mighty monarchy, a triumphing prelacy, [and a] thriving conformity” was part of God’s plan. “So it shall be,” Owen proclaimed.[[48]](#footnote-48)

Men who challenged this prophetic account associated prophets like Owen with Cromwell, his followers and their actions. Conservative Presbyterians like Bastwick and Edwards denounced their prophecies using naturalist terms like “mere vapor” and “frothy windiness.” Their conservative religious view was that prophecies lacked authority. With the arrival of the Gospels, the age of prophecy *was over* (or at least prophecies were so rare and exceptional that Englishmen should not trust in them).[[49]](#footnote-49) Nevertheless, providential views thrived within the sects. Edwards explicitly stated prophesizing was a practice advanced by sectaries within the Independent party: *they* (not the Presbyterians, according to Edwards) demanded “liberty of Prophecying.”[[50]](#footnote-50)

With respect to politics, Bastwick warned men that prophecies were making the soldiers in Cromwell’s army “run mad to the disordering of all things.” In an anonymous pamphlet, another conservative critic said prophecies were advanced by “fanatical people” in the Army who “laid violent hands upon the Lords Anointed [Charles I],…laid aside the dignity of the House of Lords…[and then tried to] introduce a most unequal parity [the commonwealth].”[[51]](#footnote-51)

If a more conservative Protestant view told men to suspect prophets and prophecies, how did the radical sects support the prophecies they cited to justify the actions and authority of Cromwell, as well as the radicals in Parliament and the Army? “Some of the Sectaries plead miracles, revelations, [and] visions for their way, and to confirm their doctrine,” explained Edwards.[[52]](#footnote-52) As noted above, Ames appealed to divine inspiration; the famous and respected army chaplain John Saltmarsh, a reputed Seeker who eventually turned against Cromwell, grounded his own prophecies about the Army and its legitimacy in his personal encounters with God’s voice; [[53]](#footnote-53) other sectaries interpreted their ambiguous, disconnected, contradictory dreams as prophetic. These dreams suggested mystery; mystery signaled divine origin.[[54]](#footnote-54) In the *Round-heads catechism,* soldiers were explicitly encouraged to “seek God” in these “extraordinary” ways.[[55]](#footnote-55)

Critics of Cromwell and the radicals in Parliament and in the Army mocked these prophetic foundations for authority. Fifth Monarchists and other sectaries manipulated the people by using “frantick jestures, enthusiasms, revelations, apparitions…[and] wild gesticulations.”[[56]](#footnote-56) One anonymous critic tells the “seduced Independents” their justifications rested upon “the innovation of brain-sick phantasies.”[[57]](#footnote-57) Another critic stated those who believed in the authority of a “pretended spirit of revelation” had succumbed to the “delusion of new and clearer light.”[[58]](#footnote-58) Cromwell and the radicals who established their authority upon “lying oracles” were not to be trusted, because they were false prophets drunk with too much “new wine.”[[59]](#footnote-59)

A third religious argument the sects used to justify the rise of Cromwell and the radicals rested on an appeal to conscience. Independent John Cook, author of *What the Independents would have* claimed that men serving Cromwell and the radicals in Parliament and the Army believed Christ reigned over conscience and all must obey His reign. The radicals freed Christians from internal oppression, aligned their politics with Christ’s, and thereby made their rule legitimate.[[60]](#footnote-60) Likewise, in *Independencie Gods veritie* the Independent John Goodwin in his argument in favor of toleration maintained that, “every man esteemeth it as properly his own….to use his conscience without [human] control; and when they shall be debarred of what they have so long enjoyed and so much covet to keep, what they may attempt let the wise judge.”[[61]](#footnote-61)

The argument of conscience drew considerable criticism. For example, in *A bloody Independent plot discovered*, an anonymous pamphleteer wrote,

If their conscience shall dictate anything to them [the Independents], …they are bound to do it, because their conscience dictates it unto them;…These sectaries have been the most active for bloodshed in these abhorred wars…They have…blown us up into that ruin, misery and slavery, that no nation or age…ever groaned under the like bondage and tyranny.[[62]](#footnote-62)

A second anonymous conservative pamphleteer stated, “To walk and rule as they please…they call….Liberty of Conscience.”[[63]](#footnote-63) Conservative critics like these anonymous authors challenged the radical appeal to conscience by claiming that action from conscience amounted to action from appetite, ignorance or pride. None of these foundations carried a hint of authority; thus, conscience could not ground Cromwell’s or the radicals’ resistance or claim to rule.

A fourth religious argument the sects used to justify the rise of Cromwell and the radicals rested on divine dispensation.Cromwell’s victory over Charles I, and then over the Irish and the Scots were not of man’s making. God was the cause; Cromwell’s conquests were divinely authored and authorized.[[64]](#footnote-64) Owen is instructive on this point. In 1644 he upended the conservative view that the age of miracles was over and then relaxed the definition of what constituted a miracle.[[65]](#footnote-65) In 1651, he declared that the Army’s victories were nothing short of miraculous.[[66]](#footnote-66) Cromwell’s critics did not hesitate to summon worldly causes to explain their losses and Cromwell’s many victories in the wars.

A fifth religious argument the sects used to justify the rise of Cromwell and the radicals rested on Scripture. Challenging sectaries who relied upon extraordinary means to know God’s will, sectary William Walwyn insisted that the Word (not the Spirit) was “the ever living god...that forceth itself into our dead natural understandings, plants itself there, makes us one with it; and forms us anew; this regenerating word, this immortal seed.”[[67]](#footnote-67) Using Scripture to justify authority was not unique to the sects. Presbyterians and Anglicans regularly referenced Scripture to craft their arguments for civil and ecclesiastical authority. The sectaries, however, claimed because they were God’s anointed their particular interpretation of God’s Word was definitive. The Holy Ghost guided their reading. Spiritualy unguided Anglican and Presbyterian readings should be discounted.[[68]](#footnote-68)

Three methods were used by the sects to connect Scripture to Cromwell and the radicals: metonymy, syllogizing, and disputation. With respect to metonymy, the sects associated the events they read in Scripture with their conceptions (or verbal accounts) of events in England. These imaginative and loose parallels (i.e., similitudes) had tremendous political significance. *The Independent catechism,* for example, told readers that the troubles and tumults described in the Book of Revelations paralleled---or were synonymous with---the troubles and tumults of mid-seventeenth-century England.[[69]](#footnote-69)Likewise, Owen forged parallels between Old Testament accounts of the Jews leaving Egypt and the saints fighting their oppressors in England. Moses delivered his chosen people from oppression; Cromwell and the Army were doing likewise.[[70]](#footnote-70) These associations explained the past, present and future. Moreover, they were politically useful because they made the case for Cromwell and the radicals.

Syllogizing was a second method the sectaries used to make the Scriptural case for their authority. Proper definitions of words like “church,” “saint,” and “magistracy” were forged out of Scriptural cloth, because the Word was the touchstone of truth and the foundation of freedom (from error and sin). The sects maintained the Catholics, Anglicans, and Presbyterians perverted the faith either because they craftily invented their own definitions or because they wove pagan (i.e., Aristotelian) philosophies into the definitions they gleamed from Scripture. The saints, by contrast, returned men to a more primitive understanding of the Word. They reformed the faith by crafting pure and true definitions—ones rooted in Scripture exclusively. The sectaries then turned their faithful definitions into major and minor premises and deduced spiritual conclusions from them. These conclusions were true in a logical (conditional) sense and in a transcendental (unconditional) sense. Both senses advanced Cromwell’s cause and claim to authority. Transcendental truths discovered by logic were especially potent because they revealed God’s true order and plan for man. Critics rebutted the sects syllogisms by arguing the radicals’ definitions were not pure reconstructions of the Word; they were human creations used to advance Cromwell’s and the radicals’ power. Their syllogisms were rhetorical enthymemes. Critics also explained how the radical’s syllogisms were muddled or confused. They were logically invalid and false.[[71]](#footnote-71)

Disputation leading to consensus and expressing consent was the third method the sectaries used to ground their claims for Cromwell’s and their own authority. During the wars Cromwell and his followers were famous for gathering together for prayer-meetings. Major political decisions were made there and men referenced Scripture to justify their policy positions.[[72]](#footnote-72) Participants spent hours engaging in debate, deliberating the claims they gathered from the Word and seeking consensus. That consensus garnered legitimacy. John Cook, an Indpendent, said the Independents were men who held “persuasion to be the gospellary way,” and men of low and high birth participated in these proto-democratic deliberative sessions.[[73]](#footnote-73) Sectaries in the Army “account[ed] it [their] privilege to dispute.”[[74]](#footnote-74)

Critics of Cromwell and the radicals found their deliberative method appalling. One conservative claimed it wrongly encouraged men to “forsake all the learned, [to] renounce the wise… [and to] follow the Communion of Fools.[[75]](#footnote-75)” When simple people debated and sought consensus, another critic maintained, debaters merely “vent[ed] their own private thoughts, and desires, in matters concerning the public and great affairs of the church and state, which can produce no other effect, then the raising and countenancing of contrary parties and factions within the country.”[[76]](#footnote-76) According to critics, deliberation did not lead to consensus expressing consent or to truth, nor did it generate legitimacy or settle affairs. Deliberation brought disaffection and instigated strife. Debate exercised the passions, exposed vanity and revealed demagoguery. Thus, for theoretical and prudential reasons, critics maintained the sectaries should not use the technique to establish political authority or make policy decisions.

**II. Hobbes’s attack on the religious justifications supporting Cromwell.**

In the preceding section I presented six ways the sects used religion to justify the rise of Cromwell and the radicals. In the popular English imagination of the mid to late 1640s and early 1650s, these justificatory methods were attributed to the sects (although the more orthodox churches also relied heavily on the Word). These methods served to persuade mid-seventeenth century Englishman that Cromwell and the radicals had a legitimate claim to power, which, in turn, breed affection for Cromwell and the radicals. And affection brought support. In short, religious justifications served to empower Cromwell and the radicals. Critics therefore did what they could to undermine these justifications.

Joining the chorus of conservative critics who attacked Cromwell and the radicals between 1645 and 1660, Hobbes (although no supporter of the Presbyterians) worked to undermine the religious foundations for authority. Let me begin with the argument from anointment. Hobbes attributes acts of sedition to those who possess “the opinion of being inspired.” Men who hold this opinion “clamour, fight against and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury.”[[77]](#footnote-77) Hobbes also attributes the argument from sainthood to delusional self-conceit or to crafty hypocrisy, challenging the saints’ sanity and integrity.[[78]](#footnote-78) For a man to say “he speaks by supernatural inspiration is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason.”[[79]](#footnote-79)

Moreover, in the first part of *Leviathan* Hobbes uses first philosophy to deepen his attack on the saints’s claim to rule. The justification from sainthood hinged on a spiritualized (i.e., Aristotlean) metaphysics that presupposed the existence of immaterial species or spiritual motions. Hobbes’s materialism uprooted these assumptions by asserting that matter was all that existed.[[80]](#footnote-80) If Englishmen accepted his materialism, then God could not possibly blow or pour sainthood into Cromwell and his followers. Englishmen could challenge the saints by asserting there was no such thing as “inblown virtue,” or “inpoured virtue.”[[81]](#footnote-81) Properly speaking, the saints do not exist because they cannot exist.[[82]](#footnote-82) Men who appeal to divine anointment are therefore affected by a kind of “madness:” “their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind.”[[83]](#footnote-83) Their argument for authority collapses.

If men accepted materialism they could also challenge the saints who claimed authority by virtue of their possession of divine knowledge. Because “apparitions” do not exist, the Holy Ghost cannot “come into the understanding” to give the saints divine truth and certainty.[[84]](#footnote-84) In Chapter 46 of *Leviathan* Hobbes pleads with men, begging them not to be abused by those who encourage civil disobedience or who “lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country” by appealing to their own “wisdom, and other virtue…poured in…sometimes blown in…from Heaven.”[[85]](#footnote-85) Hobbes is pleading with men not to be abused by Cromwell and the radicals.

In *Leviathan* Hobbes goes out of his way to demystify the faculty of understanding. There is no divine light housed within. Like beasts, the saints use concepts drawn from sense perception when they reckon.[[86]](#footnote-86) Unlike beasts, the saints reckon with made-made words. What is crucial given the historical context is “the light of [the] human mind” is not a spiritual light; it is at best “perspicuous words.”[[87]](#footnote-87) Moreover, Hobbes’s argument makes it clear that God does not direct men’s understandings. Human appetites and aversions direct reckoning and the passions have no divine origin.[[88]](#footnote-88) Therefore, seekers like William Walwyn are not using reason to discover God’s truth through meditation and study (i.e., seeking). They are using reason as a scout to satisfy their private passions.[[89]](#footnote-89) The possession of divine knowledge or Ghostly guidance cannot ground Cromwell and the radicals’ authority because neither divine knowledge nor spiritual guidance exist.

Hobbes attacks the saints’s second justification for authority. It supported Cromwell and the radicals’ rule by appealing to prophecies about the Fifth Monarchy or the post-apocalyptic Kingdom of God on Earth.Hobbes acknowledges prophecy has been “a part of human politics” and he writes men use prophecies to “make others more apt to obey them.”[[90]](#footnote-90) He also associates prophecy with sedition and rebellion: if only we could take away the fear of “prognostics from dreams [and] false prophecies…by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be more fitted than they are for civil obedience.”[[91]](#footnote-91) Men can be “frightened into rebellion with the fear of spirits.”[[92]](#footnote-92)

Hobbes spends many pages in *Leviathan* debunking the Fifth Monarchy prophecy and the post-apocalyptic prophecy. [[93]](#footnote-93) In a most succinct passage, he asserts the Kingdom of God is not imminent:

The greatest and main abuse of Scripture…is the wresting of it to prove that the kingdom of God…is the present Church (or multitude of Christian men now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last day)….[The] second coming not yet being, the kingdom of God is not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact, but our civil sovereign.[[94]](#footnote-94)

Hobbes attacks the radicals here; they maintained it was the end of days and they declared Englishmen were now subject to Christ the King (and his chosen saints) by virtue of their covenant with Christ. Hobbes deepens his attack by arguing life on earth can never be as tranquil or complete as Fifth Monarchists or Post-Apocalyptic religious utopians assumed. “While we live here,” writes Hobbes, “there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility…because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense.”[[95]](#footnote-95) The perfectly restful and satisfying Fifth Monarchy or Post-Apocalyptic Kingdom on earth is presently beyond reach.

By demystifying prophecies and prophets and by linking historical events to natural causes, Hobbes offers an even more penetrating attack on Cromwell and his followers. Hobbes is quick to acknowledge “incoherent speech” is “taken for one sort of prophecy,” but he maintains the mysterious ambiguities and contradictories men find in dreams or waking thoughts are not signs of divinity (in need of prophetic interpretation).[[96]](#footnote-96) Inconstant, ambiguous and contradictory patterns of thought and speech have either natural causes or they are absurd babble and unworthy of further consideration.[[97]](#footnote-97) They carry no authoritative insight or weight.

Hobbes also acknowledges that men sometimes attribute divine origins to their visions and voices and use these as the basis of prophesizing. He calls this type of access to God “sense supernatural,” but he maintains visions and voices have causes rooted in the material world:

To say [God] hath spoken to [a man] in a dream is no more than to say [that man] dreamed that God spake to him, which is not of force to win belief from any man that knows dreams are for the most part natural and may proceed from former thoughts (and such dreams as that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man’s own godliness, or other virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favor of extraordinary revelation).[[98]](#footnote-98)

So much for the godly saint’s justification for Cromwell’s and their own authority grounded in prophetic visions and dreams of divine origin.

Hobbes also attacks justifications for authority rooted in prophecy by maintaining that prophesizing is merely the act of engaging in imperfect prudential reasoning.[[99]](#footnote-99) That is, prophecies are uncertain predictions rooted in experiences past and “the best prophet” is just “the best guesser.”[[100]](#footnote-100) Prophets like John Owen and the radical John Saltmarsh who speak with authoritative certainty are either poorly educated and misguided, or self-conceited and vain, or they are Machiavellian “juggling…knav[es].”[[101]](#footnote-101) Englishmen should suspect these prophets: “If a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it….There is nothing [in what a prophet says] that exacteth either belief or obedience.”[[102]](#footnote-102) Arguments for Cromwell and the radicals’ authority from prophecy crumble to the ground.[[103]](#footnote-103)

Hobbes proceeds to attack the saints’ justification for authority from conscience. Appearing deferential, Hobbes acknowledges it is commonly “reputed a very evil act, for any man to speak against his conscience: or to corrupt or force another to do so.” He also writes, “The appeal of conscience has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times.” But we cannot take Hobbes’s deference seriously.[[104]](#footnote-104) Like Cromwell’s other critics, Hobbes associates the contemporary appeal to liberty of conscience with the radical sects: “Men, vehemently in love with their own *new* opinions, though never so absurd” appeal to and act in conscience’s name. He then challenges the sects’ authoritative appeal to conscience by associating the knowledge the sects find in their consciences with private opinion and with passion.[[105]](#footnote-105) The latter has no transcendental root. Conscience is relative and rooted in subjective passion. Alternatively, private conscience is socially constructed out of teachings learned within society.

In *Behemoth*, Hobbes builds upon his claim that society constitutes conscience by asserting “people know nothing of right and wrong by their own [private] meditation; they must therefore be [publicly] taught the grounds of their duty.” [[106]](#footnote-106) Moreover, in *Leviathan* Hobbes famously writes, “in the condition of [war where] men that have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good and evil action,”[[107]](#footnote-107)

Outside of civil society we have moral relativism which leads to war. Within civil society, the sovereign determines what is good and what is evil. Subjects learn the meanings of the sovereign’s terms in church where his ministers indoctrinate his subjects. These teachings give men the conscience they previously lacked.

Cromwell and the Independents encouraged men to consult their unschooled consciences. For Hobbes, Cromwell and the Independents are pernicious because their ‘liberty of conscience’ doctrine brings nothing “but diversity of opinion, and consequently (as man’s nature is) disputation, breach of charity, disobedience, and at last rebellion.[[108]](#footnote-108)” A society that embraces religious toleration or a society that leaves room for the workings of an unschooled conscience will not last long. Like other conservatives of the period, Hobbes maintained men cannot live peacefully together in societies where there are diverse religious views.[[109]](#footnote-109) Hobbes does not shy away from forcing men to submit their wills, their judgments and their consciences to the state. Men must learn or be forced to submit to “the sense of him or them that are constituted by the King to determine the sense of Scripture, upon hearing the particular case of conscience which is in question.”[[110]](#footnote-110) Thus the radicals’ appeal to liberty of conscience as a foundation for resistance and a justification for Cromwell’s authority collapses.

Hobbes challenges arguments supporting Cromwell and the radicals on the basis of divine dispensation. Miracles alone do not “serve for arguments to approve the prophet’s calling,” writes Hobbes.[[111]](#footnote-111) Moreover, miraculous events that “stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the king’s authority” should not be construed as signs of God’s pleasure. That is, Cromwell’s victories in England, Ireland and Scotland do not attest to Cromwell’s anointment, as John Owen maintained. These victories have natural causes, according to Hobbes, because the age of miracles is over. “Miracles now cease,” he asserts.[[112]](#footnote-112) If an Englishman wants to give these seditious events a supernatural twist, then Hobbes tells that man to construe sedition as a “trial.” Cromwell is a “false prophet” in this scenario. He is the Antichrist and through his many victories God tests the faithful and their allegiance to kings.[[113]](#footnote-113) Nowhere does Hobbes suggest men must patiently accept Cromwell’s still-uncertain rise.

Hobbes also challenges the Scriptural arguments the saints used to justify Cromwell’s and the radical’s authority. He begins this challenge by calling into question the divine authority of Scripture itself. Men who “believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself,” have no divine basis for their belief. Men who believe the Bible is God’s word merely trust the men who say it is so. There is no prima facie reason to accept the saint’s interpretation of the Bible as God’s Word any more than the King’s interpretation of it as such, or Hobbes’s interpretation for that matter.

Hobbes then proceeds to attack the three methods Cromwell’s supporters used to craft the Scriptural justifications favoring their authority. First, Hobbes attacks the use of metonymy. Men like John Owen are “mad” because of their fanciful uses of metonymy. Recall that Owen forged similitudes between events in Scripture and events in England. He used these similitudes to justify Cromwell’s rule. According to Hobbes, metonymy easily leads to mistakes. Mistakes are made when men exercise their imagination and forge similitudes but forget to exercise discretion. The similitudes invented by indiscrete men are inapt because they gloss over the important differences that appear if one pays attention to the discrete nature of particular events, places, and persons.[[114]](#footnote-114) Equating Egypt with England and the Israelites with the Saints is an inapt similitude. Equating events in England with the events described in Revelation is also a mistake. Supporters of Cromwell who forged these inapt similitudes to justify Cromwell’s actions and his rule are possessed with a “kind of madness.” They’re fanatics. For Hobbes, similitudes are poetic and ornamental; they may even open a way for better understanding, but they carry no insight or weight. The similitudes crafted by supporters of Cromwell and the radicals do not justify their authority.

Hobbes also undermines the men who combined religion and logic to justify political authority. This strategy did not originate with the sects. In *Behemoth,* Hobbes discusses how popes and priests originally combined divinity with the ancient philosophical method of syllogizing in order to fortify their claim to rule.[[115]](#footnote-115) The use of religious logic enabled the Pope to prove there was “but *one* way to salvation” and that was through “extraordinary devotion and liberality” to the Catholic Church—to the Pope.[[116]](#footnote-116) Attracted by the idea of using logic to ground and fortify civil authority, Hobbes comments on the potency of Pope’s religious logic: the use of logic transfixed the people and cemented the Pope’s authority.[[117]](#footnote-117)

The Catholics were not the only men to use religious logic, however. In *Behemoth* Hobbes hints that Anglicans, Presbyterians and fanatical reformers all used the tactic. In *Leviathan* Hobbes claimed men used religious logic to breed “contention and sedition.”[[118]](#footnote-118) Perhaps undermining his own attempt to establish absolute civil authority through logic, Hobbes warns readers of *Leviathan* who consume syllogisms to take heed of the “nature, disposition, and interest” of the speaker or the writer crafting the syllogism.[[119]](#footnote-119)

In *Leviathan* Hobbes works hard to undermine men who use religious logic to justify sedition and to make the case for their own civil and ecclesiastical authority. He begins by removing logic from the transcendental realm. The latter is the realm of plentitude, fullness, and completeness. Craftily, Hobbes links logic to the worldly realm of incompleteness by associating logic cumbersomely with arithmetic and writing, “Where addition and subtraction…have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do.”[[120]](#footnote-120) Syllogizing is a method one applies to the earthly realm, not the transcendental realm because the former is incomplete and can be added to or subtracted from; the latter, by contrast, is complete and thus nothing can be added to it or subtracted from it. Deepening the separation between religion and logic, Hobbes instructs readers of the Bible “not to labour in sifting out a philosophic truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science.”[[121]](#footnote-121)

Hobbes also deploys materialism to undermine the powerful political and ecclesiastical conclusions the sects deduced using religious logic. Awkwardly Hobbes explains bodies must enter into human syllogizing. When they fail to enter, men make “unfit connextion[s]” between names and craft the wrong assertions.[[122]](#footnote-122) It is safe to assume that bodies do not enter spiritual definitions. Those definitions and their logical conclusions therefore amount to “senseless and ambiguous words.” “Reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities.”[[123]](#footnote-123) Readers are forced to conclude that men like Cromwell’s supporters who used religious logic to ground their civil and ecclesiastical authority “mis-reason;” they “reason wrong, [and] fall upon false and absurd general rules.”[[124]](#footnote-124) Their religious logic carries no weight.

Hobbes also uses his account about the social construction of language to undercut the logical arguments supporting Cromwell and the radicals. The truths these men deduced through the use of religious logic are only conditional truths. Definitions, even those crafted from Scripture, are human constructs that reflect human creativity and will. “True and false are attributes of speech.” They are not attributes of God or the Ghost embodied in Scripture.[[125]](#footnote-125) Logical conclusions carry no transcendental authority. Definitions and the proper connections between them gain authority only through “our affirmations,” and our learning and use of them. Thus, arguments supporting Cromwell and the radicals that relied upon religious logic and upon the assumption that God affirmed the conclusions of this logic fall to the ground.[[126]](#footnote-126)

Finally, Hobbes attacks Cromwell’s and the radicals’ use of deliberation as a method to justify their rebellion and their claim to authority. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes links disputation to Socrates and Plato, the schools, the Jews, and to “congregations of the people” who gather around “Paul’s church” in London and around “the Exchange.” Given the historical context, we should assume Hobbes is talking about the congregations of radical men in the Army and in society who gathered to expound, dispute and decide matters spiritual and civil.

What does Hobbes have to say about this radical deliberative practice? He writes that the practice is not useful and is politically dangerous. Deliberation is not useful as a legitimating device because what deliberators express is simply a “description of their own passions.”[[127]](#footnote-127) Moreover, men who bring political and religious questions to the bar of deliberation are misguided by their own vanity: thinking themselves wiser than others they “seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other men’s reason, but their own.”[[128]](#footnote-128) Deliberation amounts to a power-struggle between passionate, self-interested and conceited men. A shared, public morality or point of view does not surface through deliberation; ““No one man’s reason, nor the reason of anyone number of men makes the certainty [in any deliberation]; no more than an account is thereof well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it.” Deliberation is useless because it cannot perform the legitimizing function the radicals believed it could perform.

Deliberation is also politically dangerous. Deliberators “make the rules of good and bad by their own liking and disliking, by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on, but everyone one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of commonwealth.”[[129]](#footnote-129) Deliberation leads to factional strife and it creates the conditions for civil war. During wartime, deliberation is also politically dangerous. It leads to further factional splintering. Men “distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily…subdued by a very few that agree together.”[[130]](#footnote-130) Hobbes intends to disempower Cromwell and the saints by claiming their deliberative method will inevitably lead them to war amongst themselves; deliberation will disunite and disempower the saints. It will create opportunities for the royalists.

**Conclusion**

I argue we should interpret *Leviathan* as a text attacking the religious justifications supporting Cromwell and the radicals. Given this interpretation, we should consider the possibility that Hobbes intended his attack to breed disaffection for both. We should also consider the possibility that Hobbes intended the very disaffection he created to lead the people to withdraw their support from Cromwell and the radicals. By disempowering them Hobbes’s *Leviathan* intended tocreate opportunities for the deeply conservative, Anglican royalists who argued in favor of the king’s absolute authority over matters civil and spiritual.

Arguments for civil and ecclesiastical absolutism and for the subordination of religion to the state were commonly associated with the king. At least up until 1651 when Hobbes published *Leviathan*, Cromwell was popularly celebrated as a general who resisted civil and ecclesiastical absolutism. In addition to attacking the religious justifications for Cromwell’s authority, Hobbes’s *Leviathan* explains why the king’s absolutist position is compatible with right reason. *Leviathan*‘s logic tries to demonstrate the necessity of absolute authority. *Leviathan* also argues absolutism is in the subject’s best interest, and the text uses rhetoric and imagery to defend the view. In attempting to justify absolutism, *Leviathan* intends to breed affection for the royalists who embraced absolutism. It intends to breed affection for the Stuart line. *Leviathan* therefore encourages readers to give their support to the king. *Leviathan* intends to empower Charles II and to disempower Cromwell at a time when the latter’s victory over the former was not yet settled.

1. See for example: Edward Hyde, *A brief view and survey of the dangerous and pernicious errors to church and state in Mr. Hobbes’ book entitled Leviathan* (Oxford, 1676), 5; John Wallis, Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos (Oxford, 1662), 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Quentin Skinner, ‘Conquest and Consent: Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy,’ in *Visions of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Springborg, Patricia, *“*Hobbes’s Fool the *Insipiens,* and the Tyrant-King,” *Political Theory* 2011, 39(1) 85-11, p.94. Hoeksra, Kinch, *“*Hobbes and the Fool,” *Political Theory* 23, no.5 (1997): 620-654; and Hoekstra, “Nothing to Declare? Hobbes and the Advocate of Injustice,” *Political Theory 27* (1999): 230-35., 39(1) 85-11, p.94. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Collins, Jeffrey 2007. *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes,* Oxford University Press: Oxford. Tuck, Richard, *Hobbes,* Oxford 1989, 29-30, 32. Tuck, *Philosophy and Government 1572-1651*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 336. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Collins, 2007, p.120-131. For a persuasive rejection of Collins’s argument that *Leviathan* supports the congregational form and liberty of conscience see Sommerville, Johann 2004 “Hobbes and Independency,” *Rivisita di storia della philosofia*,21, 155-173. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Thomas Hobbes, Mr Hobbes Considered in his Loyalty; Religion, Reputaiton, and Manners, by way of a letter of Dr. Wallis (1662), 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Burgess, Glen X [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Burgess, Glen 1990 “Contexts for Hobbes’s *Leviathan,”* *History of Political Thought,* 11 (4), 675-702, 676. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For the view that Parliament had definitively won the war by 1646 see G.E. Aylmer, “Introduction: Quest for Settlement, 1646-1660.” in *The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement,*  ed. G.E. Aylmer, (Archon Books, 1972) 1-28, p.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Sommerville, Johann S, 2009, *“*’Behemoth’, Church-State Relations and Political Obligation”*.* in *Hobbes’s Behemoth: Religion and Democracy,*  edited by Tomaz Mastnak, (London, Imprint-Academic Press), pp.93-111. For the distinction between traditional Anglicanisn and new Anglicanism (of the Laudian variety) see Lamont, William, 1969 *Godly Rule: Politics and Religion 1603-1660.* McMillan: St. Martin Press, chpts 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Not all historians see a clear divide between the Independents and the Presbyterians in Parliament. See, for example, David Underdown’s *Pride’s Purge: Politics and the Puritan Revolution* (Harper Collins, 1985). Hobbes, however, clearly considered the division significant in *Behemoth*; see especially Part III and IV. To assume that Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* as a response to Cromwell’s rise is not especially controversial. See, for example, Collins, *The Allegiance,* 2005, p.118, 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Hobbes, X [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. That one man cannot establish dominion by himself through force see *Leviathan,* p.111; see also Chpt. 31, p.236 [Curley]. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Hobbes, Leviathan, 166. See also p.170; Hobbes states the sovereign’s strength hinges upon his subject’s vigor. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. As Hobbes puts it, “The actions of men proceed from their opinions,” *Leviathan,* 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Hobbes, Behemoth, 135. Hobbes also wrote, “The cause of my writing that Book [*Leviathan]*…was the consideration of what the Ministers before and in the beginning of the Civil War, by their preaching and writing did contribute thereunto.” *Six lessons to the Professor of the Mathematiques.* (London, 1656), p 56; *Vita* [prose], 7. found in Collins, *Allegiance,*2007, 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Hobbes Behemoth, p. X [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Hobbes, Behemoth, 3, 22, 138, 169, 185. For an earlier articulation of the connection between liberty of conscience and Cromwell’s supporters see *De Cive,* 10 and 240-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. For an account of the sectarians intolerance of Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian church governance see Blair Worden, “Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate,’ in W. J. Sheils (ed.) *Persecution and Toleration* (London, 1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Hobbes, Behemoth, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. In *first and second part of Gangraena,* the Presbyterian Thomas Edwards writes, “The Army…[is] made up and compounded of Anabaptisme, Antinomianism, Enthusiasm, Arminianism, Familisme, all these errors and more to sometimes meeting in the same persons…having their heads of Enthusiasm, their bodies of Antinomianism, their thighs of Familism, their legs and feet of Anabaptism, their hands of Arminianism and Libertinism (14).” [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Hobbes, Behemoth, 3, 135, 169, 175, 181,186. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Worden, Blair 2012 *God’s Instruments,* chpt 1*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See for example,Anon, 1647, *The Anabaptists late protestation. Or their*

    *resolution to depart the city of London*, p.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. For a competing view see Jeffrey Collins who aligns the Indenpedents with the Erastians, *The Allegiance,* 101-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Thomas, Keith, 1971 *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Belief in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century England* (Harmondsworth), ch. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Thomas, 1971, chapter 4; Walsham, Alexandra 1999, *Providence in Early Modern England*, Oxford, p.333-334. See also Blair Worden, 1985 “Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England,” Past & Present, No.109 (Nov.) pp.55-99, esp. 57-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Bastwick, John 1646 *The utter routing of the whole army of all the independents and sectaries, with the total overthrow of their hierarchy, or, independency not gods ordinance in which all the frontiers of the presbytery are defended.* London, [Epistle to the Reader, pG1; Antilogique, p.F3] [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. For “new lights” see, Anon, 1649 *Balaams Asse; or the city-fast for cursing the king and blessing oliver,* London, p.1; Thomas Edwards’ *Gangraena*, 456. Edwards writes , *“*Sectaries are great Innovators…bringing into their Churches new opinions daily, new practices, taking away the old used in all Reformed Churches*…*[They bring in] strange ways and practices.” [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Behemoth, 135-136 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See for example, Anon. *1647 The tertian-ague growing into an Independent fever, p. 4* [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See especially Thomas Edwards’s *Gangreana, 12*. He writes, “I may justify the ranking and joining of Independents with other sectaries, not only because all the sectaries…are Independents…but because the Independents do join themselves with the other sectaries adhering to them, and to this day have never stood as a divided party from them, but upon all occasions have and do make one common body with them, to hold together against the Orthodox and Presbyterians.” [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Bradstock, Andrew 2011, *Radical Religion in Cromwell’s England (*London: I.B.Taurus Press, xix-xx). See also Hill, Christopher, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (Harmondswoth, 1975). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Blair Worden, 2012 *God’s Instruments: Political Conduct in the Engalndof Oliber Cromwell.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a more instrumental view of Cromwell’s supporters see Mark A. Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army* (Cambridge, 1979), 92-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Mingzeis, Alexander. 1647 The down-fall of Babylon p.17. Mingzeis claims the Independents identified themselves as saints, but other sects were also identified as saints. See Thomas Edwards, 1646, *The second part of Ganreanan, p.37, 55;* A Christian Brother, 1647 *The Independents dream* (London), p.1; Anon, 1650 *One blovv more at Babylon,* p7; Anon.1643 *A revindication of Psalem 105.15 Touch not mine anointed & from some false glosses, now and heretofore obtruded upon it by Anabapitsts;*  Bastwick, John 1646 *The utter routing,* Epistle to the Reader, p.F1. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. For God “passing into the soul” see Ames, William 1652 *The saints security against tseducing spirits,* p. 17. For “effusion” and “pouring” see Ibid, p.6; [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Owen, John 1644, *The duty of pastors and people distinguished,* London, 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ames, William 1652 *The saints,* 17. See also, Anon, 1647*Propositions to both Houses of Parliament for gathering of churches****,*** 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Anon. 1647 *The tertian-ague growing into an Independent fever,* 5.The Presbyterian Edwards (1646) attributes the claim of spiritual revelation to the sects. They are men who are “waiting what [God] will record in [their] heart, and in that measure worship him in spirit and truth from the teaching of the Spirit (16).” [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Bastwick, John 1646 *The utter routing*, [Epistle to the Reader, pF1] [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Mingzeis, *The down-fall*,17. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Anon, 1650 *One blovv more at Babylon* London, p.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. For an alternative interpretation of church-state relations amongst Cromwell and his followers see Jeffrey Collins, p.101-114. Collins maintains the deference the Independents showed to the Christian magistrates suggests Erastianism. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Anon.1643 *A revindication of Psalm 105.15 Touch not mine anointed & from some false glosses, now and heretofore obtruded upon it by Anabaptists, 2-3*. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Bastwick, *The utter routing* [Epistle to the Reader, p.B4] [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Bastwick, T*he utter routing* [Epistle to the reader p.C3] [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Lamont, William 1969, 17-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. For an alternative view of Owen see Collins, *The Allegiance,* 103-105. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Owen, John 1651 *The advantage of the kingdom of Christ, in the shaking of the kingdoms of the world:*, *or Providential alterations in their subserviencie to Christ's exaltation Opened, in a sermon preached to the Parliament, Octob. 24. 1651. a solemn day of thanksgiving for the destruction of the Scots army at Worcester,* , [London] : Imprinted at Oxford p.3-4. See also, Anon, 1650 *One blovv more at Babylon:*, p.2. See also Worden, “Providence, 55-99 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Bastwick, 1646,*The utter routing,* 60-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Edwards, *Gangraena*, p.13. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Anon 1661. *Munster paralled in the laste massacred committed by the Fifth Monarchists, p.3-4* [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Edwards, *Gangraena,* p,58; Mingzeis, *The down-fall,* 6-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Anon, 1648,*Fourteene strange prophesies****…****Whereto is added the predictions of Mr. John Saltmarch, to his Excellency, and the counsell of his army. And the manner of his death*. P.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Anon, 1660 *A brief description or character of the religion and manners of the phanatiques in general*. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *Anon.* 1643 *The round-heads catechism,* London, *21.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Anon 1661. *Munster paralled in the laste massacred committed by the Fifth Monarchists, 2.* [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. A Christian Brother, 1647 *The Independents Dream,* London, 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Anon, *The tertian-ague,5* [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Anon, *The independent catechism, 6-7;* Anon, *Munster paralled,1.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Cook, John 1647 *What the Independents would have, or, A character, declaring some of their tenents, and their desires to disabuse those who speak ill of that they know not,* London, p.3. See Sommerville, “Hobbes and Independency,” 164-166. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Goodwin John 1647 *Independencie Gods veritit: or the necessity of toleration*, p.8. See also Anon, *The Anabaptist catechism*, 1645, p.2-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Anon,1647 *A bloody Independent plot discovered,* London, 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Anon, 1647 *A battaile fought between a Presbyterian cock of the right breed, and a craven of the Independent breed*, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. For divine dispensation’s place in de facto theory see Glenn Burgess, 1986, “Usurpation, Obligation and Obedience in the Thought of the Engagement Controversey,” *Historical Journal* Vol 29, (3), 515-536, especially 520-521. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Owen, *The duty of pastors,* 33-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Owen writes, “Such things have been brought to pass as have filled the world with amazement…What is this but the must effectual design of the lord, to carry on the interest of Christ and the Gospel, whatever stands in the way,” 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Walwyn, William 1649 *Vanitie of the Present Churches, 19.* [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Ames, 1652 *The saints security,* 28-29. For more on this point see Worden 1985, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Anon, 1647 *The independent catechism*, London, 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Owen, 1651 *The advantage of the kingdom of Christ,* 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. . For Bastwick’s discussion of how the Independents used sllyogisms to advance their cause see “The Antilogique” in *The utter routing ,1646.* p.d5, e1, e5, f3; see also the main text of *The utter routing,*  7-11, 37, 41, 46, 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Worden 1985, p.74. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Cook, John 1647 *What the Independents would have,* p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Walywyn, *The Vavity of the Present Churches*, p.45-46. *Anon.* 1643 *The round-heads catechism p.*15 [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Anon, *The Anabaptist catechism*, 1645 p.2. See also Edwards, *The second part,*52. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Anon. *A declaration set forth by the Presbyterians within the county of Kent. P.3.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.63. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.10, 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Hobbes, Leviathan, curley, p.247, Chapter 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapt. 34, p.261, Curley. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Hobbes, Leviathan, 27. See also Chapter 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. See also, Leviathan, all of Chapter 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Hobbes, Leviathan, 69,70. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Hobbes, Leviathan, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 46, p.460, Curley. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Hobbes, Leviathan, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Hobbes, Leviathan, 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Hobbes, Leviathan, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Hobbes, Leviathan, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Hobbes, Leviathan, 93, 99, 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.10 [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.168 [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. See Leviathan, Chapter 44 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Hobbes Leviathan, curley, chapter 44, p.412-413. Consider also, “[God’s] kingdom is not yet come, nor shall [the people] foreknow when it shall come; for it shall come as a thief in the night.” Leviathan, chapter 44, curley, p.422. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Hobbes Leviathan, 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Hobbes, Leviathan, 284 [Curley ed.]. See also102, 106 [Molesworth]. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Hobbes, Leviathan, 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Curley, Chapter 32, p.247. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* 15, 35. Hobbes calls prudence a science on page 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Hobbes Leviathan, 15. Consider also Hobbes’s claim, “Men have no other rule to guess by ,but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time…and from the like things past, they expect the like things to come,” 97. See also p.98. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. For prophets as ignorant, or vain and conceited see Leviathan, 103, for prophets as juggling knaves see Leviathan, 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Hobbes, Leviathan, Curley, p.247, Chapter 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Hobbes, Leviathan, 97; see especially 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. For a contrasting view consider Jeffrey Collins, 2007, p.123-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. For conscience as private opinion see Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.53; for conscience as private passion see Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.41. For the association between the sects and the doctrine of liberty of conscience see *Behemoth*, 3; see also *Leviathan*, p.168. Professor Jeffrey Collins overlooks the way Hobbes challenges appeals to conscience by reducing them to passionate appeals. For example, Collins quotes a passage where Hobbes says conscience is nothing but what a man “liketh best,” but Collins uses this passage to demonstrate Hobbes’s deference for conscience. Collins, 2007, 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Hobbes, Behemoth, p.144 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.464, chapter 46. Curley. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Hobbes, Behemoth, p.144 [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Contrast with Collins who declares Hobbes supports the Independents’ pluralistic and statist religious settlement. Collins, 2007, 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Hobbes, Behemoth, p.51. For the lay teaching of conscience see Sampson, Margaret 1990, “’Will You Hear What a Casuist He Is? Thomas Hobbes as Director of Consciense” in *History of Political Thought,* 11 (4), pp.721-736. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Hobbes, Leviathan, curley, p.248 [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Hobbes, Leviathan, Curley, p.249 [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Hobbes, Levaitha, Curley, p.248 [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.58 [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Hobbes, *Behemoth, p.92* [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Hobbes, Behemoth, p.43 [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Hobbes, *Behemoth,* P.95 [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.37 [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.29 [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Hobbes,*Leviathan,* p.30 [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Hobbes, Leviathan, Curley, p.246 (Chapter32). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.34. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Hobbes, Leviathan, [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.36, 37 [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.23 [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.23. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Hobbes, leviathan, p.456, curley edition, chapter 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Hobbes, Leviathan p.31 [check, Behemoth?] [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.457. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.155 [↑](#footnote-ref-130)