

The Evolution of Post-Racialism

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Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hollywood, CA March 28th-March 30th. Please do not cite.

Abstract

Following the election of President Obama, the term “post-racial” became inherently linked with American politics. In particular, the notion of post-racialism has been used to denote the current political appetite for issues historically associated with Blacks. Via ANOVA testing of a sequence of questions regarding the perspectives of Black political outcomes from the ANES panel data from 2006 to 2010, the author investigates the claim of “post-racialism” in American politics by examining the change in racial attitudes towards Blacks over time. The research bears out that the racially driven perspectives of Whites, Blacks and Latinos actually broadened during this time. Additionally, perspectives of Black race issues became more extreme over time in certain demographics of the population. Though the term has recently become ubiquitous, this research confirms that its evolution has spanned a much longer period.

When President Barack Obama was elected in November of 2008, America was said to have become a “post-racial” society (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). And although several Black candidates had previously campaigned for the presidency, including Jesse Jackson and Shirley Chisholm, President Obama had been viewed as the most likely candidate to achieve success politically due to his unique campaign and approach to mobilizing voters (Sinclair-Chapman and Price, 2008). By electing the first Black person into the highest position of leadership in the country, many argued that the lingering animosities between racial groups and, more importantly, toward Blacks had finally dissipated. This also meant, to some, that an individual’s racial identity no longer presented a real barrier to the achievements one might attain. Many had hoped that the collective socio-political culture of America had moved beyond racial identifiers as indicators of ability, character, and/or worth. But, was this assertion timely or premature?

This research seeks to examine whether, in the years pre- and post-election of President Obama, voters have actually become less polarized along racial lines which the term “post-racial” infers. And, due to the ongoing disparity between Whites, Blacks and Latinos, the post-racial proclamation subverts actual calls for racial, political and economic equality thereby diminishing efforts to mitigate factual inequality between these distinct racial groups (Teasley and Ikard 2010).

Though the idea of a Black president has always been a distant conception, it is now a reality. President Obama’s presidency has provided the basis for the examination of political outcomes as a direct result of racial stimulation. It also suggests a very different electoral future for the country and the country’s growing body of minority political leaders; for prominent

leaders like Cory Booker, the current Democratic Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, and Harold Ford, Jr., previous Democratic Congressman for the ninth district of Tennessee, President Obama's mere existence should provide a promising outlook. However, the country's socio-political future may have yet to be impacted on a large scale. And, premature calls for post-racialism could be more damaging to the already friable understanding of race relations in the country.

"RACE" FRAMING AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF POST-RACIALISM

Racial inequality in America is often seen in black and white. And, perceived negative attitudes toward Blacks from Whites have long defined the setting of racial discourse in the country (Tate 1989). Often these two racial groups fall on opposite sides of the racial gap when judgments of racial parity are made (Craemer 2011). And, studies of these two groups' perspectives on race have largely been isolated from one another (Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Contextually, this illuminates the issue of race, in a political sense, and also where it colors the perceptions of many Blacks. Due to the measureable change in electoral politics within the Black community since the 1965 Voting Rights Act was passed, moving from a liberation era into one of heightened civic engagement, race relations have been a prime concern for political actors for some time (Tate 1989). Therefore, to fully realize the framework and consequence of the term "post-racial" in a general sense, one must qualify the concept by noting that it invariably refers to the issues and judgments associated with the Black race as opposed to the larger body of racial minorities. And, its use has a direct impact on Black sociopolitical attainment and electoral outcomes.

This established dichotomy between Whites and Blacks acts as a foundational schema for race dialogue. This has some basis in prior work which found that racial cues did indeed have an impact on White and Black voters' electoral choices (Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg. 1991; Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988). Additionally, differing levels and causes of political engagement and participation between Whites and racial minorities has long been established as persistent features of the American political system (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Leighley 1995). And, for Blacks, race plays a significant role in mobilization. Hayes and McKee (2012) found that redistricting had a demobilizing impact overall but worked to mobilize Black voters when they were redistricted into districts with Black incumbents. Similarly, the presence of racial resentment in policy preference and voters' choices has an extensive history spanning over twenty years (Tuch and Hughes 2011). This means that perceived racial tensions have the potentiality to adversely affect electoral outcomes for racial minorities. To add to this concept, Valentino and Sears (2005) found that racial resentment played a significant role in politics in the realignment of voting districts in the South even when it was not addressed directly. In other words, socialized racial cues have an impact not only on voters' decisions but also on structural political factors affecting the electorate. These foundational concepts add to and establish the racial framework from which the term "post-racialism" has emerged.

What is essential to note about the declaration of post-racialism in America is that it arose as a direct result of a Black president elect. This leads one to question whether the assertion would have been made if the first minority president were Asian, Native, or Latino American, for example. A logical place to begin might be with Moynihan's seminal piece on the Black family published amidst the landmark sequence of legislation and rulings establishing

equal protections and rights for Black Americans in the mid-1950s and 1960s¹. In the work, Moynihan (1965, Ch.4) coins the concept of the “cycle of poverty” which noted a cultural difference for Blacks as opposed to an institutional basis for their current lowered socioeconomic status. This critical articulation of the Black community helped frame the outlook of Blacks as the least innately-skilled racial minority group and thereby the most significantly different ethnic group from the general populace (Furstenberg 2009). This pervading framework helps explain the use of the Black race to both substantiate racialized perspectives and to simultaneously prove that racial issues no longer exist. It follows that if a member of the Black community, the least well-off of all racial groups, is able to reach the presidency, then surely, America *must* be beyond race altogether.

Quintessentially, this normative framework has set the parameters for dialogue concerning race and race relations. Yet, these prototypical characterizations of race relations incorrectly truncate the discussion of race as a political concept (Bonilla-Silva 1997). If the lingering effect of the country’s historical quandary with race and racial inequality is to be truly understood, the framework itself must be redefined to include a contemporary model of racial attitudes. Typically, race dialogue deals with clear racism and racial resentment (Tuch and Hughes 2011; Bonilla-Silva 1997). Yet, these types of racism appear to be on the decline². Outright racism may surely be diminishing and President Obama’s election might indeed be a mildly correlative example of that fact, but, the conversation about race must

¹ Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Civil Rights Act 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 (Affirmative Action) in 1965 and the Voting Rights Act 1965

² This note refers to the alleviation of Jim Crow laws and the suppressive acts of segregation prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These types of acts resulted in direct confrontation between racial groups in the Civil Rights Era (Shingles 1981).

necessarily be transformed if it is to comprise today's racial narrative (Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Franko 2010; Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). The dated notion that racial attitudes can be measured by outright racial acts insufficiently addresses the implicit nuances of modern racialism.

To mollify this necessary transformation, this study separates outright racial discrimination and prejudice from modern racialism. In its most basic sense, this term refers to the socialized impressions or resolutions established due to institutionalized White racial dominance³. For example, overt political prejudice might mean that White voters choose not to vote for a candidate because he is Black while modern racialism⁴ would instead suggest that White voters choose not to vote for a candidate because his or her Black race makes him or her less empathetic to their ideological affiliations or simply, deemed less equipped to lead (Sigelman et al. 1995; Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Franko 2010; Anderson and Junn 2009). This goes beyond mere stereotyping and prejudices. Modern racialism comprises the passive acknowledgement of race as a demarcation between individuals that colors positive *or* negative attitudes and opinions about racial minorities (Czopp and Monteith 2006). Simply identifying racial minorities as the "other" generates the racist perspective. These racially driven ideas color socio-political decision-making thereby establishing the concept of modern racialism.

To continue with the analysis of racialized views toward Blacks, Anderson and Junn (2009) found that altering the levels of President Obama's perceived "blackness" had an impact on White Democrats' ratings of his empathy. Conversely, White Republicans had no statistically

³ Referred to as "color-blind racism" (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011, 192)

⁴ Referred to as "modern or aversive racism" (Sigelman et al. 1995)

significant response to increased racializing of President Obama. Nonetheless, varying degrees of “blackness” had a direct impact on then candidate Obama’s electoral potential. Though his credentials and qualifications remained stagnant, Whites’ perception of his personal affiliation with the Black community altered their perception of his electability (Anderson and Junn 2009). To contend with the perception that racial attitudes color voter decisions, Highton (2004) found that there was little statistical significance in White voters’ preferences for House representatives in self-reported exit poll data. A potential explanation for these findings was that Whites tend to be more racially aware and therefore more likely to alter their responses so as not to appear prejudiced (Anderson and Junn 2009, 464; Highton 2004). White attitudes toward Black candidates are especially important because of the need for coalition building in order for Black candidates to achieve political longevity and success (Terkildsen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1995; Stanley 1986). Therefore, it follows that White perceptions of race or tensions associated with race are especially important in understanding the future successes of minority - especially Black - political candidates.

Amidst this discussion of race and its impact on policy preferences and electoral choices, there is a substantial body of work attributing voters’ choices to an array of other factors. There is significant research identifying factors like time, money, and civic skills (resource model) as key indicators of political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Lewis-Beck and Tien (2008, 690) found that although the economic outcomes for voters were significant influences on electoral choices, Obama’s vote getting potential could be directly hampered by his being “Black, rather than White.” However, after the 2008 election, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2009) found that although socio-demographics colored the vote in for President Obama,

economic conditions were the most important factor in the election. These factors, though integral in understanding voting decisions and electoral preferences, do not help to clarify the pervading structures contributing to modern racialism. Racialism acts as an origin for the political decisions these works are concerned with.

The framework of modern racialism is imperative in understanding the term post-racial because it emphasizes the fact that, at some point, America was racial and now, it is not. This means that those who would proclaim this theory are affirming two things: 1) the prior existence of racially charged perceptions, and 2) the subsequent absence of said racialism or racially based outlooks following the election of President Obama. Therefore, this research focuses on modern racialism itself. It aims to directly tackle the concept of post-racialism by investigating the presence of racially motivated attitudes and judgments toward Black Americans which, by the standard of post-racialism proclamation, should no longer exist.

RACIAL INEQUALITY, BLACK STATUS, AND DISPARITY TRENDS

The declaration of post-racialism in America connotes a disharmony between factual inequality and acknowledged inequality. As mentioned previously, the term itself denotes an era of socio-political structure that is not contingent on race. Therefore, it would follow that racial groups would no longer face disparity as a result of the country's prior issues with overt racism. To analyze this claim, several baseline indicators of economic and educational parity, income, unemployment, and high school dropout rates can be easily reviewed.

First, median weekly earnings for full-time and salaried workers in the country depict a continued trend of disparity. In 2008, White wage-earners made an average of \$742 per week

where Black and Latino workers made \$589 and \$529 per week, respectively (U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009a). In 2010, these figures followed the same general trend at \$765 per week for White wage-earners, \$611 for Black American workers and \$535 for Latino Americans in the workforce (U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011a). During this period, both Whites and Blacks saw a 3-4 percent increase in average weekly salaries while Latinos saw only a 1 percent increase. Blacks saw an approximately \$150 deficit in average weekly earnings when compared to their White counterparts in both years. In this instance, race transcendence does not appear to apply especially for Black and Latino Americans.

Another common indicator of socio-economic stability and overall personal equity is unemployment. What is most striking about unemployment data for those over 25 years of age is that Black unemployment rates are nearly double the rates of Whites in both years at 7.9 percent versus 4.1 percent in 2008 and 13.4 percent versus 7.5 percent 2010 (U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009b; U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011b). What is also very critical to note is that in 2008, Black unemployment rates were 30 percent higher than Latinos and 25 percent higher in 2010. When taken together with the changes in average weekly earnings, it is reasonable to assume that the increase in unemployment with a parallel increase in weekly earnings for Black Americans means that the total wages within the racial group came from a smaller pool of individuals. On the other hand, the lower rates of unemployment among Latinos coupled with lowered average weekly earnings statistics denotes that the racial group probably occupied lower paying jobs at

a higher rate than Black wage earners. Both narratives pale in comparison to the consistently lower unemployment rates for Whites.

Education status is of great importance in determining future wealth and economic standing for individuals and families. As such, high school graduation and conversely, dropout rates are paramount in analyzing those outcomes. In 2008, the high school dropout rate for Whites was 4.8 percent while Blacks were nearly double that at 9.9 percent (National Center for Education Statistics 2011). Most strikingly, Latinos' high school dropout rates were nearly double those of Blacks at 18.3 percent (National Center for Education Statistics 2011). The statistics improved moving into 2010 with Blacks' dropout rates at 57 percent higher than Whites' and Latinos' rates at 89 percent higher than Blacks. These data are in line with the findings for average weekly earnings and unemployment rates.

Though there are a host of methods used to analyze racial equality, these three foci help to provide foundation for the inadequacy of a premature declaration of post-racialism. Whites had significantly lower unemployment and high school dropout rates than Blacks and Latinos. And, they had much higher average weekly earnings from year to year. In addition, Blacks and Latinos consistently fall behind their White counterparts in the areas which count most toward long-term familial and individual wealth. Moynihan (1965) rooted much of this issue for the Black community in the Black family structure as opposed to institutionalized White racial dominance (Bonilla-Silva 1997). However, if the Black family structure was truly the cause of the pervading inequality for Blacks, one would expect to see a differing trend for Latinos. Based on these indicators, the issues remain for Latinos, and, in the case of earnings, and dropout rates,

they are more extreme than in the Black community. What is most important to surmise from these analyses is that the socioeconomic situation for Black Americans has yet to improve. Therefore, public opinion that race is no longer an issue, especially for Blacks, could not possibly have originated from *actual* equality measures. Instead, a *desire* to move past race and an effort to ignore its ongoing impacts to racial minorities, are the catalyst legitimizing these calls for race transcendence and post-racialism.

DATA AND FINDINGS

These analyses show that racial inequality still exists. However, one must continue to investigate the notion of post-racialism as a theoretical framework. Using the American National Election Studies from the 2008 post-election time series data and 2010 election study, I have chosen three questions which were repeated in each installment of the poll. The questions were unavailable in the 2004 panel while the 2006 study consisted of pilot data not officially included in the ANES panel series. These questions asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed (1 being strongly agree and 5 being strongly disagree) with the following questions:

- A. *“Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class”*
- B. *“Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve”*
- C. *“It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites”*

To measure the central focus of this paper, post-racialism, responses both within and across survey years have been analyzed.

Within Survey Years (2008, 2010)

To affirm the post-racial declaration, one would expect to see that, within both years, White, Black, and Latino respondents possess similar views of Blacks as measured by these three questions. If race, the Black race in particular, is no longer an issue to the electorate, this fact would be most visible in unity across the three questions and in overall neutrality of responses. Instead, Table 1 shows that, in 2008, White respondents had an average response of 3.25 on a scale of 1 to 5 for question A. This means that White respondents were in slight disagreement with the idea that past slavery made it difficult for Blacks to exit the lower class. Blacks and Latinos slightly agreed with this claim at 2.40 and 2.62, respectively. On question B, White respondents slightly disagreed that Blacks had gotten less than they deserved in recent years at an average response of 3.56. Blacks slightly agreed with an average response of 2.33 and Latino Americans were almost neutral at 3.13. In question C, all racial groups were in slight agreement that if Blacks worked harder they would be as well off as Whites. White and Latino respondents averaged 2.37 and 2.23 respectively. Similarly, Black Americans were slightly more neutral at 2.60.

From first review, these responses do not seem to vary drastically. However, the multiple group ANOVA results in Table 3 show that the difference between groups in questions A and B reach significance at the $p < .001$ level. Responses on question C reach significance at

the $p < .01$ level. Since the groups vary significantly from one another, post-racialism is not proven in the case of 2008.

Since the claim of post-racialism was made after the election of President Obama, one would expect to see that even if the theory was not proven in the 2008 post-election data, it would emerge – at least slightly – in the 2010 election year. For question A, Whites answered with an average response of 3.51 (slightly disagree) and Latinos were in the same general area at 3.41. However, Blacks answered at an average response of 2.33 (slightly agree). The difference between groups was significant at the $p < .001$ level. On question B, the same pattern is apparent. Whites and Latinos answered with an average response of 3.72 and 3.67, respectively. Blacks, on the other hand, had an average response of 2.41. The difference between groups was also significant at the $p < .001$ level. Lastly, question C shares the same general trend. Whites and Latinos were in line with one another at 2.62 (neutrality) and 2.57, respectively. Blacks, instead, were in slight disagreement at 3.64. Like questions A and B, this difference is significant at the $p < .001$ level.

These analyses disprove the claim that racial groups are beyond race or are post-racial because the groups differ significantly from one another in their perceptions of the Black race. Additionally, the extremities of the responses, as opposed to neutrality, show that racially tinged judgments are still significant in the American electorate.

Across Survey Years (2008-2010)

Now that post-racialism has been disproven, we must now focus attention on the change since President Obama's first election. Based on the three measurements of

socioeconomic success analyzed previously – unemployment, high school dropout rates, and average weekly earnings – we see that the actual status of Blacks has remained relatively flat. Therefore, an indication of President Obama as catalyst would be evident if more extreme responses were provided in the direction least favorable to Black Americans' consistent disparity. In other words, if responses increase in disagreement on the first two questions and increase in agreement on the last question, it would be evident that respondents were overlooking pervading race related issues in the Black community. This is particularly true because, on average, there have been no factual changes in the status of Black Americans to warrant any drastic changes in perceived status.

The difference of means test for Whites from 2008 to 2010, shows that the variance from year to year was significant at the $p < .001$ level for questions A and B (Table 6). The variance for question C was significant at the $p < .01$ level. This means that the more extreme responses from Whites to questions A and B (Tables 1 and 2), were significantly different from one another. For Blacks, the difference of means test shows that the variances were all significant at the $p < .01$ level. Again, the more extreme responses (Tables 1 and 2) given by Blacks are worth noting here (Table 8). An interesting component of this analysis is that the only question whose difference was significant from year to year for Latinos was question B, over the past few years black have gotten less than they deserve. On this question, Latinos went from virtual neutrality to slight disagreement. This difference was significant at $p < .05$ level. Analyzing the changes in responses from 2008 to 2010, we see that the responses for the groups did indeed get more extreme but only in the cases of Whites and Blacks did that difference reach statistical significance. In the White respondent data, this change can be

attributed to the heightened racial transcendence language which became popular after President Obama's election. For Black respondents, their opposite reaction might represent increased racial solidarity in response to the calls for racial transcendence regarding Black issues with inequality.

Post Hoc Analysis (2008-2010)

Another key indication of race transcendence politics is the transference of race related perceptions to the group or groups being perceived (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). In this case, Blacks are being perceived as no longer experiencing ongoing issues with past discrimination, years of inequality, or lack of opportunity to work in the same capacity as other racial groups, namely Whites. However, what is most striking about these facts is that they directly contend with the opinions that Blacks hold of their own racial status. Table 4 shows the post hoc analysis of the 2008 ANOVA data presented earlier. The Bonferroni test isolates the differences between the groups so that the relationships can be identified intrinsically. In the table, we see that, on question A, the differences were between Whites and Blacks and Latinos together. The difference between Whites and both other groups reached significance at the $p < .001$ level. On question B, all groups differed at the $p < .001$ level. But on the last question, Whites differed from Blacks at the $p < .05$ level and Blacks and Latinos differed from one another at the $p < .01$ level. Generally, Whites and Blacks differed at a consistently significant level. Latinos wavered between the other two groups in similarity of responses.

We see very different results in 2010. Table 6 shows that on every question, the differences which reached significance were between Blacks and every other group. Whereas

Whites and Latinos were in lockstep on each question, Blacks held increasingly more favorable positions on each question from 2008 to 2010. Whites and Latinos, on the other hand, moved increasingly toward unfavorable positions on Black inequality. This is an interesting finding that Latinos seem more aligned with Whites over time which has been seen in prior works (Twine and Gallagher 2008). Some have concluded that racial animus between the two groups, Black and Latino Americans, is due to their competing over specific economic resources (Gay 2006). While others find that “racial distancing” contributes to Latino separation from the Black community (McClain et al. 2006, 573). These theories are borne out by this analysis and help to explain the overall movement of the electorate toward a desired post-racial stance. Overall though, what is important to note, is that Black respondents in 2010 differed significantly from both Whites and Latinos in their responses.

DISCUSSION

Several key findings emerge from these analyses. First, the post-racialism claim is not borne out through the data. Based on the responses within the survey years in 2008 and 2010, respondents were in disagreement on the role of slavery in the status of Black Americans, the amount to which Blacks had received what they deserved, and the degree to which working harder might help Black Americans become as successful as their White counterparts. Consistently, responses were not neutral and were in significant discord with one another. Second, the change in responses from survey year to survey year yielded a similar result. Responses for White and Black Americans became more extreme and polar from year to year even with the conditions of the Black community remaining virtually stagnant across survey

years. From 2008 to 2010, Blacks held increasingly more favorable positions while Whites held increasingly negative views of Black inequality. Lastly, and most telling, the differences from year to year became more and more prevalent between Blacks and the other two groups. Latinos, who had previously been in more neutral agreement with Blacks in 2008, were in complete agreement with Whites by 2010.

Overall, the findings do not support the post-racial theory currently put forth as the model for race relations in the country. Additionally, it appears that this ideology, shown to be mainly held by Whites, is not held by Blacks. And, it has only become a trope for the Latino community as late as 2010. What this denotes is that there has been a call for post-racialism as opposed to the actuality of a legitimate move toward post-racial relations. Whites may be stressing the need for post-racial thinking and President Obama may have appeased this call in his 2008 campaign and subsequent tenure in office. However, Blacks resoundingly disagree with this notion which has dire consequences for race dialogue and Black equality.

APPENDIX: TABLES

Table 1: White, Black, and Latino opinions of effects of race issues on Blacks (Means), 2008 ANES

Race		Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve	If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites
White	Mean	3.25	3.56	2.37
	N	1059	1059	1059
	Std. Error of Mean	.045	.042	.047
Black	Mean	2.40	2.33	2.60
	N	516	516	516
	Std. Error of Mean	.069	.078	.088
Latino	Mean	2.62	3.13	2.23
	N	444	444	444
	Std. Error of Mean	.091	.085	.082

Table 2: White, Black, and Latino opinions of effects of race issues on Blacks (Means), 2010 ANES

Race		Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve	If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites
White	Mean	3.51	3.72	2.62
	N	917	918	917
	Std. Error of Mean	.041	.034	.038
Black	Mean	2.33	2.41	3.64
	N	110	109	110
	Std. Error of Mean	.103	.099	.118
Latino	Mean	3.41	3.67	2.57
	N	87	87	87
	Std. Error of Mean	.132	.107	.125

Table 3: ANOVA (2008 ANES)

		Mean Square	F	Sig.
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Between Groups	148.175	57.568	.000***
	Within Groups	2.574		
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Between Groups	262.394	105.274	.000***
	Within Groups	2.492		
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Between Groups	17.569	6.131	.002**
	Within Groups	2.866		

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 4: 2008 ANES Multiple Comparisons (Post Hoc - Bonferroni)

Dependent Variable			Std. Error	Sig.
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	White	Black	.086	.000***
		Latino	.091	.000***
	Black	White	.086	.000***
		Latino	.104	.088
	Latino	White	.091	.000***
		Black	.104	.088
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	White	Black	.085	.000***
		Latino	.089	.000***
	Black	White	.085	.000***
		Latino	.102	.000***
	Latino	White	.089	.000***
		Black	.102	.000***
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	White	Black	.091	.036*
		Latino	.096	.378
	Black	White	.091	.036*
		Latino	.110	.002**
	Latino	White	.096	.378
		Black	.110	.002**

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 5: ANOVA (2010 ANES)

		Mean Square	F	Sig.
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Between Groups	68.899	46.548	.000***
	Within Groups	1.480		
	Total			
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Between Groups	83.272	78.691	.000***
	Within Groups	1.058		
	Total			
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Between Groups	51.735	37.992	.000***
	Within Groups	1.362		
	Total			

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 6: 2010 ANES Multiple Comparisons (Post Hoc - Bonferroni)

Dependent Variable			Std. Error	Sig.
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	White	Black	.123	.000***
		Latino	.136	1.000
	Black	White	.123	.000***
		Latino	.175	.000***
	Latino	White	.136	1.000
		Black	.175	.000***
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	White	Black	.104	.000***
		Latino	.115	1.000
	Black	White	.104	.000***
		Latino	.148	.000***
	Latino	White	.115	1.000
		Black	.148	.000***
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	White	Black	.118	.000***
		Latino	.131	1.000
	Black	White	.118	.000***
		Latino	.167	.000***
	Latino	White	.131	1.000
		Black	.167	.000***

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 7: T-test of Equality for Whites - 2008 versus 2010

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Std. Error Difference
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Equal var assumed	16.040	.000***	-4.226	.000***	.062
	Equal var not assumed			-4.280	.000***	.061
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Equal var assumed	20.897	.000***	-2.828	.005**	.055
	Equal var not assumed			-2.886	.004**	.054
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Equal var assumed	7.948	.005**	-4.000	.000***	.061
	Equal var not assumed			-4.076	.000***	.060

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$ **Table 8: T-test of Equality for Blacks 2008 versus 2010**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Std. Error Difference
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Equal var assumed	7.462	.006**	.433	.665	.157
	Equal var not assumed			.547	.585	.124
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Equal var assumed	3.874	.049*	-.465	.642	.175
	Equal var not assumed			-.649	.517	.126
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Equal var assumed	5.316	.021*	-5.231	.000***	.198
	Equal var not assumed			-7.025	.000***	.147

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 9: T-test of Equality for Latinos 2008 versus 2010

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Std. Error Difference
A Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class	Equal var assumed	1.612	.205	-3.709	.000***	.214
	Equal var not assumed			-4.934	.000***	.161
B Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Equal var assumed	4.386	.037*	-2.735	.006**	.197
	Equal var not assumed			-3.952	.000***	.136
C If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	Equal var assumed	1.459	.228	-1.803	.072	.193
	Equal var not assumed			-2.324	.021*	.149

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

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