

Consensus Democracy for Prosperity and Peacebuilding between the Two Koreas: South Korea's Constitutional Amendment from a Majoritarian to a Consensus Democracy

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— Abstract —

South Korea is facing its increasing pressures from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy not only due to its democratic consolidation and its movements for economic democratization but also due to peacebuilding between South and North Korea through summit meetings from spring 2018. In South Korea, the movements for constitutional amendment in 2018 reflect the evaluation of the developmental state model and peacebuilding encompassing East Asia. Communitarian societies, such as East Asia's collectivist societies, are more compatible with consensus democracy than with majoritarian democracy because of institutional efficiency between communitarianism and consensualism. Despite the institutional efficiency, nationalism, rapid industrialization, and the mobilization system provided South Korea with favorable conditions to create majoritarian democracy. But why does South Korea experience its increasing pressures to shift toward consensus democracy? The present constitution made during the democratization period reveals inefficiencies in political institutionalization and power structures, because it is not compatible with the consolidation of democracy and does not satisfy democratic ideals for advanced welfare, economic democratization, or for economic, social, and political integrations between the two Koreas. South Korean society experiences internationalization and economic democratization, but it also requires its preparation for North Korea's liberalization and democratization and for the unification of the two Koreas. Eventually, the amended constitution should include 1) the proportional representation system with multi-member districts, 2) federalism and bicameralism, and 3) a gradual shift from the presidential system to the

parliamentary system through vice-presidency and the combination between presidentialism and parliamentarism.

Key Words: Consensus Democracy, Majoritarian Democracy, Economic Democratization, Peacebuilding, National Unification between South and North Korea

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Introduction

During state-building and rapid industrialization until the 1990s, a mobilization system and majoritarian institutions—majoritarian democracy after democratization—coexisted in South Korea's communitarian society, although consensualism is not compatible with state-led mobilization system. This mobilization system promoted a majoritarian democracy as a power-centralization structure in the period of democratization. Scholars on comparative institutions, such as Arend Lijphart ([1999] 2012) and Juan J. Linz (1994), have generalized majoritarian democracy commonly found in European corporatist states as a power-centralization structure, while consensus democracy, representatively South Korea, is a power-sharing structure.

However, South Korea is facing increasing pressures from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy for several reasons. Firstly, South Korea has evolved from a developing to developed economy and has initiated movements for economic democratization (경제민주화), which is defined as economic justice and a balance of interests between large and small firms also between capital and labor. By extension, this country has consolidated its democratic regime. Another reason is that, during peacebuilding, a consensus democracy will integrate the divided two Koreas into one Korea. Since spring 2018, South and North Korea have overcome their long-lasting conflicts, and are developing the peace regime through summit meetings between South and North Korean Presidents several times.

East Asian developmental states (henceforth “developmental states”), such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are collectivist societies under Confucianism. These collectivist, communitarian societies are more compatible with consensus democracy than with majoritarian democracy. This compatibility is based on institutional efficiency between communitarianism and consensualism. Despite institutional efficiency, strong nationalism made the Korean mobilization system adopt a majoritarian democracy, not a consensus democracy. Both South and North Korea has been one of

the most ethnically homogeneous in the world (Kim 2018, Chapter 2). In income and assets, South Korea was more egalitarian than other developing societies during state building (Deininger 2003, 18; Kim 2018, Chapter 3).¹ Ethnic homogeneity and socioeconomic equality are favorable conditions for the mobilization system. South Korea established majoritarian institutions under the mobilization system. South Korea made a mobilization system under authoritarianism, and then a majoritarian democracy after democratization.

However, South Korea's increasing pressures to shift from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy occur despite its long-lasting history of a mobilization system and a majoritarian democracy. These pressures imply institutional efficiencies of the developmental state model. After the 1987 democratization, South Korea became one of the stable democracies from an international perspective. Despite the consolidation of South Korea's democracy, political parties and political scientists have engaged in lively discussions on a revision of the 1987 constitution to form a universal welfare state and to prepare for national unification between South and North Korea. After South Korea's democratization, many presidents and major presidential candidates proposed the necessity of constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the constitution has not been able to be revised because each major party adhered to proposals which were parallel with its own interests. However, the issue of amending the constitution can surface again anytime due to the institutional inefficiency. In particular, after the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, most presidential candidates made the issue of constitutional revision public.

First of all, the present constitution made in 1987 during the democratization period reveals inefficiencies in political institutionalization and power structures. As South Korea reached the stage of democratic consolidation, political institutions formed in the transitional period under the 1987 constitution were not compatible with both the consolidation of democracy and democratic virtues in

¹ According to Klaus Deininger (2003, 18), South Korea was 0.35, China was 0.37, Japan was 0.42, and Taiwan was 0.46 during land reform.

South Korea. The second agenda for democratic reforms is to revise political institutions for a universal welfare state (보편적 복지국가) and economic democratization. Thirdly, the present constitution needs to be revised to prepare for unification of the two Koreas.

From these three perspectives, South Korea faces increasing pressures that move toward consensus democracy. Despite its democratic consolidation, there have been movements for a revision of the 1987 constitution to form a universal welfare state and to prepare for unification between South and North Korea. From October 2016, Korean citizens led candlelight movements for better democracy, for anti-corruption, and for the impeachment of President Park. Eventually, President Park was dismissed from presidency on March 10th, 2017. In 2018, President Moon Jae-in and major political parties made a constitutional amendment in public to find new paradigms of development and to prepare for the national unification between South and North Korea.

Despite the increasing pressures for consensus democracy, academia in comparative politics or East Asian studies have not highlight the application of consensus democracy. Broadly, comparative politics and democracy research have generalized many European corporatist states as consensus democracies, while developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have been considered majoritarian democracies (e.g., Lijphart [1999] 2012). Thus, my research aims to explain why there are movements for consensus democracy. This causal analysis can additionally identify how consensus democracy can be institutionalized through the constitutional amendment.

For this aim, Section I provides a theoretical framework to explain political reforms for economic prosperity and peacebuilding. In turn, Section II explains a causal analysis of why South Korea may gradually switch its democratic regime from a majoritarian democracy to a consensus democracy. Section III argues that political institutions and processes under consensualism can consolidate institutional democracy and a universal welfare state, and further promote political, economic, and social integrations between the two Koreas. Korean society faces increasing pressures to shift toward consensus democracy because of changes in political culture and institutions, economic regimes, and international regimes. For the constitutional amendment, Section III further suggests that a consensus

democracy can initiate political reforms of South Korea not only in the political dimension, such as the proportional representation system and federalism for consociational democracy and unification, but also reforms in the economic dimension, like universal welfare and economic democratization.


I. Theoretical Framework: Political Reforms for Economic Prosperity and Peacebuilding

1. Political Participation

South Korea's increasing pressures for a consensus democracy can be reviewed in terms of political participation and institutional efficiency. My research discusses how to enhance the quality of democracy, applying the prism of Lijphart's ([1999] 2012) patterns-of-democracy research to the development of Korean democracy. Lijphart compares two patterns of democracy between majoritarian and consensus democracies, and then advocates consensus democracy as the "kinder, gentler" democracy over majoritarian democracy. My research explores why the previous mobilization system of South Korea faces increasing pressures to shift from majoritarianism to consensualism. Consensus democracy will be promoted not only by internationalization and economic democratization of South Korea but also by the potential political change of North Korea and the preparation for unification of the two Koreas. Although North Korea is democratized, it does not share norms with South Korea. Consensus democracy can be an appropriate framework for national integration in North Korea's long-term democratization process.

North Korea's democratization will depend not only on economic cooperation and peacebuilding between South and North Korea but also North Korea's marketization, economic decentralization, and social liberalization. Meanwhile, Lijphart's ([1999] 2012) explanation on democracies' shifts toward consensualism displays institutional evolutions into consensus democracy. My research finds causal explanations in the shift in my case study of South and North Korea.

Figure 1. The Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice



Source: Hirschman (1970, 121, 122). Examples included by author.

South Korea's movement for a consensus democracy can be applied to Albert O. Hirschman's (1970) research of political participation: in Hirschman's thesis, the political market in democracies provides citizens with three options, such as exit, voice, and loyalty, as illustrated in Figure 1. Firstly,

the option of *exit* is defined as citizens' withdrawal of their support to political organizations, such as the ruling party, the government, the political regime, and the nation state. Secondly, *voice* is citizens' voluntary associations and, by extension, is translated into the political process via competitive political parties. Thirdly, *loyalty* is citizens' support their organizations. It is necessary to evaluate political rights in authoritarian states, such as North Korea and the previous authoritarian South Korea, in Hirschman's logic. The options of voice and exit are feasible only in democratic regimes, but are very limited in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

In my application of Korean politics to Hirschman's (1970) prism, the two Koreas suffer from two different kinds of leadership crises. In South Korea, private large firms mainly have oligopolistic dominance in a domestic market and also maintain *quasi-monopolistic* organizations in management through the succession from father to son. In South Korea, this unique conglomerate form is called *chaebol*. In North Korea, the Supreme Leader has maintained monopolistic organizations in state management. Although founding fathers in chaebols or in the founding father (Kim Il-sung) in the North Korean state gained legitimacy and popularity from citizens, it is not certain whether their sons or grandsons may exert strong leadership as forefathers did. This mirror image implies that potential leadership crisis will occur from generation to generation. South Koreans' destiny in domestic economy largely depend on chaebols' performances. North Koreans' destiny in democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, and social welfare is determined by the performances of the Supreme Leader and his inner circles. To reduce the crisis in South Korea's domestic economy or in North Korea's governance, it is necessary to apply democratic management or governance either to chaebols or the North Korean regime. Meanwhile, South Koreans may criticize chaebol owner's leadership, while North Koreans are not allowed to criticize their Supreme Leader's leadership in official channels. This two different leadership patterns are identified in Groups 2 and 4 in Figure 1. The leadership crisis in chaebols, such as Hanjin (한진), is one reason why South Koreans have demanded economic democratization by asking the Korean government to reform chaebols. Economic democratization is one of important agendas in South Korea's constitutional amendment.

Under hard authoritarian regimes, most citizens cannot exercise their political rights as the *exit* option to choose their own party in elections in particular under the one party rule, they have very limited freedom in choosing the *voice* option like protest. As the worst case, the North Korean regime suppressed its innocent people to keep its coercive power and its regime durability. Meanwhile, North Koreans are unable to exercise their options not only for *voice* but also for *exit* such as migration, not to mention the absence of opposition parties. In South Korea's authoritarian rule under Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, citizens could not express their voices.

Even in the democratic regime, Korean citizens had a limited channel under the conservative party's long-term rule with progressive parties' limited participation in the congress. Meanwhile, during candlelight movements since 2016, Koreans have used the "voice" option through peaceful demonstrations, and further applied "exit" by replacing the President Park administration into the President Moon administration through the presidential by-election.

2. Institutional Efficiency: A Perspective from New Institutionalism

South Korea's movement for a consensus democracy is a demand to find more efficient political institutions. New institutionalism in comparative politics have two major variants: historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. In historical institutionalism, institutions are exogenous and endogenous (Thelen 1999). As the endogenous variable, the institution is structured by macro-historical processes and cultural foundations. By extension, institutions have influenced the actors' decision making considering institutions as exogenous variables.

Previous mobilization systems and majoritarian democracy had the path-dependent effects on the durability of the developmental state model during the industrialization period until the 1990s. Meanwhile, South Korea's increasing demands for a consensus democracy, in particular for the constitutional revision will lead to the incremental change of institutions. Regarding the consolidation of political institutions, path dependence explains the durability of established institutions and the

stability and continuity of policies in the future (Thelen 1999, 385). Path dependence highlights the stability of institutions, while the changes of institutions and policies have been explained in the framework of positive feedback (incremental change) or critical junctures (rapid change). In historical institutionalism, the discourse of path dependence has been updated to a self-reinforcing process or positive feedback (or increasing returns) in a political system (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 699). Positive feedback identifies the incremental change of institutions, and hence it is regarded as a self-reinforcing process (Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999).

In rational choice institutionalism, actors' strategic choice and behavior lead to the change of institutions, which are considered endogenous variables. In new democracies, party elites can exert greater flexibility to make strategic choices in societies in which there are no sophisticated secondary organizations (Chhibber and Torcal 1997, 30). In South Korea, democratization in 1987 is a critical juncture for democratization, while candlelight movements for better democracy in the late 2010s function a positive feedback for political reforms.

Mancur Olson's (1993) collective action theory provides rational choice approach to political institutionalization. In my application of Olson's collective action theory to state building, the modern state's final aim is to build a welfare state, in contrast to the predatory state. Regarding the political regime, Olson elucidates transitions from anarchy to autocracy, and finally to democracy. Initial states in the ancient era were bandit states, commonly labelled as predatory states. In traditional states, rulers rationalize taxation as they switch their status from roving bandits to stationary bandits, when society evolves from anarchy to normal states as people settle down through agriculture. For Olson, "stationary bandits" take continuing and regular taxation, as a society switches from anarchy to agrarian societies. Because rulers in settled societies maintain their control over people, and because people have regular profits from agriculture, ruler rationalize their regular taxation through predictable expropriation from people. Meanwhile, "roving bandits" in predatory states or unsettled societies (such as nomadic societies) rely on occasional plunder and hence demand maximum expropriation from

people, because an unpredictable life expectancy of the regime due to regime instability makes the government take citizens' income as much as possible (Olson 1993, 567-68).

In my application of Olson's (1993) logic to developmental states, their effective government rationalizes their continuing taxation (in his logic "stationary bandits"). But citizens can accept the governmental control and regular taxation sharing the government's systematic goal and plan rationality for a long-term viewpoint for consistent economic growth and redistribution. Dictators in developmental states exerted programmatic development, although their rent-seeking hurt principles of market economy. Fortunately, democratization prevented these states from the degeneration into bandit states. In South Korea, dictators' rent-seeking degenerated into the *collusion between government and business* (정경유착). This collusion created crony capitalism that has nourished money politics through political funds (정치자금). As a result, in the period of democratic consolidation, citizens illuminated the pitfalls of the previous paradigms of development—labelled as the developmental state model—and demanded economic democratization.

Because South Korea prepares for the national unification between South and North Korea, it requires to transform North Korea from a predatory to a normal state. In my application of Olson's (1993) logic to authoritarian regimes, dictators in the past authoritarian South Korea and dictators in North Korea privatized national wealth, diverted it to private purposes, and siphoned off it overseas. In the past South Korea, dictators received political funds from large firms and created secret funds. All these behaviors are the maximization of taxation in Olson's metaphor. During peacebuilding between the two Koreas, South Korea needs to apply good governance to the foreign aid program for North Korea. To prevent North Korea from its degeneration into a more serious predatory state, my research proposes political reforms which should be accompanied by the national unification between the two Koreas.

Considering the association between the authoritarian regime and the predatory state, developmental states' plan rationality can be institutionalized under democracy, not under autocracy.

Because authoritarian regimes are operated without check and balance between political actors, state intervention is likely to engage in corruption; whereas, the principle of check-and-balance under democratic regimes may prevent corruption and provide a favorable conditions for plan rationality. Olson (1993) describes that democracy is governed by rule of law and operates its market economy in legitimate procedures under social contract. Meanwhile, an autocrat has a short duration of seizing power himself and a short life expectancy of the authoritarian regime, and there is always substantial uncertainty about the future when the current autocrat is gone (Olson 1993, 570). Regarding time horizons, autocrats reveal a short-term interest more than democrats, and thus the autocracy would try to extract as many resources as possible without consideration of the masses' welfare because of this regime's unpredictable life expectancy. By extension, the autocratic government arbitrarily engages in its market and financial systems. In this regime, the level of institutionalization or legalization of the economy is low since it is governed by rule of man, not by rule of law. This bandit state or predatory state is contrasted with the welfare state, which is a representative type of the modern state. After state building for modernization, the nation state enforces citizens' property rights; whereas, the predatory state restricts property rights to maximize its own profits and privileges (North and Weingast 1989).

To conclude, my research focuses on the incremental switch from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy. The development of political institutions can be evaluated in the prism of political culture and institutions, rationality in political economy, and international political structure. Increasing movements from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy are explained by the causal mechanism from democratization, internationalization, economic democratization, and the preparation for the unification between the two Koreas.

II. Movements for Consensualism

1. Democratization and Internationalization

Democratization and the 1997 Constitution: In South Korea, the 1997 constitution enacted by the agreement between the authoritarian ruling party and opposition parties was simply a *temporary expedient* which may not sustain a stable democracy. Political institutions designed by this democratic constitution have been created after democratization through negotiations between authoritarian rulers and opposition party leaders, who allied with democratization activists and civil organizations. Because authoritarian rulers have extended their rule by amending the constitution arbitrarily several times, opposition parties hoped to exclude the possibility of a long-term rule by a single president; hence, in the constitution, opposition parties proposed the elimination of the two-term limit for presidents. Meanwhile, the authoritarian power blocs wished to retain their influences in the subsequent political institutions after democratization. The authoritarian elites persisted in the five-year term of president to extend their political power as much as possible, whereas general elections are held every four years. The plurality rule with single member districts was one of the options to enhance the possibility to gain political power, because they were supported from the populous region, *Youngnam*. The combination of the five-year single term of the president and four-year term of the legislative representatives caused inefficiency in operating elections, because of irregular gaps between general elections and presidential elections. This combination also generated a discontinuity of policy making between presidential administrations as well as the repeating significant lame duck phenomenon in the latter period of the presidential term, since the constitution does not permit two or more terms of a president. This combination has further increased electoral costs, because the electoral cycle of general elections does not match that of presidential elections. The *temporary expedient* of the 1987 constitution revealed increasing inefficiency as the Korean democracy became institutionalized. More importantly, the single term of a president does not guarantee stability of governance and policy making.

Internationalization: Internationalization through immigration and world markets increasingly challenge South Korea’s high homogeneous collectivity in ethnicity. As foreigners settle down in South Korea for marriage and work, the ratio of foreigners increases up to 3.1% in 2014 (MOSPA 2014; see Table 1). As South Korea evolves into one of the advanced economies after rapid industrialization, highly educated young Koreans avoid working on so-called “3-D” jobs (dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs). It is contrasted that Park Chung-hee’s regime in the 1960s encouraged Koreans to emigrate to developed countries to earn capital.² Nowadays, many immigrants—mainly Chinese, Korean Chinese, North Korean defectors, Mongolians, and Southeast Asians—have undertaken these 3-D jobs in South Korea. Moreover, favoritism to sons over daughters based on Confucianism caused men to exceed women in numbers among young generations. Since this phenomenon incited some Korean men to seek their wife through international marriages, many Asian women immigrated to get married to them. Lastly, as North Korea’s political regime became unstable because of its economic hardship and leadership crises, the number of North Korean defectors increased, and eventually many of them settled down in South Korea.

Table 1. Total Number of Foreigners in South Korea

Year	Population (B)	Total number of foreigners (A)	Ratio of foreigners (A/B)	Increase rates of foreigners
2008	48949	891	0.018	23.3
2009	49182	1106	0.022	24.2
2010	49410	1139	0.023	2.9
2011	49779	1265	0.025	11
2012	50004	1409	0.028	11.4
2013	50220	1446	0.029	2.6
2014	50750	1570	0.031	8.6

² The Korean government dispatched many miners and nurses to developed countries like West Germany. They sent some portions of their incomes to their home country and settled in foreign countries. Their contribution to home country’s economic development was an act of patriotism. The Korean government called them as patriots or heroes for Korea’s industrialization.

Note: In A and B, the unit is 000s. The numbers in parentheses refer to increase rates of foreigners' residence.

Source: MOSPA (South Korea) 2014; regarding population, Korean Statistical Information Service.

2. Pressures for a Universal Welfare State and Economic Democratization

Social consensus on communitarianism can be called consensualism in the East Asian context, which can be compared with the consociational democracy, coordinated market economies, and social partnership of Western Europe. Lijphart's ([1999] 2012) advocacy for consensualism can apply to East Asian communitarianism, and hence may provide new visions for enhancing democratic virtues in East Asia. Lijphart argues that consensus democracy may enhance the quality of democracy more than majoritarian democracy (Lijphart [1999] 2012, Chapter 16), and that East Asia has favorable conditions to promote consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999). In the first edition of the Conclusion of *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart (1999, 307) refers to East Asia as one of the potential areas where consensualism is found and hence consensus democracy may emerge. In my application of the Lijphartian vision to East Asian societies, Confucianism has positive functions for consensus democracy. It promotes communitarianism that contrasts with individualism which is a basis of European democracy. Therefore, East Asia is one of the regions that exhibit Lijphart's optimistic visions on consensus democracy outside of his thirty-six countries considered in his work.³

During the rapid industrialization period until the early 1990s, developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, created growth-oriented regimes, in which the government made a

³ Efforts to explain varieties of democracy outside of his thirty-six countries (e.g. East Asia) are the grounds for optimism that he wishes. As for East Asian cases, he included Japan in his first edition (1999), and further added South Korea as one of the new democracies in his revised edition (2012). However, in the Conclusion chapter in the second edition, he does not refer to East Asia as the case that shows optimism on consensualism. It seems that since Japan and South Korea is explained in his second edition, he would not have to refer to East Asia as one of the potential regions where consensus democracy can be nurtured.

robust partnership with large or public firms. East Asia's political economy of consensus was based on a narrow consensus or coercive consensus under the logic of developmental states. However, after the end of the rapid industrialization period, citizens in these states demand universal welfare and the prioritization of issues of redistribution over economic growth. This demand may lead to a political economy of a *broad* consensus.

Due to the increasing inequality after the financial crisis in 1997, South Koreans recognize that the delay of institutionalized welfare regimes will be incompatible with consolidated democracies, as developmental states have increasing pressures to switch from majoritarian to consensus democracies. In advanced economies, particularly in East Asia's communitarian societies, the mobilization system is institutionally inefficient, whereas both political institutions and political economies of a broad consensus would be efficient. The economic crises in Japan and South Korea in the 1990s revealed the increasing inefficiencies of the growth-oriented mobilization system with weakly institutionalized welfare regimes.

As Korean society becomes pluralized and globalized with advanced industrialization, the direction from majoritarianism to consensualism must be institutionally efficient. Labor unions organized the pro-labor party politically, and demanded that congress should adopt the PR system and increase the ratio of seats from the PR system in the total seats. Until now, most seats in the National Assembly were still filled with seats from single member districts.

3. Preparation for North Korea's Political Change and the Two Koreas' National Unification

Constitutional Engineering for the Integration between the Two Koreas: Since peacebuilding through summit meetings between South and North Korea in 2018, both South and North Korean society requires to lessen the differences and to share identity and norms encompassing the two Koreas through consensus institutions. The regime competition with contrasting ideologies and modernization strategies magnified differences between the two Koreas. The two Korean

governments have exchanged their musicians, artists, and athletes to nourish mutual trust and to reduce gaps in identity and norms between the two Korea. Regarding the peace regime, the movements for constitutional amendment intend to prepare for North Korea's political change and two Koreas' national unification.

After the national unification, a unified Korea will be a plural society despite ethnic homogeneity because of severe differences of the two Koreas in the political regimes and economic systems. A unified Korea may be switched from a *non-plural* or *semi-plural* society to a definitely *plural* society, because the two Koreas show extreme heterogeneity in political and economic regimes. The severe regime competition between the two Koreas differentiated not only the regime types of democracy versus totalitarianism, but also the ideologies of capitalism versus socialism. Majoritarian institutions may exclude some factions in a unified Korea, whereas consensus institutions embrace as many factions and perspectives as possible to harmonize various virtues.

It is necessary for South Korea to amend the constitution to prepare for the unification of the two Koreas, although it is not certain if or when North Korea will realize democratization or political reforms. The present political institutions of South Korea—and also those of North Korea—have been created under the division of the Korean Peninsula. Each Korea intentionally differentiated itself against the other Korea despite ethnical and cultural commonalities deep-rooted in pre-modern Korea's long history. Nowadays South Korea *imagines* a unified Korea as a new *nation* state; in Benedict Anderson's (1991) context, a nation is defined as an *imagined* political community (emphasis added by author). In the 2000s two progressive administrations by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun proposed agendas for peaceful unification and established economic cooperation models like the Gaeseong Industrial Complex through the South-North Korean summit. In the 2010s President Lee Myung-bak and the conservative ruling party (the Grand National Party: 한나라당) publicized a unification tax to prepare for unification.

The present constitution needs to be amended for the foreseeable future when South and North Korea are unified. Political institutions appropriate to a unified new Korea may include components of

consensus democracy, like the federal state, the bicameral system, the proportional representation system, and the parliamentary system. These consensual components are not familiar to Koreans, who have lived under majoritarian institutions, such as the unitary state, the unicameral system, the plurality rule of a single member district system, and the presidential system.

However, consensus democracy is one of the solutions for the economic, social, and political integration between South and North Korean societies; according to the progress in integration, both South and North Koreans may reach consensus on national unification. According to Anderson (1991), *print* technology—national education on politics and history—made it possible for people to share national identity within a national boundary. In my application of his theory to the Korean context, each Korea's national education have made their own new national identity that has been imposed upon South or North Koreans within the new emerging state created by the Korean War in the 1950s. The print technology differentiated its own Korea with the other Korea. In contrast, unified education with consensus institutions can integrate the two Koreas' divided societies into a unified new Korea by lessening the differences between the two, increasing understanding of the other Korea, and creating shared identity, norms, and institutions for the newly created political community.

Majoritarian institutions are likely to exclude some factions and norms in the unification and social integration process between the two Koreas, whereas consensus institutions embrace as many factions and perspectives as possible to harmonize various virtues. North Korean power elites are very sensitive to South Korea's publicization on unification discourses, because they will degenerate into *secondary* citizens giving up their all privileges after unification. They would not wish to adopt the western electoral democracy, since they do not intend to voluntarily give up their power and privilege exclusively controlled by the communist party. South Koreans and North Koreans have shared the same *national identities*, but regime competitions between the two Koreas created contrasting *state identity* as South Korea or North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary for South Korea to reach consensus not only with common North Koreans but with North Korean elites through consensus institutions.

Preparation for North Korea's Democratization: It would take too much time for North Korea—one of the world's most durable authoritarian regimes—to initiate democratization reforms by itself. It is not predictable exactly when North Korea will be democratized, or when the two Koreas will be united. However, South Korea should prepare for several scenarios on North Korea's political change, and by extension the two Koreas' national unification.

Of course, it is not certain if North Koreans may easily accept the western style of electoral democracy. But before the division of the two Koreas, North Korea had a history, identity, and culture similar with East Asian democracies such as Japan and South Korea; these democracies are characterized as communitarianism, consensualism, and conservative corporatism, which are contrasted with individualism deep-rooted in European history and culture. Since communitarianism and collectivism show an affinity to consensus democracy, a democratized North Korea and a unified Korea can accept consensus democracy. In East Asia, Japan and South Korea share components of consensus democracy. By extension, a democratized North Korea and, similarly a unified Korea, are likely to prioritize communitarian democracy over individualistic or libertarian democracy.

Lastly, the unification of the two Koreas will enlarge state size, and thus a unified Korea will be upgraded from a middle state to a large state. A unified Korea's population, which is about 75 million, exceeds that of the United Kingdom or France, and matches that of Germany. After national unification of the two Koreas, the population in the North Korea region is expected to increase rapidly; North Korea's rapid population growth will be accompanied by its rapid industrialization of North Korea after unification, as South Korea and many early industrializers did in the past. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators in 2019, the population of North Korea is about 25.7 million, and that of South Korea is about 51.3 million. South Korea's industrialization made its population double

despite its high immigration ratio to foreign countries.⁴ A unified Korea will become one of the largest countries in population with higher heterogeneity, which was caused by disparate political regimes and social systems after the 1950s' division. Therefore, a unified Korea will accept consensus democracy to reach consensus beyond differences between South and North Korea.

III. The Constitutional Amendment for a Unified Korea with Universal Welfare

1. The Proportional Representation System with Multi-Member Districts

The proportional representation (PR) system and multi-member district system may lessen regionalism (지역주의) not simply between *Youngnam* and *Honam* within South Korea but also potential regional conflicts between South and North Korea. The PR system can also effectively respond to globalization and multiculturalism, as the ratio of foreigners and overseas Koreans over the Korean population increases due to their immigration for international marriages and job markets, and as North Korean defectors settle in South Korea due to regime crises and economic hardships in North Korea.

The electoral outcomes under the majoritarian system have weakened representation of social classes (e.g., capital versus labor) and reinforced the tendency of regionalism. The combination between the proportional representation system and the multi-member district system may lessen regionalism in elections, because a *Honam*-based party may gain a significant number of representatives elected in *Youngnam* under this combination. These electoral rules can disintegrate

⁴ Overseas Koreans are estimated to be about 7 million, ranked 8th in the total size in the world in 2007. Migration and Diaspora Research Institute, and Overseas Koreans Foundation, South Korea; cited in *Moneytoday*, “인구절벽 피하려면 재외동포 적극 받아들여야,” July 9, 2014.

major parties' regional monopolies, and therefore resolve regional conflicts and immigration issues in the period of globalization or national unification.

After national unification, regional cleavages will be more serious because social and economic gaps between South and North Korea are large. The gaps between the two Koreas are much larger than those between West and East Germany. East Germans' GDP per capita was merely 40% of West Germans in the unification period of 1991, but it increased over 70% of West Germans in 2014. But East Germans still recognize themselves as secondary citizens compared to West Germans. This sense of inferiority has become a potential cause of conflicts in the inner society inside a united Germany.⁵ Meanwhile, North Korea's economy is not comparable with that of South Korea. South Korea's GDP is estimated about 21 times larger than North Korea's GDP (Bank of Korea report 2014), although we consider that South Korea's population is around twice that of North Korea.⁶ Although West Germany prepared for unification for several decades, though the country had the world's third largest economy at the time of unification, and even though East Germany had an advanced economy among socialist countries, a unified Germany should have paid huge amounts of unification costs in the economic reconstruction of East Germany and the social integration between the two Germanies. Meanwhile, South Korea is not prepared for interstate integration between South and North Korea economically or politically.

In this vein, consensus institutions will reduce the unification costs to avoid the sudden shocks from the severe gaps between the two Koreas. As a preliminary stage of national unification, the institutional integration between the two Koreas requires both economic and political integration.

⁵ *Korea Economic Daily*, "통일 후 옛 동독은...GDP, 서독의 70% 넘어서," January 15, 2014.

⁶ Since the economic gap between two Koreas was extremely large, North Korea has not opened its economic data like government expenditures, GNI, and GDP per capita. Moreover, the data that North Korea announced about their social and economic status is not reliable. Therefore, the Bank of Korea (central bank) and research institutes in South Korea should estimate North Korea's economy, because it is not observable. According to the Bank of Korea report (2014), the gap was about 21 times.

Considering the enormous economic gap between the two Koreas, South Korea needs to prepare for unification for a longer time than West Germany, and should also enhance North Koreans' economy and welfare, including food aid, public education, and healthcare. Consensus institutions may enhance North Koreans' representation and, by extension, reduce the gaps between South and North Koreans.

Despite the predictable socio-economic gap between the two Koreas, South Korea has not yet designed the new constitution and political institutions for a unified Korea. Whether the unification process is gradual or drastic, South Koreans would undertake huge amounts of economic and political costs in state integration and national unification processes. Most South Koreans would not agree with sudden unification because they expect extreme financial burdens to support North Koreans without their immediate benefits. North Koreans will be frustrated with their socioeconomic status if they are treated as secondary citizens because of the social and economic gap between the two Koreas.

The regionalism of South Korea was caused mainly by the rivalry between power blocs, but the regionalism of a unified Korea must be generated by the extreme social and economic gaps between the two Koreas. Despite enormous unification costs, unification will be another *window of opportunity* by reconstructing a unified Korea's economy and by revitalizing the South Korean economy through South Korea's investment in North Korea on the one hand, and by reducing military conflicts between the two Koreas on the other. Consensus institutions like the PR system and a multi-member district system may lead to amalgamation between the two Korean societies, while majoritarian institutions like the plurality rule and single-member district system are not effective to do so.

2. Federalism and Bicameralism

A unified Korea requires federalism and bicameralism to overcome differences between the two Koreas in the political regime and market economy. The two Koreas have commonly established a mobilization system under the influence of World War II, Japan's colonial rule, and the regime

competition between the two Koreas. Even after democratization, South Korea still holds a centralized system aligned with a unicameral system and a unitary state.

A unified Korea can combine regional representativeness with population representativeness, as the United States and Germany did. In general, the upper house reflects regional representativeness in terms of state or regional levels. The two Koreas have been equally sovereign states, and are almost equal in their territory size. A federal system needs equal regional representativeness in the upper house between South and North Korea, if South Korea shares authority and power with North Korea as a brotherly state. In a bicameral system, the upper house can be represented by the equal number of senators in each Korea. But members of the lower house need to be elected in proportion to population, because the population of South Korea is about double that of North Korea. Because the population ratio between South and North Koreans is about 1:2, regional representation would not seriously hurt population representation.

3. A Gradual Shift from Presidentialism to Parliamentarism

The parliamentary system is one of the alternatives to reach consensus between South and North Koreans and to lead to balanced development in a unified Korea. But South Korea experienced the collapse of the parliamentary system, which was short-lived because of a military coup. Parliamentarism was introduced just after the April 19 Revolution, 1960 (4.19 혁명 in Korean) when South Koreans resisted the first President Rhee Syngman's dictatorship, but it was broken down by the May 16 military coup, 1961 (5.16군사정변 in Korean) led by President Park Chung-hee. Although the initial parliamentary system was collapsed by the military coup, not by its institutional defects, South Koreans are more familiar with presidentialism than with parliamentarism, because they have adopted the presidential system for half a century.

Koreans would still persist in the presidential system due to its path dependence even in a unified Korea in which the two Koreas are integrated politically, economically, and socially. One appropriate formula that leads to the political integration between South and North Korea is to elect both a president and vice president as the running mate system in a unified Korea in order for the two presidents to represent South and North Korea respectively. If a president is elected from South Korea, it is desirable to concede vice-presidency to a presidential candidate who may represent North Korea, and vice versa. But it is hard to mechanically select a representative of South Korea and a representative of North Korea respectively in the presidential running mate system. Due to South Korea's twice sized population compared to that of North Korea, it is likely that a presidential candidate who gains supports in South Korea will easily win the presidential election. However, politicians should try to select the two presidential running mates who can fairly represent the two Koreas. But in presidentialism, it is difficult to institutionally allocate the two presidents from each Korea. If the president is consecutively elected from the South, citizens in the North would be dissatisfied with the election result, and vice versa.

Of course, the path dependence of presidentialism simply means that South Koreans are accustomed to presidentialism and unfamiliar with parliamentarism. The path dependence must be also shown to North Koreans because North Korea's dictatorial rule by the Supreme Leader must have a stronger affinity with presidentialism than with parliamentarism. But the path dependence does not mean that presidentialism is institutionally more efficient than parliamentarism in terms of institutional performances, such as national integration, representation, and socioeconomic equity. Realistically, my research proposes a gradual shift from the presidential system to the parliamentary system through vice-presidency and the combination between presidentialism and parliamentarism.

For institutional efficiency of a unified Korea, the parliamentary system must be a more appropriate formula than the presidential system. A main reason is that it prevents winner-take-all politics and represents regions and classes proportionally through the coalitional government or negotiations. South Korea suffered from presidential dictatorship under the authoritarian rule before the

democratization movements in 1987. Even after democratization, this country frequently experienced imperial presidency.

Lijphart (Lijphart, ed. 1992; Lijphart [1999] 2012) and Linz (1990) warn that the presidential system is such a power-centralization structure that leads to winner-take-all politics, like imperial presidency. As Samuels and Shugart (2010) point out, there is a negative correlation between the president's popularity and the ruling party's popularity. Some charismatic presidents want to transform its system into imperial presidency and to weaken the influence of parties. Many Korean citizens and scholars cynically mentioned that the degradation of democratic virtues under Presidents Lee Myung-bak (이명박 in office: 2007-12) and Park Geun-hye (박근혜 in office: February 2013-March 2017) must be *neo-authoritarianism* (신권위주의) (Park 2016).⁷ Citizens' freedom in political activities have been significantly threatened by President Lee, the ruling party, and the police system; whereas, the previous governments under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (김대중 in office: 1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (노무현 in office: 2003-2008) improved human rights and freedom in civil society and political life. In North Korea, citizens have lived under one of the world's oppressive dictatorship by the Supreme Leader since state building. Power centralization under presidency will not be effective in national integration as the two Koreas seek for national unification.

Another reason why parliamentarism is more efficient for a unified Korea than presidentialism is that parliamentarism may respect North Korea's virtues, interest, and authority more than presidentialism. Although many North Koreans long for life in South Korea, they would not want that their society is negated by South Koreans. Parliamentarism may amalgamate both South-Korean and North-Korean societies into one Korean society in the process of national unification. Scott Mainwaring (1993) argues that it is difficult to combine presidentialism with multipartism. During the process of

⁷ See also *Hankyoreh*, “박근혜정부, 안보 파시즘·새로운 신권위주의 양상 보여,” October 27, 2013.

political integration, a unified Korea will have multiple parties which represent certain factions in each Korea, although a few major parties try to embrace the two Koreas beyond regional differences. Parliamentarism will promote political integration more effectively than presidentialism.

Of course, North Korea's democratization should be preceded before adopting not only federalism and bicameralism but also the presidential election. If the North Korean region is monopolized by a single party, as the present North Korea has governed with a single party, this type of dictatorship would be incompatible not only with the general democratic process of the presidential election but also with the institutional reform for *consensus* democracy like federalism and bicameralism. The dictatorial rule or regional monopoly in any set of consensus institutions would not be able to promote democracy in a unified Korea, and also would not reach consensus between the two Koreas.

However, it is certain that not only peacebuilding but also economic cooperation between the two Koreas help North Korea transform its state structure from a predatory state to a normal state. Under the form of a normal state, North Korea may perform a normal diplomacy, which previous anti-North-Korean nations, such as the United States and Japan, respect this country as equal partner in foreign affairs. The normalization of the North Korean economy helps North Korea vitalize its market and achieve compressed economic development through foreign aid and foreign direct investment. It also improve North Korea's human rights and political liberalization. All these steps will facilitate the adoption of consensus democracy in North Korea.

Conclusion: Evaluation and Summary

1. Evaluation: Institutional Efficiency between Political and Economic Democratization

My project proposes how South Korea's amended constitution in the framework of consensus democracy requires to embrace the ideal of a universal welfare state and to fulfill the process of national unification between South and North Korea. South Korean society requires to reform *exclusive*

politics like regionalism, anti-North-Korea sentiments, and exclusive attitudes toward foreigners, and then to adopt universalism and multiculturalism in political, economic, and international regimes. Both mobilization and consensus are main devices for the state's coordination capacities. A unified Korea needs to prioritize consensus over mobilization for "kinder, gentler" democracy, wellbeing, and integration encompassing the two Koreas.

Consensus democracy can effectively reflect people's general will in the pluralized Korean society with universal welfare and national unification in the future. A democratic Korea after unification requires to respond to citizens' needs more broadly, without isolating minority groups caused not only by socio-economic gaps and but also by the unification process. As South Korea becomes economically more advanced and socially internationalized, people may have disagreements about directly-opposed ideas, such as ethnical homogeneity versus multiculturalism, economic growth versus redistribution, economy versus security, and opening the market versus keeping economic sovereignty. The most essential solution is to maximize people's agreements through consensus institutions.

In a unified Korea with a universal welfare regime, consensus institutions such as the proportional representation system, federalism, and bicameralism will enhance representation as well as quality of democracy. Although South Koreans feel affinity with presidentialism, parliamentarism will lead to broader consensus to amalgamate South and North Koreans. South Korea's political reform for the constitutional revision promotes the gradual switch from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy. Communitarianism was accompanied by majoritarianism and the mobilization system during postwar state-building and industrialization periods by the late 1980s. However, it can be compatible with consensualism, as South Korea has achieved national and economic development for developed economies and consolidated democracies within the recent several decades.

In South Korea, political parties have proposed their agendas for the new constitution to prepare for stable democracy, universal welfare, and national unification. But because of their short-term interest, which is linked with upcoming elections, they failed to make agreements on when and how

they should amend the constitution. In the democratic transition period, political outcomes through negotiations between authoritarian elites and democratization groups had many components of majoritarianism, which was associated with the mobilization system during the industrialization period. But Korean society is increasingly demanding political reforms toward consensualism. Consensus democracy is the key component for reforms, not only in the political dimension such as the PR system and federalism for consociational democracy and unification, but in the economic dimension like universal welfare and economic democratization.

2. Summary

Since the democratization of 1987 in South Korea, political parties have discussed the timing and contents of constitutional amendment. They failed in reaching consensus on constitutional amendment in 2018. Although they publicized it through mass media, forums, and conferences, it is still uncertain when political parties may revise the constitution. However, it is certain that the constitution should be revised in the near future, due to the increasing inefficiencies in political economy and political institutions in South Korea.

South Korea is facing its increasing pressures from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy not only due to its democratic consolidation and its movements for economic democratization but also due to peacebuilding between South and North Korea through summit meetings from spring 2018. In South Korea, the movements for constitutional amendment in 2018 reflect the evaluation of the developmental state model and peacebuilding encompassing East Asia. Communitarian societies, such as East Asia's collectivist societies, are more compatible with consensus democracy than with majoritarian democracy because of institutional efficiency between communitarianism and consensualism. Despite the institutional efficiency, nationalism, rapid industrialization, and the mobilization system provided South Korea with favorable conditions to create majoritarian democracy. But why does South Korea experience its increasing pressures to shift toward consensus democracy?

The present constitution made during the democratization period reveals inefficiencies in political institutionalization and power structures, because it is not compatible with the consolidation of democracy and does not satisfy democratic ideals for advanced welfare, economic democratization, or for economic, social, and political integrations between the two Koreas. Korean society experiences internationalization and economic democratization, but it also requires its preparation for North Korea's liberalization and democratization and for the unification of the two Koreas.

To conclude, institutionally efficient institutions in the amended constitution should include 1) the proportional representation system with multi-member districts, 2) federalism and bicameralism, and 3) a gradual shift from the presidential system to the parliamentary system through vice-presidency and the combination between presidentialism and parliamentarism. All of these reforms in political institutions are transformations from a majoritarian to a consensus democracy, as South Korea requires to find new paradigms of development overcoming the pitfalls of the developmental state model.

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