

Authoritarian Backsliding in New Democracies

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Abstract

New democracies emerging over the last few decades have not faced a smooth path to democratic consolidation. Periodically, citizens' rights and liberties in these states have been encroached upon, sometimes accompanied by a complete return to authoritarian rule and sometimes not. While recent scholarship has looked at the factors associated with authoritarian reversals, less attention has been given to the broader phenomenon of authoritarian backsliding, which I define as a decline in the freedoms provided to citizens in newly democratized states regardless of whether a regime change takes place. I identify two distinct kinds of authoritarian backsliding: restrictions on civil liberties and restrictions on political rights. An analysis of more than seventy new democracies emerging since the beginning of the third wave examines the social, economic and political factors associated with each kind of backsliding. I demonstrate that while some factors are associated with backsliding writ large, others have different impacts on the restriction of civil liberties and the restriction of political rights in young democracies.

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1 Introduction

The third wave of democratization has led to a great deal of interest in the stability of new democracies. Scholars have investigated the relationship between various factors like economic conditions (Przeworski et al. 2000, Reenock & Sobek 2007), institutional design (Power & Gasiorowski 1997, Gates et al. 2006), and political mobilization/participation (Wright 2008, Aleman & Yang 2011), and democratic regime survival. While research has largely focused on a regime's ultimate outcome (either democratic consolidation or authoritarian reversal), most new democracies have along the way faced numerous threats to their stability and legitimacy in the form of restrictions on various political rights and freedoms. These instances of authoritarian backsliding have received less attention except in the handful of cases in which they led directly to a breakdown of democracy.¹ This paper is concerned with the broad class of events in which rights or liberties are restricted in new democracies, whether or not a regime change takes place.

I describe two types of authoritarian backsliding and empirically examine the institutional, economic and political factors associated with each. The first deals with the curtailment of political rights, such as electoral fraud or disenfranchisement of certain groups. The second dimension concerns assaults on civil liberties, which includes abridgements of individual freedoms of speech, association and so on. While these two dimensions are inherently linked in most conceptions of liberal democracy, they are theoretically distinct; respect for the integrity of the electoral process does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with respect for personal freedoms. The two dimensions may provide substitutable strategic choices for those trying to undermine the democratic process in unconsolidated democracies – the same result might be achieved by banning a particular political party or stealing an election as by closing certain media outlets or harassing organizers. Which strategy, if any, is chosen likely depends on numerous characteristics from the political culture and

¹Work on state repression has also addressed several specific types of government activity aimed at limiting or eliminating particular rights and liberties. See Davenport (2007) for a review.

other features of the citizenry to the institutional setting and authoritarian legacy.

For the new democracies that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the path from democratic transition to democratic consolidation has been neither smooth nor steady. Many new democracies have seen periods in which democratically elected leaders or their opponents have limited individual freedoms and political competition, or impeded the rule of law. These actions can take a variety of different forms, from limiting freedom of the press to openly disregarding the outcomes of free and fair elections. Occasionally, these have led to a failure of democracy and a return to authoritarianism. Previous work on the stability of new democracies has looked exclusively at regime breakdown and reversions to authoritarian rule (see Reenock et al. 2007, Wright 2008, Svobik 2008). They have not addressed restrictions on rights and liberties that are not associated with a regime change; violations that occur without pushing the regime across some threshold of democracy. While they have not received a great deal of attention in the literature on democratic regime stability, such violations have occurred quite frequently in new democracies.

Of the more than 70 new democracies that emerged since the mid 1970s, fewer than two dozen have experienced a return to dictatorship (see Table A.1). Those that did were mostly concentrated in Africa and Latin America, with only a handful in other areas of the world. In contrast, instances of authoritarian backsliding, events that curtail rights and liberties, were significantly more frequent and more widespread, touching nearly every continent and a majority of new democracies. The frequency and distribution of these events makes them fertile ground for examining theories of democratic stability. Furthermore, their prevalence begs for greater scholarly attention and a more thorough understanding of their particular causes and consequences.

The present study addresses the issue of authoritarian backsliding which I broadly define as the limiting of civil liberties or political rights in new democracies. Authoritarian backsliding can thus occur with or without a complete return to authoritarian rule. I describe two different types of backsliding: restrictions on political rights and restrictions on civil liberties. Political

rights refer to the functioning of government and the electoral process and civil liberties refer to basic individual rights such as freedom of expression and association. Drawing on the literature on democratic regime stability, I present some potential factors associated with each type of authoritarian backsliding. I utilize annual reductions in Freedom House's Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores to indicate the occurrence of each type of backsliding. An analysis of 74 new democracies that emerged between 1975 and 2003 demonstrates that while many of the same factors that help explain regime failure also help to explain restrictions on political rights, the same cannot be said for restrictions on civil liberties. Restrictions on political rights are associated with particular institutional legacies, lower GDP, the level of democracy in the region, the breadth of political participation, and the extent of anti-regime protest mobilization. In contrast, only GDP has even a marginally significant impact on civil liberties restrictions, suggesting that more work is needed to understand why some new democracies restrict individual freedoms. The findings demonstrate that there is a meaningful distinction between the two types of backsliding and they suggest that the restrictions on political rights (electoral fraud, corruption, restricted participation) may be more closely associated with democratic failure than restrictions on civil liberties. They indicate that promoting broad electoral competition early in the life of a new democracy, and even before a democratic transition occurs, may reduce the likelihood that a regime faces some forms of authoritarian backsliding.

This analysis builds upon the existing literature in several ways. First, I distinguish two theoretically distinct dimensions upon which new democracies can experience backsliding from liberal democracy. Second, I incorporate recent findings on the stabilizing effect of broad political participation (Wright 2008) and the democratizing effect of competitive authoritarianism (Brownlee 2009) and show both to be related to one dimension of authoritarian backsliding. Finally, I analyze events that do not meet the standard definition of regime change but that are conceptually linked to democratic regime failure.

The next section discusses two types of authoritarian backsliding and how they relate to existing theoretical claims concerning democratic stability. I then present an operationalization of backsliding that utilizes existing data from Freedom House. The empirical section presents the results of a discrete-time duration analysis of each type of authoritarian backsliding and discusses possible problems and extensions.

2 Authoritarian Backsliding

Recent research has investigated many of the factors associated with democratic regime stability (Reenock & Sobek 2007, Wright 2008, Svobik 2008, Aleman & Yang 2011). Generally, these studies have dealt exclusively with events that forced a country beyond some threshold of democracy, indicating the failure of the regime. A good deal less is known about curtailments of rights and liberties that occur in the absence of an actual regime transition.

Authoritarian backsliding can be understood as any significant decrease in the political rights or civil liberties enjoyed by citizens in a new democracy. Backsliding can take a number of different forms from the corruption of a particular branch of government to the stifling of a free press to electoral malfeasance and beyond. Given the breadth of the concept it makes sense to try to group together kinds of backsliding that resemble one another. Freedom House's distinction between Political Rights and Civil Liberties provides a useful analytic shorthand for classifying two types of authoritarian backsliding. Backsliding can either take the form of restrictions of Civil Liberties – individual rights to things like speech and association – and, Political Rights – the proper functioning of government and elections. An example of backsliding on the Political Rights dimension includes widespread allegation of electoral fraud, as occurred in Benin's 2001 presidential election which multiple candidates boycotted (Freedom House 2003). Alternatively, restrictions on political rights could take the form of failure of proper government functioning due to corruption as

in the case of Guatemala's judicial system in 2002 (Pena 2007). Backsliding on civil liberties includes attempts to silence dissent by banning popular protest as seen in Malawi in 2002 (Freedom House 2003a).

Backsliding may or may not be accompanied by an authoritarian reversal (a return to authoritarian rule) and it may or may not be directly caused by those currently in control of the government,² but backsliding on either dimension is theoretically related to democratic failure. In some cases, it is caused by the same driving force that ultimately undoes a democratic regime, such as an executive's desire to hold onto power.³ Events that restrict either political rights or civil liberties should also be expected to have a negative impact on the legitimacy of government and on the probability that the regime survives over the long-term. As leaders resort to stealing elections or silencing dissent, the system that put them in power likely begins to appear no more proper than the authority derived by the dictators that preceded them.

While the two types of backsliding are related to one another and to democratic breakdowns, they are also theoretically distinct. Restrictions on civil liberties and political rights do not frequently occur simultaneously, suggesting that they might represent substitutable strategies for undermining the democratic process or quieting dissent. For example, harassing opposition leaders could be as effective as electoral fraud at achieving some goals and it may be more or less costly depending upon the particular institutions, culture and history of a given country. Both forms of backsliding represent a threat to the consolidation and stability of a new democracy, but each is likely driven by different factors. This suggests that while the same factors known to be associated with democratic breakdown may help explain backsliding, they might do so differently, with some factors being related to only one or the other dimension of backsliding.

²The working definition used here is deliberately broad so as to encompass actions that are taken by challengers or incumbents, with or without the full force of the state supporting them, and whatever the outcome of the action may be.

³Every failed democracy in my data faced at least one backsliding event on each dimension prior to returning to authoritarian rule.

2.1 Previous Empirical Work

Studies of democratic stability have largely ignored instances of backsliding that did not accompany a regime transition. Aleman and Yang (2011) note that such an approach is somewhat ahistorical since it ignores the fact that regime change is often incremental, taking place over a number of years. Their approach is to model transitions in one direction or another without the use of a particular cutpoint to create a democracy/autocracy dichotomy.⁴ They take as their dependent variable a 3-point-change in a country's Polity score occurring within a three year period regardless of the overall level of democracy. This approach is more inclusive than most in that it allows for events that do not necessarily change the commonly understood classification of a country's regime-type. Still, Aleman and Yang restrict their analysis to countries that experience a 3-point shift in their Polity score which is frequently significant enough to be considered an indicator of a regime change. Many of the events on either dimension of authoritarian backsliding would not elicit a full 3-point shift in a country's Polity score. As such, the analysis that follows utilizes Freedom House's Civil Liberties and Political Rights scores to identify events that might otherwise be overlooked. Aleman and Yang also allow for the occurrence of "autocratizing transitions" in regimes of all types, both democratic and authoritarian.⁵ In contrast, I confine my discussion and analysis to newly democratized states.

While prior work has not addressed the broader conceptualization of backsliding that is presented here, many of the same variables found to be related to democratic failure should also relate to restrictions of political rights and civil liberties. Economic development has routinely been shown to inoculate democracies from authoritarian reversals (Przeworski et al. 2000, Epstein et al. 2006, Aleman & Yang 2011). Despite some evidence that institutional (Gates et al. 2006) or political (Aleman & Yang 2011) factors may play a larger role, the hypothesis that high income

⁴See Elkins (2000).

⁵The only exception is for those regime's whose Polity score makes the requisite shift mathematically impossible.

supports democracy is among the longest standing in the discipline (see Lipset 1959 for example). If development plays a pivotal role in preventing returns to dictatorship then there is reason to believe that it may forestall restrictions of political rights and liberties as well. Additionally, many have argued that presidential systems are inherently less stable than parliamentary systems, pointing to mechanisms such as the frequency of minority governments (Linz & Valenzuela 1994). Cheibub (2007) and Powers and Gasiorowski (1997) present evidence questioning this assertion, and recent analyses (see Aleman and Yang 2011) also find that presidential systems are not systematically related to democratic failures. Still, there is good reason to suspect that institutions may play a role in determining a regime's susceptibility to authoritarian backsliding.

The institutional arrangement that existed prior to the emergence of a new democracy may have longstanding effects on the successor regime. Several types of institutional arrangements have been shown to have an impact on regime stability and the prospects for democratization. It makes sense then to look at what impact different institutional legacies may have on the stability of a new democracy. Geddes' (1999) typology of authoritarian regimes based on their power base has been shown to be related to authoritarian regime stability. In addition to Geddes' own analysis, Brownlee (2009) shows that military regimes are much more fragile than other nondemocracies. Aleman and Yang (2011) further show that military regimes tend to be more likely to face autocratizing transitions. As Cheibub (2007) notes, military intervention into politics tends to be repetitive, which would indicate that new democracies emerging out of military dictatorships might be more likely than others to face military grabs for power, coups, or violent repression at the hands of security forces. This suggests that the historical legacy associated with Geddes' regime-types may be associated with the stability of new democracies.

Relatively recent interest in hybrid regimes has spurred an investigation of the role of electoral institutions in democratization (Hadenius & Teorell 2007, Howard & Roessler 2006, Brownlee 2009, Wright & Escriba-Folch 2012). Brownlee (2009) provides strong evidence that competitive

authoritarian regimes – those with nonminimally democratic electoral institutions and minimal levels of competition – are more likely to democratize (though no more likely to fail) than closed or hegemonic regimes. If competitive authoritarianism has an impact upon prospects for democratization then it may also affect the probability of authoritarian backsliding. Brownlee and others (Schedler 2009) suggest that competitive elections may make for a political culture that is supportive of democracy, a mechanism that also may support a link between a competitive authoritarian legacy and a democracy that is less prone to authoritarian backsliding.

Finally, Wright (2008) finds that new democracies with broad participation at the outset tend to survive longer than those who limit participation in the wake of a democratic transition. The logic simply asserts that greater inclusion will lead to more groups becoming invested in the democratic processes and fewer left on the outside challenging the legitimacy of its institutions.

The next section presents an operationalization of both types of backsliding and provides some descriptive statistics. The operationalizations of each kind of backsliding serve as the dependent variables in the analysis that follows. I include measures of many of the concepts from the literature reviewed above as well as a host of relevant control variables in order to try to explain authoritarian backsliding in new democracies over the last quarter of the twentieth century.

3 Data and Methods

I examine the factors associated with authoritarian backsliding in 74 new democracies that emerged between 1975 and 2004. The regimes in the sample include all those that experienced a transition to democracy according to the ACLP coding protocol (Przeworski et al. 2000).⁶ New democracies that experienced a return to authoritarian rule according to ACLP leave the sample on the year after a democratic failure. Several countries experienced multiple spells of democracy within the

⁶See the Appendix for a full list of the regimes included in the analysis.

temporal domain of the sample.

3.1 Authoritarian Backsliding

Authoritarian backsliding is measured using Freedom House's annual scoring of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Both scales range from 1 to 7 with higher numbers indicating less freedom on a given dimension. Backsliding events are identified by any year in which the Freedom House Political Rights or Civil Liberties score increased for a country in the sample. Regime-years in which the Political Rights (Civil Liberties) score increased are coded as experiencing an authoritarian backslide on the political rights (civil liberties) dimension. Regime-years with an increase are coded as one, all other years are coded as zero. This produces two binary dependent variables for each type of backsliding.⁷

Backsliding on political rights (civil liberties) occurred 80 (69) times in the sample. Unlike full authoritarian reversals, which happened only 21 times in the sample and clustered largely in Africa and Latin America, backsliding on political rights occurred in nearly two-thirds of the countries in the sample (n=45) and touched almost every region. 23 regimes experienced a second political rights backslide and eight experienced a third. Backsliding on civil liberties followed a similarly diverse geographical distribution with 40 countries experiencing a first backslide, 16 a second, and six a third.

Regimes that ultimately returned to dictatorship faced an average of .714 political rights events and .905 civil liberties events. New democracies that remained stable through 2004 had an average of .549 political rights events and .612 civil liberties events.

⁷On a handful of occasions scores increased solely due to changes in the survey methodology employed by Freedom House; these regime-years are coded as zero to reflect that no backsliding occurred.

3.2 Model

The data are a binary cross-sectional time series that can be analyzed with the tools of event history modeling. The dataset contains 60 countries that experienced 74 spells of democracy. Every regime is at risk of experiencing a backslide each year it is in the sample. Each regime experiences at most one event per dimension, per year, and remains in the sample and at risk until it either fails or is censored (2004).

The panel nature of the data implies possible temporal dependence. The analysis should account for the fact that countries will experience backslides at some baseline rate, over time, absent the impact of any of our covariates. In order to account for dependence within each spell, I follow Carter and Signornino (2010) and include t , t^2 , and t^3 , where t denotes the time under observation, or time since the last event (for those that experienced multiple events).⁸ Alternative methods for dealing with temporal dependence include cubic splines and lowess (see Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998), but they provided no improvement in model fit. The findings were largely unchanged using different modeling strategies.

Regimes in the sample can face multiple, successive backsliding events. To account for the presence of repeated events I include an event counter that simply reflects the number of prior events that occurred within a given regime. Finally, I employ robust, clustered standard errors to relax the assumption that observations within a given country are independent of one another.

A number of different models could also be employed, including continuous time duration models and models with random effects or frailty terms that are becoming more common in the comparative politics literature, but none of the alternative specifications I attempted led to any improvement in the fit of the model.⁹ The effects for all of the variables of interests were generally

⁸The time transformations were all significant for the Political Rights model, indicating the presence of temporal dependence.

⁹The continuous-time alternative is the conditional gap-time Cox model, in which observations are stratified by the particular event they are at risk for (first, second or subsequent). See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004).

the same so I have opted to report the results from the simplest specification.

3.3 Independent Variables

Several theoretically relevant explanatory variables are included based on the discussion above. First, following the standard in the literature, I use logged per capita GDP as an indicator of development. Additionally, the change in GDP from the previous year to the current year is included to check for any impact of economic growth or decline. I also include a dummy variable for Presidential systems due to the longstanding debate over the effect of democratic regime type and stability.

To control for the potential effects of institutional legacy I include a Military Legacy dummy variable that is coded one for all regimes that emerged out of a military dictatorship. Furthermore, to check for any other effects of institutional legacy associated with Geddes' typology, I include dummies for three of her other regime subtypes (single party, military-personalist, and single party-hybrid). The reference category for the Geddes dummies is Personalist Legacy.¹⁰ Recent work on hybrid regimes and democratization suggests that competitive authoritarian legacies may be associated with decreased risk of experience backsliding than regimes with hegemonic or closed authoritarian legacies. I include a dummy variable for regimes that were considered "competitive authoritarian regimes" in the year prior to transitioning to democracy to check for any impact of the legacy of authoritarian elections.¹¹

Finally, following Wright (2008), I include a variable taken from the PolityIV dataset, PARCOMP, measuring the breadth of political participation in the first year following a democratic

¹⁰Geddes' typology also includes a triple hybrid (personalist-military-single party) that I merge with Personalist since only one regime (Indonesia) in the sample was coded with that particular legacy. Omitting Indonesia from the analysis does not affect any of the results reported below.

¹¹Brownlee's coding of competitive authoritarian regimes relies on the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions. For details see Brownlee (2009).

transition (a regime's PARCOMP score is then fixed through the life of the regime). Wright finds that initial levels of competitiveness, as measured by PARCOMP, are associated with more democratic stability.

3.4 Controls

The models reported below also employ a host of control variables. Since some diffusion effects may be present, the overall level of democracy within the region, as scored by Freedom House, is included. Also, I include controls for ethnic fractionalization (Alesina 2003), number of anti-regime protests in a given year (Banks 2004), and the age of the current regime.

4 Results

Table 1 presents the results for the analysis of political rights restrictions. Interpretation is fairly straightforward: positive (negative) coefficients indicate an increased (decreased) probability of a backsliding event on the political rights dimension. The first column reports the results from a model without controls and the second reports the results of the full model.

The development indicator, logged GDP, is negatively and significantly related to political rights backslides. This is not surprising given the well-established relationship between economic development, democratization and democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000, Svoboda 2008). Going from the 25th to the 75th percentile in per capita GDP is associated with a decrease of 11.5% ($p < .05$) in risk of a political rights backslide in a given year.¹² GDP growth was not significantly related to restrictions on political rights. There is also no evidence that presidential systems are

¹²Simulations conducted in Stata and are for a regime with a non-competitive, single-party legacy, non-presidential system, and at the mean on all other independent variables. See Appendix Table 2 for a full list of simulations and measures of uncertainty.

particularly susceptible to backsliding on this dimension.

Institutional legacy turns out to be very strongly related to backsliding. The dummy for both Military and Single party-hybrid legacies were positive and significant, indicating that both are more likely to face political rights backsliding than Personalist legacies. Holding all other independent variables constant, switching from a Military legacy to a Personalist legacy is associated with a decrease in the probability of backsliding of .057 ($p < .05$). Competitive legacies were also significant with a switch from a non-Competitive legacy to a Competitive one bringing about a decrease of more than 3.5% ($p < .05$) in the risk of a backslide. This suggests that authoritarian legacies are not only significant predictors of regime change and democratization, they also reflect deeper differences that persist beyond a democratic transition and make a state more or less likely to face restrictions on political rights.

Broad participation and competitiveness early in the life of a democracy also has a significant and negative impact on the chances of a curtailment of political rights. Following Wright's argument, having more groups mobilized and invested in the democratic process from the beginning helps to prevent political rights abuses by reducing the incentives for particular group to undermine the democratic process. Going from a 3 to a 4 on PARCOMP (range = 0–5) is estimated to lead to a decrease of .022 ($p < .05$) in probability of a backslide.

Several of the control variables were also statistically significant. Being in a more democratic region reduces the probability of a backslide, as does facing less mass political dissent. Having more democratic neighbors probably increases ties to established democracies and reduces the likelihood that an incumbent might risk international criticism by committing electoral fraud or disenfranchising particular opponents. The relationship between political rights backslides and protest could very plausibly be endogenous, with less infringements leading to fewer demonstrations. Interestingly, ethnic fractionalization appears to decrease the risk of backslides but the coefficient does not quite reach conventional levels of significance.

Overall, backsliding on the political rights dimension appears to be related to many of the same factors that have been shown to relate to democratic failures. The strongest predictors of political rights backslides are low levels of economic development, non-Competitive and Military institutional legacies, relatively constrained participation early on in the life of the regime, and being in a less democratic region. This suggests a close relationship between political rights restrictions and regime stability. Political rights abuses in new democracies signal a very real risk to the stability of the regime and may help to identify particularly fragile democracies.

Table 2 presents the results from models predicting backsliding on the civil liberties dimension. Unlike the previous analysis, very few variables show any significant impact on authoritarian backsliding. In fact, only PARCOMP reaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < .10$). While the measure of development is in the expected direction, it falls short of statistical significance. Ethnic fractionalization appears to have the opposite effect on civil rights backsliding as it does on political rights backsliding, though the effect remains insignificant; more ethnic fractionalization may be associated with more restrictions on civil liberties as groups in power use repression to attack their rivals.

5 Discussion and Conclusions

The new democracies of the third wave have been quite resilient. Of more than 70 new democracies to have emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century, fewer than a third have returned to an autocratic form of government. The resiliency of these regimes becomes even more clear when we look at the number of instances in which the legitimacy and/or functioning of democracy was threatened by restrictions on political rights or civil liberties. In some cases, authoritarian backsliding was a precursor to an ultimate return of dictatorial rule. But in many others the backslides were themselves reversed, and the march toward stability and consolidation continued.

Authoritarian backsliding on the political rights dimension can be explained by many of the same factors known to be associated with democratic failure, such as low levels of economic development, high levels of mass political protest, and low initial levels of political participation. In addition, I find a significant impact for institutional legacies, with formerly competitive authoritarian regimes being less prone to backsliding on the political rights dimension and former military dictatorships being more prone to backsliding. The strong impact of participation levels and institutional legacy supports the idea that promoting broader and freer electoral competition early on in a democracy's existence, and even in electoral authoritarian settings, promotes democratic stability in the long-term.

The same model has much less success explaining curtailments of civil liberties. The stark difference in the results indicates that the conceptual distinction between the two types of backsliding is substantively meaningful. The effect of ethnic fractionalization even appears to go in different directions for one than the other; fractionalization is positively related to backsliding on political rights but negatively related to backsliding on civil liberties (though the effect is just short of statistically significant in both cases). The failure of many of the same variables that explain political rights restrictions to account for the occurrence of civil liberties restrictions indicates a need for further investigation of the causes of this type of backsliding. It also may indicate that restrictions on civil liberties are less closely associated with failures of democracy than are curtailments of political rights.

Authoritarian backsliding is a challenge faced by most of the new democracies of the modern era. Further work should address how backsliding is related to long-term democratic performance and whether or not certain types of backsliding events have particularly strong impacts on the probability that a regime fails. Improving our understanding of this phenomenon will better inform our expectations for newly democratized states and help to predict the impact of certain events on the stability of fledgling democracies.

Table 1: Predicting Authoritarian Backsliding. Dependent Variable: Political Rights Restrictions

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP	-1.205** (.227)	-1.857** (.481)
GDPgrowth	.266 (1.023)	.439 (1.002)
Competitive	-.369 (.227)	-.667* (.279)
Mil	.614* (.291)	.807* (.372)
Single party	.067 (.309)	.388 (.472)
Single party-hybrid	.784 (.490)	1.705** (.623)
Mil-personalist	.223 (.263)	.469 (.318)
PARCOMP	-.153 (.110)	-.302* (.142)
Presidential	-.364* (.169)	-.279 (.256)
Ethnic frac		-1.109 (.700)
Regional democracy		-.032** (.012)
Age		.243** (.053)
Demonstrations		.215** (.060)
Event counter		-1.348** (.313)
Constant	.185* (.772)	4.848** (1.463)
N (n events)	790 (76)	766 (72)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Note. Entries are logit coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Personalist is the reference category for the Geddes institutional legacy dummies (Mil, Single party, Single party-hybrid, Mil-personalist). t , t^2 , t^3 included in model but not reported.

Table 2: Predicting Authoritarian Backsliding. Dependent Variable: Civil Liberties Restrictions

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP	-.818*	-.760
	(.395)	(.475)
GDPgrowth	-.967	-1.108
	(1.228)	(1.216)
Competitive	-.061	.027
	(.282)	(.309)
Mil	.372*	.436
	(.458)	(.492)
Single party	-.318	-.187
	(.467)	(.557)
Single party-hybrid	.643	.728
	(.733)	(.661)
Mil-personalist	.236	.057
	(.288)	(.451)
PARCOMP	-.297*	-.280
	(.149)	(.168)
Presidential	-.190	-.217
	(.280)	(.309)
Ethnic frac		-1.233
		(.765)
Regional democracy		.014
		(.018)
Age		-.004
		(.060)
Demonstrations		.079
		(.068)
Event counter		-.378
		(.263)
Constant	.916	.778
	(1.008)	(1.677)
N (n events)	790 (60)	766 (59)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Note. Entries are logit coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Personalist is the reference category for the Geddes institutional legacy dummies (Mil, Single party, Single party-hybrid, Mil-personalist). t , t^2 , t^3 included in model but not reported.

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Table A.1: Authoritarian Regimes Succeeded by Electoral Democracies, 1975–2003

Country	Years as Democracy	Country	Years as Democracy
Albania	1992–	Macedonia	1991–
Argentina	1983–	Madagascar	1993–
Armenia	1991–	Malawi	1994–
Bangladesh	1991–	Mali	1992–
Benin	1991–	Mexico	2000–
Bolivia	1979–80, 1982–	Moldova	1996–
Brazil	1979–	Mongolia	1992–
Bulgaria	1990–	Nepal	1991–2002
Burundi	1993–96	Nicaragua	1984–
Cape Verde	1991–	Niger	1993–96, 2000–
Central African Republic	1993–2003	Nigeria	1979–83, 1999–
Chile	1990–	Pakistan	1988–1998
Congo	1992–97	Panama	1989–
Cote d'Ivoire	2000–2003	Peru	1980–90, 2001–
Croatia	1991–	Philippines	1986–
Cyprus	1983–	Poland	1989–
Czech Republic	1993–	Portugal	1976–
Ecuador	1979–2001	Romania	1990–
El Salvador	1984–	Russia	1992–
Estonia	1991–	Sao Tome	1991–
Ghana	1979–81, 2000–	Senegal	2000–
Greece	1975–	Sierra Leone	1996–97, 1998–
Grenada	1984–	South Africa	1994–
Guatemala	1986–	Spain	1977–
Guinea-Bissau	2000–2003	Sri Lanka	1989–
Guyana	1992–	Sudan	1986–89
Haiti	1994–	Suriname	1988–1990, 1991–
Honduras	1982–	Taiwan	1996–
Hungary	1990–	Thailand	1975–76, 1983–91, 1992–
Indonesia	1999–	Turkey	1983–
Kenya	2002–	Uganda	1980–1985
South Korea	1988–	Ukraine	1990–
Kyrgyzstan	1991–2001	Uruguay	1985–
Latvia	1991–	Zambia	1991–

Democratic spells with no end year indicate regimes that were coded as democratic as of January 2004. All microstates (Sao Tome, Cape Verde, Grenada, Suriname, and Guyana) and Taiwan were dropped from the full analysis due to the unavailability of data on control variables. Including these regimes under alternate specifications did not change the substantive or statistical significance of the main results.

Table A.2: Simulation Results for Political Rights Backslides

	Change in IV	Change in Predicted Probability	95% Confidence Interval
GDP	25th percentile to 75th percentile	-.116	(-.221 -- -.048)
Institutional Legacy (Geddes)	Military to Personalist	-.057	(-.095 -- -.016)
Institutional Legacy (Electoral)	non-Competitive to Competitive	-.036	(-.076 -- -.005)
PARCOMP	3 to 4	-.022	(-.054 -- -.002)

Simulations conducted in Stata using 1000 reps. Institutional legacy dummies, presidential dummy, and PARCOMP held at their modes. All other IVs held at their means.