

SLOUCHING TOWARDS AUTHORITARIANISM? evidence from survey experiments around the 2014 Hungarian elections

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March 20, 2015

Abstract

We fielded a panel survey immediately before and after the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections to analyze how citizens respond to the process of incremental democratic decay. In embedded survey experiments we provided respondents with varying levels of information about recent reforms to Hungarian electoral rules, asking citizens about the legitimacy of the election and satisfaction with Hungarian democracy more generally. We have four main findings. First, Hungarians were widely aware of the incumbent party's (Fidesz) electoral reforms. Second, non-Fidesz voters were significantly more pessimistic about the reforms implications for electoral fairness. Third, when non-Fidesz voters were provided with information that the opposition parties were against the reforms, their assessments of the reforms fairness became even more negative. Fourth, providing more information is not a silver bullet: the effect of information is marginal and concentrated only among those who did not already support Fidesz. No matter the information provided, voters preexisting partisan allegiances dominate how they interpret the information they receive. In short, supporters of the electoral victor believe the winners actions are legitimate and fair, while supporters of the losers see an important erosion of democracy. Our findings highlight a major difficulty for the mechanisms of a self-enforcing democracy.

JEL codes: P26

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While some new democracies successfully consolidate, others experience democratic backsliding. An influential strand of scholarship views the challenge of consolidation as the problem of self-enforcing democracy (Fearon, 2011; Przeworski, 1991, 2008). Enduring democracy is thought of as a delicate equilibrium that can survive only if political losers believe that in the future they can one day be the electoral victors. Absent this confidence about the future possibility of gaining power through the ballot box, losers in any given election may find it attractive to resort to extra-constitutional or illegal methods of retaining or seizing power, such as coups and electoral fraud.

As “democracy” has become the most accepted political regime in the post-Cold War world, a new challenge has emerged for maintaining a self-enforcing democracy: incumbent parties or rulers, elected through free and fair elections, might use their transitory majorities to entrench themselves in power and dramatically reduce the possibility of future opposition victory by reshaping political rules in entirely legal ways. We conceptualize this route to authoritarianism as a “majoritarian pathway,” which is distinctive insofar as elected politicians use legal and constitutional rules to undermine democracy, and do so via subtle, technocratic methods. Unlike the traditional pathways to authoritarianism – outright election fraud, military coups, or the intimidation and removal of political opposition (Fish, 2005; Linz and Stepan, 1978) – the majoritarian pathway to authoritarianism is paved with a series of legal steps that, over time, serve to insulate the incumbent from meaningful competition. Hungary, a member of the European Union, arguably started down this path in 2010 under the legislative dominance of the center-Right Fidesz party. We take advantage of the recent parliamentary elections – the first under a newly reformed electoral system – to investigate how citizens react to this process.

1 Democratic decay

The breakdown of formerly democratic institutions is a long-standing subject of study in comparative politics (Linz and Stepan, 1978). Existing thinking on democratic consolidation has tended to focus on two paradigmatic pathways through which democracies breakdown. These two pathways, reflecting historic European and Latin American experiences are not exhaustive, and in some ways fail to anticipate the current events. In the classic model of democratic breakdown, built on the

dramatic cases of interwar Europe and twentieth century Latin America (Linz and Stepan, 1978; O'Donnell, 1973; Valenzuela, 1977), the threat of popular mobilization triggered defensive moves by old regime elites to reinstate themselves in power by illegal means. Whether in the form of a military coup or *Machtergreifung* by explicitly anti-democratic political parties, the hallmark of this route to democratic collapse is extra-constitutional or illegal *rule-breaking* that reinstates old regime elements.

A second frequently-studied pathway of democratic breakdown, common in the post-Cold War environment where incumbents seek electoral legitimacy, involves light to moderate repression. Incumbent office holders jail political opponents, censor the media, and manipulate elections in such a way that democratic politics, if it continues to exist at all, is no longer meaningful (Fish, 2005; Schedler, 2006). While more subtle than the former strategy, this pathway to authoritarianism is also defined by incumbents' willingness to break rules to entrench themselves in power.

In this paper we examine a third pattern of democratic decay that can be conceptualized as a majoritarian pathway to authoritarianism. Exemplified most prominently by three recent cases – Hungary since 2010, Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan since 2003, and Thailand under the Thaksin Shinawatra's regime between 2001 and 2006 – the majoritarian path to authoritarianism features an incumbent that uses democratic rules to make its transitory power enduring. It has three major characteristics: (1) the removal of counter-majoritarian constraints on the executive (e.g., court-packing), (2) re-regulation of the flow of information in ways that, while not illegal, disadvantage the opposition, and (3) alteration of the electoral system in subtle ways that can catapult a plurality into a dominant majority (Kornai, 2015).

Unlike the frequent occurrence of military coups in twentieth-century Latin America (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014), the majoritarian path to authoritarianism does not require an interventionist military that deposes the government.¹ Indeed, in a case like Hungary since 2010, the military is firmly under civilian control and is never seen to issue veiled threats to usurp power. Likewise, unlike democratic breakdown in interwar Europe (Luebbert, 1991), the post-Cold War

¹It is of course worth noting that in the case of Thailand, Thaksin's rule was suspended precisely via military coup (2006), regarded by some as the only route to "save democracy." A similar tension between civil and military authority plays out for similar reasons in Turkey.

majoritarian pathway to authoritarianism does not require massive economic crisis or democratic malaise that pave the way for non-democratic leaders to seize power. Hungary, while hard-hit by the 2008 economic crisis, endured far deeper economic convulsions in the 1990s when it was a leader in democratic reform.²

Perhaps most significantly, unlike in the former Soviet Union and indeed unlike cases marked by outright electoral manipulation across the world today (Simpser, 2014), the majoritarian pathway to authoritarianism does not entail the jailing of the political opposition, the intimidation of voters, or the explicit manipulation of voting. Whatever one thinks of Fidesz, the incumbent in Hungary, there have been relatively few instances of explicit rule-breaking to entrench power. Instead incumbents slouch toward authoritarianism by using innovative rule-making. In short, in the majoritarian pathway to authoritarianism, incumbents employ a subtle package of strategies to entrench themselves in power, tilting the playing field in their favor by exploiting weaknesses in largely democratic procedures, and relying on the highly technocratic nature of their reforms to avoid upsetting the populace, or at least their supporters. Rather than merely using its transitory super-majority status to pass its preferred legislation, incumbents change the rules by which future majorities can be elected and govern.

1.1 Hungary after Communism

Hungary held its first post-communist national parliamentary elections in the spring of 1990. Parties spanning the political spectrum contested the election, with the rightist Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) ultimately forming a governing coalition. The MDF set about dismantling the dictatorial politics and centrally planned economics of the communist period.

The 1994 national parliamentary elections saw a strong swing back toward the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the successor to the former communist party, which captured an absolute parliamentary majority. The Socialist victory precipitated a transformation in the Hungarian party system. The parties of the former rightist ruling coalition disappeared, and the political space they

²It is true that in a recent poll only just over a third of Hungarians expressed satisfaction with the way democracy worked in the country. But the numbers were even more dire in older and more consolidated democracies such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Eurobarometer 81, p. 125).

held came to be occupied by the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP). Between 1994 and 2002, leftist governments dominated by MSZP and a rightist government dominated by Fidesz alternated in power, as Hungary undertook the reforms necessary for entry into the European Union.

Figure 1 gives a snapshot of the Hungarian population's experience with democracy in the run up to the 2010 election, comparing it to other formerly Communist Central European countries. Hungarians are notably pessimistic about their democracy, especially relative to the strong positive movement seen in the rest of the region in the 2000s with the exception of Ukraine.




Figure 1: Satisfaction with democracy in post-communist Central Europe. Data from EVS (2011*a,b*); Reif and Cunningham (1993)

MSZP eked out a narrow victory in the 2006 elections, making it the first party since the fall of communism to win two consecutive terms of office. But after a series of gaffes and scandals involving the Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, Fidesz and other parties organized massive protests

and called for his resignation. MSZP never recovered its popularity, losing the 2010 election by a wide margin. The 2010 elections were a watershed in Hungarian politics. With the Socialists mired in scandal and the liberals irrelevant, Fidesz, in coalition with the small Christian Democratic Party, captured over two-thirds of the seats in parliament. This parliamentary supermajority gave Fidesz unprecedented power to remake the Hungarian political system, including amending the constitution without opposition input.

1.1.1 Pro-majoritarian reforms under Fidesz

Three signposts of the majoritarian path to authoritarianism – neutering counter-majoritarianism bodies, regulating the flow of information, and electoral reform – are all visible in Hungary under the Fidesz supermajority.

Until Fidesz came to power in 2010, the primary counter-majoritarian institution in Hungary was the powerful Constitutional Court, which had both the authority and will to review and reject legislation that it deemed unconstitutional. Several of Fidesz Prime Minister Orbán's early initiatives aimed at altering this Constitutional Court. First, the Fidesz government attempted to impose a mandatory retirement age for justices in order to purge the Court of its older and more leftist and liberal judges, a blow that was softened after only after the European Union objected. The government also altered the appointment process to the court, routing nominees through a new Judicial Council controlled by Fidesz appointees. With no opposition participation, the Fidesz government drafted and then passed a new constitution that restricted the Court's authority, in particular its ability to review new constitutional amendments. In cases where the Court did attempt to reject a piece of Fidesz legislation, the government has simply used its super majority to amend the constitution to incorporate the new law.

In 2011 Fidesz passed a controversial media law with two key features. First, the law restricts the freedom of expression when it “encourages acts of crime,” “violates public morals or the moral rights of others,” or “incites hatred against any nation, community, national, ethnic, linguistic or other minority or majority as well as any church or religious group.” These restrictions are draconian by American standards but not outrageously out of line with European norms. However,

the second feature of the legislation provides for the creation of a Media Council tasked with adjudicating disputes about whether particular content violated the speech codes. This Council is dominated by Fidesz partisans who serve terms of nine years. Given the further stipulation that media owners be “fit and proper,” Fidesz thus has the ability to suspend any organization it deems in violation of the rules.

Most directly relevant to this study, Fidesz has entrenched itself by altering the electoral system in subtle ways.³ The old system provided for a parliament of 386 members, some of whom were elected from regional party lists and others from single-member constituencies. There were two rounds of voting and a complex system whereby parties losing in single-member districts were compensated with seats assigned through party lists. The new law shrinks the number of districts to 199, now highly gerrymandered in Fidesz’s favor, of which a little over half are single-member districts. It also introduces a feature whereby the winners of single-member districts are compensated for the surplus votes they receive. Fidesz also passed legislation allowing ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries to acquire Hungarian citizenship without living in Hungary. These individuals are now eligible to vote for party lists in the parliamentary elections. The net effect of this is to reduce the proportionality between votes received and seats won for the top vote getters while retaining the centrifugal features of mixed and proportional systems.

All of these reforms were controversial both inside and outside Hungary. Domestic opponents protested and the OSCE and EU, among others, made critical noises about the apparent democratic drift in Hungary. In this environment Hungary held its first election parliamentary elections under the new rules in April 2014. These elections were the voters’ first opportunity to punish Fidesz for these self-serving but legal changes. Fidesz still won a plurality of the popular vote (just over 44% of the list vote, down from 52% in 2010) but retained its supermajority (67%) in parliament seats.

2 Democracy’s Achilles’ heel?

Existing models of self-enforcing democracy (Fearon, 2011) rely on regularly held and transparent elections as a critical coordination device. Elections allow diverse political actors to aggregate their

³See Hegedus (2013) for a detailed discussion.

private information about government performance. Any attempt by the incumbent to suspend elections can serve as a public signal for protest or even rebellion. Incumbents are willing to cede power because the possibility of coming to power again in the future makes fighting now too costly. This logic would seem to apply all the more strongly in a case such as Hungary where membership in the European Union and linkages with the West may increase the costs of violating democratic norms while also providing external signals about government performance (Levitsky and Way, 2010). But Fearon (2011) also recognizes that the value of elections in sustaining democracy may be subverted by incumbents who could hold elections but use transitory majorities to “tilt the (electoral) playing field” in low visibility ways. For this to occur the electoral reforms must be sufficiently technocratic such that voters (a) might not notice or understand the consequences of reform and (b) even if they were to notice, they find it more difficult to mobilize a large enough challenge to the incumbent. This latter situation is particularly likely when the incumbent in fact commands significant support, as Fidesz does in Hungary.

This logic leads to some immediate intuition that we then take to an original panel survey with embedded experiments. First, if these anti-democratic reforms are, in fact, flying under the radar, then providing voters with information should induce them to view the reforms and the elections in a more negative light. Voters, however, may face cognitive limitations or the reforms can be so specialized that simple factual information is insufficient. Providing information about other parties’ stances on the election reforms should be more informative to voters, and consequently, induce them to view the reforms more negatively. We propose that the effect of contextualized information (i.e., with partisan cuing) will be more influential to voters than simple factual statements.

The interests and limitations of voters should also affect their assessment of the reforms. Most obviously we expect that supporters of the incumbent view the incumbent’s actions positively, whether because people are motivated reasoners (“I voted for party X therefore party X does good things”) or because voters care about partisan outcomes and are less concerned with democratic norms (“I like party X so I don’t really care how party X keeps power”). Providing information about anti-democratic reforms will either fail to affect the views of pro-incumbent voters or, perhaps

make them more positively disposed toward the reforms. Voters' abilities to handle complex political calculations may also condition the impact of a marginal piece of information on their attitudes. Voters with more education and/or a greater sense of personal political efficacy will be less affected by new information simply because they have already incorporated more information into their existing opinions.

3 Research design

We investigate our hypotheses using an original survey with embedded informational experiments.⁴ We want to learn whether Hungarian citizens knew about the electoral reforms and what they thought about the reforms' consequences for the election's legitimacy.

In cooperation with a larger research team based at Central European University we fielded a two-wave panel survey immediately before (31 March-4 April 2014) and after (approximately 28 April-5 May 2014) the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 6 April 2014. The questionnaire was administered by the polling firm Median in collaboration with Kutatocentrum. Our sample were regular respondents in Kutatocentrum's active online panel representative of the adult online resident citizen population of Hungary.⁵ The pre-election survey had a sample of 3000 Hungarians aged 18 and above. In the second wave we successfully followed up with 1500 of the respondents from the first survey after the election.

3.1 Outcomes

We use two questions as the core dependent variables for this study. The first question focuses directly on the Hungarian reforms' effect on the legitimacy of the election. We denote responses to this question for wave $t \in \{1, 2\}$ as Y_t^l . This question's English translation reads:

⁴The analysis reported in this paper was pre-registered with EGAP as registration number 20150127. Wherever our reported analysis deviates from the pre-registered plan we make note and provide justification in footnotes.

⁵Respondents were incentivized to take the survey by entering them into a quarterly lottery for 200,000 HUF (about US\$815, approximately the average monthly wage). The sample may have included respondents who lived abroad by the time of the survey, but it was not intended to include newly naturalized citizens with dual citizenship or without a residence in Hungary. We have the ability to weight the sample to the adult Hungarian population using the 2011 Hungarian census. Analysis reported here uses only unweighted data; future versions will provide additional results with weights.

Y_t^l “How do you think the changes in the electoral system affect the fairness and legitimacy of Hungarian elections?”

- “Big effect for the better,” “small effect for the better,” “no effect at all,” “small effect for the worse,” “big effect for the worse.”

All 3,000 respondents in the pre-election survey answered this question. Fifteen hundred of the original 3,000 respondents answered this same question again in the post-election survey. We encode responses as integers ranging from -2 (big effect for the worse) to 2 (big effect for the better). We construct the within-subject change in opinion, $\Delta Y_i^l = Y_{i2}^l - Y_{i1}^l$, to analyze how our treatments (described below) combined with the election to alter respondents’ evaluations of the reforms. Note that this variable, which takes on integer values between -4 and +4, is only measured for the 1500 respondents that participated in both survey waves.

Our second dependent variable asks about the more diffuse concept of “satisfaction with democracy.” This question was presented to respondents immediately following the legitimacy question just described; it was asked in the pre-election wave of the survey only. The English translation of the question and responses (Y^d) read as:

Y^d “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in this country?”

We encoded responses to this question as integers from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Note that this question does not reference the electoral reforms in any way.

3.2 The experiment

As part of the survey, we randomly assigned respondents to one of three treatment conditions that differ in the information about the electoral reforms: *control*, *content*, and *content+process*.⁶ The treatment consists of receiving an informational preamble immediately prior to answering the outcome questions just described. Respondents who participated in both survey waves saw

⁶See Appendix C for balance tests. The randomization process appears to have worked acceptably. There is some evidence of minor imbalance with the income and gender variables. We report results that condition on these variables below.

preambles in both surveys. Treatment status did not change across waves, i.e., those who saw no preamble (controls) in the pre-election wave also saw nothing in the post-election wave. We denote treatment status for respondent i in wave t as D_{it} . Note that for the respondents in both waves $D_{i1} = D_{i2}, \forall i$, so we will refer to D_i unless clarification for wave is necessary.

In the pre-election survey, the information treatments in English translation were as follows:

Control ($D_1 = 0$) no preamble

Content ($D_1 = 1$) “Since the last election there have been several changes made to the Hungarian electoral system. For instance, parliament has been shrunk from 386 to 199 members; constituency boundaries were changed; and Hungarians living abroad can now cast ballots in the election.”

Content + Process ($D_1 = 2$) “Since the last election the ruling party, Fidesz, has implemented several changes to the Hungarian electoral system. For instance, Fidesz shrank parliament from 386 to 199 members; changed constituency boundaries; and Hungarian citizens living abroad can now cast ballots in the election. The opposition rejected some of these changes.”

The only difference between *content* and *content+process* was the additional information that the opposition parties rejected Fidesz’s proposed reforms.

In the post-election wave we took advantage of the fact that the results of the election were now known and could provide additional information on the *consequences* of the electoral reforms on the partisan composition of the legislature. The treatments for the second wave in English translation were:

Control ($D_2 = 0$) no preamble

Content + Consequences ($D_2 = 1$) “There were several changes made to the Hungarian electoral system and constituency boundaries for the elections just held on 6 April. Under these new rules Fidesz won 67 percent of the parliamentary seats with 44 percent of the domestic vote in 2014, while in 2010, under the old rules, Fidesz needed 53 percent of the domestic vote to win 68 percent of the seats.”

Content + Consequences + Process ($D_2 = 2$) “There were several changes made to the Hungarian electoral system and constituency boundaries for the elections just held on 6 April. Under these new rules that the Fidesz majority adopted in parliament in spite of protest from the opposition, Fidesz won 67 percent of the parliamentary seats with 44 percent of the domestic vote in 2014, while in 2010, under the old rules, Fidesz needed 53 percent of the domestic vote to win 68 percent of the seats.”

Again note that the only difference between the *content+consequences* and the *content+consequences+process* treatments was that the latter included a clause referring to the opposition’s rejection of Fidesz’s changes.

3.3 Covariates

We hypothesized that different subpopulations will exhibit different baseline responses for our outcomes and that they will respond to our treatments differently. Specifically, we argued for heterogeneous effects based on party support and education/political efficacy.

We operationalize party support using a pre-election, pre-treatment question asking respondents which party/bloc they plan to support with their party list vote in the upcoming election. We code those planning to vote for Fidesz-KNDP as a Fidesz supporter and all others, including non-voters, as non-Fidesz supporters. We viewed education as one proxy for respondents’ political efficacy and pre-treatment information levels. We use the question described in appendix A to generate a 3-category partition of education, with categories {no secondary degree, secondary degree, university degree}. We use the political efficacy question described in the same appendix to generate an ordered, three category variable with answers in $\{-1,0,1\}$. We use the neutral response (0) as the reference category.

We also use several covariates in certain models to more precisely estimate treatment effects. These are income, age (and its square), gender, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives in one of the three main regions of the country (West, Central, East). Finally we account for whether respondents planned to vote using the pre-election, pre-treatment question about their vote intentions. Details for all these variables are in appendix A.

3.4 Analysis framework

The research design for our causal analysis involves both a within- and across-subjects design. All hypotheses will be evaluated using simple differences-in-means and regression analysis. Future iterations of the paper will report analysis of corresponding sharp null hypotheses in a randomization inference framework in appendix D.

4 Results

4.1 Did citizens know what was going on?

Did Hungarian citizens know about changes in their electoral system? Did they care? Our survey data indicate that the answer to both questions is “yes.” When asked whether they had “heard about any changes in the electoral system since the last parliamentary elections in 2010” fully 89% of respondents said that they had.⁷ When we asked them to predict what percent of the party list vote Fidesz would win, the modal response was “40-50%.” Fidesz’s actual party list vote share was 45%.

Respondents were very inclined to vote. Nearly 92% of our pre-election sample said they would “probably” or “surely” vote in the 2014 elections. Asked after the election 88% of our wave 2 sample reported having voted. The Hungarian National Election Office reported turnout for the 2014 election at about 62%.

In the post-election survey wave we asked respondents to state how important each of a series of issues were in determining how they cast their party list vote. Figure 2 displays the results across ten issue areas. The response distribution for the issue area most closely related to election reform, “quality and stability of Hungarian democracy,” is in the top row. In the top left panel we display the distribution for all respondents while the top center and top right panels divide respondents based on whether they claimed to have voted for Fidesz in the election.⁸ Several things stand out in this figure. First, “quality of democracy” was extraordinarily salient to respondents. Only the state of the economy had a greater proportion of responses in the top categories. Second, quality

⁷This value increased to 94% in the post-election survey wave.

⁸In our (unweighted) post-election sample we had 35% of respondents claiming to have voted for Fidesz.




Figure 2: Importance of various issue areas in deciding which party to vote for (post-election survey). In the top row we break out respondents by whether they reported casting a ballot for Fidesz.

of democracy was notably less important among Fidesz voters than non-Fidesz voters. Finally, relations with the EU were not terribly important to voters. This last point is important as the EU and other Western countries have been making critical comments about Fidesz’s apparent rollback of several democratic institutions.

Our sample of Hungarian citizens appear to be likely to vote, aware of electoral reforms, and claim to care about Hungarian democracy. We turn to our experimental results to see whether these beliefs were deeply held or malleable.


4.2 Election legitimacy

When asked about their views of the electoral reforms, respondents in our sample were decidedly negative in their opinions, at least in relating these reforms to the legitimacy of the 2014 election. Figure 3a displays the response distribution for this question by treatment status for both the pre- and post-election waves. To make the top and bottom panels as comparable as possible, this figure includes only those respondents who were in both survey waves. “Big effect for the worse”, the most extreme value on our scale, was the modal response in both waves, with the neutral “no effect” as the next most common response. We also see that there appear to be differences across treatment groups; those in the *content+process* treatment are the most likely to be in the most negative category.

To better visualize the differences across treatment groups and survey waves we treat the Y_t^l as continuous variables and plot the group-specific means and (unadjusted) 95% confidence intervals in Figure 3b. Here it is easy to see that average opinions about the reforms became significantly more negative after the election across all treatment groups. We again see that the information treatments move respondents’ average answers in a negative direction, although the *content+process* treatment is the only one that reaches conventional significance thresholds.

This is confirmed more precisely in table 1, where we display the differences in means across all pairwise treatment comparisons. For these comparisons we test the following hypotheses: $H_0 : \mu^1 - \mu^0 \geq 0$ against $H_a : \mu^1 - \mu^0 < 0$; $H_0 : \mu^2 - \mu^0 \geq 0$ against $H_a : \mu^2 - \mu^0 < 0$; and $H_0 : \mu^2 - \mu^1 \geq 0$ against $H_a : \mu^2 - \mu^1 < 0$, where μ^j is the average response among the respondents for whom $D_i = j$.

Figure 3: Election legitimacy



(a) The distribution of responses to the election legitimacy question by treatment status, pre- and post-election. These plots include only respondents who were in both waves.

(b) Mean responses and 95% confidence intervals for the election legitimacy question by treatment status, pre- and post-election.

The p -values in the table are corrected for multiple comparisons using Holm's method (Holm, 1979).

Table 1: Effects of information on Hungarians' assessments of electoral reforms' effects on election fairness and legitimacy, pre-election survey. Estimates are differences in group means.

	Estimate	Std. Error	t -value	Pr(< t)
content - ctrl	-0.06	0.06	-1.02	0.15
(content+Process) - ctrl	-0.17	0.06	-2.89	0.01
(content+Process) - content	-0.11	0.06	-1.87	0.06

$N = 3000$. one-sided p -values corrected for multiple comparisons using Holm's method.

Based on these results we find that *content+process* significantly affects perceived legitimacy of the election, moving average response more negative by about 0.17 on our scale when compared to the control group. Interestingly, just providing information on the content of reforms does *not* have a significant effect here. Moreover, the difference between *content* and *content+process* borders on conventional significance thresholds. It appears that simply describing technocratic reforms has little effect, but even a simple partisan context for these descriptions causes our subjects to respond.

4.2.1 Subpopulation differences

We find a modest but significant treatment effect in the pooled analysis. Are there important subgroups differences? Yes. We find truly large differences in both baseline and treatment response depending on whether a respondent came in to the survey already planning to vote for the incumbent party. We found no meaningful subgroup differences for education and efficacy; indeed we interpret the apparent findings for education (described below) as an artifact of education itself predicting Fidesz support.

Figure 4 displays the partisan differences in starkest fashion. We display means of the electoral legitimacy outcome variable by treatment status and Fidesz support. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence bars, adjusted to account for multiple comparisons. Fidesz supporters are, unsurprisingly, far more upbeat about the effects of the reforms on electoral legitimacy. All the treatment effects are concentrated among those already planning to vote against Fidesz. With gerrymandering that gave more weight to its supporters votes, Fidesz faced relatively little downside electoral risk with their reforms.

To investigate subgroup differences more exhaustively we turn to a regression framework. We estimate OLS regression models of the following forms:

$$Y_{i1}^l = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i^1 + \beta_2 T_i^2 + \beta_3 \text{Fidesz}_i + \beta_4 T_i^1 \text{Fidesz}_i + \beta_5 T_i^2 \text{Fidesz}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{x}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{i1}^l = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i^1 + \beta_2 T_i^2 + \beta_3 \text{secondary}_i + \beta_4 \text{university}_i + \beta_5 T_i^1 \text{secondary}_i + \beta_6 T_i^2 \text{secondary}_i + \beta_7 T_i^1 \text{university}_i + \beta_8 T_i^2 \text{university}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{x}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

$$Y_{i1}^l = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i^1 + \beta_2 T_i^2 + \beta_3 \text{low efficacy}_i + \beta_4 \text{high efficacy}_i + \beta_5 T_i^1 \text{low efficacy}_i + \beta_6 T_i^2 \text{low efficacy}_i + \beta_7 T_i^1 \text{high efficacy}_i + \beta_8 T_i^2 \text{high efficacy}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{x}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where $T_i^1 = \mathbf{1}(D_i = 1)$, $T_i^2 = \mathbf{1}(D_i = 2)$, and \mathbf{x}_i includes age, age squared, gender, income, region,




Figure 4: Important partisan differences in how Hungarian’s view the election reforms and whether informational treatments have any effect. Points are within-group means; error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, corrected for multiple comparisons.

and intention to vote. The variable *Fidesz* is simply a dummy indicating a Fidesz supporter. In equation (2) we examine different education strata, with the the low-education group (no secondary degree) as the reference category.⁹ In equation (3) we examine political efficacy; subjects who chose the neutral response are the reference category here.

In all three equations we are interested in testing $H_0 : \beta_1 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_1 < 0$ and $H_0 : \beta_2 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_2 < 0$. In equation (1) we examine heterogeneous effect for Fidesz supporters by testing $H_0 : \beta_4 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_4 > 0$, and $H_0 : \beta_5 = 0$ against $H_a : \beta_5 > 0$. We formally test for heterogeneous effects across education strata in equation (2) by comparing $H_0 : \beta_5 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_5 > 0$; $H_0 : \beta_6 = 0$ against

⁹This differs from the pre-analysis plan in which the middle education category was the reference category.

the alternative $H_1 : \beta_6 > 0$; $H_0 : \beta_7 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_7 > 0$; and $H_0 : \beta_8 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_8 > 0$. In equation (3) we conduct the following hypothesis tests: $H_0 : \beta_5 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_5 < 0$; (2) $H_0 : \beta_6 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_6 < 0$; (3) $H_0 : \beta_7 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_7 > 0$; and (4) $H_0 : \beta_8 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_8 > 0$.

Table 2 displays parameter estimates for four pairs of regression models. In each pair the odd-numbered model omits the conditioning variables X . Across all the models we restate in a regression framework what we have already seen above: we observe a modest but significant treatment effect in the expected negative direction for the *content+process* treatment. There is no discernible effect of the *content* treatment; we cannot reject the null that $\beta_1 = 0$. Looking at the covariates we also see consistent evidence that female respondents were more positively disposed towards the reforms than males and that those in Central Hungary (largely Budapest residents) were more negatively disposed toward the reforms than respondents in the East and West. The other covariates showed no consistent relationship.

Among the heterogeneous effects tests for Fidesz supporters, results in Models 3 and 4 mirror what we see in Figure 4. Including for pro-Fidesz disposition dramatically improves model fit, accounting for a good portion of the variance in the response. We find a non-zero average treatment effect for the *content+process* treatment *only* among those who do not plan to vote for Fidesz.¹⁰ Among Fidesz supporters, we find that the treatments have no effect on average.

Looking at Models 5 and 6 we see some curious results: the estimated β_5 and β_7 are of the opposite sign from what is hypothesized and are statistically distinguishable from zero. Moreover, the education strata seem to interact with the *content* treatment but not the *content+process* treatment, contrary to the other models. When we compare Models 5 and 6 against 7 and 8, it becomes clear that the education variable and efficacy question are picking up different things. In Models 7 and 8 there is no evidence of heterogeneous effects based on efficacy and other parameter estimates are quite similar to those in Models 1-4.¹¹

So what is happening with education? It turns out that our education variable is a strong pre-

¹⁰Formally we can reject the equation 1 null that $\beta_5 = 0$ at the 0.05 level, but not for β_4 .

¹¹Formally, we can reject the null for none of the proposed test for equation 3.

dictor of being a Fidesz supporter; the chances of someone in the low-education category planning to vote for Fidesz is about 20% greater than in either of the other two categories. Our provisional conclusion is that education’s (negative) correlation with Fidesz vote intention is driving the education results.

4.2.2 Post-election opinion change

We followed up with 1,500 of our first wave respondents after the election to see how experiencing the election and, possibly, our informational treatments may have changed their views. Figure 3 indicated that, on average, respondents held more negative views about the reforms after the election.

The election was not randomly assigned so we cannot unambiguously claim that the election caused any opinion change. Nevertheless we can look at the opinions of the control group to describe how opinions changed from before to after the election, with no additional intervention on our part. We then look at our treatment groups to see whether the informational prompts caused opinions to move more (and in what direction) as compared with the control group. Because treatment assignment was not re-randomized for the post-election survey wave we are unable to determine whether it was the pre-election information, the post-election information or the combination of both that caused any observed changes.

Figure 5 explores within-subject opinion change in more detail, displaying opinion change by treatment status and baseline Fidesz support. Respondents’ opinions about the effect election reforms on election were fairly stable: 62% reported the same opinion after the election as before. This is not surprising, however, as our response scale is bounded and 38% of both-wave respondents put themselves in the lowest category (“big effect for the worse”) in the pre-election wave. If these respondents became more pessimistic after the election our survey tool had no way of capturing it. It appears that Fidesz supporters were less likely to move their opinions in a negative direction, but this is difficult to see here, requiring more involved analysis.

Because subjects’ pre-election responses, Y_{i1}^l , necessarily constrain the size and sign of ΔY_i^l we




Figure 5: The distribution of opinion change about the legitimacy of the election by treatment status and baseline Fidesz support. Fidesz supporters are represented in purple and non-supporters are represented in green.

must account for this in estimation process for any treatment effects.¹² Regression models are the simplest way to make the appropriate comparisons. In what follows we estimate OLS regression models, the most general form being:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y_i^l &= \alpha_{[k]} \mathbf{1}_{[k]}(Y_{i1}^l) + \beta_1 T_i^1 + \beta_2 T_i^2 + \beta_3 \text{Fidesz}_i + \\ &\quad \beta_4 T_i^1 \text{Fidesz}_i + \beta_5 T_i^2 \text{Fidesz}_i + \gamma' \mathbf{x}_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

¹²In our pre-analysis document we failed to fully recognize this fact, therefore our analysis strategy here differs from the plan: we include dummies for the Y_1^l responses.

where $\mathbf{1}_{[k]}(Y_{i1}^l)$ are dummy variables for each of the k possible responses to the pre-election legitimacy question, $\{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$. Note that this specification allows for possible heterogeneous effects for Fidesz supporters. Based on findings above we omit reports for heterogeneous effects by education and political efficacy. The covariates in X are as above with the addition of education.

We are interested in testing $H_0 : \beta_1 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_1 < 0$ and $H_0 : \beta_2 = 0$ against the alternative $H_a : \beta_2 < 0$. For heterogeneous effects, we also test $H_0 : \beta_4 = 0$ against $H_a : \beta_4 \neq 0$ and $H_0 : \beta_5 = 0$ against $H_a : \beta_5 \neq 0$.

Y_{i1}^l is a post-treatment variable, and one may object that its inclusion biases our estimates of average treatment effects. However, the expected bias will work against our ability to find the hypothesized negative effects of treatment on opinion change. To see this note that our treatments have negative effects on Y_1^l . This negative effect therefore reduces the magnitude of any possible negative opinion *change* for the treated relative to the controls since Y_2^l cannot be any smaller than -2.

Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for several models of opinion change. Model 9 includes only the experimental treatments. Model 10 includes just the linear term for Fidesz supporters while Model 11 allows for heterogeneous effects by Fidesz support. Model 12 omits the Fidesz \times treatment terms but includes a slate of pre-treatment covariates. Across all the models we find a negative and significant effect of the *content+process* treatment. Adjusting for the pre-election response to the legitimacy question, those receiving a preamble describing the content of the reforms *and* the opposition's rejections of these policies became more negative in their opinion of how those reforms affected the legitimacy of the election. The size of this effect (0.1) is modest, but considering that so many respondents gave the lowest possible response in the first survey wave, we find any detectable negative movement to be remarkable. As with the pre-election analysis, we are unable to reject the null that the *content* treatment had no effect on opinion change. This null finding, too, is remarkable since the wave 2 preamble provides unambiguous evidence that the election reforms actually yielded electoral benefits for Fidesz sufficient to retain a supermajority. This information alone seems insufficient to move opinion but cuing partisan interests directly matters.

Looking at the other models we, again, find a huge difference between Fidesz supporters and

all others. The average opinion change among Fidesz supporters was almost a full point in the positive direction, after accounting for Y_1^l . We fail to find any evidence of heterogeneous effects of our treatments, however. In terms of opinion *change* our treatments moved Fidesz supporters by amounts that are indistinguishable from the opinion shifts among those who did not intend to vote for Fidesz. Model 12 indicates that the other pre-treatment covariates have no correlation with opinion change once we account for Fidesz support and informational treatments.

Figure 6 provides another window into the tremendous partisan gulf in Hungarians' evaluations of the 2014 election. In a separate question in the post-election survey we asked respondents whether the 2014 election was "at least as fair as the elections of the last 20 years." Figure 6 displays a mosaic plot of subjects' responses by their self-reported party list vote in the election.¹³ Fidesz voters were overwhelmingly positive in their views of the election while those who cast votes for the Unity ticket had virtually opposite views. Voters for other parties were not as pessimistic as Unity voters but they were also less sanguine than those voting for Fidesz. Voters are clearly interpreting the election through a partisan lens.

Taken together, our survey findings about election legitimacy point to simple conclusion: respondents substitute their feelings about the election outcome for their evaluation of its legitimacy. Asking about a complex or nuanced concept like electoral "fairness" and "legitimacy", it is unsurprising that respondents turn to the more cognitively accessible answer: whether they liked the election outcome.¹⁴ Those whose team won thought the reforms improved election fairness and legitimacy and those who lost thought the opposite. Providing information on content of the reforms themselves did nothing. Only when partisan cues were present did subjects have a framework in which to evaluate the technocratic nature of the reforms.

4.3 Quality of democracy

More to come.

¹³This plot uses only respondents in our control condition.

¹⁴See Sunstein (2005) on attribute substitution bias.




Figure 6: Mosaic plot indicating significant partisan differences in Hungarians’ views about the fairness of the 2014 elections.

5 Conclusion

An important theoretical approach to the study of democratic consolidation posits that a major factor helping to sustain democracies and prevent democratic backsliding is that voters will perceive anti-democratic actions and then mobilize to counter them. This framework requires two key steps (a) voters discern anti-democratic actions of incumbents as such, and (b) they will in turn mobilize to “rebel” against incumbents. We have investigated the first building block of this theoretical framework (i.e. the perceptions of citizens) in the case of Hungary. We come to four main conclusions. First, Hungarians were widely aware of the incumbent’s electoral reforms. Second, non-Fidesz voters were significantly more pessimistic about the reforms implications for electoral fairness. Third, when non-Fidesz voters were provided with information that the opposi-

tion parties were against the reforms, their assessments of the reforms' fairness became even more negative. Fourth, providing more information is not a "silver bullet": the effect of information is marginal and concentrated only among those who did not already support Fidesz. No matter the information provided, voters preexisting partisan allegiances dominate how they interpret the information they receive. These findings are significant because they suggest that voters do not always "punish" incumbent efforts to extend transitory majorities into the future. Our findings also suggest indirectly that "third party" information about the reforms democratic implications (e.g., from the EU) may not be sufficient either. Where anti-democratic reforms are passed legally by democratically elected governments, voters who support the incumbent tend to overlook what actions that might endanger the long-term health of democracy.

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Appendix

A Survey questions

A.1 Heterogenous effects variables

Education “What is your highest educational attainment?,” which has 8 categories. We map responses 1-4 into “no secondary secondary”; 5-6 into “secondary degree”; and 7-8 map into “university degree.”

Efficacy “To what extent do you agree or disagree that sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on?,” which has 5 categories (Strongly agree (1), agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly agree (5)). We recode these to have 3 categories: -1 (agree or strongly agree), 0 (neutral), and 1 (disagree or strongly disagree).

Support for Fidesz “Which party list would you vote for if you were to vote?” We will recode this into two categories: 1 (Fidesz-KDNP) vs all other categories including “definitely do not vote.”

A.2 Other covariates

Age This is calculated from the question reading, “Which year were you born in?”

Gender Female or male

Income “Please mark which of these categories your total net monthly household income falls into.” This has 9 categories ranging from “20,000 HUF or less” to “more than 500,000 HUF.” We assign each respondent the mean value of the bounds of the bucket s/he selected.

Region Responses are in {Central, East, West}.

Intent to turnout “What are your plans for the elections in April?” The responses “definitely do not vote” and “probably do not vote” coded as 0, and the responses “probably vote” and “definitely vote” coded as 1.

B Alternative models

To come in future iterations

C Balance tests

D Randomization inference

To come in future iterations

E Weighted analysis

To come in future iterations

Table 2: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitimacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
content	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.54* (0.16)	0.48* (0.15)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)
content+process	-0.17* (0.06)	-0.19* (0.06)	-0.17* (0.06)	-0.19* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.28* (0.11)	-0.28* (0.11)
age		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.02* (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)
age ²		-0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
female		0.18* (0.05)		0.11* (0.04)		0.20* (0.05)		0.14* (0.05)
income		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
East		0.19* (0.06)		0.12* (0.05)		0.19* (0.06)		0.15* (0.06)
West		0.19* (0.06)		0.12* (0.05)		0.16* (0.06)		0.16* (0.06)
turnout		0.05 (0.09)		-0.16* (0.07)		0.06 (0.09)		0.05 (0.09)
Fidesz			1.68* (0.07)	1.68* (0.07)				
content × Fidesz			0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.10)				
(content+process) × Fidesz			0.19* (0.11)	0.20* (0.10)				
secondary degree					0.07 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)		
university degree					-0.11 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.13)		
content × secondary					-0.73* (0.18)	-0.69* (0.18)		
(content+process) × secondary					-0.11 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.18)		
content × university					-0.68* (0.18)	-0.62* (0.18)		
(content+process) × university					-0.07 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)		
low efficacy							-0.53* (0.11)	-0.45* (0.11)
high efficacy							0.02 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)
content × low efficacy							-0.11 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.15)
(content+process) × high efficacy							0.22 (0.15)	0.20 (0.15)
content × hi efficacy							-0.07 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.14)
(content+process) × high efficacy							0.08 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)
<i>N</i>	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.00	0.03	0.35	0.38	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.05

Intercept estimated but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

Table 3: OLS regression for within-subject change in perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on legitimacy of 2014 election.

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
content	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)
content+process	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)
Fidesz		0.92* (0.06)	0.92* (0.09)	0.91* (0.06)
content × Fidesz			-0.01 (0.11)	
(content+process) × Fidesz			0.00 (0.12)	
age				0.00 (0.01)
age ²				0.00 (0.00)
female				-0.04 (0.04)
income				-0.00 (0.00)
secondary degree				-0.09 (0.07)
university degree				-0.09 (0.07)
East				0.08 (0.05)
West				0.03 (0.05)
turnout				-0.11 (0.08)
Pre-election controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1500	1500	1500	1500
adj. R ²	0.14	0.26	0.26	0.26

Constant not estimated

Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed)

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(<t)
content - cntrl	-0.04	0.04	-1.05	0.29
contentProcess - cntrl	-0.08	0.04	-1.95	0.08
contentProcess - content	-0.04	0.04	-0.90	0.29

	std.diff	z	
fidesz0	0.04	1.57	
fidesz1	-0.04	-1.57	
edno secondary degree	0.01	0.60	
edsecondary degree	-0.01	-0.64	
eduniversity degree	0.00	0.22	
efficacy0	-0.01	-0.58	
efficacy-1	-0.01	-0.62	
efficacy1	0.03	1.14	
age	-0.01	-0.62	
genderM	-0.04	-1.76	.
genderF	0.04	1.76	.
income	-0.04	-2.00	*
regionCenral Hungary	-0.02	-0.82	
regionEastern Hungary	0.01	0.45	
regionWestern Hungary	0.01	0.34	
planned.turnout	0.00	0.10	
LSQ23I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church	-0.01	-0.50	
LSQ23I am religious in my own way	-0.00	-0.02	
LSQ23I cant say if I was religious or not	-0.01	-0.30	
LSQ23I am not religious	0.01	0.51	
LSQ23I have a different conviction, I am definitely not religious	-0.00	-0.03	
fidesz10DNV	0.02	1.12	
fidesz10fidesz	-0.02	-1.07	
fidesz10other	0.00	0.15	

Table 4: Balance tests: standardized differences in means with z -scores.