Forming New Cities: A Model of Municipal Incorporation Campaigns and Decisions

The politics of municipal incorporation suggests two rounds of voting, with an initial vote on incorporation and a second vote on a city charter. This model describes a voting agenda that may require either sequential or simultaneous campaigning for the adoption of a charter and election of officials. The model consists of a two-stage decision space that can be extended to multi-round voting among ranges of options for city incorporation. An analysis of voting on incorporation explains these variations in campaign support, opposition, and voter turnout by town (sectional), city or village, and municipal incorporation votes. Additional panel data results describe precinct level analysis of an intra-community variance in support and turnout in the formation of new cities. The basic findings indicate significant differences in the charter status and choice of city charter options by voters in Los Angeles, Miami-Dade, and King Counties. In these counties, the timing and sequence of boundary decisions is an evolving spatial history that includes data on failed incorporation and dissolution decisions. County home rule and planning of these boundary decisions suggest county charter status for planning municipal incorporation through the formation of community council districts (in Miami-Dade and Honolulu-Oahu Counties), municipal advisory committees, and other technical assistance to incorporation campaigns. As the population size and land area incorporated increases, county planning supercedes incorporation campaigns for attaining city status in urban areas, censuses defined places, urban development districts, and generally unincorporated municipal service areas in county territory. Inasmuch these results suggest the importance of county home rule and planning in the formation of new cities, during a period of investment in inter-local cooperation and coordination.

The politics of municipal incorporation suggests two rounds of campaigning, with an initial vote on incorporation and a second vote on a city charter. The basic findings indicate significant differences in county planning and charter status attained by voting in Los Angeles, Miami-Dade, King, and Honolulu Counties.

The politics of municipal incorporation consists of incorporation and charter voting decisions by local referenda. Incorporation campaigns describe a contestation for changes to a status quo of remaining unincorporated, within county territory. The incorporation decision is a campaign by municipals for city status. In the model presented in this study, municipals are against a status quo of remaining unincorporated, campaigning in support for city incorporation. Locals are therefore the opposition to incorporation by any campaigning for a no vote, by varying levels of support for the status quo of remaining unincorporated. The locals' preferences for unincorporated status are generally more diffusely held, less organized, and hold less valuation than municipals pursuing a yes vote for both incorporation and charter decisions.

Incorporation campaigns are complicated by the voting rules and procedures used for electoral referenda on municipal incorporation and charter decisions. The election of local officials may also be incorporated into the decisions, even though the campaigns for new cities elected offices are distinct from incorporation campaigns and the leadership of those supporting incorporation. Not only are election decisions separable from incorporation and charter votes, the first local elections usually produce candidates from municipals, locals, and frequently candidates independent of the incorporation campaigns. Most important, the structure of voting allows for range in timing of the elections, from simultaneous voting on incorporation, charter status, and local officials to sequential votes on incorporation, charter status, and electing new municipal officials. The structure adopted varies by The States, with some states allowing simultaneous votes, combinations of simultaneous votes, or sequential voting. Combined voting describes situations with votes on incorporation and charter status, or votes on a charter and holding local elections.

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In the presence of county home rule, planning for cities is becoming a more top-down mechanism, centralized by county administration and management. Even though competition between municipals and locals continues to result in incorporation campaigns, the use of strategic planning has generated successful incorporation campaigns, with cities going through planning by county established incorporation rules and procedures. The largest numbers of incorporation campaigns are run by municipals, and these decisions generated the most frequent number of failures in city incorporation. In some of the larger counties, such Los Angeles County, King County, Miami-Dade County, and the consolidated City and County of Honolulu, planning for cities adopt rules and procedures for establishing districts in unincorporated areas. These districts may be described as community council districts, single purpose improvement districts or general purpose municipal service districts, and therefore minimal cities, such as general law incorporations that contract for municipal services from county government.

A city plan implies a goal for both municipals and county administration and management of unincorporated areas that pursue municipal, municipal-like, urban and larger scale provision of public goods and services. In metropolitan areas, central city plans evolve over a spatial history of boundary decisions, consisting of frequently a large number of boundary decisions in a long duration sequence. As a result of the sequence of boundary decisions, the evolution of a central city plan may produce spatially inelastic boundaries, with marginally few opportunities for boundary expansion to merge with or annex county territory for the purposes of municipal organization. In each of the four metropolitan areas mentioned above, the evolution of each central city plan influenced the structure of town and county organization, the balance between annexation and incorporation campaigns, and therefore potential municipal status.

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Planning and development produces changes to a city plan, promoting boundary expansion through linear extension, forming rectangular corridors of municipal organization. In metropolitan areas, the absence of county home rule places the responsibility for municipal organization of county territory in city plans, covering both central cities and suburbs. In metropolitan districts, the predominance of the central core city, in terms of spatial elasticity, describes what spatial configurations, numbers of the boundary annexation and incorporation decisions, and therefore fragmentation numbers are emergent and derived from city planning. Within the largest cities, community council districts may be either adopted by city council regulation or mayoral organization. The use of regional or mini-city halls, community centers, and district meeting facilities decentralize public goods and services by location within a city plan. Additionally, community council districts may be enacted to decentralize the mechanism for both provision and planning of municipal goods and services. As a consequence, city planning organizes the mechanism design for municipal goods and services, by location, and any mixture of centralization or decentralization for direct provision.

In summary, planning for cities implies planning in existing urban areas, within urban development boundaries and by allocation of development land units. In metropolitan districts, planning for cities may involve multiple planning organizations, at both a city and county level. In cities large enough to have adopted planning districts, these cities may also have from a few, too large numbers of community council areas. The formations of new cities around the unincorporated periphery of these cities remain areas of municipals versus locals incorporation campaigns. By holding charettes in community council districts, the strategic planning of cities by home rule counties provides for stronger municipal attempts to incorporate county territory.

Analysis of Local Jurisdiction

Definition 1.0   A finite number of local jurisdictions $\equiv$ J = {1, 2, 3, ..., j}.

Definition 2.0   J = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} = the number of jurisdictions, with jurisdictional fragmentation number $\mathscr{F}$(j) = n.

Definition 3.0   j = {j_1, j_2, j_3, ..., j_m} = set of jurisdictions, m-forms of local jurisdictions, 1/m = local division.

Proposition 1.0   Number of forms of local government, $\mathbb{C}$ = {1,..., m}.
- city
- borough
- town
- township
- village

Proposition 2.0   Number of major and minor civil districts, $\mathbb{C}$ = {1, ..., j}.
- regional city
- metropolitan county (borough)
- shire (borough)
- city
- burgh (borough)
- village
- town
- township

Proposition 3.0   The States have territorial integrity of jurisdictional boundaries, $\tilde{A}$ = J(B).

Proposition 4.0   Territorial Integrity, $\tilde{A}$ $\equiv$ closed & bounded totally complete area, $\mathring{A}$ = J(B).

Proposition 5.0   Local territorial integrity exists only to the extent jurisdiction is contained within disjoint areas, $\cap$J = $\varnothing$.

Proposition 6.0   Local affairs (as states of welfare) exist inherent to the territorial organization of jurisdiction.

Proposition 7.0   The jurisdictional correspondence of decentralized provision of public goods and services are regulated for general purposes, such that local autonomy is equal to only those issuances necessarily implied by state jurisdiction or those expressly delegated through home rule charter status.

Theorem 1.0 (Units of state government) Local jurisdictional division is congruent to county subdivision units in numbers of major and minor civil districts

Theorem 2.0 (Units of local government) County subdivision is congruent to local division by towns, boroughs and counties, county-townships and villages.

Theorem 3.0 An unrestricted partition of local jurisdiction is a finite cover by numerical solution, $\mathcal{P} = \mathscr{F}(j) = n$.
Proof.

fragmentation number	county area	local jurisdiction
local division	ward-district $\not\subseteq$ county territory	$\cap J \neq 0$
county subdivision	ward-district $\subseteq$ county territory	$\cap J = \varnothing$

Proposition 8.0 Home rule status by local jurisdictions permitted by state regulation, $J = \{0, 1, ..., m\}$.
- unorganized county territory
- survey townships
- township
- town
- borough
- village
- city

Proposition 9.0 Home rule status of the number of forms of local jurisdictions, $k = [0, m]$.

**Lemma 1.0** Municipal home rule status by population size implies a unique, continuous city classification.
Proof. Generate an ordering of cities, from the largest to the smallest in population size, $k = [1, j]$. Assign a rank ordering to each of the cities and compute the log of the population size for each city. The log rank rule equals the relationship between the log of the city population and the rank of the city population. Given each city has a different population size, city classification by population size generates a unique, continuous classification of municipal jurisdictions.

Lemma 2.0 Home rule status by city classification permitted by state regulation, $\mathbb{C} = [0, j]$.
Proof. No city incorporation, $k = 0$. Binary unincorporated versus incorporation status, $k = \{0, 1\}$. Forms of cities, $k = [0, m]$, and an ordering of municipal jurisdictions, $k = [1, j]$, with cities assigned a unique rank from the largest to the smallest city. The number of municipal jurisdictions equal to a fragmentation number solution, $\mathscr{F}(j) = n$.

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Theorem 4.0   The number of cities equals a fragmentation number solution, $\mathscr{F}(j) = n$.

Theorem 5.0   The log rank rule is a unique, totally complete city district classification.

Theorem 6.0   Incorporated or unincorporated status is a discrete, binary choice, city classification of municipal jurisdictions.

Theorem 7.0   Home rule incorporation status by local jurisdictions permitted by state regulation, $J = \{0, 1, ..., m\}$. **Proof**.
- 0   township
- 1   town
- 2   borough
- 3   village
- 4   city

Theorem 8.0   Home rule charter status by local jurisdictional options permitted by state regulation, $\mathbb{C} = \{0, 1, ..., m\}$. **Proof**.
- 0   township
- 1   town
- 2   borough
- 3   village
- 4   city

Lemma 3.0   Range of organization, $\mathbb{C}[0, m]$ equal to a measure space of full, limited, and unorganized forms of local jurisdiction.
Remarks. The range of organization is determined by the allocation of local public goods and services. These are defined as location goods. Municipal goods and services are generally defined as local public goods, with single or multiple locations available for provision.

Proposition 10.0   A fragmentation solution equals the number and forms of differentiated (general purpose) local jurisdictions.
Remarks. Fragmentation of local government is equal the number of local jurisdictions, by range of organization and allocation of local public goods and services. The number of local jurisdictions equals the number of cities and the number of townships, towns, boroughs, and/or villages.

Lemma 4.0   Town and County subdivision units permitted by state regulation.
- town formation.
- full township organization.
- limited township organization.
- survey township.
- ward-district division.

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MAP 1.0   Town & (Full, Limited, Survey) Township Organization, Ward District States

Theorem 9.0   Home rule status by charter options permitted by state regulation, J = {0, 1, ..., m}.
- •   unincorporated organization
- •   special act legislation
- •   general law provision
- •   home rule charter allocation

Theorem 10.0   Range of charter options permitted by state regulation, $\mathscr{F}(j) = m$.
- •   m = 1, a single purpose, single dimensional district.
- •   m ≥ <u>m</u>, a general purpose, multidimensional district.

Theorem 11.0   Form of local government adopted by range of charter options permitted by state regulation, $\mathscr{F}(j) = \mathbb{C}$.
- •   0   town meeting, representative town meeting
- •   1   city council general orders, weak mayor
- •   2   commission plan
- •   3   council manager
- •   4   strong mayor.

Theorem 12.0   (Product Differentiation) Form of local government provided by the set of the incorporation and charter alternatives.
- •   0   unorganized.
- •   1   survey (town division, ward district division, township division).
- •   2   (organic act) local formation decision to organize.
- •   3   special act legislation, local incorporation and charter bills by State Legislatures, local delegation vote, county regulation.
- •   4   general law organization, [0, 1] continuum (full, limited, or unorganized).
- •   5   home rule charter provision, [0, m].

Proposition 11.0   Choice of the form of local government implies a matter of local affairs, $\mathbb{C} = \mathbb{C}[0, m] = m^*$.

Definition 4.0 $\mathscr{L}(Q) \equiv$ location good.

Definition 5.0 $J = \mathscr{L}(Q_J) = f^* \equiv$ local jurisdictionally-induced equilibrium $\doteq$ fragmentation solution.

Proposition 12.0   The set of incorporation and charter alternatives implies a matter of state and local welfare decisions, $\mathscr{L}(Q) = q^*$.

Lemma 5.0   The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in organization of local jurisdiction equals territorial organization, adoption and then implementation of a form of local government.
- organization of state territory into counties.
- organization of county territory into towns and townships.
- organization of townships and villages.
- incorporation and charter of cities.

Theorem 13.0   County organization.
- town, no county organization.
- town organization.
- township organization.
- survey townships.
- county, no township subdivision units.

Remarks. Organization of county territory implies county subdivision. County subdivision implies township organization.

MAP 2.0   Local Division by Towns, Townships, Survey Townships, Counties

Lemma 6.0   County-Township, full township organization.

MAP 3.0   States with County-Township organization (1787)

Proposition 13.0   Limited township organization allocated judicial townships, with elected justices of the peace and/or constables.

Proposition 14.0   County-township subdivision by townships and villages.

Proposition 15.0   County Board of Supervisor's district allocation by independent city and township organization.

Proposition 16.0   County Commission Plan district allocation by size of the legislature, with from 1 to 9 electoral districts and 3 to 9 positions or seats.

Proposition 17.0   Town and County subdivision by towns and townships.

Proposition 18.0   Town and County subdivision by zonal areas, boroughs and ward-districts.

Spatial Competition in Location Games

Definition 6.0 $\mathcal{L} = \{1, 2, 3, ..., n\} \equiv$ set of locations.

Definition 7.0 $\mathcal{L}_J = \{\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_3, ..., \mathcal{L}_n\} \equiv$ spatial distribution of local jurisdictions.

Definition 8.0 $\mathcal{P} = \{1, 2, 3, ..., m\} \equiv$ set of partitions, with $m = 2$, two-dimensions.

Theorem 14.0 Given the existence of local affairs $\cap J = \varnothing$, $\ell(B)$ is continuous.

Theorem 15.0 (State Boundary) B: ö(J) = $\mathcal{P}$.
Proof. States have territorial integrity over the areas contained within their boundaries. State territorial integrity implies a totally complete, well-defined boundary function. A well-defined boundary function implies transitive closure in state territory and therefore every boundary function has a unique partition for local division of jurisdiction.

Proposition 19.0 Status quo in either town or township organization.

MAP 4.0   States with Regular Shaped, Survey Townships (1796)

Definition 9.0 $B = \{1, 2, 3, ..., n\}$ ≡ number of local boundary decisions.

Definition 10.0 $B = \{1, 2, 3, ..., t\}$ ≡ sequence of local boundary decisions = duration of evolution of local boundary decisions, $\acute{O}B = T$.

Definition 11.0 $J = Bdy(J) = \{1, 2, 3, ..., j\}$ ≡ spatial history of local jurisdictions.

Proposition 20.0 $B = Bdy(J) = \{\ell_1, \ell_2, \ell_3, ..., \ell_j\}$ ≡ spatial history of local boundary decisions.
-     formation
-     organization
-     reorganization
-     annexation
-     merger
-     incorporation
-     (charter)

Proposition 21.0 $B = ö(J) \approx U(j) = U[\ell_1, \ell_2, \ell_3, ..., \ell_j]$ ≡ (a uniform) spatial distribution of local jurisdictions.

Definition 12.0 $s = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, ..., s_j\}$ ≡ local jurisdiction shares.

Definition 13.0 $s = ö(s_1, s_2, s_3, ..., s_j)$ ≡ distribution of local jurisdiction shares.

Definition 14.0 $A^T = ö(A_1, A_2, A_3, ..., A_j)$ ≡ distribution of local jurisdiction areal time series.

Proposition 22.0   (Township, Town, Borough, Village, or City) Spatial mean = centroid, in two-dimensions.

Lemma 7.0   Average distance = radius of compactness.
Proof. The radius of compactness equals a relative measure of compactness varying in average distance from the central site location. Relative compactness implies a compact spatial distribution of local jurisdictions.

Proposition 23.0   (Township, Town, Borough, Village, or City) Spatial median = median site location by planning and development.

Lemma 8.0   Spatial mean = spatial median = central location implies a symmetric areal distribution.

Proposition 24.0   Spatial skewness = 0.

Theorem 16.0   By local division, 1/m, an equal distribution of local jurisdiction shares implies regular shapes.

Theorem 17.0   By any local division, a symmetric distribution of local jurisdiction shares implies regular shapes.
Proof. Assume the spatial mean = spatial median. Mean - Median = 0. Any local division implies the central location divides the area into equal shares. Given spatial skewness = 0 implies a symmetric distribution of areal shares. For any local division, spatial symmetry generates regular shaped areas. The existence of spatial symmetry implies a general distribution of regular shapes in local jurisdiction shares.

Proposition 25.0   Territorial integrity implies total completeness.

Proposition 26.0   Partitions of state territory establish counties.

Proposition 27.0   A closed covering of state territory produces county organization.

Proposition 28.0   Completeness of the set of counties implies a closed set of territories.

Proposition 29.0   The set of local jurisdictions equals a fragmentation numerical solution.

Proposition 30.0   A stable fragmentation number implies transitive closure in the set of county territories.

Proposition 31.0   A stable configuration of local jurisdictions implies transitive closure in the set of local jurisdictional boundaries.

Lemma 9.0   The set of local jurisdictions is a closed set.
Lemma 10.0   The set of local jurisdictions is a bounded set.
Lemma 11.0   The set of local jurisdictions is a compact set.

Lemma 12.0   The set of local jurisdictions is a totally complete set.
Lemma 13.0   The set of local jurisdictions is a transitively closed set.

Theorem 18.0   An equilibrium exists in local jurisdiction.
Proof. Closed and bounded set implies a compact set. Any closed, bounded, and compact set guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.

Theorem 19.0   A fragmentation number solution exists in local jurisdiction.
Proof. Given any set of local jurisdictions. The set of local jurisdictions are a closed, bounded, and compact set. The fragmentation solution is an integer number.

Proposition 32.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists from integer sequences of decisions.

Proposition 33.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists from large numbers of local boundary decisions.

Proposition 34.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists derived from local jurisdiction.

Proposition 35.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists by stable configurations of local jurisdictional boundaries.

Proposition 36.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists in long durations of local jurisdictional boundaries.

Proposition 37.0   A local boundary equilibrium exists by zero spatial elasticity in annexation and boundary changes.

Theorem 20.0   An equilibrium exists in local jurisdictional boundaries.

Theorem 21.0   An equilibrium exists in the spatial history of boundary decisions.

Theorem 22.0   An equilibrium exists in forms of local government organization.

Theorem 23.0   An equilibrium exists in incorporation and charter decisions.

Theorem 24.0   An equilibrium exists in local division.

Theorem 25.0   An equilibrium exists by home rule organization of local government.
- local jurisdiction
- fragmentation number
- forms of local government organization
- incorporation and charter decisions
- spatial history of local boundary decisions
- local division

Proposition 38.0   In two-dimensions, the spatial distribution of local jurisdictions equals a circular distributions.

Proposition 39.0   In a coordinate space, closed, bounded, and compact individual cities generate a circular distribution.

Proposition 40.0   In a radial distance, the compact measure of individual cities generate circular distributions.

Lemma 14.0   Any bivariate normal municipal distribution, in central location and average distance, equals a circular distribution.

Definition 15.0 Hausdorff condition on local jurisdiction, $\cap J = \varnothing$.

Definition 16.0 Finite intersection property on county subdivision, $\cap B \neq 0$.

Definition 17.0 Intersection property on local division, $\cap B = $ a single point or coterminus boundary area with Banach measure space $= 0$.

FIGURE 1.0   Hausdorff Uniform Space and Topology

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|	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	6	5	4	3	2	1
1	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	18	17	16	15	14	13
1	19	20	21	22	23	24
1	30	29	28	27	26	25
1	31	32	33	34	35	36

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Area = 36

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Lemma 15.0   Given the area of a set of local jurisdiction boundaries, B = å (B), a
                      measure space = 0 implies the existence of a minimal å (B) = á, a nonzero
                      sphere of influence area of intersection among local jurisdictions.

Lemma 16.0   Given radial compactness, the areal intersection of boundaries $\cap B = a$
                      single point, implies the spatial distribution of local jurisdiction equal
                      Soddy circles.

Lemma 17.0   In a coordinate space, closed, bounded, and compact individual cities
                      generate metropolitan organization equal to Soddy circles.

Theorem 26.0   In two-dimensions, the spatial distribution of local jurisdiction equals
                      Soddy circles.
                      Proof. The number of local jurisdictions equals a fragmentation number
                      solution. The fragmentation number equals the number of Soddy circles to
                      cover of the spatial distribution of local jurisdiction.

Theorem 27.0   In two-dimensions, the number of local jurisdictions implies a circle
                      packing solution.
                      Proof. In two dimensions, the fragmentation of local government is a
                      circle packing solution. The number of Soddy circles equal a
                      fragmentation numerical solution for the maximum or minimum number
                      of local jurisdictions contained in closed, bounded, and compact areal
                      shares. The number of Soddy circles equals the fragmentation number to
                      partition local jurisdiction.

Proposition 41.0 Individual local jurisdiction may have equal radial compactness.

Proposition 42.0 (Spot Density Map) Individual local jurisdiction may have varying radial
                      compactness.

Proposition 43.0 (Range-Density) Given a spatial distribution of local jurisdiction, spatial
                      kurtosis equals the concentration of cities

Lemma 18.0   The concentration of distances equal the number of circles for the
                      fragmentation solution of circle packing within the coordinate space.

Theorem 28.0   The concentration of distances equal the number of circles for the circle
                      packing fragmentation solution of the distribution of local jurisdiction
                      shares.

Theorem 29.0   Regular polygonal condition on spatial distributions of local jurisdiction.
- Given two-dimensions, a uniform spatial distribution of local jurisdiction implies a circular distribution.
- Given a coordinate space,
  - spatial mean = central site location of local jurisdiction.
  - spatial distance = average distance between local jurisdictions.
  - spatial symmetry implies regular shapes of local jurisdiction.
  - spatial kurtosis equals the concentration of proximity of local jurisdictions.
- Given a symmetric spatial distribution of local jurisdiction,
  - spatial skewness equal to zero asymmetry in the distribution of local jurisdictions.
  - zero asymmetry implies regular shapes in the spatial distribution of local jurisdiction.

Proposition 44.0   States with irregular shaped towns and counties.
Remark. Other states described in MAP 4.0.

Proposition 45.0   Irregular shapes of local jurisdiction by nonlinear partition combinations, in numbers and sequences of boundary decisions.

Proposition 46.0   Irregular shapes of local jurisdictional boundaries.

Proposition 47.0   By linear extension, an n-gon forms irregular boundaries that approximates polygonal shapes.

Proposition 48.0   Radial compactness approximates irregular shapes and boundaries of local jurisdiction.

Definition 18.0   The set of local jurisdictions boundaries ≡ a spatial configuration or distribution of boundary decisions.

Definition 19.0   The set of individual local jurisdictional boundaries ≡ township, town, borough, village, ward-district, or city division.

Proposition 49.0   County subdivision ≡ set of local jurisdictional boundaries.

Proposition 50.0   Local division ≡ township, town, borough, village, ward-district and city division.

Lemma 19.0	Partition in local division equals the number of township, town, borough, village, ward and city districts.
Lemma 20.0	The number of township, town, borough, village, ward and city districts equal a finite cover of local jurisdiction.
Lemma 21.0	Local division equals a partition by township, town, borough, village, ward and city districts.
Lemma 22.0	County subdivision equals a finite cover by township, town, borough, village, ward and city districts.
Theorem 30.0	Convex linear combinations of local jurisdiction.

- fragmentation number derived from local government organization.
- county-township organization.
- township organization.
- town sectional annexation and boundary change decisions.
- village incorporation.
- uniform spatial distribution of local jurisdiction.
- barycentric division.
- rectangular municipal organization.
- linear corridor extensions in coordinate space.
- ward-district division.
- planning and development land units.
- hexagonal lattice in two dimensions.
- circular distributions of local jurisdictions in two dimensions.
- constellations in three dimensions, by latitude and longitude, distance and time measure.
- square city, 2x2 town district plan.
- square city, 3x3 city district plan.
- township grid partition, 6x6 township district plan.
- county organization and subdivision.
- county reorganization and township organization.
- county reorganization and consolidation into ward-district division.
- local boundary division by combination of township, town, borough, village, ward and city district plan.

Theorem 31.0	Closed, bounded, and compact local jurisdiction implies a convex set of local jurisdiction.
Theorem 32.0	Convex sets of local jurisdiction by division and organization.

FIGURE 2.0   Convex City Plan

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	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	6	5	4	3	2	1
1	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	18	17	16	15	14	13
1	19	20	21	22	23	24
1	30	29	28	27	26	25
1	31	32	33	34	35	36

6

Area = 36

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Theorem 33.0   Convex Town, Village, City Plan
Proof. Town = 4 town sections 15, 16, 21, & 22. Village = 8 town sections 15, 16, 21, 22, 9, 10, 14, 17, 20, 23, 27, & 28. City = 4 town sections 15, 16, 21, & 22. City = 36 town sections, 9 ward-districts, 4 town sections in each ward district. City = {15, 16, 21, 22}, {1, 2, 11, 12}, {3, 4, 9, 10}, {5, 6, 7, 8}, {17, 18, 19, 20}, {29, 30, 31, 32}, {27, 28, 33, 34}, {25, 26, 35, 36}, and {13, 14, 23, 24}. City = 16 town sections by village, town and city division.

Lemma 23.0   San Antonio Plan.
Proof. City = 16 town sections.

Lemma 24.0   Los Angeles Plan.
Proof. City = 16 town sections by town and city division.

Lemma 25.0   Convex Township Plan.
Proof. Township = 36 town sections.

Lemma 26.0   Convex County-Township Plan.
Proof. County subdivision by Township. Township = 36 town sections. Number of townships by county subdivision.

Lemma 27.0   Convex Township and Town Planning.
Proof. County subdivision by Township. Township = town sections. Number of town sections by county-township subdivision.

Lemma 28.0   Convex Township and Village Plan.
Proof. County subdivision by Township. Village incorporation contained within Township division. Number of towns per-village by county-township subdivision.

Lemma 29.0   Convex Township Plan.
Proof. County subdivision by Township organization. Number of town sections variable by township organization. Number of townships variable by county organization.

Theorem 34.0   Convex Annexation and Boundary change.
Proof. County subdivision by survey township. Annexation, merger, or consolidation of territory to local jurisdiction by town section. Linear extension of territory by corridor equal to boundary changes. De-annexation of territory by detachment of town section(s). Boundary change by linear contraction of territory by corridor and town section(s).

Theorem 35.0　　　Convex Municipal Incorporation.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. Local division by survey township or town section. Municipal incorporation of territory to local jurisdiction by town sectional city plan. Linear extension of town, township, borough, or village boundaries. The number of town sections varies by municipal organization and city division.

Lemma 30.0　　　Convex town sectional planning and development.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. County subdivision by town section. Survey township = 36 town sections. Number of townships variable by county organization.

Lemma 31.0　　　Convex urban areas.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. Survey township = 36 town sections. Number of town sections variable by county organization. Urban areas of county territory planned by town section.

Lemma 32.0　　　Convex urban development boundary.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. County organization by survey township or town section. Urban areas of county territory are contained within closed, bounded town sections. The number of town sections variable by county organization.

Lemma 33.0　　　Convex city ward-district plan I.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. Municipal organization by survey township or town section. City division contains town, township, borough, village, or other county ward-district areas. The number of townships or town sections variable by municipal organization.

Lemma 34.0　　　Convex city ward-district plan II.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. Municipal organization by town section and ward-district division. The number of ward-districts variable by city division.

Lemma 35.0　　　Convex city planning districts.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. Municipal organization by town section. The number planning districts variable by the number of ward-districts and city division.

Lemma 36.0　　　Convex county territory.
　　　　　　　　　　Proof. County organization by township and town section. Local jurisdiction forms a closed, bounded, and compact set (or shares) of county territory. The number of unincorporated county areas variable by fragmentation solution, municipal organization, and town, township, borough, village and city division.

Lemma 37.0   Convex county home rule organization.
Proof. County organization by charter status. Planning for cities in unincorporated areas by county subdivision units and local division of county territory. The number of unincorporated areas variable by county planning and development.

Lemma 38.0   Convex county planning for cities.
Proof. County organization by township and town section. The number of new cities are variable by the number of cities planned. Districts form closed, bounded, and compact shares of county territory by:
- ward-district division,
- community council districts,
- municipal advisory councils,
- municipal service districts.

Remarks. Planning for new cities. Consolidation of unincorporated county territory, single unincorporated area. Fragmentation of unincorporated area, multiple unincorporated areas. Census defined places (CDP's) by population and area. Provision of county municipal service by contracts to local areas. Allocation of special tax, service, and bonded capital improvement districts. Municipal service districts formed by unincorporated municipal service area (UMSA). Community council district allocation. Planning for municipal jurisdictions, local public goods and services provision. Planning locations for public goods and services provision.

Lemma 39.0   Convex county planning for urban areas and development districts.

Theorem 36.0   Convex planning and development.
**Proof**. County organization by survey township and/or town section. Uniform linear extension or contraction by planned development, in rectangular corridors. Development land unit permits issued by planning and development corridors.

Incorporation Campaigning

Definition 20.0	Municipals ≡ proponents of municipal or city incorporation, by a yes vote and favoring incorporation.
Definition 21.0	Locals ≡ opponents of municipal or city incorporation, by a no vote and opposing a vote on incorporation.
Proposition 51.0	Municipals prefer incorporation to unincorporated status.
Proposition 52.0	Municipals prefer charter adopted to general law organization.
Proposition 53.0	Locals prefer to remain unincorporated (in county territory).
Proposition 54.0	Locals prefer to remain unincorporated to charter status.
Definition 22.0	I ≡ a binary incorporation decision, I = [0,1].
Definition 23.0	C ≡ a binary charter decision, C = [0,1].
Definition 24.0	S. Q. ≡ remain unincorporated as status quo county territory, I = 0, C = 0.
Proposition 55.0	Incorporationists = municipals organize to contest incorporation and charter voting decisions.
Proposition 56.0	Incorporation campaigns organize for the purposes of attaining petition signature requirements to gain access as ballot initiatives for incorporation and charter decision votes.
Proposition 57.0	Anti-incorporationists = locals may be unorganized in opposition to incorporation campaigns for petition signatures and ballot initiatives to enact incorporation and charter voting decisions.
Proposition 58.0 **Lemma 40.0**	Incorporation and charter initiative votes are binary yes or no choices. Incorporation and charter votes are simple majority rule decisions.
Proposition 59.0 **Proposition 60.0**	Municipals gain valuation by successful incorporation and charter votes. Locals have no change in valuation by failure in incorporation & charter voting decisions.
Proposition 61.0 **Proposition 62.0**	Municipals versus locals is nonzero competition by organization. Municipals versus locals is nonzero competition for incorporation and charter status.

FIGURE 3.1

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN I

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

S. Q.   I

(0, 0)

S. Q.   C

(1, 0)   (2, 0)

Proposition 63.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter) > (incorporation, status quo) > (status quo, remain unincorporated).

Proposition 64.0   Locals are indifferent among (status quo, remain unincorporated), (incorporation, status quo) and (incorporation, charter).

Lemma 41.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in mixed strategies.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporate	2: Status Quo	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0
2	0	1	0	1
MLE	**0**	**1**	½	½

Proposition 65.0   Municipals valuation equals 2.
**Proposition 66.0**   Locals valuation equals 0.
Lemma 42.0   A unique equilibrium exists in mixed strategies.
Proposition 67.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.50.
Proposition 68.0   Locals valuation equals 0.
Theorem 37.0   Incorporation campaigns are equally likely to attain home rule status.

FIGURE 3.2

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN II

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

Lemma 43.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in pure and mixed strategies.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporate	2: General Law	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0
2	0	1	0	1
MLE	**0**	**1**	½	½

Proposition 69.0   Municipals valuation equals 2.
Proposition 70.0   Locals valuation equals 0.
Lemma 44.0   A unique equilibrium exists in mixed strategies.
Theorem 38.0   Cities are equally likely to incorporate by general law organization and charter or incorporate as charter cities.
Proposition 71.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.50.
Proposition 72.0   Locals valuation equals 0.
Proposition 73.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter) > (incorporation, general law organization) > (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory).
Proposition 74.0   Locals are indifferent among (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory), (incorporation, general law) and (incorporation, charter).

FIGURE 4.0

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN III

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

Proposition 75.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter) > (incorporation, general law organization) > (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory).

Proposition 76.0   Locals are indifferent between remaining unincorporated (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory) = general law organization (incorporation, general law) > (incorporation, charter).

Theorem 39.0   (Lakewood Plan) A unique Nash equilibrium exists favoring incorporation by general law organization.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporate	2: General Law	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0

Proposition 77.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 78.0   Locals valuation equals 1.

FIGURE 5.0

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN IV

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

Proposition 79.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter) > (incorporation, general law organization) > (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory); charter(2) > incorporation(1) > status quo(0).

Proposition 80.0   Locals prefer (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory) > (incorporation, general law) > (incorporation, charter); status quo(1) > incorporation(0) > charter(-1).

Theorem 40.0   (Cities by contract) A unique Nash equilibrium exists favoring municipal service districts by county organization.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporate	2: General Law	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0

Proposition 81.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 82.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

Theorem 41.0   Local government fragmentation by general law organization is preferred to remaining unincorporated or charter status.

FIGURE 6.0

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN V

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

S. Q.   I

(0, 0)

S. Q.   C

(1, 0)

S. Q.   E

(2, 0)   (3, 0)

Proposition 83.0   Municipals valuation equals 3 (or 2).

Proposition 84.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

Proposition 85.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter, local elections) ≻ (incorporation, charter) ≻ (incorporation, general law organization) ≻ (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory); elections(3) ≻ charter(2) ≻ incorporation(1) ≻ status quo(0).

Proposition 86.0   Locals are indifferent among the status quo, incorporation, charter and municipal elections.

Theorem 42.0   (Home Rule Charter status) A Nash equilibrium exists favoring charter city status.

#S	1: S. Q.	1: I	2: S. Q.	2: C	3: S. Q.	3: E	form of local organization
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	municipal service district
2	0	1	1	0	0	1	general law
3	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	charter
1	**0**	**1**	**.5**	**.5**	**0**	**1**	**general law or charter**

Theorem 43.0   (Incorporation Status) A Nash equilibrium exists in mixed strategies, as a local government fragmentation solution.

FIGURE 7.0
INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN VI
A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

Proposition 87.0 Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter, local elections) ≻ (incorporation, charter) ≻ (incorporation, general law organization) ≻ (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory); elections(3) ≻ charter(2) ≻ incorporation(1) ≻ status quo(0).

Proposition 88.0 Locals prefer (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory) ≻ (incorporation, general law) ≻ (incorporation, charter) ≻ (incorporation, charter, local elections); status quo(1) ≻ incorporation(0) ≻ charter(-1) ≻ local elections(-2).

Proposition 89.0 Municipals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 90.0 Locals valuation equals 0.

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Theorem 44.0 (Lakewood Plan, cities by contract, Municipal Service Districts) A Nash equilibrium exists favoring incorporation by general law organization and county home rule charter status.

#S	1: S. Q.	1: I	2: S. Q.	2: C	3: S. Q.	3: E	form of local organization
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	municipal service district
2	0	1	1	0	0	1	general law
1	**0**	**1**	**.75**	**.25**	**1**	**0**	**general law or charter**

Theorem 45.0 (Incorporation Status)   A Nash equilibrium exists in mixed strategies, as a local government fragmentation solution.

Theorem 46.0 (Incorporation) A unique Nash equilibrium exists by incorporation with mixed strategies likely to adopt 3/4 general law and 1/4 charter organization.

FIGURE 8.0

INCORPORATION CAMPAIGN VII

A Model of Incorporation & Charter Decisions

Proposition 91.0   Municipals prefer (incorporation, charter) ≻ (incorporation, general law organization) ≻ (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory); (incorporation status) ≻ (remaining unincorporated); charter(2) ≻ incorporation(1) ≻ status quo(0).

Proposition 92.0   Locals prefer (remain unincorporated, status quo county territory) ≻ (incorporation, general law) = (incorporation, charter); status quo(1) ≻ incorporation(0) = charter(0); (remaining unincorporated) ≻ (incorporation status).

Proposition 93.0   Municipals valuation equals 2.

Proposition 94.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

Theorem 47.0   Local government fragmentation is preferred to remaining unincorporated.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporate	2: General Law	2: Charter	form of organization
1	0	1	1	0	general law
2	0	1	0	1	charter
1	0	1	½	½	general law or charter

Theorem 48.0   A Nash equilibrium fragmentation solution exists in mixed strategies.

Proposition 95.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.5.
Proposition 96.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

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Lemma 45.0   The timing of incorporation vote decisions may be either simultaneous or sequential elections with other votes on incorporation status.

Lemma 46.0   The timing of charter vote decisions may be either simultaneous or sequential elections with other votes on incorporation status.

Lemma 47.0   The timing of charter commission elections, for candidates, are either simultaneous or sequential elections with other votes on incorporation status.

Lemma 48.0   The timing of local elections, for candidates, are either simultaneous or sequential elections with other votes on incorporation status.

Theorem 49.0   (Order of Play) The timing of vote decisions defines the incorporation campaign schedule and any agenda for incorporation status.
- sequential voting
- limited sequential voting
- simultaneous voting

Proposition 97.0   Sequential voting.
- incorporation vote (yes/no).
- charter commission vote (candidates for charter commission).
- charter vote (yes/no).
- local elections (candidates for city positions).

Proposition 98.0   Sequential voting.
- incorporation vote (yes/no).
- charter vote (yes/no).
- local elections (candidates for city positions).

Proposition 99.0   Limited sequential voting.
- incorporation vote (yes/no).
- local elections (yes/no).

Proposition 100.0   Limited sequential voting.
- incorporation and charter vote (yes/no).
- local elections (candidates for city positions).

Proposition 101.0 Simultaneous voting.
- incorporation vote (yes/no),
- charter commission (candidates for city positions).

Proposition 102.0 Simultaneous voting.
- incorporation vote (yes/no),
- charter vote (yes/no),
- local elections (candidates for city positions).

Proposition 103.0 Simultaneous voting
- incorporation vote (yes, no),
- charter vote (yes, no).

Incoporation Campaign	S. Q.	C
S. Q.	0, 0	0, 0
I	1, 0	2, 0

Proposition 104.0 Municipals prefer incorporation status to remaining unincorporated; $C(2) \succ I(1) \succ S. Q.(0)$.

Proposition 105.0 Locals are indifferent between incorporation status and remaining unincorporated; S. Q.(0) = I(0) = C(0) and therefore unorganized as opposition in an incorporation campaign.

Proposition 106.0 Municipals valuation equals 2.

Proposition 107.0 Locals valuation equals 0.

Lemma 49.0 A Nash equilibrium exists by incorporation campaign for general law organization.

Lemma 50.0 A Nash equilibrium exists by incorporation campaign for incorporation and home rule charter.

Lemma 51.0 A unique equilibrium exists in mixed strategies with simultaneous voting on incorporation and charter status.

Theorem 50.0 Cityhood campaigns are equally likely to attain either general law organization or home rule charter status.

Theorem 51.0 Nash equilibrium exists by incorporation campaign for incorporation and charter status.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporation	2: Status Quo	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0
2	0	1	0	1
MLE	**0**	**1**	**½**	**½**

Proposition 108.0 Municipals valuation equals 1.5.

Proposition 109.0 Locals valuation equals 0.

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Proposition 110.0   Simultaneous voting
- incorporation vote (yes, no),
- charter vote (yes, no).

Incorporation Campaign	S. Q.	C
S. Q.	0, 1	0, 0
I	1, 0	2, 0

Proposition 111.0   Municipals prefer incorporation status to remaining unincorporated; C(2) ≻ I(1) ≻ S. Q.(0).

Proposition 112.0   Locals prefer remaining unincorporated to incorporated status; locals are indifferent toward incorporation status; S. Q.(1) ≻ I(0) = C(0).

Proposition 113.0   Municipals valuation equals 2.

Proposition 114.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporation	2: Status Quo	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0
2	0	1	0	1
1	**0**	**1**	**½**	**½**

Theorem 52.0   Nash equilibrium exist such that city-hood campaigns may attain either general law or charter status.

Lemma 52.0   A unique equilibrium exists in mixed strategies with simultaneous voting on incorporation and charter status.

Theorem 53.0   Incorporation campaigns are equally likely to attain either general law incorporation or charter status.

Proposition 115.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.5.

Proposition 116.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

Proposition 117.0   Simultaneous voting
- incorporation vote (yes, no),
- charter vote (yes, no).

Simultaneous Voting Game 1	S. Q.	C
S. Q.	0, 1	0, 0
I	1, 1	2, 0

Proposition 118.0   Municipals prefer charter status ≻ general law incorporation status ≻ a status quo in remaining unincorporated county territory; C(2) ≻ I(1) ≻ S. Q.(0).

Proposition 119.0   Locals are indifferent between remaining unincorporated county territory and municipal organization and prefer either remaining unincorporated and general law municipal organization to home rule charter status; S. Q.(1) = I(1) ≻ C(0).

Proposition 120.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 121.0   Locals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 122.0   Simultaneous voting
- incorporation vote (yes, no),
- charter vote (yes, no).

Simultaneous Voting Game 2	S. Q.	C
S. Q.	0, 1	0, 0
I	1, 0	2, -1

Proposition 123.0   Municipals prefer home rule charter status ≻ general law incorporation status ≻ a status quo in remaining unincorporated county territory; C(2) ≻ I(1) ≻ S. Q.(0).

Proposition 124.0   Locals are prefer remaining unincorporated county territory ≻ general law incorporation status ≻ home rule charter status; S. Q.(1) ≻ I(0) ≻ C(-1).

Proposition 125.0   Municipals valuation equals 1.

Proposition 126.0   Locals valuation equals 0.

Theorem 54.0   (City Incorporation) A unique Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategy.

#S	1: Status Quo	1: Incorporation	2: Status Quo	2: Charter
1	0	1	1	0

Lemma 53.0   (Incorporation Campaign) The Nash equilibrium solution is the same for incorporation games 1 and 2.

Theorem 55.0   (Lakewood Plan) A Nash equilibrium exists in incorporation status by general law organization.

Theorem 56.0   (City-hood Vote) A Nash equilibrium exists by favoring incorporation status by campaigning and voting decision.

Theorem 57.0   A Nash equilibrium fragmentation solution exists in pure strategies.

Proposition 127.0   Incorporation votes are low turnout elections.

Proposition 128.0   Incorporation votes are lower turnout elections varying by the organization of municipals and locals incorporation campaigns.

Proposition 129.0   Charter votes are low turnout elections.

Proposition 130.0   Charter votes are lower turnout elections varying by the organization of municipals and locals incorporation campaigns.

Proposition 131.0   Charter votes are lower turnout elections than incorporation votes.

Lemma 54.0   In sequential elections, charter votes are lower turnout elections than incorporation votes.

Proposition 132.0   Voter support equals a consensus equilibrium on incorporation votes.

Proposition 133.0   Voter support equals a consensus equilibrium on charter votes.

Lemma 55.0   In sequential elections, charter vote support is lower than vote support for incorporation.

Proposition 134.0   The success rates for city and town incorporation range from 50% to 75% indicating from a competitive, municipals versus locals incorporation campaign, to a consensus equilibrium supporting incorporation status.

Local Government Organization

Definition 25.0 A finite number of local jurisdictions $\equiv$ J = {1, 2, 3, ..., j}.

Definition 26.0 J = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} = the number of jurisdictions, with jurisdictional fragmentation number $\mathscr{F}(j)$ = n.

Definition 27.0 j = {j_1, j_2, j_3, ..., j_m} = set of jurisdictions, m-forms of local jurisdictions, 1/m = local division.

Proposition 135.0 Choice of the form of local government implies a matter of local affairs, $\mathbb{C}$ = $\mathbb{C}[0, m]$ = m^*.

Definition 28.0 $\mathscr{L}(Q) \equiv$ location good.

Proposition 136.0 The set of incorporation and charter alternatives implies a matter of state and local welfare decisions, $\mathscr{L}(Q)$ = q^*.

Proposition 137.0 Local jurisdiction, quantity setting, $\mathscr{L}(Q_J)$ = q_j^*

Proposition 138.0 Product differentiation by functional responsibility for provision, $\mathbb{C}[0, m]$ = m^*.

Definition 29.0 Provision decisions by local jurisdictions.
- number of local jurisdictions.
- number and allocation of local public goods and services.
- number of forms of local government organization.
- distribution of location goods.
- number of locations.

Definition 30.0 J = $\mathscr{L}(Q_J)$ = $f^* \equiv$ local jurisdictionally-induced equilibrium $\doteq$ fragmentation solution.

Definition 31.0 Fragmentation numerical solutions for provision decisions.
- voting by unincorporated county territory, single area.
- voting by unincorporated areas, multiple areas, community districts.
- voting by incorporated areas, city districts and ward-district division.

Definition 32.0 (SIE) structure induced voting equilibrium, majority of local jurisdictions.

Proposition 139.0   (Reciprocity Game) Voting rules and procedures ranging from (SMR) simple majority rule, even division and perfect duopoly competition to (NC) consensus decisions.

Proposition 140.0   Voter preferences, for forms of local jurisdiction and government organization, are consensus-based > 3/4 consensus (cumulative voting equilibrium) > even division > 1/4 minimum.

Proposition 141.0   Voter preferences are symmetric for municipals and locals.

Proposition 142.0   The voting equilibrium is a majority or more, consensus, of the fragmentation number of local jurisdictions.

Reciprocity Game	Consensus	Simple Majority Rule
Consensus	1, 1	.25, .75
Simple Majority Rule	.75, .25	.5, .5

#S	1: Consensus	1: SMR	2: Consensus	2: SMR
1	½	½	½	½
2	0	1	0	1
3	1	0	1	0
MLE	½	½	½	½

Lemma 56.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in mixed voting strategies.

Lemma 57.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in method of majority rule voting strategy.

Lemma 58.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in consensus voting decisions.

Proposition 143.0   The municipals and locals valuation equals 1.

Lemma 59.0   A unique Nash equilibrium exists in mixed voting strategies.

Proposition 144.0   The municipals and locals valuation equals .625.

Theorem 58.0   (Nalebuff and Caplin) A consensus equilibrium exists equal to a .625 division in valuation.

Definition 33.0   (Location Game I) Hotelling voting and site location strategies, Mogling
(3x3 location game) and Macy model of local division.

Location Game	ℓ_1	ℓ_2	ℓ_3
ℓ_1	$\mathcal{L}_1$	$\mathcal{L}_2$	$\mathcal{L}_3$
ℓ_2	$\mathcal{L}_4$	$\mathcal{L}_5$	$\mathcal{L}_6$
ℓ_3	$\mathcal{L}_7$	$\mathcal{L}_8$	$\mathcal{L}_9$

FIGURE 9.0

Circular City

Ring

Radial

CDB

Lemma 60.0   The median site location equals $\mathcal{L}_5 = \ddot{o}(\ell_2, \ell_2)$ the CBD in two dimensions.

Proposition 145.0   Municipals site location preferences $\equiv \mathcal{L}_5 \succ [\mathcal{L}_2 = \mathcal{L}_8] = [\mathcal{L}_1 = \mathcal{L}_3 = \mathcal{L}_7 = \mathcal{L}_9] \succ [\mathcal{L}_4 = \mathcal{L}_6]$.

Proposition 146.0   Locals site location preferences $\equiv \mathcal{L}_5 \succ [\mathcal{L}_4 = \mathcal{L}_6] \succ [\mathcal{L}_1 = \mathcal{L}_3 = \mathcal{L}_7 = \mathcal{L}_9] \succ [\mathcal{L}_2 = \mathcal{L}_8]$.

Proposition 147.0   The median site location, for provision decisions, is preferred by both municipals and locals.

**Proposition 148.0**   Municipals and locals valuation equals a ½ or even division.

Definition 34.0   (Location Game II) Hotelling voting and site location strategies, Mogling (3x3 location game) and Macy model of local division.

Location Game		ℓ_1	ℓ_2	ℓ_3
ℓ_1		.5, .5	1, 0	.5, .5
ℓ_2		0, 1	1, 1	0, 1
ℓ_3		.5, .5	1, 0	.5, .5

#S	1: ℓ_1	1: ℓ_2	1: ℓ_3	2: ℓ_1	2: ℓ_2	2: ℓ_3
1	0	1	0	0	1	0
2	1	0	0	1	0	0
3	1	0	0	0	0	1
4	0	0	1	1	0	0
5	0	0	1	0	0	1
MLE	**½**	**0**	**½**	**½**	**0**	**½**

Lemma 61.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies.

Lemma 62.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in matching location strategies.

Lemma 63.0   A Nash equilibrium exists in switching location strategies.

Lemma 64.0   A unique Nash equilibrium exists in mixed strategies.

Theorem 59.0   A Tiebout equilibrium exists in pure location strategies.

Theorem 60.0   A Bilateral monopoly equilibrium exists in mixed voting strategies.

Theorem 61.0   (Oates Decentralization) Location competition guarantees the existence of a Tiebout equilibrium.

Theorem 62.0   (Oates Decentralization) Provision decisions by local jurisdictions guarantees the existence of a Tiebout equilibrium.

Theorem 63.0   The Tiebout equilibrium is a fragmentation numerical solution by form of local government organization.

Lemma 65.0   Incorporation status and provision decisions are an adoption and implementation game, with an ESS by duration of local jurisdiction and local government organization.

Proposition 149.0   Adoption of incorporation status equals an incorporation vote decision.

Proposition 150.0   Implementation of incorporation status equals a charter vote decision.

Proposition 151.0   Generalized adoption of incorporation status equals incorporation and charter vote decisions with local elections.

Proposition 152.0   Generalized implementation of incorporation status requires provision decisions allocating municipal or local public goods and services by incorporation and/or charter authority.

Proposition 153.0   Implementation equals allocations of local public goods and services.

Proposition 154.0   Implementation equals allocation of location goods.

Theorem 64.0   Existence of a form of local jurisdiction
- 0   township
- 1   town
- 2   borough
- 3   village
- 4   city

Theorem 65.0   (Product Differentiation) Existence of local jurisdiction provided by the set of the incorporation and charter alternatives.
- 0   unincorporated
- 1   general law organization, [0, 1] continuum (full, limited, or unorganized).
- 2   home rule charter provision, [0, m].

Lemma 66.0   Choice of the form of local government organization, $\mathbb{C} = \mathbb{C}[0, m] = m$.
Lemma 67.0   Choice of the number of local governments, $\mathbb{C} = \mathbb{C}[0, n] = n$.
Lemma 68.0   City classification, $\text{Log}[1,n] = R[1, n]$, is continuous by population size.

Lemma 69.0   Fragmentation numerical solution = the number of local jurisdictions, $\mathscr{F}(j) = n$.

Lemma 70.0   Equilibrium number of local jurisdictions = circle packing solution in two dimensions.

Theorem 66.0   Incorporation and Charter Decisions = Adoption, Implementation Game.
- adoption decisions
  - formation
  - annexation, merger, consolidation and boundary change
  - incorporation
- implementation decisions
  - charter
  - local elections
  - allocation of municipal goods and services

Lemma 71.0   Fragmentation number by charter status by mechanism design, with Banach measure space =
- 0   incorporation and charter decisions.
- 1   partition of unity in local jurisdiction shares.
- 2   two dimensional, circle packing fragmentation solution.
- 3   organization of planning and development.
- k   form of local government organization.
- m   product differentiation by form of local jurisdiction.
- $m \geq \underline{m}$ home rule charter status, provision & amendment decisions

Lemma 72.0   Finite set of local jurisdictions equals an integer fragmentation number solution.

Lemma 73.0   A set of local jurisdictions equals a fixed or constant fragmentation numerical solution.

Lemma 74.0   An integer set of local jurisdictions, with varying numbers of local jurisdictions, derived from entry and exit decisions equals a variable or range of fragmentation numerical solutions.

Proposition 155.0   New cities are produced by entry, incorporation and charter decisions.

Proposition 156.0   Abolishment of forms of local jurisdiction are produced by exit decisions, such as de-annexation and detachment of territory, dis-incorporation, and secession of re-incorporation as independent city status and municipal organization of territory.

Theorem 67.0   For a closed, bounded, and compact set of local jurisdictions, a local jurisdictionally-induced equilibrium exists by
- city classification
- fragmentation number solution
- two dimensional circle packing solution
- charter status, organization, and form of local jurisdiction
- incorporation & charter provision of local public goods & services
- decentralization and provision of location goods

Proposition 157.0   (Local government organization I) In two dimensions, the fragmentation solution = fragmentation number and circle packing solution.

Proposition 158.0   (Local government organization II)   In two dimensions, the fragmentation number equals the number of Soddy circles and a fragmentation solution by circle packing.

Definition 20.0   Hausdorff condition on local jurisdiction (areal or population) shares, $s = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, ..., s_j\} = \cap s = \varnothing$.

Lemma 75.0   (Local government organization III) Game of pursuit in areal shares imply zero-sum competition in shares with local boundary decisions.
- differential rates in formation and organization.
- differential timing of incorporation and charter decisions.
- competition in areal shares in numbers and sequences of local boundary decisions.

Theorem 68.0   (Local government organization IV) Banach measure space = 1 and a game of pursuit in area by
- partition of unity of county territory.
- county subdivision units.
- local division.
- a spatial distribution of shares = areal shares.

Proposition 159.0   (Local government organization V) Annexation and boundary change by existing local jurisdictions.

Proposition 160.0   (Local government organization VI) Incorporation and charter decisions by new local jurisdictions in unincorporated county territory.
- towns → cities.
- boroughs → cities.
- townships → cities.
- villages → cities.
- CDPs → cities.

Proposition 161.0   (Local government organization VII) Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) converges to local government fragmentation by number and form of organization.
- number of alternative forms of local government are decreasing.
- town, township, borough and village organization is decreasing.
- municipal organization is increasing.
- the number of cities is increasing.
- fragmentation of local jurisdiction is increasing.

Proposition 162.0   (Local government organization VIII) Zero-sum competition among local jurisdictions in areal shares.

Proposition 163.0   (Local government organization IX)   Imperfect competition to allocate local public goods and services and by provision of location goods.

Proposition 164.0   (Local government organization X) Nonzero sum metropolitan organization, in planning and development, planning new cities and zoning allocation of development land unit permits.

Proposition 165.0   County organization by units of subdivision.
- town organization.
- ward-district division
- township organization
- limited township organization.
- no township organization.

Incorporation Status by a Spatial History of Boundary Decisions

New cities may be formed by town or city incorporation. The spatial history of local boundary decisions evolves by incorporation and charter votes. The voting may be in either simultaneous or sequential elections, favoring (with a yes vote majority) or opposing (with a no vote majority) an incorporation campaign. If a majority opposes incorporation, no sequential election is held to determine support for a municipal charter. If a majority opposes incorporation, any simultaneous charter vote is null or voided. Locals win by defeating incorporation, whereas municipals win by enacting incorporation and charter decisions by vote. The expectation is that the vote on incorporation is strongly and positively linearly correlated with the vote on a charter, using either sequential or simultaneous voting rules and procedures for incorporation campaigns.

The empirical analysis in this section describes planning for new cities in four metropolitan areas, Los Angeles, Miami, Seattle and Honolulu. Each of these areas has a home rule county and limited or no township organization for the purposes of county subdivision. Examples with county-township organization, and town or township and village incorporations include Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, three Ohio metropolitan areas, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus and states such as Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Additional examples with stronger county-township organization are states such as New York, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, that had Board of Supervisors elections, with city, town, and township districts. The Ohio and Indiana Commission Plans provide further examples of county-township organization with fixed and small sizes of the county legislatures. The use of county-township organization, and survey townships, mapped earlier, suggested equilibrium among the number of minor civil districts for county subdivision, township organization and new town, village and city incorporation.

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Generally speaking, a time ordering of the dates of municipal incorporation provides a measure of the spatial history of incorporation decisions. The sequence of decisions may not include all town, borough, township, village and city incorporation. Because of the changes in either incorporation provision or state regulation of county subdivision, the incorporation of these local jurisdictions evolves by home rule status, general law city classification and the incorporation status of special charters. The number of cities is generally less than ½ the total number of incorporation decisions, by town, borough, township, village, and city incorporation. By dates of incorporation, the sequence of incorporation decisions is longer in duration, the more forms of local government organization are included in the set of decisions.

Municipals generate small and large cities that may be classified by incorporation status and form of local government organization. Forms of local government organization evolve by general law during spatial histories of incorporation decisions, so that changes occur in incorporation status and any city classification by population size or area. Because forms of local government organization are regulated by general law, state home rule provision may either produce new forms of incorporation as substitutes or eliminate the incorporation status of some existing forms of organization. In this setting, incorporation status for towns, boroughs, villages and small cities, by population and areal size, may be dis-incorporated or considered only as local government organization and formation by general law. These local jurisdictions may no longer be considered municipal incorporations, and therefore may only retain special charter status by votes on local legislation passed under previous constitutional and legislative provisions. Even so, state regulation permits votes for incorporation, by general law provision, and any combination of incorporation and charter votes by home rule provision.

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TABLE 1.0   **Descriptive Statistics on Year of Incorporation Vote**

Descriptive Statistics: Los Angeles County Incorporation Votes (Years of Incorporation Decisions)

N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
176	1850	2003	1939	2.29 yrs	30.38 yrs	-.064	-.702

Descriptive Statistics: Miami-Dade County Incorporation Votes (Years of Incorporation Decisions)

N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
47	1896	2005	1947	4.16 yrs	28.49 yrs	.896	-.114
53	1856	1949	1918	3.24 yrs	23.61 yrs	-.369	-.471
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Descriptive Statistics: King County Incorporation Votes (Years of Incorporation Decisions)

N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
72	1865	1999	1941	4.32 yrs	36.69 yrs	.040	-1.302

The distributions of the years of incorporation voting decisions are summarized in

TABLE 1.0 by Los Angeles, Miami-Dade and King county. The ranges in years of decisions

indicate a history of spatial decisions between 1850 and 2003 in Los Angeles County, 1856 to

2005 in Miami-Dade County and 1865 to 1999 in King County. As a result, the time series

produces an approximate one hundred and fifty-year duration in evolutionary incorporation,

annexation, and merger or consolidation decisions. In terms of a voting sequence, the average

years are 1939 in Los Angeles County, 1941 in King County and an average of 1918 and 1947

for town and city incorporations in Dade County. The mean standard errors estimate average

durations above and below the average year of incorporation. The findings indicate a 2.29 year

average duration in Los Angeles County, a 4.16 year average for municipal incorporations in

Miami-Dade County and a 4.32 average duration in the King County, Seattle area.

The results using the mean standard error, in years, reveal the importance of county subdivision by town sectional planning and development. Additionally, any city plan designed as the status quo in local jurisdiction may also have influenced not only the central city, but the early planning and development of cities and suburbs. The fact that many of the incorporation decisions are prior to the adoption of state home rule, home rule for counties and county charters, suggests that evolution toward fragmentation in local government formation and organization began before extensions of state regulation into the fragmentation of local jurisdiction and county planning and development of local boundary decisions.

The standard duration statistic indicates the duration for any evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to emerge from the timing of sequences of incorporation and charter decisions. In Miami-Dade County, the average duration is 23.61 years for town incorporation versus the 28.49 year standard duration for city incorporation decisions. The time horizons for both Los Angeles (30.38) and King counties averaged more than thirty years' duration to complete most of the incorporation and charter votes. Whereas Dade County had the shortest duration of town formation, King County generated the longest duration, timing in at 36.69 years, for both town and city incorporations. These findings suggest differential rates of pursuing incorporation equal to varying time period lengths of development and durations of acceleration in local government fragmentation. These results suggest variation in planning town versus city incorporation decisions and therefore any timing and time horizons for planning new cities.

The skewness and kurtosis coefficients indicate non-normal distributions of the timing of incorporation and charter votes. These findings indicate a less concentrated and therefore more continuous timing of incorporation and charter votes. The results are consistent with a somewhat

uniform distribution of incorporation and charter decisions. The most asymmetric distribution of incorporation times was in Miami-Dade County, with new cities and towns after the Town of Miami incorporation less likely than expected by a normal distribution of incorporation and charter decision years. This finding indicates there were fewer towns incorporated immediately for a longer duration after the Town of Miami was incorporated among the distributions of town incorporation decisions. Among the city incorporations, new cities were less frequent than expected by a normal distribution, because of a thirty-year moratorium on incorporation by Dade County entry barriers on new cities by regulation. More generally, all three of the Metro-Counties exhibited less concentrated distribution of incorporation and charter decisions than expected by a normal distribution. This result implies differential rates of pursuing incorporation and charter votes, consistent with wavelets of incorporation campaigns. The findings suggest incorporation campaigns become popular in multiple short-run time horizons. These results suggest there are periods of greater frequencies of failures and lengthening of periods with few or no incorporation campaigns. As a consequence, the municipals' campaigns occur in shorter duration, time horizons, producing successful campaigns for incorporation and charter votes.

This result can be demonstrated by an analysis of the dates of incorporation in Los Angeles and Miami-Dade counties. Reorganization occurred in both counties, with territories in Southern California now included in Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Imperial counties. Territories in South Florida were detached from Dade County are now included in Broward, the Palm Beeches and Monroe County in the Florida Keys. In **TABLE 2.1**, the cities underlined are the twenty charter cities in Los Angeles County, enacted in clusters of decisions from 1886-1911 (12 cities) and then later on from 1956-60 (five cities).

Given clustering of the timing of incorporation decisions, there may have been additional charter cities among the 12 cities than have been merged by consolidation votes. These twelve cities, mostly annexed to the City of Los Angeles, are shown with italics in **TABLE 2.1**. The longest and almost continuous campaign for town incorporation is from 1886 to 1930, producing most of the charter cities. As reported, the fragmentation number of cities equals 88 cities, with 20 Charter Cities and 68 General Law Cities. The 1954-1968 and 1973-1991 incorporation campaigns were triggered by attempts to provide municipal services within county territory, first through contractual arrangements between Los Angeles County and new cities, and then later by larger, planning and development areas within county territory. The new cities emerge during the 1973 to 1991 period through a series of incorporation campaigns. These municipals' campaigns were the most expensive for what some may consider boundary or peripheral areas by town section in Los Angeles County. The endpoint for this campaigning appears to be three failed efforts in an area described as Hacienda Heights (1982, 1992 and 2003). In 1979, three Los Angeles County boundary areas began the pursuit of municipal incorporation producing new cities in Agoura Hills, Calabasas and Santa Clarita with the distinction being among these somewhat isolated new cities versus the 1954-1968 fragmentation by the linear extension of cities throughout town sections of Los Angeles County. These new cities came into existence because of the population increases throughout Southern California, and specifically by county planning of new cities in southern Los Angeles County from the San Gabriel Valley to the South Bay. As the 1954-1968 municipals incorporation campaign increased in frequency, the numbers of incorporation failures increased with multiple attempts because changes in local jurisdiction boundaries were necessary for successful incorporation votes.

TABLE 2.1   Los Angeles County Dates of City Incorporation

Los Angeles	04/04/1850	Glendora	11/13/1911
Pasadena	06/19/1886	El Monte	11/18/1912
Santa Monica	12/09/1886	Manhattan Beach	12/07/1912
Monrovia	12/15/1887	San Gabriel	04/24/1913
Pomona	01/06/1888	San Marino	04/25/1913
South Pasadena	02/29/1888	Avalon	06/26/1913
San Pedro	03/01/1888	Beverly Hills	01/28/1914
Compton	05/11/1888	Monterey Park	05/29/1916
Redondo Beach	04/29/1892	El Segundo	01/18/1917
Long Beach	12/13/1897	Culver City	09/20/1917
Whittier	02/28/1898	Montebello	10/15/1920
Azusa	12/29/1898	*Hyde Park*	05/12/1921
Covina	08/14/1901	Torrance	05/12/1921
Alhambra	07/11/1903	Lynwood	07/16/1921
Arcadia	08/05/1903	Hawthorne	07/12/1922
Hollywood	11/09/1903	South Gate	01/15/1923
Venice\Ocean Park	02/17/1904	West Covina	02/17/1923
Vernon	09/22/1905	Signal Hill	04/22/1924
Wilmington	12/27/1905	Maywood	09/02/1924
Glendale	02/15/1906	*Tujunga*	05/01/1925
Huntington Park	09/01/1906	*Barnes City*	02/13/1926
Lordsburg/La Verne	09/11/1906	Bell	11/07/1927
Sawtelle	11/26/1906	Gardena	09/11/1930
Hermosa Beach	01/10/1907	Palos Verdes Estates	12/20/1939
Sierra Madre	02/07/1907	Lakewood	04/16/1954
Watts	05/23/1907	Baldwin Park	01/25/1956
Claremont	10/03/1907	Cerritos/Dairy Valley	04/24/1956
Inglewood	02/14/1908	La Puente	08/01/1956
Belmont Heights	10/09/1908	Downey	12/17/1956
Eagle Rock	03/01/1911	Rolling Hills	01/24/1957
Tropico	03/15/1911	Paramount	01/30/1957
Burbank	07/15/1911	Santa Fe Springs	05/15/1957
San Fernando	08/31/1911	Industry	06/18/1957

Bradbury	07/26/1957	Bell Gardens	08/01/1961
<u>Irwindale</u>	08/06/1957	Hidden Hills	10/19/1961
Duarte	08/22/1957	Palmdale	08/24/1962
Norwalk	08/26/1957	Hawaiian Gardens	04/14/1964
Bellflower	09/03/1957	Lomita	06/30/1964
Rolling Hills Estates	09/18/1957	Carson	02/20/1968
Pico Rivera	01/29/1958	**Rancho Palos Verdes**	**09/07/1973**
South El Monte	07/30/1958	**La Canada-Flintridge**	**12/08/1976**
Walnut	01/19/1959	**Lancaster**	**11/02/1977**
Artesia	05/29/1959	**La Habra Heights**	**12/04/1978**
Rosemead	08/04/1959	**Westlake Village**	**12/11/1981**
Lawndale	12/28/1959	**Agoura Hills**	**12/08/1982**
Commerce	01/28/1960	**West Hollywood**	**11/29/1984**
La Mirada	03/23/1960	**Santa Clarita**	**12/15/1987**
<u>Temple City</u>	05/25/1960	**Diamond Bar**	**04/18/1989**
San Dimas	08/04/1960	**Malibu**	**03/28/1991**
Cudahy	11/10/1960	**Calabasas**	**04/05/1991**

As reported in **TABLE 2.2**, there are 34 cities in Miami-Dade County. There were four periods of municipal incorporation campaigns, from 1913 to 1926, 1927-1941, 1945-1961 and 1991 to 2005. The first period consists of a real estate development and town sectional incorporation of these town plans. In South Dade, two cities were incorporated in the Perrine land grant (Homestead and Florida City) and one Beach City was incorporated on the town sections to the east of the City of Miami. During 1913-1926, the Greater Miami Plan was enacted favoring town sectional incorporation throughout the survey township areas in Dade County territory. In this Plan, cities were formed from Shoreland Development territory in Fulford and Arch Creek, located in the northern corridor of townships from the Everglades to the Beach town sections (North Miami Beach, North Miami, Surfside, and Golden Beach). In the western town sections, the Curtiss-Bright Ranch and Real Estate Company produced three additional incorporations (Hialeah, Opa-locka and Miami Springs) to those along the beach and inter-coastal highway inland. The City of Miami merged with and annexed village and town incorporations and by doing so, greatly expanded the City's boundaries.

The second period occurs after the devastation of a Hurricane that resulted in a de-annexation of City of Miami territory. The de-annexation consisted of a detachment of multiple town sections and a return of these areas to Dade County control. The de-annexation produced a permanent reduction of the City of Miami area, with areas that would later develop adjacently to the City of Miami boundaries. This de-annexation of territory produced a long-run debate about spheres of influence for the City of Miami, Dade County responsibility to provide municipal services to areas previously contained with the central city, and therefore any incorporation campaigns by municipals are either to be re-annexed by the City of Miami or to form new cities.

The third period produces new cities, some of which were contained in the town sections de-annexed from the City of Miami. Among these town sectional detachments cities are Miami Shores, Biscayne Park, El Portal, Indian Creek Village, North Bay Village, West Miami, Bay Harbour Islands, and Bal Harbour. The towns of South Miami and Virginia Gardens were also produced by the 1920's Greater Miami Plan, in areas considered for southern and western extension of City of Miami territory. These two cities experienced significant boundary changes from the 1920's to municipal incorporation, with multiple changes in the town sections what had been included in South Miami and adjacent to the extension of Coral Gables to the town sections known as Gables-by-the-Sea. The boundaries produced by the incorporation campaign for South Miami generated both discontiguous areas of county territory within the City of South Miami and the City of West Miami. By doing so, this produced an incentive for additional incorporation campaigns along the U. S. 1 corridor from the cities of Miami, Coral Gables and South Miami to Homestead and Florida City. The development of Virginia Gardens was actually in zonal ordinance areas, in rectangular lots similar to those blocks generated in the City of Los Angeles by the Ord Plan and in New Orleans as a Plan for ward-district division. The areas in and to the south (36 Street) of Virginia Gardens developed as a major railroad transit point and then later became County administered territory as part of the Miami International Airport District. The creation of the Airport District by Dade County significantly reduced the size of Virginia Gardens, eliminating residential town sectional areas, by de-annexation and detachment of territory back to the County. The incorporation of Sweetwater was part of the real estate development planned incorporation of individual town sections throughout Dade County just beyond what was the City of Miami boundaries in the 1925 Greater Miami Plan.

Only two cities, from several additional incorporations, survive from the fourth period of town sectional incorporation campaigns. Both the cities of Hialeah Gardens and Medley have annexed town sections, in the western sections of the earlier Shoreland Development. These two cities are somewhat isolated in West Dade, beyond the three Curtiss-Bright planned cities of Hialeah, Miami Springs and Opa-locka. The town sections adjacent to Hialeah Gardens and Medley were owned by the Pennsylvania Sugar Company (Pennsuco) did not develop, with a city that existed with fewer than fifty to twenty-five voters for most the 1949 to 1986-period. Severe flooding in 1973 damaged or destroyed industrial buildings and residential areas throughout the northwestern Dade sections in Miami Springs, Hialeah, Medley, Hialeah Gardens and Pennsuco.

In 1961, the incorporation of the City of Islandia was intended as a Plan for development of the Beach towns and islands. The plan was for the construction of Inter-coastal bridges and highways similar to those linking Dade County cities to the Beach towns, and U. S. 1 connecting the Florida Keys in Monroe County. The Islandia Plan was defeated by 1965, although the City continued with fewer than 20 residents from 1961 to 2012. This period of incorporation indicated the existence of County Plans for inter-coastal development and the charter authority for regulation of local government fragmentation in County territory. The moratorium on new cities ended with planning conflicts on Key Biscayne over the numbers of visitors to the Island to various County administered parks and recreation facilities. In addition, residential development zoning increased the population density on Key Biscayne. Issues concerning access to the Island on the inter-coastal bridge and local traffic during events triggered the incorporation campaign that succeeded in incorporating only the Key Biscayne town sections not included in County Parks and Recreation that became the precedent for eight additional new cities formed.

TABLE 2.2   Miami-Dade County Dates of Municipal Incorporation

Miami	07/28/1898	North Bay Village	08/01/1945
Homestead	02/08/1913	West Miami	04/07/1947
Florida City	12/29/1914	Bay Harbor Islands	04/28/1947
Miami Beach	03/26/1915	Bal Harbour	06/16/1947
Coral Gables	04/01/1925	Virginia Gardens	07/09/1947
Hialeah	02/01/1926	Hialeah Gardens	12/01/1948
North Miami	02/01/1926	Medley	05/01/1949
Opa Locka	05/14/1926	*Pennsuco*	06/15/1949
Miami Springs	08/23/1926	*Islandia*	12/06/1960
South Miami	06/01/1927	**Key Biscayne**	**06/18/1991**
Golden Beach	05/21/1929	**Aventura**	**11/07/1995**
North Miami Beach	06/15/1931	**Pinecrest**	**03/12/1996**
Miami Shores	01/02/1932	**Sunny Isles Beach**	**06/16/1997**
Biscayne Park	12/01/1933	**Miami Lakes**	**12/05/2000**
Surfside	05/18/1935	**Palmetto Bay**	**09/10/2002**
El Portal	05/30/1937	**Miami Gardens**	**05/13/2003**
Indian Creek Village	05/17/1939	**Doral**	**06/24/2003**
Sweetwater	10/10/1941	**Cutler Bay**	**11/08/2005**

In Miami-Dade County, nine new cities were formed by ten incorporation campaigns,

from 1991 to 2005 with additional campaigns continuing after 1995. These ten incorporation

campaigns each held sequential incorporation and charter votes implied by the 1956 statewide

approval of county home rule and the 1957 adoption of the Dade County Charter. Prior town

incorporation campaigns were enacted by special acts of The Legislature. These local bills

incorporated cities by individual charters. State legislation in 1949 intended to reduce the

number of new cities, and in some cases, rejected the incorporation voting rules and procedures

used for town sectional incorporation in Dade County. The 1956 Amendment replaced 1949

State regulation by potential county home rule charter regulation. In the absence of a county

charter, incorporation and charter adoption is regulated by general law provisions of The

Legislatures. The 1949 to 1956 changes in the incorporation and charter laws explain the dis-

incorporation and dissolution or rejection of petitions for city incorporation in The Legislature.

The 1949 legislation unincorporated the cities formed by town incorporation voting rules and

procedures from 1948 to 1951, including the adjacent Central Miami-Dade town sectional

incorporations of Earlington Heights, Flagler City, Gladeview, Northwest Miami, the South Dade

incorporation of (East and West) Perrine, and Westgate in the West Dade-Everglades sections of

West Chester. The petitions for the North and South Dade cities of Coral City (Shoreland town

sections) and Goulds (Perrine land grant) were both rejected by The Legislature in the 1950-

1951 sessions. This transition from town to municipal incorporation, provided for charter cities,

general law organization, and after county charter adoption, home rule provision for

incorporation and charter decisions. A transition also occurred in California, after county home

rule was adopted, by 1911, 1964, and 2002 legislation regulating local government organization.

TABLE 2.3   Special Charter Town Incorporation by Town Section and Survey Township

Miami	1856	Miami Shores Village	1922
Biscayne District	1870	Miami Springs	1922
Coconut Grove	1873	Buena Vista	1924
Cutler	1884	Ojus	1926
Lemon City	1889	Opa-locka	1926
Arch Creek-North Miami	1891	Golden Beach	1928
Perrine	1897	Biscayne Park	1931
Larkins-South Miami	1899	Biltmore Village	1935
Redland	1900	Surfside	1935
Silver Palm	1900	El Portal	1937
Kendall	1902	Indian Creek Village	1939
Longview	1902	Sweetwater	1941
Benson	1903	North Bay Village	1945
Goulds	1903	Bal Harbour	1946
Howard	1903	Bay Harbour Islands	1947
Key	1903	Virginia Gardens	1947
Fulford-North Miami Beach	1903	West Miami	1947
Peters	1903	Earlington Heights	1948
Rockdale/Richmond	1903	Flagler City	1948
Homestead	1904	Gladeview	1948
Princeton	1904	Hialeah Gardens	1948
Modello	1906	Northwest Miami	1948
Naranja	1907	Perrine	1948
Florida City	1908	Westgate	1948
Miami Beach	1912	Medley	1949
Coral Gables	1921	Pennsuco	1949
Hialeah	1921	Goulds	1950
Silver Bluff	1921	Coral City	1951

As reported in **TABLE 2.3**, town incorporations were provided for by special charter acts in the form of local government organization. These organic acts by The Florida Legislature enacted successful completion of town incorporation voting rules and procedures and provided local bills to implement city incorporation by charter and election of local officials. Initially, the town incorporation campaigns concentrated in a linear corridor, at the intersections of the Florida East Coast Railroad. After the 1940's, these areas developed along the U. S. 1 corridor from Ojus, Fulford and Arch Creek in North and Northeast Dade County to Homestead and Florida City in South Dade and Monroe County and the Florida Keys.

After the separation of Miami Beach township from the City of Miami, additional cities were formed adjacent to the City of Miami and by various real estate development corporations. Some of the town sectional incorporations have never formed cities posterior to either the1949 or 1957 provisions. Others formed, by incorporation campaigns, and then were required to reincorporate under the new set of voting rules and procedures. In many instances, the incorporation campaigns failed to attain either petition signature requirements or they were defeated by incorporation votes. The 1950-51 rejection of incorporation bills passed by the 1948-49 and1949-1950 sessions eliminated the largest number of the town incorporations that had held successful incorporation votes. After the 30-year, 1961-1991 moratorium on creating new cities in Dade County, all of the new cities were formed under the 1957 Home Rule Charter, with new voting rules and procedures enacted after the 1991 Key Biscayne incorporation and charter votes. The sequential voting rules and procedures created the most expensive incorporation campaigns in Dade County and triggered a movement for incorporation of county territory by either city incorporation or municipal service district formation.

Differential Rates of Success in Cityhood Votes

As shown by the dates of incorporations, **TABLE 2.1, 2.2, & 2.3,** there is evidence of differential rates of success by town and city incorporation. Even after a successful incorporation campaign, coinciding with an ongoing multi-city movement for municipal incorporation, changes in state legislation and county authority to regulate, produce dis-incorporation decisions by dissolution of the existing local government organizations. The frequency of dis-incorporation was greater in Los Angeles and Miami-Dade County because of the use of development corporations for planning new cities. Additionally, these findings reveal town incorporation as special charter cities may produce an unincorporated status by county home rule charter authority that establishes voting and rules and procedures for incorporating new cities. In both California and Florida, these findings indicate multiple town incorporations were either set aside or considered failures and therefore regulated as unincorporated county territory under new state legislation and county charter authority. In summary, many town incorporations failed to become cities by not attempting an incorporation campaign under new rules and procedures, being allocated unincorporated status by state and county incorporation and charter decisions, or failing to win incorporation and charter votes under new voting rules and procedures. The failed incorporations are explained by incorporation status and forms of local government organization, as special charter cities, general law cities, or home rule incorporation and charter vote cities. In summary, the spatial history of incorporation and charter decisions reported in **TABLES 2.1, 2.2, & 2.3** describe periods of town incorporation, city incorporations by special act charter, town, village, or city incorporation votes by general law, and finally, home rule status by sequential incorporation and charter votes.

TABLE 3.1   The Successes and Failures of Los Angeles Incorporation Campaigns

Los Angeles	1850	success	Manhattan Beach	1912	success
Wilmington	1871	success	Avalon	1913	success
Pasadena	1886	success	San Gabriel	1913	success
Santa Monica	1886	success	San Marino	1913	success
Monrovia	1887	success	Beverly Hills	1914	success
Pomona	1887	success	*Tropico*	1914	failure
Compton	1888	success	*Eagle Rock*	1915	failure
Long Beach	1888	success	Monterey Park	1916	success
San Pedro	1888	success	Culver City	1917	success
South Pasadena	1888	success	El Segundo	1917	success
Redondo Beach	1892	success	Santa Monica	1917	failure
Azusa	1898	success	*Sawtelle*	1917	success
Whittier	1898	success	*Tropico*	1917	failure
Covina	1901	success	Burbank	1920	failure
Alhambra	1903	success	Montebello	1920	success
Arcadia	1903	success	Newhall	1920	failure
Hollywood	1903	success	*Hyde Park*	1921	success
Venice\Ocean Park	1904	success	Lynwood	1921	success
Glendale	1905	success	Torrance	1921	success
Vernon	1905	success	Hawthorne	1922	success
Wilmington	1905	success	*Sawtelle*	1922	success
Huntington Park	1906	success	Beverly Hills	1923	failure
Lordsburg/La Verne	1906	success	*Eagle Rock*	1923	success
Sawtelle	1906	success	*Hyde Park*	1923	success
Claremont	1907	success	South Gate	1923	success
Hermosa Beach	1907	success	West Covina	1923	success
Sierra Madre	1907	success	Maywood	1924	success
Watts	1907	success	Santa Monica	1924	failure
Belmont Heights	1908	success	Signal Hill	1924	success
Inglewood	1908	success	*Venice*	1924	failure
Belmont Heights	1909	success	Alhambra	1925	failure
San Pedro	1909	success	Burbank	1925	failure
Wilmington	1909	success	Casa Verdugo	1925	failure
Hollywood	1910	success	*Tujunga*	1925	success
Burbank	1911	success	Venice	1925	success
Eagle Rock	1911	success	*Barnes City*	1926	success
Glendora	1911	success	Watts	1926	success
San Fernando	1911	success	*Barnes City*	1927	success
Tropico	1911	success	Bell	1927	success
El Monte	1912	success	*Tujunga*	1927	failure

Downey	1930	failure	Lawndale	1959	success
Gardena	1930	success	Rosemead	1959	success
Tujunga	1930	failure	Sun Oaks	1959	failure
City Terrace	1931	failure	West Hollywood	1959	failure
East Los Angeles	1931	failure	West Whittier	1959	failure
Tujunga	1931	failure	Carsolinguez	1960	failure
Tujunga	1932	success	Commerce	1960	success
East Los Angeles	1933	failure	Cudahy	1960	success
Garden City	1933	failure	Monte Villa	1960	failure
Garden City	1933	failure	San Dimas	1960	success
Palos Verdes Estates	1939	success	<u>Temple City</u>	1960	success
Willowbrook	1945	failure	Walnut Park	1960	failure
Willowbrook	1946	failure	Altadena	1961	failure
Baldwin Park	1950	failure	Bell Gardens	1961	success
Bell Gardens	1950	failure	**East Los Angeles**	1961	failure
Dominguez	1953	failure	Hahn-Alondra Park	1961	failure
Lakewood	1954	success	Hidden Hills	1961	success
Baldwin Park	1956	success	La Colima	1961	failure
<u>Cerritos/Dairy Valley</u>	1956	success	The Heights	1961	failure
<u>Downey</u>	1956	success	West Hollywood	1961	failure
East Whittier	1956	failure	Moneta Park	1962	failure
<u>Industry</u>	1956	success	Palmdale	1962	success
La Puente	1956	success	Carson	1963	failure
Moneta Gardens	1956	failure	South San Gabriel	1963	failure
Bellflower	1957	success	Hawaiian Gardens	1964	success
Bradbury	1957	success	Lomita	1964	success
Duarte	1957	success	San Pedro Hills	1964	failure
<u>Irwindale</u>	1957	success	**East Los Angeles**	1965	failure
La Mirada	1957	failure	Rowland Heights	1965	failure
Norwalk	1957	success	Topanga	1967	failure
Paramount	1957	success	Carson	1968	success
Rolling Hills	1957	success	Lennox	1968	failure
Rolling Hills Estates	1957	success	Westmont-West Athens	1968	failure
Santa Fe Springs	1957	success	Newhall-Valencia	1970	failure
Covina Highlands	1958	failure	Altadena	1972	failure
Pico Rivera	1958	success	**East Los Angeles**	1972	failure
South El Monte	1958	success	Flintridge	1973	failure
Walnut	1958	success	La Crescenta	1973	failure
Artesia	1959	success	Rancho Palos Verdes	1973	success
Charter Oak	1959	failure	Quartz Hill	1975	failure
La Mirada	1959	success	Canyon Country	1976	failure

La Canada-Flintridge	1976	success
Lancaster	1977	success
La Habra Heights	1978	success
Las Virgenes	1981	failure
Westlake Village	1981	success
Agoura Hills	1982	success
Diamond Bar	1983	failure
Hacienda Heights	1983	failure
West Hollywood	1984	success
Santa Clarita	1987	success
Diamond Bar	1989	success
Sunset Hills	1990	failure
Calabasas	1991	success
Malibu	1991	success
Hacienda Heights	1992	failure
Hollywood	2002	failure
San Fernando Valley	2002	failure
Hacienda Heights	2003	failure

Crosstabulation of SUCCESS by TYPE of BOUNDARY DECISION IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Success		TYPE			Total
		unincorporated	consolidation	incorporation	
failure	Count	50	15		65
	% within TYPE	100.0%	55.6%		36.5%
success	Count		12	101	113
	% within TYPE		44.4%	100.0%	63.5%
Total	Count	50	27	101*	178
	% within TYPE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Incorporation decisions include the twelve prior town incorporations and thirteen consolidation decisions.

As reported in **TABLE 3.1**, twelve towns consolidated with other cities, and some of these incorporations were likely to have been by local bills, and therefore charter cities by special acts of state legislation. In Los Angeles County, the incorporation and charter decisions are generally simultaneous votes with some cities approved by State legislation and post-1965 incorporations and charters designed by County authority of the Local Area Formation Commission (LAFCO). Based on the incorporation campaigns, there were 101 distinct city incorporations in Los Angeles County. As a result, twelve of these town and city incorporations were consolidated with the cities of Los Angeles (San Pedro, Hollywood, Venice-Ocean Park, Wilmington, Sawtelle, Watts, Eagle Rock, Hyde Park, Tujunga, Barnes City), Long Beach (Belmont Heights) and Glendale (Tropico). Four cities consolidated were a scattering of town sections on the west side of Los Angeles County (Venice and Ocean Park adjacent to Santa Monica, Sawtelle-Veteran's Administration Center & the Barnes City-Westchester area). Three cities were located in the Harbor District and southern Los Angeles County (San Pedro, Wilmington and Belmont Heights). Only one city, the town of Watts, existed as a rail road intersection among north-south, and east-west rail lines. This compares with Dade County, reported in **TABLE 2.3**, in an extensive linear development of towns by railroad corridors that produced town incorporations in 22 cities, from 1870 to 1908. In Los Angeles County, only one town was established as a rail road company transportation center, with modern transit centers located in El Monte, unincorporated East Los Angeles and the City of Los Angeles Union Station. Very few of the stations planned and developed by Pacific Bell street car lines were incorporated as cities. These areas remained unincorporated territory until later incorporation campaigns, as either named town sections or township districts in Los Angeles County territory.

The annexation of the central Los Angeles cities of Hyde Park and Eagle Rock consolidated most of the downtown areas in the City of Los Angeles. The annexation of Hollywood, merged the portion of the Sunset Boulevard corridor with downtown Los Angeles by separating the commercial center of East Hollywood and built areas of the Prospect Park town sections from the less developed and residential zoned Sunset Hills town sections in West Hollywood. Because these twelve cities voted for consolidation, the towns and cities were dis-incorporated and merged with Los Angeles, Long Beach and Glendale.

The runs of successes are in **TABLES 3.1 & 3.2** for incorporation campaigns in Los Angeles and King County. Some of the failures involve multiple attempts at consolidation decisions for twelve cities either merged or annexed to the three cities aforementioned. The other decisions describe the runs of successes in incorporation and charter votes. These incorporation decisions provide for both charter and general law cities and town or city incorporation status.

What is important is that the City of Los Angeles attempted multiple failures in annexation and boundary change votes with crucial 1931 and 1961 defeats resulting in the failure to annex on the eastern boundary across the Los Angeles River. The failures in these eastern town sections and townships produced the most populated unincorporated County territory in East Los Angeles. In 1931 two votes were held, on mergers of the town of City Terrace with the City of Los Angeles and incorporation of a City of East Los Angeles. Both the annexation and incorporation vote failed in the 1931 election to attain majority support. With this defeat the City of Los Angeles attempted an annexation of East Los Angeles, excluding the town sections in City Terrace. The vote on this annexation failed so that both areas remained unincorporated.

Had the 1931 incorporation campaign succeeded in East Los Angeles this would have provided for a City of East Los Angeles, and the City Terrace would not have been able to merge the City of Los Angeles. Support for the East Los Angeles incorporation would have surrounded town sections comprising City Terrace. Los Angeles County determined this would comprise dis-contiguous territory, such that a vote in City Terrace implied support for city incorporation by either consolidation with the City of Los Angeles or as a vote for independent city status. Given successful incorporation of East Los Angeles, a vote for city consolidation was therefore a vote for municipal incorporation. Given the failure of the East Los Angeles incorporation vote, a vote for City Terrace consolidation was a vote for municipal annexation to the City of Los Angeles. Because the incorporation and consolidation vote failed in both East Los Angeles and City Terrace, both remained unincorporated Los Angeles County territory even though some town sections of East Los Angeles are seemingly within the boundaries of the City Plan. This defeat occurred in a high turnout election, where the Mayor of Los Angeles was recalled and the Eastern District Representative on the City Council was defeated for reelection. The defeat of W. Sanborn, 1920-1932, ended the East Los Angeles incorporation campaign within the Eastern District. In 1933, the incorporation campaign changed the boundaries of the town sections and townships included for a city incorporation vote. This campaign was described as the Garden City incorporation consisting of the town sections and townships named Laguna, Belvedere Gardens, Belvedere and City Terrace. This four-city proposal was held with a single incorporation vote and was also defeated. The other sections of East Los Angeles campaigned both for and against the incorporation vote indicating organized locals' campaign against the municipals seeking incorporation of four cities.

By changing the boundaries, this produced a campaign for four cities in what was sometimes described as a second attempt for an East Los Angeles incorporation vote. The incorporation campaign failed in the second incorporation vote and was defeated by a large majority. The 1933 incorporation campaigns encouraged city incorporation by town sections and townships throughout East Los Angeles but this failed sufficiently for municipals to continue campaigning for incorporation of Hollenbeck, Boyle Heights (in the1922 Doheny land purchase), Lincoln Heights, El Sereno, Highland Park, Brooklyn Heights and any of the County territory in the City Terrace and East Side District No 2 incorporation vote areas. Even though spheres of influence suggest some potential for annexation, the cities of Los Angeles, Montebello and the town sections that became Commerce did not pursue an annexation campaign. Neither were boundary changes proposed for an incorporation vote nor continuing an incorporation campaign for these areas. The 1961 and 1972 East Los Angeles incorporation campaigns failed by incorporation vote and polling support for an incorporation initiative, with the most recent effort a 2005 County analysis determining a City of East Los Angeles is not viable without extensive contracting for services and planning and development for greater fiscal capacity.

By 1968, incorporation campaign failures reduced support for any movement toward incorporating the largest and most populated areas of Los Angeles County. These failures reduced the differential rate for successful incorporation in the 1950's and continued to decelerate incorporation campaigns during the 1960's, until failures in incorporation were more frequent than successful votes. Some of the areas of Los Angeles County that remains unincorporated include Willowbrook, Baldwin Park, Dominguez, Moneta (2), Charter Oak, Sun Oaks, Monte Villa, Altadena (2), Alondra Park, Rowland Heights, Lennox, La Crescenta & Quartz Hill.

As reported in **TABLE 3.2**, there are three periods of incorporation campaigns in King County. The Greater Seattle Plan produced consolidation of County territory and adjacent incorporated towns with the City of Seattle. In response, incorporation campaigns resulted in successes and failures at town and city incorporation. The use of towns, town sections and survey townships generated linear extensions of the City of Seattle and town incorporation. The formation of new cities involved larger areas of County territory than town sectional incorporation votes, generating township sized city incorporation campaigns. The involvement of County planning and development resulted in boundary changes to incorporation campaigns and therefore multiple attempts to form new cities.

The spatial history of incorporation decisions indicates three periods of incorporation campaigns, from 1890-1924, with town, city, and village incorporations, 1947-1961, town and city incorporations, and 1979 to 1999. The most recent period equals a twenty-year duration of County planning for new cities. From 1979 to 1985, there were only failed incorporation votes in the County development areas in linear north to south corridors, adjacent to downtown and through the City of Seattle. The planning and development for new cities included other North West, West, North East and South King County town sections and survey townships' in unincorporated county territory. Beginning in 1990, an incorporation movement continued for a nine-year duration of successful incorporation votes. The incorporation campaign and planning for new cities by King County produced eleven new cities. The planning and development of the new cities involved both individual incorporation campaigns and County generated boundary decisions using strategic plans and feasibility studies. Charettes were held in the unincorporated areas and several of new cities required boundary changes before an incorporation vote.

TABLE 3.2   The Successes and Failures of King County Incorporation Campaigns

Seattle	1865	Success	Normandy Park	1953	Success
Ballard	1890	Success	Beaux Arts	1954	Success
Kent	1890	Success	Burien-Highline	1954	Failed
Auburn	1891	Success	Kenmore	1954	Failed
Slaughter	1891	Success	Skyway Heights	1954	Failed
Gilman	1892	Success	Algona	1955	Success
Issaquah	1892	Success	Hunts Point	1955	Success
Columbia City	1893	Success	Medina	1955	Success
Renton	1901	Success	East Redmond	1956	Success
South Park	1902	Success	Kenmore	1956	Failed
West Seattle	1902	Success	Midway	1957	Failed
Snoqualmie	1903	Success	Angle Lake	1958	Failed
Georgetown	1904	Success	Black Diamond	1959	Success
Kirkland	1905	Success	Des Moines	1959	Success
South Seattle	1905	Success	Yarrow Point	1959	Success
Ravenna	1906	Success	Mercer Island City	1960	Success
South East Seattle	1906	Success	Mercer Island Town	1960	Success
Milton	1907	Success	Burien-Highline	1960	Failed
Tukwila	1908	Success	Lake Forest Park	1961	Success
Bothell	1909	Success	Federal Way	1979	Failed
North Bend	1909	Success	Federal Way	1981	Failed
Pacific	1909	Success	Newcastle	1981	Failed
Skyomish	1909	Success	Woodinville	1981	Failed
Carnation	1912	Success	Burien-Highline	1984	Failed
Redmond	1912	Success	Federal Way	1985	Failed
Tolt	1912	Success	**Federal Way**	**1990**	**Success**
Duvall	1913	Success	**SeaTac**	**1990**	**Success**
Enumclaw	1913	Success	**Burien**	**1993**	**Success**
Ravensdale	1913	Success	**Woodinville**	**1993**	**Success**
Harrisburg	1913	Failed	**Newcastle**	**1994**	**Success**
Ravensdale	1913	Failed	**Newport Hills**	**1994**	**Success**
Bingen	1924	Success	**Shoreline**	**1995**	**Success**
Houghton	1947	Success	**Covington**	**1997**	**Success**
Norwood Village	1950	Failed	**Maple Valley**	**1997**	**Success**
Bellevue	1953	Success	**Kenmore**	**1998**	**Success**
Clyde Hill	1953	Success	**Sammamish**	**1999**	**Success**

Crosstabulation of SUCCESS by TYPE of BOUNDARY DECISION IN KING COUNTY

Success		TYPE				Total
		unincorporated	consolidation	city	town	
failed	Count	16				16
	% within TYPE	100.0%				36.5%
success	Count		8	33	23	64
	% within TYPE		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	63.5%
Total	Count	16	8	33	23	80
	% within TYPE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0	100.0%

In Greater Seattle-King County, the differential success rate was 56/72 incorporation vote equal to 77.8%. The findings for Los Angeles County indicate 63.5% successful incorporation votes, based on 113 incorporation decisions divided by a total number of boundary decisions equal to 178. Between 1905 and 1910, eight cities were consolidated with the City of Seattle by annexation vote and merger decisions. By town or city incorporation, these eight cities are South Seattle, Ballard, Columbia, Ravenna, Southeast Seattle, South Park, West Seattle, and Georgetown. The success rate is lower by selection of only current cities as a direct measure of local jurisdiction fragmentation. This selection implies dis-incorporation failures through successful consolidation decisions, merger and annexation votes. This may neither imply abolishment of local jurisdiction nor dissolution of local government organization given the spatial history of boundary decisions and any changes in provision for consolidation, annexation and boundary change, or incorporation and charter votes. The fragmentation numbers equal 88 cities in Los Angeles County, 48 cities in King County and 34 cities in Miami-Dade County. In Los Angeles County, Wilmington held town (1871) and a city (1905) incorporation votes, before this Harbor District City voted for consolidation in 1909. The City of Sawtelle held a successful incorporation vote in 1906, and two consolidation votes in 1917 and 1922 both with majority support for annexation to the City of Los Angeles. Even so, only the 1922 consolidation vote was implemented after boundary changes were made including the Veteran's Administration Center as unincorporated. In Los Angeles County, the consolidation decisions were 12/27 = 44.4% successful, reducing the total number of successful charter and general law cities from 100 to 88. These two County results reveal differential success rates and the importance of the selection of votes, boundary decisions and forms of local government organization.

In summary, the number of cities is therefore less than the number of successful incorporation decisions and the number of incorporation votes are larger than the number of cities. The total number of incorporation and charter votes are also greater than the number of cities, because these decisions include incorporation and charter decisions for both town and city incorporation decisions. The total number of boundary decisions is also greater than the number of incorporation votes because these include annexation and boundary changes, consolidation decisions, and town and city incorporation and charter votes.

In Los Angeles County, the differential success rate for incorporation status produced $113/178 = 63.5\%$ success, included both successful incorporation and consolidation votes. The failures equal 65 consolidation and incorporation votes, resulting in 50 unincorporated areas and 15 incorporated cities that did not support consolidation and annexation or merger with adjacent cities. The findings in Miami-Dade County also demonstrate differential success rates by town and city incorporation. The findings indicate $51/62 = 82.3\%$ and $47/62 = 75.8\%$ successful town and city incorporation votes. Given 34 current cities in Miami-Dade County, the differential survival rate equals $34/62 = 54.8\%$ success rate for municipal incorporation. Using current cities in Los Angeles & King County, the incorporation success rates equal a survival rate of $88/178 < 50.0\%$ in Los Angeles County and $48/72 = 66.7\%$ in King County.

Additionally, some of the incorporation votes used the term village to suggest incorporation of a smaller city, with alternative forms of local government organization. Some of the smaller cities have larger city councils, so that the distinction between town sectional incorporation, town incorporation votes, and village government organization may not be clearly distinguishable from the incorporation and charter decisions made by the other cities in Dade

County. The forms of local government are generally not the same as those in other states allowing village incorporation decisions, so that the decision to incorporate as a village appears consistent with the Lakewood Plan cities in Los Angeles County that contract more extensively with County government for municipal services. The attempts to incorporate villages in Miami-Dade County describe Lakewood Plan cities with the intention of creating municipal service districts that provide municipal goods and services by contracting with the County government.

The numbers of new cities equal 11 in Los Angeles County, 9 in Miami-Dade County and 11 in King County. These numbers of new cities were produced by incorporation campaigns during an 18-year period in Los Angeles County, a 14-year period in Miami-Dade County and either a 9 or 20-year period in King County. During the 1973-1991 period, there were 21 incorporation decisions in Los Angeles County, with 11 successes and 10 failed incorporation votes. In Miami-Dade County, the incorporation campaign produced 9 victories and 1 defeat in 10 incorporation votes. No charter vote was held after the defeated incorporation in Destiny even though another two incorporation campaigns (Encida and Miami Gardens) with a changed boundary later produced a new city incorporation and charter vote success in Miami Gardens. In King County, there were 11 new cities incorporated between 1979 and 1999, with 6 incorporation vote failures during this 20-year period. After a 1985 defeat and five-year hiatus in incorporation campaigns, 11 of 11 incorporation votes attained a majority in the elections held from 1990 to 1999 by King County. These electoral results produced the only 100% successful incorporation campaign among the recent campaigns of incorporation status for 29 new cities in Los Angeles, King and Miami-Dade counties.

New City Formation by Incorporation and Charter Vote

The evolution of sequential voting describes the formation of new cities in Miami-Dade County, with the use of simultaneous voting for incorporation votes in Los Angeles County. Some of the incorporation votes are described in **TABLES 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3**. The findings describe incorporation and charter votes for the nine new cities in Miami-Dade County (shown in **TABLES 4.1 & 4.3**) and a summary (**TABLE 4.2**) of available charter and general law city incorporation votes in Los Angeles County. The findings in **TABLE 4.1** reveal no significant correlations among vote supports, voter turnouts and the sequence of boundary decisions. The fact that there is no linear trend in the vote support or turnout data suggests there is no evidence of decline in support for the incorporation campaign during the period of incorporation and charter votes. The durations of the individual incorporation campaigns vary from two months to ten months with the only failed campaign the shortest in duration. The population sizes of the new cities vary from Key Biscayne, the first and smallest of the new cities, to Doral the only city larger than 100,000 in population at the time of incorporation.

The findings reveal that four of the nine new cities had incorporation votes above 75% approval and therefore consensus for incorporation status. Four other cities attained incorporation votes approximately between 60% and 67% or two-thirds of the vote. These new cities also attained a consensus majority equilibrium approximately equal to 63% support for incorporation. Among the movement for the new city incorporation campaigns, the vote support for incorporation status exceeded 75% consensus in Aventura, Miami Lakes, Palmetto Bay, and Doral, with a consensus majority attained in Key Biscayne, Pinecrest, and Miami Gardens, more than two-thirds majority support in Sunny Isles Beach and a 60% majority in Cutler Bay.

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TABLE 4.1   Forming New Miami-Dade Cities by Incorporation & Charter Vote

Key Biscayne	11/06/1990	06/18/1991	8	11425	.637	.675	.445	.398
Aventura	04/11/1995	11/07/1995	7	28500	.850	.872	.424	.415
Destiny	09/19/1995	11/07/1995	2	35662	.426	.	.306	.
Pinecrest	09/19/1995	03/12/1996	6	19460	.656	.655	.464	.444
Sunny Isles Beach	01/08/1997	06/16/1997	5	16703	.718	.805	.392	.271
Miami Lakes	09/05/2000	12/10/2000	3	24741	.833	.940	.486	.150
Palmetto Bay	02/05/2002	09/10/2002	7	24795	.812	.832	.466	.540
Doral	01/28/2003	06/24/2003	5	105457	.852	.920	.284	.100
Miami Gardens	01/28/2003	05/13/2003	4	30331	.630	.690	.156	.070
Cutler Bay	01/11/2005	11/08/2005	10	37000	.595	.690	.299	.221
City of Miami*					.142	.	.229	.

City
incorporation vote
charter vote
duration of charter campaign
population size
vote support for incorporation
vote support for charter
voter turnout in incorporation election
voter turnout in charter election

*City of Miami
vote support for dis-incorporation
voter turnout in dis-incorporation election

TABLE 4.2   Descriptive Statistics on Incorporation Votes in Los Angeles County

N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation	*Skewness	*Kurtosis
141	.012	1.000	.62731	.01688	.20044	-.251	.263

number of incorporation and consolidation boundary decisions
minimum vote support for incorporation status
maximum vote support for incorporation status
average vote support for incorporation campaign
standard error of average vote support for incorporation campaign
average deviation in vote support for incorporation campaign
symmetry of the distribution of incorporation vote support
concentration of the distribution of incorporation vote support

TABLE 4.3   Descriptive Statistics on Miami-Dade Incorporation & Charter Votes

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation	*Skewness	*Kurtosis
SUPPORT0	10	.426	.852	.70086	.04388	.13874	-.632	-.013
SUPPORTC	9	.655	.940	.78668	.03718	.11153	.143	-1.878
TURN0	10	.156	.486	.37227	.03382	.10695	-.899	.101
TURNC	9	.070	.540	.28997	.05560	.16680	.069	-1.496
SUPPORT	20	.142	.940	.71154	.04133	.18483	-1.620	3.813
TURNOUT	20	.070	.540	.32807	.03112	.13916	-.398	-1.007
n	9							

support0 ≡ incorporation vote support
supportC ≡ charter vote support
turn0 ≡ voter turnout in incorporation election
turnC ≡ voter turnout in charter election
support ≡ vote support for incorporation and charter vote
turnout ≡ voter turnout for incorporation and charter vote
n ≡ number of new cities formed
minimum vote support and turnout for incorporation status
maximum vote support and turnout for incorporation status
average vote support for incorporation campaign
standard error of average vote support for incorporation campaign
average deviation in vote support and turnout for incorporation campaign
symmetry of the distribution of incorporation vote support and turnout
concentration of the distribution of incorporation vote support and turnout

*The skewness and kurtosis coefficients indicate the incorporation campaigns produced consensuses in both Los Angeles and Miami-Dade County's with a greater consensus in the Miami-Dade new cities' votes.

The charter vote decisions achieved greater vote support than the incorporation campaigns for an incorporation vote. Once approved, the incorporation campaigns shifted tactics and leadership to organize city charters for approval. In a few instances this required the election of a charter commission. Charter committees were appointed and then produced ballot initiatives in the durations of the incorporation campaigns listed in **TABLE 4.1**. In most cases, the charter vote returns indicate a greater consensus than the initial incorporation votes. Among the new cities, more than a 75% consensus was achieved on five, new city charters' for Aventura, Sunny Isles Beach, Miami Lakes, Palmetto Bay and Doral, with a 64% consensus majority equilibrium attained in all four of the other new cities, Key Biscayne, Pinecrest, Miami Gardens and Cutler Bay. As a result, the incorporation and charter vote returns indicate the incorporation campaigns formed a successful consensus for incorporation status over the duration of the individual municipals' campaigns *and* the sequence of boundary decisions comprising the movement toward municipal organization of unincorporated county territory (the UMSA).

There is some evidence of a decline in voter turnout during the sequence of incorporation and charter votes. This trend is *not* significant even though voter turnout equaled almost 40% or more for six of the first seven successful incorporation campaigns. Even so, there were county deliberations and public discussion of the fact that voters' turnout appeared to be indicating decreasing interest and support for incorporation. The County described the elections as either vote coordination by the municipals or vote suppression to reduce opposition and prevent organization of locals against incorporation campaigns. The evidence cited are the three voter turnout results below 30% in the last three of the nine successful incorporation campaigns, with one election near 15% turnout and another with less than 60% vote support for incorporation.

The findings in **TABLE 4.1** summarize some the important recent changes in incorporation and charter decisions for new cities. First, the cities are larger in population size than any town and city incorporations in the spatial histories of boundary decisions. Even in Los Angeles County, the 1979 rebellion in County territory produced relatively small cities with somewhat larger areas. These areas were generally considered growth areas so that incorporation status may be viewed as an effort to obtain municipal service district status with County contracts and planning, development, and even zoning to assist in the management of population growth and acceleration in population growth.

Secondly, new Miami-Dade cities were successful in 9 or 10 incorporation campaigns. The only defeat produced two additional campaigns, with changed boundaries that also resulted in the incorporation and charter vote for a new city. For these 10 incorporation votes, the duration of the incorporation campaign equals 57 months generating an average of 5.7 months of charter campaigning. Some of the new cities took longer, and there is agreement that the Cutler Bay incorporation involved a deceleration in the incorporation campaign.

Thirdly, the support for incorporation and charter votes indicate a consensus equilibrium with approximately 60% or more of the vote. The findings indicate support increased in sequential voting for charter adoption. In each new city election, the second incorporation vote, for charter adoption, increased over the first vote in incorporation to approve incorporation status. As a result, sequential voting produced a consensus equilibrium in two separate elections supporting both incorporation and charter decisions. The success of the individual incorporation votes generated consensus for city charters. The success of new cities increased momentum for additional new cities producing incorporation status for all nine areas.

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Forth, the voting turnout was lower in the charter versus incorporation election. In each of the nine successful incorporations of new cities, sequential voting produced a larger voter turnout in the first election on incorporation status. Once the locals lose the incorporation vote there is less interest in organizing opposition favoring unincorporated status since voting against a charter may not result in remaining unincorporated. The municipals may have less interest in the pursuit of a charter vote, once the incorporation campaign produces a successful incorporation vote. The emphasis in an incorporation campaign implies a consensus equilibrium by reducing the number of concerns about incorporation boundaries, voting rules and procedures, ongoing boundary changes that have been made for a potential incorporation, and any complexity in the explanation of either the provision of incorporation or the charter form of local government.

Lastly, some voters may expect the adoption of charter after a successful incorporation vote. The bivariate correlation between the incorporation and charter vote, for the nine new cities in Miami-Dade County, equals an $r = .942$ that is significant at the .05 level by linear correlation. By finding a 94.2% correlation between the incorporation and charter decision, rational expectations in sequential votes support a strong positive correlation between the adoption and implementation votes. The results demonstrate this conjecture is plausible so that there is less incentive for municipals to vote a second time and for those in opposition, the locals to vote against a charter decision. The bivariate correlation between voter turnouts in incorporation and charter elections equals an $r = .711$ that is lower than the correlation between vote support for sequential incorporation and charter decisions. The correlation between voter turnout in these two elections is significant at the .05 level.

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The results in **TABLES 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3** demonstrate successful incorporation campaigns produce a consensus equilibrium in both vote support and voter turnout. The average votes support for incorporation status equals 62.7% in the 141 votes available for Los Angeles County. The average vote support and a standard error equal to 1.7% indicate a consensus majority equilibrium favoring incorporation status throughout the spatial history of boundary decisions. The use of simultaneous versus sequential voting may explain some of the vote differences indicated by the 20.0% standard deviation for the Los Angeles vote on incorporation status in comparison to the new cities in Miami-Dade County generating 13.9% and 11.2% deviations by incorporation and charter vote. These findings reveal that sequential incorporation and charter may reduce some of the uncertainty for municipals pursuing incorporation status and consensus for any incorporation and charter vote by County allocated boundary decisions. The risk of losing the initial incorporation vote renders any simultaneous charter vote moot. Additionally, the failure of an incorporation campaign is sometimes a permanent failure. The permanent failures remain unincorporated and may only attain municipal service district status years later under County planning and development. The potential for annexation campaigns introduces the possibility of creating service islands and spheres of influence areas that may be too small and expensive to incorporate. In most of the unincorporated municipal service areas, municipal service districts and service islands exist by Los Angeles County territorial control, independent of any CDP's defined by Census information. In the absence of community council districts, the UMSA areas are generally represented by County Supervisor Districts. The five Supervisors' Districts are local jurisdictionally-induced equilibrium equal to a fragmentation number solution consisting of a large number of cities and the number of unincorporated municipal service areas.

Planning New Cities by Municipal Service District Organization

The findings on new cities suggest basic changes in the provisions from what was done before by successful incorporation campaigns, to planning and development of new cities. The results also suggest that an accumulation of both a large number and long sequence of boundary decisions produces a more complicated spatial history of boundary decisions. These decisions encompass annexation and boundary changes, mergers, incorporation, reincorporation, dis-incorporation, changes in incorporation status, consolidations, decreasing variation in the forms of local government, new voting rules and procedures and therefore a change in importance of municipals and locals in incorporation campaigns. The results imply a stronger involvement of County government in regulating the fragmentation of local government.

In the past, the use of charter and general law provisions generated episodic periods of incorporation campaigns. Inasmuch incorporation campaigns produced consensus for incorporation and charter votes. Given a large number of incorporation and charter decisions in 10 to 20 year durations, incorporation campaigns generated movements of support and mobilization for municipals to attain incorporation status. Any involvement by County planning and development was to design local jurisdictional boundaries by town section, townships and therefore, town, village or city incorporation. The adoption of County home rule provisions and County Charters introduced county government as a third participant with municipals and locals. The use of strategic planning and the adoption and implementation of County planning and development encouraged more direct involvement in annexation, incorporation and charter decisions. Even so, the Census Defined Places (CDP's) in County territory were already populated with larger and more developed areas than incorporation campaigns in the past.

In this setting, stronger county governments are becoming more directly involved in the planning and development of new cities. The new cities' incorporation campaigns represent existing CDP's in unincorporated County territory. These unincorporated places comprise larger population and areal sizes than even recently incorporated new cities. As a consequence, the spatial histories of boundary decisions are evolving toward both a more complicated form of fragmentation of local government organization and conflicts over County government providing municipal services. During previous incorporation campaigns the deliberations may have generated multiple attempts at incorporation status, with changes made in the timing of incorporation and charter votes, the form of government voted on and the local jurisdiction boundaries by town section and (survey) township. The incorporation decisions may not have been in the urban areas of County territory and the local boundaries may have been close in proximity to existing cities. The incorporation campaigns frequently organized in County territory that may have already had previous annexation or incorporation votes, and in some cities town incorporation and city charter votes under previous voting rules and procedures. Consolidation and dis-incorporation decisions were frequently used to change the incorporation status of local jurisdictions and therefore abolish and dissolve existing forms of local government organization. By City Plan, county government regulated town sectional and survey township incorporation of local boundaries in increasingly urban areas by county subdivision. By doing so, planning and development reduced the importance of central city annexation and boundary change by placing an emphasis of town sectional and survey township incorporation. These modern incorporation campaigns slowly increased the regulatory authority of County planning and development as the town sections and townships varied in distance from existing cities.

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As a result, planning and development has produced greater population size in unincorporated town sections and survey townships in County territory. These CDPs begin to resemble cities with lower tax rates and allocations of local public goods and services. In the absence of incorporated status, these CDP's are increasingly contained within urban areas and urban development boundaries. As a result, county governments are becoming involved planning and development for new cities, for these CDP's, that may already resemble or be considered municipal districts even though no towns or cities are defined as incorporated places in these areas of County territory. Any use of county subdivision by decentralization of county government may promote the allocation of municipal-type goods and services by either direct provision or contracting out. In this setting, county governments are providing municipal organization to urban areas that are already larger in area and population size than new cities created by incorporation campaigns.

The idea of an incorporation campaign qualifying for a vote with 25, 50, 100, or 500 to 2000 petition signatures describe less urbanized and unincorporated areas. The purpose for an incorporation is to organize for a town incorporation vote, and then attain incorporation status by a special act of the legislature to approve of the incorporation decision and provide for a town charter. As these settings are replaced by larger populations, the changes in the voting rules and procedures decentralize the incorporation and charter decisions for local boundary decisions to annexation and incorporation campaigns by municipals. Inasmuch some of the new cities described in this study exceed municipals versus locals incorporation campaigns because of the larger population sizes and Charter County authority to regulate voting rules and procedures by permitting local boundary changes by annexation, incorporation & charter votes.

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Any interactions between local boundary decisions and voting rules and procedures for incorporation status are oftentimes excluded from the analysis of annexation, incorporation, charter and provision decisions. As reported in **TABLE 5.1**, the sequence of boundary decisions interacts with changes in incorporation status and any voting rules and procedures used to determine annexation, incorporation and charter decisions. The elements of incorporation campaigns are frequently triggered by short-run changes in voting rules and procedures at the same time the longer durations in numbers and sequences of boundary decisions produce an ESS in forms of local division in government organization and fragmentation of local jurisdiction by county subdivision.

In Miami-Dade County, the spatial history of boundary decisions begins with the town incorporation of the City of Miami. The detachment of Miami Beach Township from the City of Miami and town incorporation votes in and south of the Perrine Land Grant produced the first four suburbs, all located some distance from the boundaries of the City of Miami. The incorporation of three smaller villages, on the boundary of the City of Miami, produced three new cities in the form of town incorporations that were designated as villages by town sections. Their proximity to the City of Miami generated the Greater Miami Plan for linear extension of the City of Miami into adjacent Dade County town sections. The annexation campaign by the municipals in the City of Miami was successful and this resulted in the merger of the village-towns of Coconut Grove, Silver Bluff and Buena Vista with the City of Miami. The annexation of unincorporated territory was also successful producing a larger central city in Greater Miami. The success of this annexation campaign generated interest in posterior city-county consolidation campaigns, from 1925-1932 and 1953-1957 with the adoption of the Dade County Charter.

The City of Miami 1925-1932 annexation campaign resulted in the merger of three cities to form a central city beyond the town plan enacted in 1856. In Los Angeles, the City annexation campaign merged 10 cities with the City of Los Angeles adding town sections, survey townships and the rectangular Ord Plan blocks to the central city. The linear extension of both central cities, with status quo town and city plans, produced a substantial expansion of municipal land area. The growth of these central cities was considered crucial for the establishment of Greater Miami and Greater Los Angeles Plans implying some potential for city-county consolidation by municipals annexation campaigns.

After the successful 1925 City's of Miami annexation campaign for the Greater Miami Plan, town incorporations proliferated by incorporation campaigns organized by real estate development corporations: Miami Land, Coral Gables, Shoreland, Biscayne, Curtiss-Bright Ranch, the Perrine Grant and the Fisher Estate. The 1932 City of Miami de-annexation triggered several incorporation campaigns that produced cities adjacent and within short-distances of the City of Miami through successful incorporation votes in the boundary changes de-annexed and therefore both detached and dis-incorporated from the City of Miami. The 1932 return of these areas to County territory produced incorporation campaigns in some of these areas, whereas other sections permanently remained unincorporated County territory. The fact that these were urban areas created permanent municipal service district areas within Dade County territory. The 1957 through 1961 period, produced strict regulation of County territory to block new cities in an attempt to implement the 1949 State legislation to prevent local government fragmentation into a large number of cities. The efforts targeted incorporation voting rules and procedures that used minimal petition signature requirements and allowed for town incorporation campaigns.

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In the spatial history, the 1932-1961 period generated successful incorporation and reincorporation campaigns. The emphasis on incorporation of town sections gradually eroded, and then became regulated against during the implementation of Dade County Charter authority from the 1957 adoption by the 1961 incorporation of the City of Islandia. The 1945-1961 Greater Island improvement project planned for coastal and inter-coastal development similar to Cape Hatteras in North Carolina, with County Parks, Docks and Beaches invested in SE Dade and the County town sections of Key Biscayne, Fisher Island, Star Island, Sunny Isles, combined with the City of Miami Causeway areas on the Venetian Islands and Virginia Key and the cities of Miami Beach, Indian Creek, Surfside, North Bay Village, Bal Harbour, Bay Harbour Islands and Golden Beach. After this 1955-1963 bonded improvement campaign failed in 1963, the County's position on incorporation and annexation campaigns was generally to oppose *any* local boundary changes. The status quo at the time of the adoption of the Dade County Charter remained in place from 1957-1991, in terms of the number of cities and their town, village, or city boundaries. The only exception was the dissolution of the town of Pennsuco, with a 1986 dis-incorporation decision by the remaining fewer than 25 voters and 50 residents.

The Pennsuco dis-incorporation decision ended the town incorporation and within five-years ended the moratorium on forming new cities. By 1991, the incorporation campaigns sought to incorporate whole survey townships, in town sectional developments that sometimes exceeded survey township boundaries to include urban area across more than two townships, in larger numbers of town sections than previous incorporation campaigns. The survey township sized incorporation campaigns contained larger populations, but these population sizes were still substantially smaller than the some of the CDP's of the 1990-2010 Censuses.

From 1957 to1991, population growth in Greater Miami-Dade County continued to erode the environment and the quality of life in unincorporated town sections. Incorporation campaigns for small cities, would only contribute to the increasing fragmentation of local government organization in areas that increasingly required municipal services and stronger county regulations. The traditional forms of town government, with minimal taxation and regulation implied that town section, town and village incorporation was an insufficient form of local government organization for urban areas in county territory.

Other solutions had been emulated from Los Angeles and San Diego counties, based on county subdivision into districts for local fiscal policy in Los Angeles and a San Diego County Manager's Plan for special tax and service districts. The use of single purpose districts had been used in Greater Miami-Dade County in the form of bonded improvement districts, with the Islandia Development Corporation the largest construction single plan to build coastal and inter-coastal infrastructures (inter-coastal highways, bridges, streets, residential, county parks and recreation, a seaport, a harbor for what became cruise ship docks, warehouse districts for shipping and transport and a utility grid for the Islands). Even during incorporations for new cities, unincorporated areas in Los Angeles make use of multiple fiscal, regulatory and bond improvement districts, with Miami-Dade County limited to public infrastructure districts for street and road improvements. As a consequence of urban areas in County territory, Miami-Dade County began to use Charter authority for planning and development to increase the number of alternatives to incorporations by municipals and locals. By dis-incorporation, these regulations changed the incorporation status of existing local jurisdictions, voting rules and procedures, sustained the local division, and rejected town sectional incorporation for township planning.

By planning and development of survey townships, this prevented incorporation campaigns by requiring larger areas and population sizes for either annexation to existing cities or incorporation of new cities. The contentious issues of proximity of new cities and municipal service provision to CDP's created spheres of influence deliberations among cities and between the cities and the county departments. For most of the 1961-1991 period the negotiations were between the cities, with bilateral negotiations between individual cities and the county departments. Because of the variation in cities, spheres of influence matters, and therefore unincorporated areas, existing cities generated issues concerning new cities as frequently or more often than Dade County government. Three organizational issues evolved toward decentralization, with the failure to incorporate county territory into a second-tier of cities, a county reorganization that tended to favor county subunits and the provision of location goods by area of unincorporated territory, and allocations of local public goods and services by municipal service districts.

As reported in **TABLE 5.1**, Miami-Dade County's response to town sectional annexation and incorporation campaigns was to study and then establish unincorporated municipal service districts by survey townships. County planning and development of municipal service districts provided analysis for municipal-type goods and services, and then later generalized to the delivery of location goods by decentralization of County Departments by "regions" of Miami-Dade County. By providing mini-city halls, libraries, and emergency services, the County intended to decentralize municipal-type services and allocate location goods in multiple, survey township sized, site locations. The location goods may be described as multiple special districts with site locations to coordinate provision by centralized County Departments.

From 1963-1990, the decentralization reforms targeted unincorporated areas by regions such as Northeast Dade, North Dade, Northwest, West Dade, South Dade and the Central Miami District. The Central Miami District had already been the subject of study in 1935 for the purposes of either city incorporation or annexation to the City of Miami. The planning and development Liberty Square by 1938 and subsequent successful City of Miami annexation campaign between 1935-1938 reduced the size of the Central Miami District. By doing so, the boundary decisions produced a district in several incorporated cities, the City of Miami, and areas that remained unincorporated County territory. These areas generated multiple town sectional incorporation campaigns that were successful in 1948 to 1951, but then led to immediate State legislation in 1949 to prevent local government fragmentation into a large number of small cities. The Central Miami District was one of the few county subdivision examples where the proliferation of incorporation campaigns appeared to be preventing successful annexation to existing and adjacent cities. Soon after town incorporation votes, the State set aside incorporation status during the 1950-1951 sessions, imposing dis-incorporation on seven cities with two additional dis-incorporations in 1986 and 2012.

After the 1961-1963 Islandia development was partially rejected, the County targeted the U. S. 1 corridor for municipal service allocations. The West Miami Service Area describes town sections surrounded by the City of West Miami and along the boundaries of the City of West Miami. In the transition from the Towns of West and South Miami, both cities incorporated and then dis-incorporated areas back to unincorporated status in County territory. The service areas in West Miami are no longer in a single county district: the analysis established the principle of County administered, municipal service districts for cities with irregular town section divisions.

The existence of town subsections, surrounded and located adjacent to an incorporated area is pervasive in both Miami-Dade County and Los Angeles County. The existence of these areas may be regulated as a sphere of influence and therefore provided municipal goods and services from the surrounding or adjacent municipality. These areas may be considered for annexation campaigns by these cities, so that a sphere of influence status may be the important decision for an annexation campaign. In other "service" areas, these unincorporated areas may contract for municipal-type services from the County government. These areas are generally described as urban areas with no potential for independent city status and therefore regulated to prevent incorporation campaigns in both Los Angeles and Miami-Dade counties. The combination of low population size, land area, and tax base all contributes to the County decisions to prevent incorporation and/or annexation campaigns in isolated or dis-contiguous service district areas.

Other services areas were established during the 1960's, including West Dade contiguous town sections and survey township areas described as Westchester. This increasingly suburban area was considered the largest, with potential for long-run growth and an acceleration in the rate of growth in the Tamiami corridor. In 1995, an incorporation campaign emerged with changed boundaries from the 1965 area that was prevented from holding an incorporation vote by the County Legislature. The County cited polls conducted that indicated a majority in opposition, with the interpretation that low voter turnout and the municipal incorporation campaign having a possibility of winning a low voter turnout election even though locals comprised a majority of the residents in the area. The principle used to reject an incorporation vote was that locals are an unorganized majority and municipals are capable of a successful incorporation campaign.

Four other areas were considered for the establishment of municipal service district areas. These four unincorporated areas are located in West Dade (Doral Park), U. S. 1 corridor (East Kendall), Central Miami District (Liberty City) and Northeast Dade (West Golden Glades). Among these four areas, only the town sections in Doral Park were successfully incorporated during the 1991-2005 incorporation campaigns for new cities. The other three areas each had failed incorporation campaigns, with the Central Miami District also involved in an annexation campaign with the City of Miami. This annexation campaign may have been the trigger for the failed dis-incorporation campaign and vote in the City of Miami. The dis-incorporation election was opposed throughout the City of Miami with the Coconut Grove, Village District Area precincts, the only exceptions to an average vote equal to 14.2% in favor of the City of Miami dis-incorporating. The city precincts averaged 22.9% voter turnout indicating low support for the dis-incorporation campaign.

At the same time, the defeat of Valley and Hollywood secessions from the City of Los Angeles reveals the importance of voting rules and procedures on what are considered county reorganization decisions. In California, the State Legislature approved voting rules and procedures to go forward with a dis-incorporation campaign from the City of Los Angeles. The County Boundary had responded to campaigns for independent city status for the San Fernando Valley (the Valley District), Hollywood (the East Hollywood District and Town of Hollywood), Wilmington and San Pedro (the Harbor District), Rancho San Vincenzo (West LA District, Towns of Barnes City and Sawtelle), and the former cities of Eagle Rock, Venice Beach and Ocean Park. Only the San Fernando Valley and Hollywood areas were permitted to vote on dis-incorporation generating a 50.8% majority in the Valley Vote and 31.5% support in Hollywood.

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In Los Angeles County, the vote of reorganization was similar to an annexation decision with two votes, in this case requiring a simultaneous vote by the areas voting on a change in incorporation status at the same time as the areas that would remain in the City of Los Angeles if the dis-incorporation campaigns were successful. The voting rules and procedures enacted by the State Legislature for this county reorganization vote permitted only two of six areas and the city district of Los Angeles to vote. Each area had to attain 55% majority support for their area to dis-incorporate from the City of Los Angeles. The Valley vote at 50.8% failed to attain the 55.0% majority required by the State County Reorganization Act.

The election involved simultaneous voting on dis-incorporation, a city charter and local officials (a Mayor and City Council). A successful dis-incorporation vote was described by the State legislation as a vote for de-annexation and detachment. The votes for a city charter and local officials imply a reincorporation vote and therefore an incorporation campaign for independent city status. The city of Los Angeles ballots did not include votes on either a city charter or candidates for what would have been new city positions. A relatively large number of candidates contested for new city positions even though not attaining a 55.0% majority on the dis-incorporation vote prevented adoption of new city charters and electing local officials. As a result, the Valley and Hollywood Vote on reorganization required changing both the Los Angeles City and County Charters, and this vote implied first de-annexation and detachment and then second, an incorporation, charter and vote for local officials. The first part of the vote implied a dis-incorporation decision that could only be permitted by State legislation and not by the City and County charter's being reorganized. The second part of the Valley and Hollywood vote was an incorporation campaign within the same boundaries having temporary unincorporated status.

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The City of Los Angeles also had to approve by 55.0% majority support for any dis-incorporation decision. The voting rules and procedures had to be enacted by State Legislation because the County Local Area Boundary Commission could not impose these voting rules and procedures on the City District of Los Angeles or any of the six areas campaigning for a Valley and Hollywood dis-incorporation vote. The other four areas remained under LAFCO review during the reorganization campaign and after the election was held. The dis-incorporation votes in the City of Los Angeles averaged between 25 and 20% voting support with some precincts averaging below 10% in favor. With simultaneous voting by the affected areas and the citywide district, voter turnouts generally averaged below 20% in a 5% to 25% range. Each of the other four areas had dis-incorporation plans and decisions. These four areas voted *only* on the incorporation status of the San Fernando Valley and Hollywood areas, and like the other City of Los Angeles precincts, they neither voted on forms of government for the Valley and Hollywood areas nor cast ballots for candidates for city positions. Because all six areas could potentially change the boundaries of the areas included, and the Valley Vote was close to attaining a majority, there was a remote possibility that another reorganization campaign would pursue approval through the LAFCO reorganization voting rules and procedures. The more likely possibility was for a campaign to change the voting rules and procedures, and therefore reduce the petition signature requirements, the 55.0% majority requirement and the combination of simultaneous voting by areas for incorporation, charter and local officials. Both the dis-incorporation and reorganization vote campaigns, in the cities of Miami and Los Angeles, ceased after the votes. Both cities, however, have some city decentralization and the City of Los Angeles had at least 128 neighborhood organizations at the time of the reorganization vote.

TABLE 5.1   Local Jurisdiction and Boundary Decisions in Miami-Dade County

Miami	1896	Medley	1949	
Florida City	1914	Pennsuco	1949	
Homestead	1915	Coral City	1950	
Miami Beach	1915	Goulds	1951	
Redland	1915	Miami-Dade Consolidation	1953	
Coconut Grove	1919	Home Rule Amendment	1956	
Silver Bluff	1921	Metro Dade Charter	1957	
Buena Vista	1925	Islandia	1961	
Miami Annexation	1925	West Miami Service Area	1963	
Coral Gables	1925	Westchester	1965-95	
Hialeah	1925	Doral Park	1968	
Ojus	1926	East Kendall	1968	
Opa Locka	1926	Liberty City	1968	
Country Club Estates	1926	West Golden Glades	1969	
South Miami	1926	Key Biscayne	1991	
Fulford-North Miami Beach	1926	Commission SMDs	1993	
Miami Springs	1926	Aventura	1995	
Golden Beach	1929	Destiny	1995	
Biscayne Park	1931	Pinecrest	1996	
Arch Creek-North Miami	1931	Strong Mayor	1996	
Miami Shores	1932	Sunny Isles	1996	1
Miami Deannexation	1932	Ojus	1996	2
Biltmore Village	1935	Destiny	1996	3
Surfside	1935	Carol City	1996	4
Central Miami District	1935	Country Club Lakes	1996	5
El Portal	1937	Miami Lakes	1996	6
Liberty Square annex	1938	Biscayne Gardens	1996	7
Indian Creek Village	1939	Central Miami	1996	8
Sweetwater	1941	Doral Park	1996	9
North Bay Village	1945	Westchester	1996	10
Bal Harbour	1946	West Kendall	1996	11
Flagler City	1946	East Kendall	1996	12
West Miami	1947	Palmetto Bay	1996	13
Bay Harbor Islands	1947	Redland	1996	14
Virginia Gardens	1947	Cutler Ridge	1996	15
Perrine	1948	Fisher Island	1996	16
Earlington Heights	1948	Sunny Isles Beach	1997	
Gladeview	1948	Miami Lakes	2000	
Northwest Miami	1948	Palmetto Bay	2002	
Westgate	1948	Doral	2003	
Hialeah Gardens	1948	Miami Gardens	2003	
		Cutler Bay	2005	

The City of Miami permits formal community districts with election of the Coconut Grove Village District Council. In 1993 and 1996, Dade County Charter Amendments reorganized the Metro County structure to vote for County Commissioners by districts, replacing a countywide vote with residency requirements. The 1993 Amendment substituted an At-Large, Place voting rules and procedures with Single Member Districts nominated and elected on nonpartisan ballots. The 1996 Amendment introduced a Strong Mayor's position, substituting a separate election for Mayor from what had been an at-large, position on the County Commission, countywide election with no residency requirement. The substitution of a Strong Mayor for the Weak Mayor structure appeared to change the leadership of Greater Miami- Dade County from the City of Miami's Mayor to a County Mayor's position. This produced a Charter Amendment campaign for a name change from Metro Dade County to Miami-Dade County. The successful amendment campaign interacted with the City of Miami dis-incorporation campaign indicating the timing of the campaigns implies the efforts meant to achieve city-county consolidation. In Miami-Dade County, the combination of an annexation campaign in the Central Miami District, the City of Miami dis-incorporation campaign, and the Metro Dade County charter amendment campaign all signaled a campaign for county reorganization and city-county consolidation, that had been voted on before in 1953. In comparison, the Los Angeles County reorganization implied municipal reorganization and the formation of independent cities that had existed prior to successful annexation campaigns by the City of Los Angeles. In both counties, the use of dis-incorporation decisions and campaigns for de-annexation and detachment of incorporated territory produced State legislation and County charter amendments and provisions for home rule status and authority for the purposes of reorganization.

County reorganization continued in Miami-Dade County with decentralization of Departments to provide location goods. The decentralization of County provision of goods and services explains the formation of regional county halls and the emphasis by County elected officials to implement district elections by reorganizations of the allocation of local public goods and services. The countywide election of County Mayor reorganized what had been a Weak Mayor structure with an appointive County Manager. The County Managers' system had been adopted and implemented by the 1957 Dade Charter to make improvements in Dade County public goods–infrastructure and Department direct provision of municipal-type service districts in both the unincorporated areas and to existing cities through contracting for services. The purpose for centralized County management was to implement the 1957 home rule Charter and reorganize Dade County into a Metro-County or metropolitan district.

As reported in **TABLE 5.1**, within seven-years, a failed county reorganization campaign voted on several Dade County Charter Amendments to overturn county charter status. After this failure, municipal service districts were studied for six unincorporated County areas as a substitute for incorporation campaigns in County territory. The municipal service districts were neither adopted nor implemented. The collapse of the Islandia project, by cost and environment regulation, the dis-incorporation of Pennsuco and the ongoing development of unincorporated urban areas generated the incorporation campaign described as LINC! In this setting, the LINC (Let's Incorporate Now Campaign) produced demands for new local jurisdictions and potential elections for county area incorporation and charter votes on new cities. The local boundaries for these areas were derived from the town sections, town incorporations and survey townships included in previous annexation and incorporation campaigns.

The LINC! campaigns sometimes used the information from Dade County plans for municipal service districts. Unfortunately, the 1960 data and the forecasted 1970 data did not provide accurate guidance for the 1990 population sizes in the unincorporated County areas. As a result, any local boundary decisions required use of the 1990 data that suggested forming municipal planning and zoning or service districts in areas like Key Biscayne. The County government began with a deliberation of County formation of municipal service districts that produced county bureaucratic reorganization, charter amendment campaigns and decentralization to provide location goods. The purpose of this reorganization was not to reorganize annexation and incorporation voting rules and procedures or encourage annexation and incorporation campaigns. Even so, these reorganization decisions produced municipals and therefore incorporation campaigns in some of the unincorporated municipal service district areas. The success of Charter Amendment implied adoption and implementation of county reorganization consistent with Single Member Districts and a Strong Mayor organization of county government. The response in the unincorporated areas ranged from opposition to stronger and more centralized county authority to incentives for incorporation the urban areas of Greater Miami-Dade County to provide municipal goods and services by forming city governments in these areas. The LINC campaign for incorporation and charter votes influenced county reorganization of sites for location goods and provision of municipal-type services to the unincorporated areas. As a consequence, the LINC campaign suggested the Lakewood Plan and Los Angeles and San Diego County planning and development of either new cities or municipal service districts. The organization adopted is an unincorporated municipal service area (an UMSA) that exists by either by single district contracts in County territory or multiple decentralized districts.

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Generally speaking, the deliberations involve county reorganization to provide unincorporated municipal service areas. The provision decisions involve both the site locations for county government and any allocation of public goods and services by municipal service districts. The numbers of districts and their boundaries generate issue salience for annexation and incorporation campaigns. Inasmuch any campaigning may produce county reorganization or new cities or both. The LINC campaign produced an across-the-board movement for annexation, incorporation and charter votes. The County response produced decentralized and elected community council districts by planning and development of UMSA areas. The intent of LINC was to provide municipal-type services to local areas defined by previous town incorporations, town section and survey townships areas. Unfortunately, the spatial histories of these local boundaries seldom coincide exactly with Census Defined Place (CDP) boundaries.

The results in **TABLE 5.2** describe local government reorganization of unincorporated county territory. The first three new cities were formed with three of the four incorporation campaigns successful. In response, the County formed municipal service district areas that held elections for community council districts. The districts varying in the area and population size, size of the district council and method of election in the council districts. Some of the sixteen community council district areas are feasible cities.

The failure of the 1995 Destiny incorporation vote generated change in the local boundaries and a LINC! Campaign for a larger, City of Encida. This campaign successfully incorporated the Destiny and Carol City, Community Council District Areas' 3 and 4 into the City of Miami Gardens. After a boundary change for a County Park, the successful incorporation of District 1 meant that ½ of the new cities were not organized by LINC!

The findings indicate six of the at least ten LINC! Areas remain unincorporated as

municipal service districts with elected community councils. Additional incorporation and

annexation campaigns occurred during the 1991-2005 period, so that some of these campaigns

may be considered resulting from the movement toward new cities even if these campaigns were

not affiliated with LINC. The findings reveal the largest contiguous areas in County territory

remain UMSA-community council district areas: the Central Miami District, Westchester, West

Kendall, East Kendall and the Redland. The West Kendall incorporation campaign divided into

planning and development of three villages by town section. The East Kendall Area generated

both a strategic plan for incorporation of a single city and a second incorporation campaign, in

the U. S. 1 corridor, to incorporate town sections described as The Falls to indicate a campaign

area distinct from the Cutler Ridge-South Bay campaign. The Redland area contained both

incorporation and annexation campaigns, by the cities of Homestead and Florida City. The

successful campaign for Pinecrest encouraged the incorporation movement in The Falls area and

resulted in two additional cities in the U. S. 1 corridor: Palmetto Bay and Cutler Bay.

Even though both incorporation and charter votes were held, the incorporation status

varies among the new cities with four charter cities and five cities incorporated by general law.

Some of the provision decisions changed during the incorporation campaign so that the decisions

and voting rules and procedures evolved from town incorporation, with simultaneous voting to

sequential voting on incorporation and charter decisions. What is most important is that planning

for new cities evolved from incorporation campaigns to community council districts and

unincorporated municipal service areas. The findings reveal 7/16 = 43.8% of the community

council districts attained incorporation status in an eight-year period, from 1997 to 2005.

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All of the community council districts, except the isolated and discontinuous service island areas in Community Council District 7 have held strategic planning sessions with Miami-Dade County. These planning sessions establish a Municipal Advisory Committee to produce a comprehensive study of municipal incorporation for the UMSA-community council district area. Community Council District 1 had conducted a feasibility study that was used for the incorporation campaign. The Sunny Isles Community Council District existed for such a brief period, before successful incorporation that no additional strategic planning process was initiated by the County to study incorporation. The County rejected the 1995 incorporation campaign boundaries, reducing the size of the new city by eliminating Causeway corridor developments and a County Park and Recreational Area. The attempts to retain any of the residential areas or add to town sectional-causeway areas were also rejected by Miami-Dade County. After doing so, the incorporation vote was then held, two years later, with a favorable vote for incorporation.

The Biscayne Shores Community Council includes one of the original LINC! Areas that were allocated a Municipal Advisory Committee by the County. The area of Biscayne Gardens is contained the (East/West) Golden Glades municipal service area (1969). This area originated in the town sections described as the Biscayne District, contained in the survey townships of the Shoreland Development Corporation. The Biscayne Gardens area is in the Golden Glades highway corridor north of the City of Biscayne Park. The Biscayne Gardens MAC completed the strategic plan for new cities, with the planning and development decision that incorporation is infeasible for the remnant Biscayne District town sections in the Biscayne Shores Community Council District. As a result, the remnant areas have considered annexation campaigns rather than attempting another incorporation campaign through strategic planning.

The number of Municipal Advisory Committees varies among the other Community Council Districts. This variation depends the number of UMSA town sections considering incorporation status. These areas contain some town sections where an annexation to existing cities may be more likely to succeed than an incorporation campaign for independent city status. The number of MACs is an indication of areas larger than what had been either town or town sectional incorporations under previous voting rules and procedures. The fact that the largest, near-township sized UMSA areas remain unincorporated implies these areas are more complicated to incorporate because the locals comprise an unorganized majority. Area size and local boundaries may explain some of the opposition to annexation and incorporation campaigns. The spatial history of boundary decisions suggests that the information from feasibility studies and the continuing increases in the size of the population, produce support for County provision of fiscal policies and bonded improvements. In these areas, there is a preference for County versus new city provision, and more generally, support for municipal service-community council districts instead of incorporation and annexation decisions. The results indicate these preferences' reveals the opinion new and existing cities cannot afford the costs nor make the investments required for township-sized cities, in the largest and contiguous UMSA areas. The question whether East Los Angeles and North-Central Miami-Dade, Westchester, East and West Kendall and the Redland may become cities' underestimates feasibility data already available and the fact that these areas may be too large and costly to form new cities. The MDC strategic planning and feasibility data may therefore reduce the next UMSA cities from township to town sectional areas. The efficient size of incorporation and therefore annexation campaigns may only succeed by town sectional planning such as the 1990-1999 planning for new King County cities.

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TABLE 5.2   Planning and Development of UMSA Districts in Miami-Dade County

Place	Entry	Community District #	MAC	LINC	FORM	# of MACs
Key Biscayne	1991		no	no	charter	0
Aventura	1995		no	no	charter	0
Pinecrest	1996		no	no	charter	0
Sunny Isles	1997	1	yes	no	charter	0
Ojus--Northeast Dade		2	yes	yes	UMSA	1
North Dade	2003	3	yes	yes	general law	1
North West	2003	4	yes	no	general law	1
Country Club Lakes		5	yes	yes	UMSA	1
Miami Lakes	2000	6	yes	no	general law	1
Biscayne Shores		7	no	yes	UMSA	0
North Central Dade		8	no	no	UMSA	1
Doral	2003	9	yes	yes	general law	1
Westchester		10	yes	no	UMSA	2
West Kendall		11	yes	yes	UMSA	1
East Kendall		12	yes	yes	UMSA	2
Palmetto Bay	2002	13	yes	yes	general law	1
Redland		14	yes	yes	UMSA	2
Cutler Ridge (South Bay)	2005	15	yes	yes	general law	3
Fisher Island		16	yes	no	UMSA	1

TABLE 5.3   Miami-Dade County, Municipal Advisory Committees, 1995-2005

Westchester	1995		UMSA
Sunny Isles	1996		Sunny Isle Beach
Northeast Dade	1996		UMSA
North Dade	1996		Miami Gardens
North West	1996		Miami Gardens
Country Club Lakes	1996		UMSA
Miami Lakes	1996		Miami Lakes
Biscayne Shores District	1996		UMSA
North Central Dade	1996		UMSA
Doral	1996		Doral
Westchester	1996		UMSA
West Kendall	1996		UMSA
East Kendall	1996		UMSA
Palmetto Bay	1996		Palmetto Bay
Redland	1996		UMSA
Cutler Ridge-South Bay	1996		Cutler Bay
Fisher Island	1996		UMSA
Redland Edge			UMSA
PLANT City			UMSA
Goulds			UMSA
Fontainbleau (Bleau MAC)	09/02/2002	11/21/2003	UMSA
North East Dade	05/21/2003	09/01/2004	UMSA
Biscayne Gardens	05/2004	10/26/2006	UMSA
Fisher Island	08/19/2004	11/16/2005	UMSA
The Falls	05/25/2004		UMSA
North Central	2005		UMSA

By 2005, all of the Municipal Advisory Committees completed a strategic plan. The strategic plan produces a feasibility of municipal incorporation study for each UMSA area pursuing either incorporation as a new city or annexation to existing cities. The strategic planning sessions are charettes held by the County to organize the incorporation campaign for city-hood. The planning for new cities consists of establishing local boundaries first, then conducting a comprehensive feasibility study that summarizes County data within the MAC area considering incorporation status. The feasibility study describes the estimated tax rate and revenues, budgets and service provision for the MAC area. The data may be the same as the total community council district area and this information may also describe the existing UMSA provision levels at the time of the strategic planning for a new city. The tax rates, budgets, and likely expenditures demonstrate increases in the cost of local government that result from incorporating the boundaries established by a strategic plan. The strategic plan provides an accurate estimate of what are costs of a new city and therefore the feasibility of city incorporation. What the findings' reveal is that even with fiscal commitments, the UMSA areas are too costly to incorporate for either the residents in the UMSA area or the municipal provision of public goods and services. In the absence of County subsidies, the remaining $9/16 = 56.3\%$ of community council districts are unlikely to engage in strategic planning by changing boundaries of plans for a new city. The County has tended to provide analysis for existing cities annexation plans that include strategic planning to reduce fragmentation by UMSA areas and Community Council Districts. These annexation campaigns are ongoing in several areas of Miami-Dade County. In several community council districts there are multiple offers for consolidation, between existing and some of the new cities for the annexation of unincorporated town sections.

Miami-Dade County describes the duration the Municipal Advisory Committees (MACs) with a sunset period, from initiation to completion. The timing describes the schedule for strategic planning, including holding charettes to gather and present information to the Municipal Advisory Committee. The members of the committees are usually not elected community council district members. In some instances, members of the LINC! Incorporation movement served as members. These members were not in a majority of most of the Municipal Advisory Committee (MAC) areas being considered for incorporation status.

There were exceptions, such as Doral, Fontainbleau (Bleau MAC) and Country Club Estates. In Doral, the strategic planning sessions were conducted, the feasibility study suggested a reduced area, with changed boundaries from the initial Doral Park town sections and those suggested by LINC! for the MAC area. A successful incorporation campaign ensued with several successful annexation campaigns conducted through County strategic planning and feasibility studies. The Country Club Estates MAC completed the strategic plan and then voted to not recommend incorporation based on the information in the feasibility study. The MAC area was determined to be too small, too isolated, and better served by County-UMSA status. The use of the strategic plan provided the information for this decision to not incorporate and therefore pursue an incorporation campaign until other town sections were either annexed or incorporated in Northwest Dade County. The incorporation of Miami Lakes produced some renewed interest in incorporation, but the authorization period for the Municipal Advisory Committee had expired. Similarly, the Fontainbleau MAC area had origins in the Flagler City town incorporation, was part of the LINC! Campaign and continued to renew the Municipal Advisory Committee.

The strategic plan was completed for the Bleau MAC area, but the period for incorporation campaigns was also completed. The timing for any incorporation campaigns was influenced by temporary moratoriums on incorporation enacted by the County Commission. The Commission initiated these moratoriums to regulate the incorporation movement and to prevent what the State described in 1949 as an over-fragmentation of local government organization. The 1949 Legislation generated the 1956 State Constitutional amendment for County home rule. The County Commission decisions made to regulate the number of cities determined the incorporation and annexation campaigns, changes in voting rules and procedures and any changes in local boundaries necessitated multiple attempts at both incorporation and annexation. The County Commission changes in the annexation and incorporation policies were made under the 1957 Dade County Charter authority. The changes to these policies evolved during the 1995 to 2005, ten-year period of municipals and locals incorporation campaigns.

Even though the LINC! organization pursued incorporation in specific areas, reported in **TABLE 5.2**, there were municipals campaigning independently for incorporation and annexation in other areas of unincorporated County territory. After 1996, the community council district elections provided a mechanism for organizing where the incorporation campaigns existed and would continue to pursue incorporation status. The County then authorized MACs in these areas of county subdivision units, by community council districts. The strategic plans were drafted for the purposes of determining the feasibility, in cost and efficiency terms, for decentralization and forming a second-tier city in the MAC areas. In this environment, boundaries of the MAC areas could be adjusted, service areas could be changed, and the budget and tax data could be reported to those pursuing incorporation.

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The Community Council Districts were provided some of the regulatory information, and these Councils became somewhat involved in zoning decisions. Because these policy decisions prompted all of the UMSA areas, including Key Biscayne, to pursue both incorporation and annexation, the use of elected Community Council Districts provided for greater decentralization than the regional department resolutions of policy decisions. The County attempted two forms of decentralization by establishing regional county halls, with county services provided by UMSA areas, and the elected county officials enacted a policy of County Department decentralization to a maximum feasible amount to provide location goods. In the situations where the County already maintained offices and provided location goods, such as County Parks and Recreation, these public goods and services were not centralized to the regional county halls. This decentralization policy changed the organization of County government, from the County Management, toward the County Commission elected by single member districts, and the County Mayor elected countywide.

The regional county halls provided for less decentralization than the Community Council Districts. As the Community County Districts accrued more influence as municipal service districts (UMSAs), this timing produced completed MAC strategic plans and new annexation campaigns to existing cities. In the Bleau MAC area, the appeals were made to continue the authority to pursue incorporation even though multiple changes in boundaries had already occurred and this would have been likely required for the Municipal Advisory Committee to continue. During the eight-year incorporation campaign, from 1995 to 2003, the existing cities in the area pursued annexation campaigns so that the timing of the County-MAC strategic planning ended at the point in time when annexation campaigns surged throughout County territory.

Several successful annexation campaigns were conducted through strategic planning, from 2001 onwards. Others began during this period of incorporation campaign decline until the 2006 completion of the MACs. As reported in **TABLE 5.3**, this timing of MAC incorporation plans for new cities ends in 2006 with the remnant areas of the LINC! movement. The timing of this period ranges from 2003 to 2006, from the Fontainbleau to Biscayne Gardens strategic plans. Among the remaining areas, there were six areas in the U. S. 1 corridor: 1) a Lakes by the Bay CDP, 2) PLANT City MAC (consisting of former railroad town incorporations: Princeton, Leisure City & Naranja), 3) The Falls (a regional mall development and area distinct from East Kendall-Dadeland Mall), 4) Goulds MAC (with similar boundaries to the 1950-51 town incorporation), 5) Redland Edge MAC (formed to consider annexation to Homestead and Florida City), and 6) the Redland MAC District that reduced the areas of the previous town sections and survey townships included in 1915-1919 town incorporation. The deliberations considering the six U.S. 1 corridor areas and those involving Club Fontainbleau, Northeast Dade-Biscayne Shores service islands, Fisher Island and Biscayne Gardens continued the LINC! incorporation campaign that was increasingly transformed into an annexation campaign determined by County strategic plans and feasibility studies. This campaign continues with successful annexations and strategic plans by existing cities for annexation by Sweetwater and Doral (near the Fontainbleau MAC area), Florida City and Homestead (Redland Edge MAC area), Miami Shores, El Portal, North Miami (Northeast U. S. 1 corridor, Biscayne Shores Community County District), North Miami Beach (service islands and Biscayne Gardens) and town sectional areas adjacent to the cities of Hialeah Gardens, Medley, Hialeah, Miami Springs, Opa-Locka, Virginia Gardens, Miami Gardens, Miami Lakes, and Miami Beach (Fisher Island District, Star Island).

In these subdivisions of County territory, the areas prefer County provision, multiple UMSA areas, municipal service districts, elected community council districts, maintaining service islands and when given a choice, there may be approximate indifference between incorporation as a new city versus annexation to an existing city. The areas remaining unincorporated bifurcate into areas too costly to either incorporate or annex, too large or too small to incorporate and generally better served by county service islands than municipal provision.

By decentralization in 1996, Miami-Dade County established municipal service districts with elected community councils. The community council districts have produced new cities by a consolidation of two community council districts, incorporations of the community whole district, single and multiple municipal advisory committees in community council subareas, and multiple attempts at incorporation status. All sixteen municipal service district areas have been studied for incorporation and annexation by strategic plans. Among these community council districts, nine areas or 56.2 exist as unincorporated municipal service areas.

A summary of the incorporation decisions is described in **TABLE 5.4**. The basic result indicates varying support for town sectional and survey township incorporation status in the UMSA–community council district areas. The findings imply varying use of municipal advisory committees and therefore strategic plans and multiple feasibility studies of incorporation of new cities and annexation to existing cites. By 2000, there were 147 unincorporated municipal service areas in Los Angeles County that may be classified as failed incorporation campaign areas and isolated and discontinuous service islands in County territory. The UMSA-community council districts established by Miami-Dade County are much less fragmented areas.

TABLE 5.4   Incorporation Decisions and Status by Community Council Districts

- 1   Sunny Isles, MAC(1) formed city, Sunny Isles Beach
- 2   Ojus-Northeast Dade & North Miami Beach Areas, MAC(1), UMSA
- 3   North Dade, MAC(1), Destiny, Bunche Park CDP, Encida, formed city of Miami Gardens
- 4   North West Dade, MAC(1), Carol City, formed city Miami Gardens
- 5   Country Club Lakes, MAC(1) rejected incorporation, UMSA
- 6   Miami Lakes, MAC(1) formed city, Miami Lakes
- 7   Biscayne Shores District (Turnberry, Belmar), MAC(1) Biscayne Gardens, UMSA
- 8   North Central Dade, MAC(1), UMSA
- 9   Doral Park, MAC(1), formed city, Doral
- 10   Westchester, MAC(2), Club Fontainbleau, UMSA
- 11   West Kendall, MAC(1), UMSA
- 12   East Kendall, MAC(2), The Falls, UMSA
- 13   Palmetto Bay, MAC(1), formed city, Palmetto Bay
- 14   Redland, MAC(2), Redland & Redland Edge, UMSA
- 15   South Bay, MAC(3), Cutler Ridge, PLANT City, Goulds, formed city, Cutler Bay
- 16   Fisher Island, MAC(1), UMSA

The importance of the numbers of unincorporated municipal service areas and community council districts describe an increasing fragmentation in local government organization. This increasing fragmentation is both complicated by the numbers of public goods and services and any location goods provided by county government. The increasing organization of county subdivision units implies planning and development for county territory that may remain unincorporated as municipal service islands. In King and Miami-Dade counties there is some use of the UMSA as a single entity described as a County-City for the whole unincorporated area. The description of the UMSA as a single entity was rejected in Miami-Dade County, but the use of planning and development in King County suggests that any new cities, annexations, municipal-type services or municipal service districts may require strategic plans, with multiple attempts at boundary formation and feasibility studies before ballot initiatives on annexation and incorporation decisions. In Miami-Dade County, Honolulu City-County, and Los Angeles County, the UMSA is defined by multiple service islands, increasing in fragmentation numbers, with varying functional responsibilities for municipal service district areas. In Miami-Dade County, the community council districts were appointed positions and then changed to elective positions to regulate the differential rate of incorporation success and the annexation campaigns by existing cities. Moratoriums were imposed and studies were conducted to revise incorporation and annexation voting rules and procedures. Electing the sixteen community council districts were suggested and then adopted during this 1995-2005 period. In the consolidated city-county of Honolulu, there are thirty-six elected community council districts equated to municipal service districts. As reported in **TABLE 5.5**, the municipal service district areas are considered town and city incorporations.

TABLE 5.5   Honolulu City and County: Town and City Community Council Districts

Hawaii Kai	1	4	4	No division
Kuliouou-Kalani	2	4	4	No division
Waialae-Kahala	3	4	4	No division
Kaimuki	4	4	4	No division
Diamond Head-Kapahulu	5	4, 5	.	Division
Palolo	6	5	5	No division
Manoa	7	5	5	No division
McCully-Moiliili	8	5	5	No division
Waikiki	9	4	4	No division
Makiki-Tantalus	10	6	6	No division
Ala Moana-Kakaako	11	5	5	No division
Nuuanu-Punchbowl	12	6	6	No division
Downtown	13	6	6	No division
Liliha-Kapalama	14	6, 7	.	Division
Kalihi-Palama	15	7	7	No division
Kalihi Valley	16	6	6	No division
	17		.	.
Aliamanu-Salt Lake	18	7	7	No division
	19		.	.
Aiea	20	8	8	No division
Pearl City	21	8	8	No division
Waipahu	22	9	9	No division
Ewa	23	1	1	No division
Waianae Coast	24	1	1	No division
Mililani-Waipio	25	8, 9	.	Division
Wahiawa	26	2	2	No division
North Shore (Haleiwa-Waialua)	27	2	2	No Division
Koolaualoa	28	1, 2	.	Division
Kahaluu	29	2	2	No division
Kaneohe	30	3	3	No division
Kailua	31	3	3	No division
Waimanolo	32	3	3	No division
	33		.	.
Makakilo-Kapolei	34	1	1	No division
Mililani Mauka-Launani Valley	35	2	2	No division
Nanakuli-Maili	36	1	1	No division

Name of the Community Council District Area.
Community council district number.
Honolulu City Council District number(s)
Community Council District in either a single or multiple, Honolulu City Council District(s).

Among the community council district areas, there have been several reorganizations and almost all of the areas have a mini-village, town, or city halls that are decentralized from the consolidated city-county. The community council district elections are nonpartisan and separable by year and ballot from the city council and Mayoral elections for the island of Oahu. For both the community council districts in Honolulu and Miami-Dade County, the turnover rates on the community councils are greater than elections by city district, by a council or commission plan. As a result, members are frequently appointed to serve out terms as turnover occurs on community councils. Issues concerning a quorum and numbers of meetings held are therefore relevant to the description of community councils and any salience of elections and appointment to seats and positions for these community council district areas. In Miami-Dade County, the voting rules and procedures vary for the size of the community council and the method of election by an at-large district, single member districts, or mixed representation plan that guarantees seats on the community councils. Additionally, these community council districts vary by County in population size and area. In Honolulu, the community council districts vary in functional responsibilities, with some limited authority for maintaining the community centers, providing services as a mini-consolidated city-county hall, and discussion of planning, zoning, and development within the community council district areas. In Oahu, several of the community councils had town sections organized as bonded-capital improvement districts. Because of the range of planning and development projects, these improvement districts may be considered either single purpose districts or municipal service districts. None of the improvement districts were incorporated as cities and some of the community council districts are contained in what was municipal territory in the City of Honolulu.

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The municipal incorporation of the City of Honolulu occurred after the formation of the Territorial Legislature in 1900. Multiple attempts were made to incorporate a rectangular area known as Honolulu with an organic act enacted in 1903. The Honolulu City Council consisted of five wards and then was expanded to nine districts by the 1907 city-county consolidation decision. By 1900, the City of Honolulu had police, fire and water districts. Some of these special purpose districts extended the City boundaries into a larger area to the north and east of the downtown area town sections of Oahu. In 1910, the Legislature enacted an organic act for Island consolidation of the City and County of Honolulu (Oahu and NW Islands), Hawaii County (the Big Island), Maui County (Maui, Moloka'i, Lana'i, Kolo'olowe), and Kauai County (Kauai and Ni'hau). This county reorganization act created strong county governments to generally prevent local government fragmentation into cities.

Planning and development produced the formation of improvement districts. The improvement districts enacted boundaries and site locations generally outside of the municipal areas in the five-ward, 1898-1908 City of Honolulu. More recently, Honolulu has suggested in the Budget the use of planning districts for the purpose of economic development:

> The team reviewed Oahu looking for areas primed for economic revitalization–areas that have the greatest potential to achieve a maximum return on the City's investment in the shortest period of time. The resulting Targeted Economic Development Plan has as its initial area of focus: Chinatown (section downtown District 13) Culture and Arts District; Kalihi (Districts 16,17); Kaimuki (4); Moiliili (8); Kapolei (34); and the North Shore (27). With the plan as a guide, the City of Honolulu will work with these communities, using a format of *economic summits* toward implementation of proposed actions.

The economic summits describe charettes for the presentation and gathering of information through a strategic planning–calender schedule for timing adoption of a plan. These areas comprise planning and development districts most closely describing cities in Oahu.

In addition to the thirty-three active and consolidated community council districts, the City of Honolulu maintains ten Satellite City Halls. These decentralized City Halls are located in Fort Street Mall, Hawaii Kai, Kailua, Kapolei, Wahiawa, Waianae and Windward City. Two additional City Halls are located in the Ala Moana and Pearlridge shopping malls. Because of the accessibility by public mass transportation, these City Halls are more decentralized than the regional city halls established in Miami-Dade County that are within driving distance.

Because of the large number of unincorporated municipal service district areas, neither regional/satellite city halls nor community council districts have been provided to any of the numerous service islands in Los Angeles County territory. In the municipal service district areas that have had failed incorporation campaigns, the potential exists for incorporation and annexation votes. It is likely that in most of UMSA, a strategic plan for the municipal service district area would produce the decision to remain unincorporated because of the costs and efficiency of additional fragmentation. The fact that there is already too many, small cities explain the scale and scope of contracting between the cities and the County of Los Angeles. The possibility is that these service islands are too expensive for incorporation status, by either municipal incorporation as a new city or annexation to an existing city. In the absence of LAFCO feasibility study, the potential for incorporation and annexation campaigns seems unlikely in the future as methods for providing county reorganization and city districts. The expense of municipal provision is therefore an entry barrier for new cities and a sunk cost to explain by any incorporation campaign or UMSA movement for incorporation status. LAFCO regulation and permits also limit incorporation, annexation and other boundary decisions by feasibility studies that are used to determine costs and efficiency of incorporation status.

TABLE 5.6   THE LAFCO AGENDA: COUNTY REORGANIZATION

AREA	TYPE OF DECISION	DECISION REPORTED
Hollywood	Incorporation	Proposed (Defeated)
San Fernando Valley	Incorporation	Proposed (Defeated)
Harbor City	Incorporation	Rejected
Eagle Rock	Incorporation	no study conducted
West Los Angeles (Rancho San Vincente, Venice-Ocean Park, Barnes City, Sawtelle)	Incorporation	no studies conducted
Hacienda Heights	Incorporation	Proposed (Defeated)

TABLE 5.7   Local Government Organization and Fragmentation in Greater Los Angeles

COUNTY	NUMBER OF AREAS	TYPE OF JURISDICTION
Los Angeles	88	Cities
Los Angeles	47	Unincorporated CDP's
City of Los Angeles	35	Planning areas in Los Angeles
Orange	33	Cities
San Bernadino	24	Cities
Riverside	24	Cities
Ventura	10	Cities
Total	179	Number of Municipalities

The Valley Vote campaign demonstrates the failure of county reorganization in the form of de-annexation and detachment of territory. The San Fernando Valley City campaign targeted the fact that the Valley is a whole, complete area, geographically dis-contiguous with the Los Angeles basin areas. The San Fernando Valley City would have contained more than one million in population with independent incorporation status. The complications involved having a dis-incorporation vote that implied de-annexation and detachment from the City of Los Angeles *and* simultaneous incorporation of a Valley City District. The campaign failures in the other areas are summarized in **TABLE 5.6** by the Los Angeles County (LAFCO) strategic plans and decisions to conduct feasibility plans. Given an incorporation campaign and movement that were citywide, the County decided not to allow all the areas pursuing reorganization access to the ballot initiative for the boundaries approved. In the two cases where boundary decisions favored the incorporation campaign, the County waited until the State Legislature enacted voting rules and procedures for the Vote! The petition signature and 55% majority requirements indicate the State and County deliberations over the costs and efficiency of forming eight new cities by detaching territory from the City of Los Angeles. The LAFCO strategic planning for county reorganization was completed, rejecting one area and accepting two boundaries for an incorporation vote.

The issue of local government fragmentation is measurable by municipal organization in the number of cities. Even so, this measure eliminates the complications in provision decisions, in allocations and numbers of local public goods and services and any location goods provided. In the county reorganization case, the addition of from three to eight cities would seemingly not have made much of the difference in the number of existing cities in Los Angeles County (88) or the Greater Los Angeles five county area, with 179 cities reported in **TABLE 5.7**.

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The opposition was not generally because of the potential for increases in local government fragmentation. The votes in the City of Los Angeles indicate locals were in a large consensus majority with preferences for the City of Los Angeles over any new city being formed. In the course of the strategic planning, by LAFCO and Miami-Dade County, it is clear that the feasibility studies reveal which areas are surplus or deficit areas in terms of costs and tax base available to provide public goods and services. The San Fernando Valley generates a fiscal surplus for the City of Los Angeles. In Miami-Dade County, the Westchester, East and West Kendall areas generate a fiscal surplus for the County. These compare with the deficit areas in East Los Angeles, the Central Miami District and other service islands in Los Angeles and Miami-Dade County. The areas with a fiscal surplus always have an incentive to pursue incorporation and annexation. The fiscal deficit areas are also potentially supportive of municipal organization to replace unincorporated status. Both surplus and deficit areas' incorporation campaigns must convince voters about the likely costs and efficiency of cityhood.

The incentives to pursue incorporation and annexation votes may be determined by the costs and efficiency, scale arguments for municipal organization and provision of local public goods and services. The adoption and implementation of decentralization, specifically by charter county governments, with home rule status, reduces the cost and efficiency argument for municipal organization. The introduction of public sector, county level, strategic plans and feasibility studies implies a scale argument for county governments to provide municipal-type services by municipal service & community councils districts in areas too expensive to incorporate. Even so, the use of County strategic plans and determination by feasibility study substitute for incorporation and annexation campaigns by regulating boundary decisions.

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TABLE 5.8   Correlation Analysis of Vote Support, Incorporation Success, Sequence and Type of Incorporation Decisions in Los Angeles County

		SUPPORT	SUCCESS	SEQUENCE	TYPE
SUPPORT	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.726	-.169	.622
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.047	.000
	N	138	138	138	138
SUCCESS	Pearson Correlation	.726**	1.000	-.387	.873
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000
	N	138	177	177	176
SEQUENCE	Pearson Correlation	-.169*	-.387**	1.000	-.349
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.047	.000	.	.000
	N	138	177	178	176
TYPE	Pearson Correlation	.622**	.873**	-.349**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.
	N	138	176	176	176

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Type of Incorporation Decision: Incorporation, Consolidation, or Remain Unincorporated.

TABLE 6.0   Cities, Townships and Municipal Service Districts

Township organization and fragmentation in Los Angeles County

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1860	10	2.2	2.2
1900	20	4.3	6.5
1911	120	26.0	32.5
1920	34	7.4	39.9
1930	38	8.2	48.2
2000	239	51.8	100.0
Total	461	100.0	

Local government organization in Los Angeles County (1900-2000)

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
township	226	49.0	49.0
city	88	19.1	68.1
county	147	31.9	100.0
Total	461	100.0	

Townships: 1900, 1911, 1920, 1930.
City: number of cities = 88.
County: unincorporated municipal services areas, 2000.

The importance of an incorporation vote is analyzed in **TABLE 5.8** by the correlation analysis of vote support for incorporation status, the success or failure of the incorporation campaigns, the sequence of the boundary incorporation and merger-consolidation decisions and type of boundary decision. The findings indicate a strong positive 72.6% correlation between differential rates of incorporation success and vote support that is significant at the 01 level. The findings reveal the type of boundary decision were strongly and positively correlated at the .01 levels with incorporation vote support and rates of success. The results imply incorporation votes held marginally greater vote support and rates of campaign success in comparison to the merger-consolidation decisions and the failures consisting of decisions to remain unincorporated.

The findings also indicate decreasing support for incorporation campaigns, with the sequence of decisions strongly negatively correlated with differential success rates, vote support and the type of boundary decision. The findings suggest the longer the duration of the sequence of boundary decisions the less support for an incorporation movement and the fewer the number of successful incorporation campaigns. The results demonstrate how much the spatial history of boundary decisions correlate with incorporation movements, campaigns and votes. These results suggest the sequence of boundary decisions determines the fragmentation of local government, such that as the number of cities increases, the number of potential new cities decreases during the sequence of incorporation and charter decisions. As the number of local jurisdictions converges to a fragmentation solution, the number of new cities added decreases and therefore the incorporation vote and campaign success rates decline during the complete sequence of boundary decisions and not only for an incorporation campaign or movement period.

As reported in **TABLE 6.0**, the use of municipal service districts in UMSA-community council districts adds to the fragmentation of local government organization beyond fragmentation solutions in numbers of cites formed. The findings in **TABLE 6.0** describe a seventy-year sequence of township organization of Los Angeles County. These boundary decisions produced county subdivision in unincorporated town sections and survey townships. This subdivision of Los Angeles County produced a sequence of 10, 20, 34 and 38 limited townships during this period of County organization. The townships formed consisted of areas that are best described as town sections and town subsections. Few of the townships organized covered a complete survey township area. These townships are similar to fractions of townships that incorporate as towns, villages, small cities, and townships and cities in other states. In the 1911 local division, Los Angeles precincts were named and allocated as county subdivision units and this generated one hundred and twenty township-precincts. By the time of the 2000 data, the fragmentation number solution equals 88 cities plus 147 municipal service districts equal to 235 municipals and unincorporated municipal service areas. These results strongly indicate the importance of voting rules & procedures, by simultaneous voting on incorporation & charter decisions.

Local Government Organization and Fragmentation Number Solutions

This study analyzes the spatial history of boundary decisions by form of local government organization and therefore fragmentation number solutions. The boundary decisions determine county subdivision units and local division by numbers of local jurisdictions. As the number and sequence of boundary decisions increases, there are convergent patterns in evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in differential timing games (for incorporation status), varying games of pursuit (in annexation, incorporation and charter campaigns) and location games in differential shares (derived from reorganization, incorporation, annexation, consolidation, merger, dis-incorporation, de-annexation and detachment decisions). As a result, any long duration sequence in boundary changes implies an increasingly large number of boundary decisions that are generally uncountable and larger than the number of cities, number of incorporation decisions, number of major and minor civil districts, and therefore the number of local jurisdictions. As the duration of local boundary decisions increase, the number and sequence of boundary decisions increase the number of competitors by area and population size. Some of these increases in urban areas, unincorporated county areas, and CDP's are converging toward becoming too expensive and inefficient to incorporate by vote, even with incorporation and annexation campaigns and information provided by the adoption of strategic plans and feasibility studies. With the continuing momentum and population growth of CDP's and other unincorporated county areas, the planning and development of new cities require a balance among forms of local government organization, provision decisions, reorganization of voting rules and procedures, and strategic plans and feasibility study for determining boundary decision campaigns and votes on incorporation status.

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As these results suggest, the modern incorporation and annexation campaigns produce substantial changes in town sectional & survey township incorporation. The regulation and permitting of boundary decisions involve State legislation, County authority and local boundary decisions through new city incorporations and existing city annexations. Local boundary decisions frequently involve multiple attempts by design of local jurisdictional boundaries. The multiple attempts may be generated by reorganization, consolidation, incorporation, charter, annexation, merger and boundary change decisions, strategic plans and feasibility studies. The boundary function may be established at the State level by legislation or a State Boundary Commission, or at the County level by Local Area Formation Commissions (LAFCOs). For any State territory, a well-defined boundary function is a totally complete local division by county subdivision units.

Local jurisdictional boundary decisions produce changes in the number and forms of local government organization and therefore any fragmentation number solution. The importance of provision decisions implies reorganization of the functional form and charter responsibility for the number of local public good dimensions and the number of site location goods. In this setting, reorganization involves centralized management and decentralization by site location and administration. By strategic planning and development of new cities, the costs and efficiency of new cities are known during incorporation and annexation campaigns and therefore residents and management may prefer decentralization to county subdivision units instead of incorporation status by either new or existing cities. The provision decisions generate a fiscal policy equilibrium, potential bond improvement district areas and regulation of planning, zoning and development.

Generally speaking, incorporation and annexation campaigns may be failing as a mechanism to attain incorporation status in the absence of strategic plans and feasibility studies. As a result, locals may exceed the number of municipals equaling from simple majority to consensus in opposition to incorporation, annexation and any boundary changes. This may be happening because voters prefer decentralization to either incorporation or an annexation campaign. Some voters oppose the increases in cost of provision and higher tax rates imposed by new city incorporation. Other voters oppose the boundaries adopted and believe the areas are too expensive for incorporation status. As suggested, the voters oppose boundary decisions that are too costly and inefficient for either new city incorporation or existing city annexation in the remaining unincorporated areas. These voters may potentially support incorporation status generally, but oppose local jurisdictional boundary changes as neither a strategic plan for the area nor a feasible charter and policy equilibrium, given the existing level of local government fragmentation. Even so, the locals' voters may respond to multiple boundary changes and therefore multiple incorporation and annexation campaigns and vote decisions.

The municipals may fail in their individual and collective campaigns for annexation and incorporate votes. The municipals tend to generate movement organizations that support across-the-board incorporation and annexation decisions. By favoring municipal organization to county government, these movements reject government by county subdivision units in favor of bigger and more organized government through municipal incorporation status. As the results indicate, the municipals are successful in many unincorporated county areas by town section and limited or survey townships. The successful municipal campaigns produce a reduction in fragmentation by number of minor civil districts, number of local jurisdictions and forms of local government.

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The conflict between municipals and locals may be insufficient to resolve large CDPs, service island and UMSA-areas unincorporated status when the voters, strategic plans and feasibility studies indicate the areas are too expensive to incorporate. As the urban areas in unincorporated county territories increase in population size, voters prefer decentralization of market areas of location goods and local public good and service areas. Even so, the evidence suggests the county governments may not establish the minimum cost and efficient market areas for location goods in numbers of site locations. Additionally, the provision decisions required local public good and service areas implying the formation of UMSA-unincorporated municipal service areas and possibly appointed or elected community council districts. The results imply any provision of unincorporated municipal service (island) districts greatly increases the fragmentation number solution for local government organization.

The results describe a zero-sum competition between municipals and locals by incorporation, charter, annexation, merger, consolidation, and reorganization vote. The campaigns for incorporation status are nonzero sum competitions that result in multiple attempts and county regulation by strategic plans and feasibility studies. A nonzero competition exists in the planning and development of new cities, annexation and mergers with existing cities, city-county consolidation and charter adoption, reorganization of incorporation status, and changes in voting rules and procedures. Nonzero sum competitions exist between municipal status and the allocation of unincorporated municipal service areas and community council districts. In the absence of a city classification, the range of incorporation status is binary and therefore the municipal service district areas add to the integer fragmentation number of forms of government and numbers of local jurisdictions.

A complete integer classification of the number of cities corresponds to the log rank rule and is therefore a fragmentation number solution. Both a discrete and an integer classification describe an imperfect range in nonzero sum competition. There is no core in the incorporation and annexation vote but there may be a core in the incorporation and annexation campaigns by consensus equilibrium in boundary decisions expected to attain at least consensus majority. Once incorporation status has been achieved, the local jurisdictionally-induced equilibrium equals the core. The core exists in the spatial history of boundary decisions by fragmentation number solution and the duration in the sequence of boundary decisions. In the sequence of local boundary decisions, the accumulation and the total number of boundary decisions are generally uncountable and larger than most integer sequences used to measure spatial competition in the number of local jurisdictions. During the sequence of boundary decisions, majorities of local jurisdictions exist as a structure induced-voting equilibrium by voting rule and procedure. The existence of a structure-induced equilibrium implies the core exists in the spatial history of local jurisdiction.

In summary, the establishment of local boundaries and boundary changes remain the importance decisions by strategic plan, feasibility study, campaign and vote for incorporation status. The number, sequence, and duration of boundary decisions produce stability in local government organization and a measure of any local jurisdiction fragmentation number solution. Any convergence of boundary decisions produces a fragmentation number solution and a spatial history of boundary decisions. As a consequence, the results imply games of pursuit in spatial competition and site location decisions with at times equal local division in spatial competition among local jurisdictions and location competition by town section and survey townships.

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Appendix on Township District Areas in Miami-Dade and Los Angeles County

1920 Dade County Townships

Ojus
Fulford
Arch Creek
Little River
Lemon City
Buena Vista
Allapattah
Miami City
Miami Beach Town
Coconut Grove
Montgomery's Corner
Larkins
Perrine
Goulds
Silver Palm
Princeton
Redland
Homestead
Florida City

Hawaii Counties and Townships on Oahu

Hawaii
Kauai and Nihau
Maui, Molokai and Lanai
Oahu

Ewa
Honolulu
Koolauloa
Koolaupoho
Wahiawa
Waianae
Midway

1915 Dade County Town section Districts with three City of Miami Precincts

Fort Lauderdale
Davie
Dania
Hallandale
Lemon City
Ojus
Fulford
Allapattah, N.
Allapattah, S.
Buena Vista
North Miami
Miami C and 4th
Miami D and 6th
Miami, central
Riverside
Southside
Cocoanut Grove
Larkins
Goulds
Perrine
Silver Palm
Princeton
Redland
Homestead
Detroit-Florida City

1925 City of Miami Precincts in the 1925 Annexation Vote
Little River
Buena Vista
Miami (NE 2 Ave, 24ST)
Allapattah
Miami (No 2 Fire Station)
Miami (Downtown)
W Flagler & 17th Ave
S Miami Ave & 10th St
Silver Bluff
Coconut Grove

Los Angeles County Townships by Town Section and Survey Townships

Los Angeles	1850
San Gabriel	1850
San Jose	1850
San Bernardino	1850
Santa Ana	1850
San Juan Capistrano	1850
Azusa	1860
El Monte	1860
Los Angeles	1860
Los Nietos	1860
San Gabriel	1860
San Jose	1860
San Juan	1860
San Pedro	1860
Santa Ana	1860
Tejon	1860
Burbank	1900
Cahuenga	1900
Catalina	1900
Compton	1900
Downey	1900
El Monte	1900
Fairmont	1900
Long Beach	1900
Los Nietos	1900
Pasadena	1900
Redondo	1900
Rowland	1900
San Antonio	1900
San Fernando	1900
San Gabriel	1900
San Jose	1900
Santa Monica	1900
Soledad	1900
South Pasadena	1900
Wilsington	1900
Acton	1911
Alamitos	1911
Alhambra	1911
Alhambra City	1911
Almonester	1911

Altadena	1911
Angeles Mesa	1911
Annadale	1911
Arbor Glen	1911
Arcadia	1911
Artesia	1911
Azusa	1911
Baldwin Park	1911
Ballona	1911
Bell	1911
Bellflower	1911
Belvedere	1911
Beverly Glen	1911
Beverly Hills	1911
Bixby	1911
Calabasas	1911
Canyon	1911
Carval	1911
Catalina	1911
Centinela	1911
Cerritos	1911
Charter Oak	1911
Chatsworth	1911
Claremont	1911
Clearwater	1911
Covina	1911
Crescent	1911
Culver Heights	1911
Del Sur	1911
Dominguez	1911
Downey	1911
Duarte	1911
Eagle Rock	1911
East Whittier	1911
El Monte	1911
El Porto	1911
El Segundo	1911
Fruitland	1911
Gardena	1911
Glendale	1911
Glendora	1911
Glorietta Heights	1911
Green Meadows	1911

Hermosa Beach	1911
Howard	1911
Hynes	1911
Inglewood	1911
Inglewood Truck Farm	1911
La Brea	1911
La Canada	1911
La Crescenta	1911
La Liebre	1911
La Mirada	1911
La Rambla	1911
La Verne	1911
Laguna	1911
Lamanda	1911
Lancaster	1911
Lasher	1911
Lawndale	1911
Linda Vista	1911
Little Rock	1911
Llano	1911
Lomita	1911
Long Beach	1911
Los Nietos	1911
Lugo	1911
Machado	1911
Malibu	1911
Manhatten Beach	1911
Middle town	1911
Midwich	1911
Moneta	1911
Monrovia	1911
Montebello	1911
Monterey Park	1911
Mount Lowe	1911
Nadeau	1911
Naples	1911
Neenach	1911
Newhall	1911
Norwalk	1911
Ocean Park Heights	1911
Palmdale	1911
Pomona	1911
Redman	1911

Redondo Beach	1911
Rivera	1911
Rowland	1911
San Antonio	1911
San Dimas	1911
San Marino	1911
San Rafael	1911
Santa Monica	1911
Santander	1911
Saugus	1911
Sherman	1911
Sierre Madre	1911
Signal Hill	1911
Snithsdale	1911
Spadra	1911
St. Francis	1911
Sterling	1911
Sunland	1911
Torrance	1911
Tweedy	1911
Verdugo	1911
Vernon City	1911
Watts	1911
West Adams	1911
Whittier	1911
Willowbrook	1911
Wilmington	1911
Wilsona	1911
Wiseburn	1911
Antelope	1920
Azusa	1920
Belvedere	1920
Burbank	1920
Cahuenga	1920
Calabasas	1920
Catalina	1920
Compton	1920
Covina	1920
Downey	1920
El Monte	1920
Fairmont	1920
Gardena	1920
Inglewood	1920

Lankershim	1920
Lomita	1920
Long Beach	1920
Los Angeles	1920
Malibu	1920
Monrovia	1920
Norwalk	1920
Pasadena	1920
Redondo	1920
Rowland	1920
San Antonio	1920
San Dimas	1920
San Fernando	1920
San Gabriel	1920
San Jose	1920
Santa Monica	1920
Soledad	1920
South Pasadena	1920
Venice	1920
Whittier	1920
Antelope	1930
Avnet	1930
Azusa	1930
Belvedere	1930
Beverly Hills	1930
Bixby	1930
Calabasas	1930
Chaves	1930
Covina	1930
Catalina	1930
Compton	1930
Dominguez	1930
Downey	1930
El Monte	1930
Fairmont	1930
Gardena	1930
La Brea	1930
Glendale	1930
Inglewood	1930
La Crescenta	1930
Lomita	1930
Machado	1930
Malibu	1930

Monrovia	1930
Montebello	1930
Norwalk	1930
Pasadena	1930
Redondo	1930
Rowland	1930
San Dimas	1930
San Antonio	1930
Soledad	1930
San Gabriel	1930
San Jose	1930
Talamantes	1930
Universal	1930
Whittier	1930
Venice	1930

Town of Los Angeles Districts

Downtown District
Greenfield (Little Tokyo—Green Lantern District)/Union Field
Civic Hotel—Civitan—Citizen's Defense League/Civic Hotel===Municipal Hotel

Bunker Hill
Highland Park (Village)
Hancock Park (Village/Ord Division)
Doheny (Ord Division)

Angelino Heights
Echo Park Village
town of Silver Lake

Hollywood-Colegrove
town of Prospect Park

Fairfax

Wilshire
Western Heights
Westchester

Crenshaw

Valley

Harbour

The Beaches

Suburbs
(High Palms)
West Adams

Melrose

University

Larchmont Village
Leimert (Park) Village
Carthay Circle Village

City of Los Angeles Districts

Eastgate   (Plaza To a North-Eastern Districts 1 & 2)
Greenfield (City District)
Bunker Hill 1 & 2 (City Districts)
Westgate (To Western Districts)
       Wilshire
       Western Heights

The Beaches to the Suburbs (South-Western District(s))

Hollywood & Colegrove (To a North-Western District)

Vernon-Crenshaw-Southern Additions & Extension and Central Manufacturing District

Harbor (Industrial) (Corridor—Shoestring–Southern District)

Valley (Agricultural)

University (Exposition) (South-Eastern District)

City of Los Angeles District Areas

Central Area
  Hollenbeck
  Rampart
  Newton
  Northeast
  Eastern
  Eastgate
  Bunker Hill

South Area
  77 Street
  Harbor
  Southeast
  Southland
  Southwest
  South Central, southern additions and extensions
  University

Valley Area
  Devonshire
  Foot Hill
  Mission
  North Hollywood
  Van Nuys
  West Valley
  Topanga

West Area
  Hollywood
  Olympic
  Pacific
  West Los Angeles
  Westgate
  Western
  Western Heights
  Wilshire

Los Angeles County UMSA Districts and Service Islands

Acton	2000
Agoura	2000
Agua Dulce	2000
Alondra Park-El Camino	2000
Alpine	2000
Altadena	2000
Antelope Acres	2000
Athens	2000
Avocado Heights	2000
Baldwin Hills	2000
Bandini	2000
Bassett	2000
Belvedere Gardens	2000
Big Pines	2000
Bouquet Canyon	2000
Castaic	2000
Castaic Junction	2000
Centinela	2000
Cerritos	2000
Charter Oak	2000
Citrus	2000
City Terrace	2000
Cornell	2000
Covina	2000
Crystallaire	2000
Deer Lake Highlands	2000
Del Aire	2000
Del Sur	2000
Dominguez	2000
East Azusa	2000
East Compton	2000
East Irwindale	2000
East La Mirada	2000
East Los Angeles	2000
East Pasadena	2000
East San Gabriel	2000
East Whittier	2000
Eastmont	2000
Elizabeth Lake	2000
Fairmont	2000
Fernwood	2000

Firestone	2000
Firestone	2000
Florence	2000
Florence	2000
Forrest Park	2000
Franklin Canyon	2000
Gorman	2000
Graham	2000
Graham	2000
Green Valley	2000
Hacienda Heights	2000
Hawthorne	2000
Hi Vista	2000
Juniper Hills	2000
Kagel Canyon	2000
Kinneola Mesa	2000
La Crescenta	2000
La Rambla	2000
Ladera Heights	2000
Lake Hughes	2000
Lake Los Angeles	2000
Lakeview	2000
Lang	2000
Lennox	2000
Leona Valley	2000
Little Rock	2000
Llano	2000
Long Beach	2000
Longview	2000
Los Cerritos Wetland	2000
Los Nietos	2000
Los Nietos	2000
Lynwood	2000
Malibu Bowl	2000
Malibu Highlands	2000
Malibu Lake	2000
Malibu Vista	2000
Marina Del Rey	2000
Mint Canyon	2000
Monte Nido	2000
Montrose	2000
Neenach	2000
Newhall	2000

North Claremont	2000
North El Monte	2000
North Whittier	2000
Northeast San Dimas	2000
Oat Mountain	2000
Pearblossum	2000
Placerita Canyon	2000
Playa Vista	2000
Quartz Hill	2000
Redman	2000
Roosevelt	2000
Rowland Heights	2000
Rowland Heights	2000
San Clemente Island	2000
San Pasqual	2000
Santa Catalina Island	2000
Seminole Hot Springs	2000
Soledad	2000
South El Monte	2000
South Monrovia	2000
South San Gabriel	2000
South San Gabriel	2000
South San Jose Hills	2000
South Whittier	2000
South Whittier	2000
Stevenson Ranch	2000
Sulphur Springs	2000
Sun Village	2000
Sunshine Acres	2000
Sylmar	2000
Sylvia Park	2000
Three Points	2000
Topanga Canyon	2000
Triunfo Canyon	2000
Twin Lakes	2000
University City	2000
Val Verde	2000
Valencia	2000
Valinda	2000
Valinda	2000
Valyemo	2000
Vasquez Rocks	2000
Veterans Adm Center	2000

View Park	2000
Walnut Park	2000
West Arcadia	2000
West Carson	2000
West Chatsworth	2000
West Chatsworth	2000
West Compton	2000
West Fox Hills	2000
West Pomona	2000
West Puente Valley	2000
West Whittier	2000
West Whittier	2000
Westfield	2000
Westmont	2000
White Fence Farms	2000
Whittier Rec Area	2000
Willowbrook	2000
Wilsona Gardens	2000
Windsor Hills	2000
Wrightwood	2000