The Effects of Descriptive Representation on Political Attitudes and Behaviors

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Abstract

A great deal of scholarship has looked at the effect that descriptive representation has on policy making at the congressional level. Much less work has examined the effect of descriptive representation on individual citizens, and of the work that exists, most of it has focused only on turnout. In this research, we look at the linkage between descriptive representation and a range of political evaluations and behaviors among the public. More specifically, we argue that an increase in descriptive representation at the congressional level positively affects and increases one’s level of engagement in, efficacy in, and attitudes towards government institutions and actors. We examine support for these arguments using data from the 2008 American National Election Study, which has an over-sample of African Americans and Latinos. Our primary independent variable is whether an individual is represented by a co-ethnic at the congressional level.
Introduction

In the influential work *Preface to Democratic Theory*, Robert Dahl argues that the values and norms of society are more essential to the democratic integrity of the American nation and the protection of its minorities than the institutional barriers written in the Constitution: “To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our society is essentially democratic” (143). A representative democracy requires pro-democratic behavior and feeling among its citizens that lend stability to the system. One of the possible ways of increasing positive feelings toward government and adequately representing the needs of all peoples at the governmental level, particularly minorities, is through descriptive representation.

Descriptive representation is when the outward, physical appearance such as gender, ethnicity, or race of a governmental official resembles that of his or her constituents (Pitkin, 1967). Whether descriptive representation leads to an increase in substantive representation is of particular normative concern for those interested in adequate representation of minorities in Congress. While descriptive representation appears to have substantive effects on the local level, such as in hiring of educators, police officers, and civil servants (Browning, Marshall, & Tabb 1984; Fraga, Meier, & England 1986; Meier & Stewart 1991; Meier et al. 2005) the effects seem to disappear on the federal level (Cannon 1999; Lublin 1997; Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran 1996; Meier & England 1984). Additionally, some scholars have challenged the efficacy of descriptive representation for African Americans on the local and state level (Critzer 1998; DeWeever 2000; Layman 1993).
Nevertheless, other studies purport to show an intimate link between descriptive representation and policy output. Minority legislators propose minority legislation more often than their white colleagues, though they have greater difficulty in seeing that legislation enacted (Bratton & Haynie 1999; Hedge, Button, & Spear 1996; Hawkesworth 2003; Tate 2001). Studies also show that at the state level, legislation adverse to Latino interests is blocked by the presence of descriptive representatives (Preuhs 2005; Santoro 1999; Tatalovich 1995). Preuhs (2007) finds that the inclusion of Latinos in state legislatures leads to “relative increases in welfare expenditure effort, welfare generosity, and welfare benefits in the states” (287).

Even though evidence demonstrating the link between descriptive representation and substantive representation is mixed, descriptive representation may be important for many other reasons; especially with respect to how persons of color evaluate and engage with the political system. For example, descriptive representation for African Americans has been linked to an increase in qualities that are often deemed valuable to democratic citizens, such as higher levels of political knowledge (Burns, Schlozman, & Verba 2001; Tate 1993), efficacy (Sellers, Merolla, & Fowler 2011), and trust (Abney & Hutcheson 1981; Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Howell & Fagan 1998; Tate 2003). In some instances, descriptive representation has also been linked with higher voter turnout among African Americans (Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Tate 2003; Burns, Schlozman, & Verba 2001) and the same appears to be true for Latinos (Barreto, Segura, & Woods 2004; Barreto, Segura, Woods 2002).¹ These types of effects for descriptive representation should be noteworthy to anyone concerned with having a democratic society in which people of color feel engaged in and favorably evaluate the political system and its actors.

¹ However, it is important to note that other scholars do not find that as a general rule voter turnout increases among African Americans when they know their Congress member’s race (Gay 2001, Tate 2003, and Griffin and Keene 2006).
While scholars have explored the effect of descriptive representatives on participation for both African Americans and to a lesser extent Latinos, there is more limited work on the effects of descriptive representation on a broad range of attitudes toward and engagement with the political system among communities of color, especially Latinos. In this study, we ask several questions. First, does descriptive representation affect the political engagement of African Americans and Latinos? We take a very broad look at engagement to include interest as well as participation in the political system. Second, does having a descriptive representative influence African American and Latino levels of efficacy toward the political system? Finally, we ask how having a descriptive representative affects evaluations of government institutions and leaders, particularly one’s own representative. We have a unique opportunity to explore these questions by utilizing data from the 2008 American National Election Survey (ANES), which contains an oversample of approximately 500 African Americans and Latinos.

Our study has the potential to uncover findings that will illuminate the relationship between descriptive representation and a variety of minority political behaviors and attitudes. First, the possible direct effect of descriptive representation on voter turnout is a crucial key to uncovering ways that minorities might feel more empowered in the political system and hopefully in turn ensure that their needs are represented on the governmental level. Second, descriptive representation and its potential to increase efficacy may help us understand the relationship between efficacy and civil peace in society as established by prior scholars (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson 1982; Wright 1976, Schwartz 1973). For example, in earlier studies, some scholars have suggested that descriptive representation might lend itself to the avoidance of extreme political activities such as protests, riots, or terrorism (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson 1982; Wright 1976, Schwartz 1973). Finally, if descriptive representation increases evaluations of
government institutions and actors, then it suggests descriptive representation may improve one’s sense of being represented.

The Presence of African Americans and Latinos in the House

Over the last 40 years since the 92nd Congress (1971-1973), there has been a steady numerical, and hence proportional, increase in the number of African Americans and Latinos serving in Congress. In 1971 there were 13 African Americans serving in the House of Representatives (3% of the legislative body) and six Latinos (1.4% of the legislative body). Those numbers have risen to the present total of 44 Africans Americans (10%) and 29 Latinos (6.7%) respectively for the 112th Congress (2011-present). Despite the increase in African American and Latino representation in Congress, both groups are still under-represented relative to their proportion in the population. The gradual increase in numerical and proportional representation for African Americans and Latinos is shown in Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix.

One of the prevailing hypotheses as to why the number of African American officeholders has been low is that racial prejudice among some white voters has led to their reluctance to vote for African Americans (Jones & Clemons 1993; Piliawsky 1989; Reeves 1989; Tirkildsen 1993). If this is true, then perhaps the steady rise of the number of minority members in Congress indicates that racial animosity at the polls is slowly subsiding. Nevertheless, additional findings by other scholars call into question the validity of the racial prejudice claim at the U.S. congressional level (Bullock 2000; Voss & Lublin 2001). Whether the hypothesis of white racial prejudice is supported by data or not, it is indisputable that African American candidates enjoy greater electoral success running in districts with a significant African American population (Highton 2004), as do Latinos in Latino majority districts (Griffin &

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Newman 2007). Jacobson notes that while the creation of majority minority districts after 1990 did not eliminate minority underrepresentation in Congress, “the gap did narrow” (2004, p. 222). Therefore, we believe that the creation of majority minority districts is the most significant factor contributing to the increase in minority officeholders in Congress.

Whether or not descriptive representation has led to an increase in substantive representation is debatable. Cameron, Espstein, and O’Halloran (1996) find that a tradeoff exists between descriptive representation and substantive representation for African Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives. Their findings purport that racial redistricting to achieve “majority-minority districts, may in fact, dilute the overall influence of minorities on public policy” (p. 810). However, Lublin (1997) has challenged Cameron et al.’s conclusion based on methodological grounds for failing to take into consideration how the Latino vote lends itself to the election of African Americans in majority minority districts. Other scholars have argued that the creation of majority minority districts are unnecessary for electing African Americans to the House of Representatives (Swain 1993). Swain argues that the liberal party platform represents the needs of minorities and descriptive representation does not add to the overall effect of influencing policy decisions (see also: Hero & Tolbert 1995). Regardless of whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation, the underlying argument remains by a number of scholars that majority minority districts are imperative for the descriptive representation of African Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives (Davidson & Grofman 1994; Grofman & Handley 1989; Lublin 1999). We seek to look at many other ways in which having a descriptive representative may affect communities of color. Policy output is certainly an

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3 For more on what constitutes a significant population or proportion of African American voters needed to secure a descriptive representative, see: Epstein and O’Halloran; Lublin, 1999.
important consideration, but all of these studies assume common interests among communities of color, which may be problematic in some cases.

**The Effects of Having a Descriptive Representative**

The effects of having a descriptive representative can be far-reaching. The first potential effect of great normative concern is the possible link descriptive representation shares with substantive representation. Hero and Tolbert (1995) find that even though descriptive representation only modestly translates into substantive representation in terms of policy, they do suggest that substantive representation does increase at the collective level as institutions become more attuned to Latino concerns. Similarly, descriptive representation may enhance substantive representation by placing members in office who may share more preferences of their minority group than white counterparts (Tate 2003). Descriptive representation when linked with substantive representation also alters the legislative agenda (Canon 1999), and Mansbridge (1999) argues that the increase in African American descriptive representation enhances substantive representation, which in turn changes the nature of deliberation. The normative concern of engaging minorities in the political process is also addressed by descriptive representation.

Among Latinos, Pantoja and Segura (2003) find an inverse relationship between descriptive representatives in the state assembly, state senate, and U.S. House of Representatives and political alienation. As the number of descriptive representatives increases, feelings of political alienation decline. Descriptive representation and its relationship to substantive representation suggest that it may engage more minorities in the political process (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp 2004; Barreto, Segura, & Woods 2004; Gay 2002), thereby also enhancing political empowerment among minorities.
In the remainder of this section, we will outline the literature and our expectations for the effects of descriptive representation in three domains: engagement, efficacy, and evaluations of government and government leaders. These domains have received less attention in the literature than the links between descriptive representation and substantive representation.

**Engagement**

It is a well-established fact that minority voter turnout is generally lower than white voter turnout. However, when socio-economic status is taken into account, African Americans participate at a higher rate than whites (Verba & Nie 1972), while Latinos participate at the same rate (Hero & Campbell 1996; Uhlaner, Cain, & Kiewiet 1989; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). That being said, since socioeconomic resources are not as high in African American and Latino communities, scholars seek to explore other factors that might enhance the participation of both groups. One factor that has been proposed is having a descriptive representative.

A wide body of empirical work has systematically linked descriptive representation to higher levels of political participation. One significant factor in driving African Americans to the polls is being descriptively represented at the congressional level (Tate 2003; but see Gay 2001; and Griffin & Keane 2006 for more nuanced findings). Of particular note is that African Americans living in “high black-empowerment areas,” as indicated by an African American holding the mayor’s office, were more politically active than African Americans living in “low-empowerment areas” (Bobo & Gilliam 1990, p. 383; see also: Lublin & Tate 1995). Building on

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4 The 2008 presidential race between Senators Barack Obama and John McCain saw a surge of 4.9 points in voter turnout rates among eligible African Americans—from 60.3% in 2004 to 65.3%. Hispanic and Asian participation also rose in this time period from 47.2% to 49.9% and 44.6% to 47.0%, respectively, while white participation fell from 67.2% to 66.1%. Source: A. Nagourney, “Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls.” *New York Times*, 5 November 2008, p. A1.

5 However, Gay shows that the election of African Americans to congressional office depresses white voter turnout and “rarely increases political engagement among African Americans” (2001, p. 589, 600; also see Brace, Handley, Niemi, & Stanley, 1995; Tate, 2003).
literature that shows that group consciousness increases the political participation of African Americans (Guterbock & London 1983; Shingles 1981; Verba & Nie 1972), Bobo and Gilliam contend that descriptive representation increases voter turnout because “black empowerment is a contextual cue of likely policy responsiveness that encourages blacks to feel that participation has intrinsic value” (p. 387). This assertion is based on their findings that “empowerment leads to higher levels of political knowledge and that it leads to a more engaged (i.e. that is trusting and efficacious) orientation to politics” (p. 387).

The link between descriptive representation and turnout has also been found among Latinos residing in majority Latino districts (Barreto, Segura, & Woods 2004). Keeping in line with the theme of the empowerment literature of Bobo and Gilliam (1990) and Tate (1993), Barreto (2007) concludes that “when a viable co-ethnic candidate is present, Latinos will turnout to vote at heightened rates, and in some instances vote at rates greater than those of other ethnic and racial groups—including whites” (p. 438). Barreto’s study is unique in that it analyzes 10 elections in five cities, thereby bringing together multiple data sets that grant his findings a nationwide focus untested by previous research limited to one congressional district (Cain & Kiewiet 1984), one statewide office (Graves & Lee 2000), or mayor candidates from one city (Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods 2005; Hill, Moreno, & Cue 2001; Manzano & Vega 2006).

Voter turnout is but one measure of a citizen’s engagement with the political system. Political participation can be conceived in much broader terms than turnout; it can include engagement with one’s community. Furthermore, engagement can even include one’s attention to politics and the extent to which one discusses politics with others. We contend that having a descriptive representative may also have positive effects on these other indicators of political engagement. It is conceivable that minorities will feel more vested in participating in the
political process when a candidate mirrors them descriptively as well. The sense of
connectedness arising from having “one’s own” represent him or her in Congress, particularly
when there is a dearth of descriptive representatives for minorities at present, could prove to be a
motivating factor to spur engagement. Some work suggests that the effects of descriptive
representation on engagement extend beyond voter turnout. With respect to Latinos, Pantoja and
Segura (2003) find that Latinos represented by co-ethnics have lower levels of political
alienation. In this paper, we explore how having a descriptive representative might increase
interest in politics, the extent to which one discusses politics with others, political participation,
and participation in the community

_Efficacy_

Research has demonstrated that levels of efficacy in government and evaluations of
government leaders vary across different racial and ethnic groups. With respect to the
arguments we advance, studies have suggested that descriptive representation has a noteworthy
effect on political efficacy (Bobo & Gilliam 1990). Political efficacy is categorized as either
internal or external. Internal efficacy refers to “beliefs about one’s own competence to
understand, and to participate effectively in politics,” and external efficacy refers to “beliefs
about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands”

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6 Existing literature is mixed regarding whether racial and ethnic minorities exhibit higher or lower levels of political
efficacy than whites. Using a sample from New Orleans in 1984, Wu (2003) found that the percentage of blacks
with high efficacy is greater than whites with high efficacy, but the percentage of blacks with low efficacy is greater
than whites with low efficacy. In a comparison of poor African Americans with poor whites, using data from the
1972 Political Participation in America survey, Shingles (1981) showed that internal efficacy is higher among
African Americans even though their levels of political mistrust are higher than whites. Less is known about
political efficacy levels for Asians and Latinos. In an original survey conducted in Chicago, Michelson (2000)
found that Latinos do not share African Americans’ low levels of political efficacy. However, in a later study
utilizing only California residents, both Asian Americans and Latinos exhibited lower levels of efficacy than whites
and African Americans (Michelson, 2002).
Both types of efficacy have been linked to an increased likelihood of participation 
(Abramson 1983; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes 1960; Clark & Acock 1989; Cohen, 
Vigoda, & Samorly 2001; Guterbock & London 1983), especially among African Americans 
(Kuo 1977; McPherson 1977; Shingles 1981). However, little is known about how to boost 
efficacy since the existing literature typically treats it as an explanatory variable for political 
participation rather than as a dependent variable (Wu 2003).

Regardless, scholars have linked several individual factors to efficacy levels. Older 
individuals, as well as those with higher levels of education, income, and social position have 
higher levels of efficacy, and this holds for African Americans and whites (Wu 2003; see also: 
Abramson 1972; Rodgers 1974; Shingles 1981). Studies have also shown that those who are 
religious (Dawson, Brown, & Allen 1990; Harris 1994), psychologically involved in politics, 
trusting of government (Wu 2003), and politically active have higher levels of political efficacy 
(Finkel 1985, 1987; Leighley 1995; Madsen 1987), as do those who support the winning 
candidate or party in an election (Banducci & Karp 2003; Clarke & Acock 1989).

Of special importance to our study is the research that has shown that a group’s 
experience with and position in the political system also has an effect on efficacy levels. As 
Rodgers (1974) notes, the low political efficacy and high levels of political cynicism he observed 
among African-American adolescents were not rooted in feelings of personal inadequacy, but 
rather in African-Americans’ “evaluations of their position in the political hierarchy” (p. 280). 
McClain and Stewart (2002) argue that low levels of political efficacy among Asian Americans 
are due to a history of discriminatory laws.  

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7 The history of marginalization of African Americans in the political process raises a fundamental paradox: why do African Americans demonstrate high levels of political efficacy in some surveys despite their history of marginalization and oppression? Shingles (1981) attributes this to the emergence of black consciousness which led African Americans to blame the system, rather than themselves, for marginalization and oppression, resulting in
A key factor then in boosting efficacy among racial and ethnic minorities may be shifting their position in the political hierarchy, leading them to feel a sense of political empowerment. Bobo and Gilliam define political empowerment as “the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making” (1990, p. 378). One means of gaining significant representation and influence in politics is through having descriptive representatives (Banducci, et al. 2004; Gay 2001; Griffin & Keane 2006; Mansbridge 1999; Michelson 2000; Tate 2001; but see Wu 2003). For example, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) show that African Americans who live in areas represented by an African American mayor have higher levels of political knowledge, trust in and efficacy toward the system (but see: Wu 2003). Therefore, based on the work of Bobo and Gilliam and our recent study that suggests a direct link between the election of Barack Obama and a boost in efficacy among African Americans (Sellers, Merolla, Fowler 2011), we have good reason to believe that descriptive representation is a prime factor in boosting levels of efficacy among minorities in relation to Congress as well.

*Evaluations of Government Institutions and Actors*

Finally, we are interested in exploring how the presence of a descriptive representative influences one’s evaluations of their own representative, as well as government institutions more generally. With respect to government institutions, individuals may come to have more positive evaluations of Congress and government institutions as members of their group are represented in the process. With respect to the evaluations of one’s own member, individuals may have more favorable evaluations of their representative when they are descriptively represented. If descriptive representatives are more in tune with the policy needs of their communities, as the literature cited above holds, then it is likely the case that they will attain higher evaluations as high efficacy coupled with cynicism about government (*see also*: Hulbury, 1975; ISR, 1973; Yancey, Rigsby, & McCarthy, 1972).
Prior studies have examined some of these linkages. Gay (2002) finds that both whites and African Americans seem to be more satisfied with their representatives when they are descriptively represented, though these positive evaluations do not extend to the institution of Congress as a whole. Banducci et al (2004) find that African Americans “are more likely to believe the representative is in touch and more likely to believe the representative has done something special for the district when that representative is black” (pp. 544-545). Of particular interest is Tate (2001) who found that African Americans who had African Americans representing them approve of their performance more than African Americans who were represented by whites. Tate cautions that party affiliation is a more significant factor affecting the approval ratings of African American members of Congress. Nevertheless, Tate concludes that “while white Democrats can still earn high marks from black Democrats for their performance, even taking into account political party and political leadership, black Democrats can earn even higher marks” (p. 635). Existing work has not explored these relationships among Latinos. We might safely surmise that having a descriptive representative will increase evaluations of one’s own incumbent; however, the positive effects of having a descriptive representative may not extend beyond the dyadic relationship between constituents and their representatives.

Additional studies also show that African Americans who are represented by an African American member of Congress have higher levels of information and more positive evaluations of their representative than those who lack descriptive representatives (Banducci, et al. 2004) and African Americans who live in areas represented by an African American mayor have higher levels of political knowledge, trust in and efficacy toward the system (Bobo & Gilliam 1990, but
see: Wu 2003). Pantoja and Segura (2003) find that Latinos who lived in areas represented by a Latino representative had lower levels of political alienation, though the results were modest.

In sum, the theory of descriptive representation suggests that having a descriptive representative should increase: one’s engagement (H1); one’s political efficacy (H2); and one’s evaluations of their representative (H3). We more tentatively explore whether it also has a positive effect on one’s evaluations of government institutions (H4).

**Data and Methods**

To test these hypotheses, we use data from the 2008 ANES time series study. The time series study consisted of two waves of interviews, pre-election and post-election. A significant element included in the dataset important to our study is the oversample of African Americans and Latinos. The target oversample for each group was 500 respondents, and the resulting sample ended up with 572 African Americans and 504 Latinos. Since we are interested in the effects of descriptive representation on communities of color, we confine our analyses to these two groups. Because we use a wide range of dependent variables, related to engagement, efficacy, and evaluations of government and government actors, we first describe the independent variables that are common across all models. We then describe the dependent variables for each dimension separately.

To explore support for our hypotheses regarding the significance of having a descriptive representative at the congressional level, our models include dummy variables for whether the incumbent is an African American or a Latino. In 2008, there were 35 African American incumbents and 22 Latino incumbents in the U.S. House. 25 percent of African Americans in the ANES sample were represented by an African American, while 42.8 percent of Latinos in the sample were represented by a Latino representative. Based on the theory of empowerment with
descriptive representation (Bobo & Gilliam 1990), we expect a positive and significant effect of these variables on our three areas of focus: engagement, efficacy, and evaluations of institutions and leaders.

An important factor to take into account when looking at the effects of descriptive representation, as noted by Tate (2001) is the partisanship of the incumbent. It could be that partisanship rather than race or ethnicity of the incumbent produces positive effects with respect to engagement, efficacy, and evaluations of leaders. We therefore include a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent’s party identification matches the incumbent, and is zero otherwise. About 50.9 percent of African Americans in the ANES sample had a party identification that matched the incumbent, while 62.5 percent of Latinos in the sample had a party identification that matched the incumbent. We would expect this measure to have a positive effect on our three areas of focus.

Finally, the models include the following individual level control variables: gender, age, income, education, home ownership, marital status, identification with the Democratic Party, and identification with the Republican Party. Gender, marital status, and home ownership are dummy variables, where a one equals male, married, and a homeowner. Age is the respondent’s age in years. Income and education are coded such that higher values indicate higher levels of each. For the political indicators, dummy variables are included to determine whether the respondent identifies with the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. In the next section, we describe the measures we use to capture engagement.

**Engagement**

We separate engagement into two categories, attentiveness and participation. We include several measures to capture attentiveness. First, we use a question that asked respondents the
extent to which they care who wins the House election. Response options were on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all” to a “great deal.” The mean on this measure is 3.06 for African Americans and 2.74 for Latinos. Second, we use a more general interest question, which asked people their interest in following campaigns, coded on a three-point scale from “not much” to “very interested.” About 37.63 percent of African Americans fell into the category of very interested, while 24.85 percent of Latinos did. As a third measure, we create a combined index for exposure to news. The ANES asked a battery of questions related to how many days in a typical week, the respondent did the following: watched news on television, read a print newspaper, read an online newspaper, and listened to the news on the radio. All of the measures were added together and then we divided by the number of questions, so that the scale ranges from 0 to 7. The measure therefore gives the average number of days in a week that the respondent accesses all of these types of information, and the mean is 2.65 for African Americans and 2.34 for Latinos. Finally, we include a measure to capture how often respondents discuss politics with others, which is coded from 0 to 7.

To explore the effects of descriptive representation on participation, we rely on four measures. First, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was registered to vote in 2008. 41.1% of African Americans in the sample are registered to vote, compared to 37.5% of Latinos. Second, we include a dummy variable indicating if the respondent voted in the House election. 80% of African Americans and Latinos indicating voting in the House election. To examine other types of political participation, we create an additive scale of the following activities: attended political meetings, rallies, or speeches; wore a campaign button or posted a sign or bumper sticker; worked for a party candidate; contributed money to specific

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There were two versions of response options for this question on the ANES and we combined them into one variable.
campaigns; and contributed to any other group for or against a candidate. This measure ranges from 0 to 5. The mean is .54 for African Americans and .28 for Latinos. Finally, to capture non-political participation, we combine a battery of questions in which respondents were asked if they engaged in the following activities in their community: community work, contacted an official, or attended a meeting on school or community issues. This scale ranges from 0 to 3, with a mean of .63 for African Americans and .49 for Latinos.

We first look at the effect of having a descriptive representative on these measures for African Americans. The results across all of the dependent variables are shown in Table 1. The table also indicates whether a probit analysis, ordered probit analysis or an OLS regression was used. Turning first to our measures of attentiveness, we can see that the African American incumbent dummy variable is statistically significant for general campaign interest (p=0.037), care who wins the House election (p=0.025), and the combined news exposure measure (p=0.022). The only measure for which we do not observe a statistically significant effect is discussing politics. With respect to the substantive significance of these findings, having a descriptive representative increases news exposure by about 1/3 of a unit, which is fairly modest, but still meaningful for a scale that only ranges from 0 to 4. Since ordered probit was used for general interest and interest in the outcome of the House elections, the substantive effects are not directly interpretable. We therefore generated the substantive effects using CLARIFY. All of the ordinal and discrete independent variables were set to their mean, while dummy variables were set to a male, homeowner, who is married and identifies with the Democratic Party. Going from a district that is not represented by an African American to one that is increases the probability of falling into the most interested category by 10 percentage points for general interest and by 11.6 percentage points for interest in the House election. Overall, the evidence is
pretty strong for descriptive representatives having a positive effect on the political attentiveness of African Americans.

Table 1 also displays the results for participation among African Americans. Here, we find a statistically significant effect of having an African American representative on voting in the House election (p=0.024) and on general community engagement (p=0.086), but not on being registered or on other forms of political participation. The results of these analyses are not directly interpretable, so we used CLARIFY to generate the substantive effects. Having a descriptive representative increases the probability of voting in the House election by 9 percentage points. Meanwhile, going from a district without an African American representative to one with an African American representative increases the probability of falling into the highest level of community engagement by only 2.3 percentage points. These results support past scholarship, which shows a link between having a descriptive representative and increased political participation among African Americans. They also show that the effects of having a descriptive representative extend to non-political participation, though the substantive effects are weaker.

Overall, we receive fairly strong support for the argument that having a descriptive representative at the congressional level increases levels of political attentiveness and participation among African Americans. These effects hold up with the numerous control variables in the model, in particular the variable capturing whether the incumbent’s partisanship matches the respondent. In the interest of space, we do not detail the results of the control variables, though the effects of education are the only ones that rival the effect of having a descriptive representative. Education is significant and positive in seven out of the eight models.
We next turn to the results for Latinos in Table 2. The effects of descriptive representation on attentiveness and engagement are much weaker among Latinos. There is only one case in which the descriptive representative dummy variable is close to significant and that is for being registered to vote (p=0.16). Having a descriptive representative increases the probability that a Latino registers to vote by 12.7 percentage points. Furthermore, there is a significant, negative effect of having a Latino descriptive representative on how often the respondent discusses politics with friends. This is an unexpected finding for which we do not have a good explanation. Part of the problem with these analyses may be that we are not taking into account many individual level factors that may be important, such as language use, generational status, and country of ancestry. While the support for the descriptive representation thesis is weak in these models, the effects of education are consistently strong in boosting attentiveness and engagement among Latinos. In the next section, we turn to another set of evaluations.

Efficacy

As we indicated earlier, political efficacy contains two dimensions, internal and external. Internal efficacy is one’s personal feelings of connectedness to the political process and external efficacy is the feeling about government effectiveness. The ANES has asked a battery of questions for internal and external efficacy for an extended period of time, though in the 2008 round, they did a split sample of some of the efficacy questions. The same questions were asked in both versions, but different response choices were provided. The response options were too different to combine the two versions, so we analyze the standard efficacy questions that have been asked over a long period of time. The first set of questions asked respondents for their level of agreement (on a five point scale) with the following statements: (1) “Sometimes, politics and
government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on”; (2) “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country”’” (3) “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”; and, (4) “People like me don’t have any say about what government does.” We recoded all of the measures such that higher values are more efficacious. We then did a principal components factor analysis and found two factors with eigenvalues over 1. The variables that load highly on the first factor are the latter two questions above (3 and 4), while the variables that load highly on the second factor are the first two questions above (1 and 2). The first factor therefore captures more of a respondent’s own sense of their ability to understand politics, or internal efficacy, while the second captures their sense of how much government pays attention, or external efficacy.

Since these efficacy questions cut the sample in half, we wanted to also include internal and external efficacy type questions that were asked of the whole sample. The additional internal efficacy question asks a respondent how successfully they would be able to defend their own opinions. Response options ranged on a five-point scale from not successfully at all to extremely successfully. The mean response among African Americans was 3.1, and was 3.0 among Latinos. The survey also included several external efficacy/alienation type questions that were asked of the whole sample. These questions are as follows: (1) “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” (2) “Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?” (3) “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?” (4) “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think – a good deal, some, or not much?” All of
these questions were recoded such that higher values are higher levels of external efficacy. We again did a principal components factor analysis and found one factor with an eigenvalue over 1. All of the variables loaded highly with the exception of the last one (where the loading was only .34).

Our regression results for the internal and external efficacy measures are depicted in Table 3 for African-Americans. The African-American incumbent dummy variable is not statistically significant for the first two efficacy factors. Part of this may be due to the reduced sample size on these questions. The variable is just outside of conventional significance levels on an individual’s belief in their ability to defend their opinions (p=0.13). The substantive effect is such that having a descriptive representative lead to a .21 unit increase on the dependent variable. Finally, we find an un-hypothesized negative effect of having an African American representative on the second external efficacy factor (p=0.054). It could be that there is some endogeneity between low levels of external efficacy in a community and their likelihood of choosing a descriptive representative. Again, we also find that the only consistently significant variable is education, which has a positive effect on African-Americans feelings of efficacy for three out of the four measures.

The results for Latinos are depicted in Table 4. Having a descriptive representative leads to a marginally significant increase on the first internal efficacy factor (p=0.12) and a significant increase on the first external efficacy factor (p=0.090). The substantive effects are also quite meaningful. Having a Latino representative increases efficacy by .22 units on the first factor and .23 units on the second factor. While these may not seem very large, the factors only range from about -2 to 3. There is no statistically significant relationship between having a Latino

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9 We also did an analysis of the new version of the efficacy questions that were tested in the ANES and found null effects. Part of this could be due to the fact that the sample size is cut in half.
representative and the defend opinions measure or the second external efficacy factor. The control variables do not show any consistent significant effects across all four models. In sum, there is some evidence that having a Latino representative increases feelings of efficacy among Latinos.

*Evaluations of institutions and leaders*

The final area we explore is determining if having a descriptive representative leads to more favorable evaluations of institutions and leaders. There were several questions related to job approval that fit into this category, as well as feeling thermometers towards leaders and institutions. For job approval, respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of how Congress was handling its job and if they approved or disapproved of their current House incumbent. Responses are coded on a four-point scale, from disapprove strongly to approve strongly. Mean approval of Congress is 2.0 and mean approval of one’s incumbent is 2.9 among African Americans. The comparable percentages among Latinos are 2.2 and 3.1. For both groups, we find that individuals are generally more approving of their own member of Congress compared to the whole institution, which is consistent with the research we discussed earlier. Respondents were also asked how good a job they felt their House incumbent does, with responses coded on a four-point scale ranging from very poor to very good. The mean perception for African Americans is 2.6, and is 2.7 among Latinos.

Since all of the approval measures are on four-point scales, we run ordered probit analyses to assess the effect of having a descriptive representative on approval of Congress and House incumbents. To determine a respondent’s feelings toward their incumbent, Congress, and government in general, we use feeling thermometers toward the incumbent Congress member, Congress, and the federal government in Washington. Responses range from 0 to 100, with
higher values indicating warmer feelings. The mean responses for African Americans are 65.1, 59.1, and 61.9, respectively. For Latinos, the mean responses are 66.9, 58.8, and 60.9, respectively. We use OLS to analyze the feeling thermometer questions.

The results for African Americans are displayed in Table 5. We find that the African-American incumbent dummy variable is statistically significant for assessments of how good a job the House incumbent is doing (p=0.003), as well as feelings toward the House incumbent (p=0.004). Having a descriptive representative increases feelings toward the House incumbent by 7.49 units, which is a fairly sizeable effect. With respect to how good the incumbent is perceived to be doing, having a descriptive representative increases the probability of the member getting the highest rating by 8.6 percentage points. However, having a descriptive representative does not increase evaluations of Congress as a whole, nor does it increase warmth towards the federal government. Among African Americans then, it appears that the effects of descriptive representation on positive evaluations only extend to the incumbent representative rather than to institutions more generally. These findings are consistent with work by Tate (2001), Gay (2002), and Banducci et al. (2004).

The results for Latinos are presented in Table 6. We find that the Latino incumbent dummy variable is statistically significant across all of our models. Thus, having a descriptive representative increases not only approval and feelings toward the incumbent member of Congress, but also to institutions as a whole. With respect to the substantive effects, having a descriptive representative increases the probability of falling into the highest level of approval by 6.9 percentage points for approval of Congress, by 19.9 percentage points for approval of the incumbent, and by 14 percentage points for perceptions that the incumbent is doing a good job. For the feeling thermometer measures, having a descriptive representative leads to a 6.62 unit
increase in feelings toward the incumbent, a 5.25 unit increase in feelings toward the federal government, and a 4.58 unit increase in feelings toward Congress. The only measure to come close to such consistent effects is age, which is significant in four models and leads to more positive evaluations.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

Based on the results of our models, we find evidence that having a descriptive representative has positive effects on a range of behaviors and attitudes among African Americans and Latinos. There are however some differences between the two groups with respect to the effects of having a descriptive representative. African Americans represented by a descriptive representative had higher levels of both political attentiveness and participation during the 2008 election relative to African Americans who were not represented by a descriptive representative. These findings dovetail nicely with research by Tate (2003), Bobo and Gilliam (1990), Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004), and Barretto (2007). For political efficacy, they were also somewhat more efficacious with respect to defending their own political opinions, though there were null effects for the other measures of efficacy and a negative effect on the external efficacy factor. These weaker results run counter to some of the findings in the literature (e.g. Bobo & Gilliam 1990) that show a positive relationship between descriptive representation and higher efficacy among African Americans, though some of this may be due to the smaller sample size for two of the measures. Finally, African Americans represented by a descriptive representative also experienced more positive evaluations of and feelings toward their House incumbent representative, though these positive effects did not extend to government institutions more generally, in line with existing research (Banducci et al. 2004; Gay 2002; Tate 2001).
For Latinos, having a descriptive representative had much weaker effects for attentiveness and participation than it did among African Americans, with effects only found for registering to vote. These findings run counter to those of Barreto et al. (2004), though our sample size is smaller than the one used in their study. That being said, we did see a boost in both internal and external efficacy for Latinos who are represented by a Latino in Congress. These findings are consistent with research by Pantoja and Segura (2003), who found lower levels of alienation among Latinos represented by a co-ethnic. Furthermore, having a descriptive representative led to positive evaluations of and warmer feelings toward one’s own representative, as well as government institutions. This pattern was therefore different from the one observed in our own study as well as in research by others for African Americans.

There are a few limitations to the existing study that are worth discussing. First, our sample size was fairly small for both groups and this was reduced even further for some of the efficacy questions. Nevertheless, the oversample data that was provided by ANES is the best sample that we were able to utilize for the purposes of this study. We also may be missing some important independent variables. For example, one’s sense of linked fate with their racial and ethnic group may be an important control variable. We chose not to include these measures because they reduced our sample size even further. However, the effects for our descriptive representative measures are similar when these measures are included in our models. Finally, for Latinos, there may be several other factors that influence our dependent variables that we did not take into account (language use, generational status, country of ancestry, etc.). We wanted to keep the models similar for both groups in this first analysis, but we will incorporate such measures in future iterations of the paper.
While understanding the link between descriptive and substantive representation is certainly one important area of study, and current scholarship has revealed many important findings on this linkage, our study has shown that the effects of descriptive representation on communities of color are significant. Descriptive representatives can affect the extent to which communities of color engage in the political system, which is a quality deemed important to democratic theorists. They can also lead to higher feelings of efficacy, which has been linked to an increase in political participation and empowerment. Finally, having a descriptive representative leads to more positive evaluations of one’s incumbent representative which arguably enhances the extent to which one feels represented in government. As we indicated above, these effects varied a bit between groups. An interesting question for future research to address would be what explains some of these differences across African Americans and Latinos.
Appendix

Figure 1. Percentage of African Americans in Congress, 1971-2012

Figure 2. Percentage of Latinos in Congress, 1971-2013
Table 1. The effects of descriptive representation on the political engagement of African Americans (oprobit, regression, probit), ANES Time Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Campaign interest (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Combo news (OLS)</th>
<th>Care house (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Discuss politics (OLS)</th>
<th>Registered (Probit)</th>
<th>Vote House (Probit)</th>
<th>Combo active (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Politically active (OLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black incumbent</td>
<td>.299* (.139)</td>
<td>.355* (.154)</td>
<td>.286* (.127)</td>
<td>-.318 (.291)</td>
<td>-.344 (.424)</td>
<td>.494* (.219)</td>
<td>.248* (.144)</td>
<td>-.098 (.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match pid</td>
<td>-.002 (.123)</td>
<td>-.356* (.141)</td>
<td>-.067 (.113)</td>
<td>.201 (.268)</td>
<td>-.148 (.394)</td>
<td>.056 (.175)</td>
<td>-.121 (.137)</td>
<td>-.022 (.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.005* (.003)</td>
<td>.007* (.003)</td>
<td>.006* (.003)</td>
<td>.005 (.007)</td>
<td>.005 (.010)</td>
<td>.012* (.005)</td>
<td>.007* (.003)</td>
<td>.044* (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.045 (.106)</td>
<td>.077 (.120)</td>
<td>-.190* (.098)</td>
<td>-.231 (.227)</td>
<td>-.074 (.325)</td>
<td>-.085 (.158)</td>
<td>-.046 (.113)</td>
<td>-.000 (.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>.091 (.112)</td>
<td>.030 (.129)</td>
<td>.026 (.105)</td>
<td>.036 (.244)</td>
<td>.263 (.366)</td>
<td>.205 (.164)</td>
<td>.176 (.121)</td>
<td>.069 (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>.101 (.135)</td>
<td>.063 (.150)</td>
<td>.240* (.124)</td>
<td>.417 (.282)</td>
<td>-.313 (.433)</td>
<td>.119 (.203)</td>
<td>-.139 (.141)</td>
<td>-.242** (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.157*** (.042)</td>
<td>.142** (.045)</td>
<td>.073* (.038)</td>
<td>.319*** (.087)</td>
<td>.167 (.137)</td>
<td>.151* (.065)</td>
<td>.285*** (.043)</td>
<td>.131*** (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<td>.543* (.232)</td>
<td>.720*** (.184)</td>
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<td>.074 (.397)</td>
<td>.360 (.340)</td>
<td>.017 (.222)</td>
<td>.093 (.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.410 (.285)</td>
<td>.514 (.344)</td>
<td>.528* (.270)</td>
<td>.177 (.658)</td>
<td>1.03 (.642)</td>
<td>-.162 (.456)</td>
<td>-.116 (.347)</td>
<td>-.031 (.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-.001 (.009)</td>
<td>.003 (.023)</td>
<td>.003 (.031)</td>
<td>.018 (.015)</td>
<td>-.002 (.011)</td>
<td>.014* (.007)</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>-.307 (.191)</td>
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<td>548</td>
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<td>.034</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.065</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>.081</td>
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 2. The effects of descriptive representation on the political engagement of Latinos (oprobit, regression, probit), ANES Time Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign interest (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Combo news (OLS)</th>
<th>Care house (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Discuss politics (OLS)</th>
<th>Registered (Probit)</th>
<th>Vote House (Probit)</th>
<th>Combo active (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Politically active (OLS)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino incumbent</td>
<td>.065 (.109)</td>
<td>-.042 (.127)</td>
<td>.013 (.102)</td>
<td>-.390* (.191)</td>
<td>.322 (.232)</td>
<td>-.104 (.198)</td>
<td>-.159 (.128)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match pid</td>
<td>.056 (.141)</td>
<td>.114 (.162)</td>
<td>.027 (.131)</td>
<td>.381 (.242)</td>
<td>-.530 (.324)</td>
<td>.025 (.252)</td>
<td>.106 (.162)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.013** (.003)</td>
<td>.014*** (.003)</td>
<td>.003 (.005)</td>
<td>.006 (.008)</td>
<td>.012* (.006)</td>
<td>.006 (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.198* (.108)</td>
<td>.297* (.124)</td>
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<td>.010 (.196)</td>
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<td>-.227* (.122)</td>
<td>.061 (.142)</td>
<td>-.142 (.115)</td>
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<td>.305 (.222)</td>
<td>.085 (.148)</td>
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<td>.099** (.036)</td>
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<td>.299** (.098)</td>
<td>.119* (.066)</td>
<td>.220*** (.143)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<td>.342 (.221)</td>
<td>.616** (.181)</td>
<td>.012 (.333)</td>
<td>1.25** (.408)</td>
<td>.895* (.362)</td>
<td>.036 (.229)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.639** (.191)</td>
<td>.332 (.222)</td>
<td>.596** (.180)</td>
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<td>.000 (.011)</td>
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<td>-.005 (.023)</td>
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<td>.043</td>
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<td>.074</td>
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<td>.098</td>
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 3. The effects of descriptive representation on the political efficacy of African Americans, ANES Time Series, OLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal Efficacy Factor 1</th>
<th>External Efficacy Factor 1</th>
<th>Defend opinion</th>
<th>External efficacy Factor 2</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black incumbent</td>
<td>-.074 (.161)</td>
<td>-.016 (.149)</td>
<td>.205+ (.135)</td>
<td>-.213* (.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match pid</td>
<td>.109 (.147)</td>
<td>.046 (.136)</td>
<td>-.069 (.124)</td>
<td>.022 (.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.003)</td>
<td>.005 (.003)</td>
<td>-.006* (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.043 (.123)</td>
<td>.260* (.114)</td>
<td>.299** (.105)</td>
<td>-.082 (.086)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>-.050 (.132)</td>
<td>.091 (.122)</td>
<td>.107 (.113)</td>
<td>.122 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>-.104 (.132)</td>
<td>-.159 (.106)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.171*** (.040)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>.152 (.236)</td>
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<td>-.210 (.204)</td>
<td>-.087 (.168)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
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<td>-.183 (.334)</td>
<td>.182 (.300)</td>
<td>.336 (.250)</td>
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<td>.004 (.011)</td>
<td>.002 (.010)</td>
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<td>.430 (.226)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>275</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>479</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>.079</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.051</td>
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, +p<.13
Table 4. The effects of descriptive representation on the political efficacy of Latinos, ANES Time Series, OLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal Efficacy Factor 1</th>
<th>External Efficacy Factor 1</th>
<th>Defend opinion</th>
<th>External efficacy Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino incumbent</td>
<td>Coef (.144)</td>
<td>Coef (.136)</td>
<td>-.001 (.110)</td>
<td>.033 (.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match pid</td>
<td>.127 (.191)</td>
<td>-.093 (.180)</td>
<td>-.061 (.140)</td>
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<td>.005 (.004)</td>
<td>-.004 (.003)</td>
<td>-.003 (.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.351* (.135)</td>
<td>.145 (.108)</td>
<td>.054 (.106)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home</td>
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<td>-.152 (.150)</td>
<td>-.188 (.124)</td>
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<td>.053 (.038)</td>
<td>-.084* (.037)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<td>.181 (.230)</td>
<td>.211 (.194)</td>
<td>.084 (.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.021 (.265)</td>
<td>.095 (.250)</td>
<td>.413* (.196)</td>
<td>.301 (.196)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.022 (.014)</td>
<td>.004 (.011)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.250 (.323)</td>
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<td>2.86 (.255)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>230</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>414</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>.120</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.043</td>
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 5. The effects of descriptive representation on evaluations of Institutions and Leaders among African Americans (oprobit, OLS), ANES Time Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Congress approve (Ordered probit)</th>
<th>House approve (Ordered probit)</th>
<th>House job (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Feelings incumbent (OLS)</th>
<th>Feelings government (OLS)</th>
<th>Feelings Congress (OLS)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black incumbent</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match pid</td>
<td>-.032 (.122)</td>
<td>.462 (.140)</td>
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<td>13.7*** (.2.65)</td>
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<td>.051 (.072)</td>
<td>.122* (.059)</td>
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<td>-.239* (.118)</td>
<td>-.171 (.111)</td>
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<td>-2.04 (2.24)</td>
<td>-2.25 (1.86)</td>
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<td>.016 (.130)</td>
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<td>5.42 (3.56)</td>
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<td>.097 (.344)</td>
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<td>9.69* (5.35)</td>
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<td>.012 (.012)</td>
<td>.010 (.011)</td>
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<td>-.981 (1.90)</td>
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<td>.052</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>.057</td>
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 6. The effects of descriptive representation evaluations of Institutions and Leaders among Latinos (oprobit, regression), ANES Time Series

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Congress approve (Ordered probit)</th>
<th>House approve (Ordered probit)</th>
<th>House job (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Feelings incumbent (OLS)</th>
<th>Feelings government (OLS)</th>
<th>Feelings Congress (OLS)</th>
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<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
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<td>Coef (S.E.)</td>
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<td>.511*** (.134)</td>
<td>.530*** (.127)</td>
<td>6.62** (.2.14)</td>
<td>5.35* (.2.27)</td>
<td>4.58* (.2.04)</td>
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<td>.815 (.171)</td>
<td>.127 (.159)</td>
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<td>5.19* (.2.85)</td>
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<td>.000 (.004)</td>
<td>.010** (.003)</td>
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<td>.162* (.071)</td>
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<td>.241 (.147)</td>
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<td>.155</td>
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***p<.01,**p<.05, *p<.10
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